

THOUGHT AND THINGS

BY THE SAME AUTHOR.

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THOUGHT AND THINGS

A Study of the Development and
Meaning of Thought

OR

GENETIC LOGIC

BY

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VOL. I

FUNCTIONAL LOGIC, OR GENETIC
: THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE



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TO HIS FRIENDS
WHO WRITE IN FRENCH
JANET, FLOURNOY, BINET,
AND TO
THE LAMENTED
TARDE AND MARILLIER
THIS BOOK
IS INSCRIBED BY THE AUTHOR
IN TESTIMONY TO THE JUST CRITICISM
AND ADEQUATE APPRECIATION HIS OTHER
BOOKS HAVE HAD
IN
FRANCE.

Τὸ καλὸν πᾶν

PREFACE

THE object and topic of the present work are sufficiently explained in the Introduction. The phrase Genetic Logic is there commented upon. I should prefer to use that phrase for the principal title; but remembering the varying meanings of the word Logic, I hesitate to do so, and adopt, at the publishers' suggestion, a title that is less severe, although, if taken literally, still sufficiently descriptive. It is "Thought" and its objects, "Things," that the work treats of; so "Thought and Things" is really my topic.

The work is in line with certain endeavours characteristic of the time. The inroad of evolution and development theories, under the general notion of geneses, upon various "preserves" of the older disciplines, is resulting in a certain obliteration of boundaries and readjustment of methods. What has been called the "longitudinal treatment" of the cargo of science is forbidding its storage in the water-tight and exclusive compartments of the good old ship of Philosophy. For a time this will seem to lead to some confusion. But the result will undoubtedly broaden and enrich both our science and our philosophy.

In this movement the problems of knowledge as such have been slow to feel the need of a new balance and equilibrium. In psychology the emotional life was involved in evolution theory by Darwin himself. Later writers have seen that the active life must be interpreted as a continuous adjustment or accommodation to the environments of nature, physical, social, and

moral. And now the movement is finding the same urgency of motive in the sphere of cognition. The first result has been the rise of certain hypotheses by which the principles of change, relativity and movement are applied to that net outcome of knowledge we call Truth; and the survival value, the pragmatic or instrumental utility, the use and consequence of thought, are taken to be, by a quick and perhaps too violent swing of the pendulum, its entire *raison d'être* and justification. There is need of a careful and detailed working out of the development of cognition: an inductive, psychological, genetic research into the actual movement of the function of knowledge. It is needed both in order to bring this part of our science into line with genetic results accruing elsewhere, and also in order to subdue and temper the extravagant first hypotheses—if they prove to be so—of the pragmatic revolutionaries.

The task is already undertaken—indeed it is under weigh. Meinong and his colleagues are developing what has become the “Austrian” tradition in favour of emphasis on form (*Gestalt*) and function—notably the function of Judgment—in opposition to content (*Inhalt*) and structure. The recent publications of this school are of great importance; I only regret that my own “copy” was in press before I had opportunity for detailed study of their researches.¹ Other contributions to the theory of objects, handling similar topics, are by Marty,² and Lipps.³ Schrader⁴ has given us an acute study of Truth and Error, and Russell⁵ has expounded and criticised the *Annahme-Theorie* of Meinong. In

¹ Besides Meinong's work, *Über Annahmen* (1902), there is the volume of collected studies, edited by Meinong, *Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie* (1904), and his latest paper, *Über die Erfahrungsgrundlagen unseres Wissens* (1906).

² “Über Annahmen,” in *Zeitsch. f. Psychologie*, Bd. 40.

³ *Bewusstsein und Gegenstände* (1905).

⁴ *Elemente der Psychologie des Urteils*, i. (1905).

⁵ “Meinong's Theory of Complexes and Assumptions,” *Mind*, 1904.

America the *Studies in Logical Theory*, edited by Dewey (1903), is a valuable contribution toward the new "clearing-up," and the functional point of view is now wide-spread. My own paper, "The Limits of Pragmatism," in the *Psychological Review*, xi., January, 1904, is an attempt to appraise certain of these tendencies.

In entering this field, therefore, I have not found myself lonely—although these works were for the most part not directly available. My own work will have what value it may be found to possess—mostly I fancy from its detailed and careful putting-through of a consciously genetic method—throughout the entire stretch of cognition from the simplest to the most developed modes. There has been, so far as I know, no other attempt to do this consistently; and there should be some fruit in the way both of criticism of views and also of constructive results in the theory of thought and reality, however inadequately the method be used by any such early explorer in this new territory.

Seeing that the entire work is not ready for immediate publication, certain general results for the theory of knowledge may be indicated here in advance. The genetic development of meanings, when carried through the pre-logical into the logical and then through what I call the hyper-logical stages of mental development, shows us the growth and restatement of certain great Dualisms of "Control"¹: Mind and Body, Subject and Object, Reality and Appearance. I find that these dualisms are of a certain first-hand and unreflective crudeness in the epochs before the rise of Judgment and Reflection, and that they cannot be finally resolved by the "practical" methods of that epoch, as is claimed by Instrumentalism or Pragmatism; that they are given refined and characteristic form when melted up and re-cast

¹ The conception of "control," which is made use of in the following pages, is to be found in the address "Selective Thinking" (1897), printed as chap. xvii. of the volume *Development and Evolution*.

in the dualism of Reflection, that of Self and Not-self, or Subject and Object. Yet Thought as such, Reflection, cannot resolve its own Dualisms ; Rationalism is as helpless before the final problem of the meaning of Reality as is the cruder Pragmatism.

It is, on the contrary, in a form of contemplation, Aesthetic in character, that the immediacy of experience constantly seeks to re-establish itself. In the highest form of such contemplation, a form which comes to itself as genuine and profound Aesthetic Experience, we find a synthesis of motives, a mode in which the strands of the earlier and diverging dualisms are merged and fused. In this experience of a fusion which is not a mixture, but which issues in a meaning of its own sort and kind, an experience whose essential character is just its unity of comprehension, consciousness has its completest and most direct and final apprehension of what reality is and means.

This first volume traces the achievements and embarrassments which motive the great dualisms of Substance and Reflection ; and even here, before the higher reaches of aesthetic meaning are traced at all, we find unmistakable indications that in the Semblant functions—those of play, mediate control, selective determination, constructive imaging—the psychic life always finds a certain resource. This is its retreat from the practical and theoretical embarrassments of a strenuous career. On the other hand, the impotence both of practice and of thinking to solve the dualisms of development in any final way also conclusively appears. Practice itself but establishes and insists upon the dualisms of “schematic” and general, and singular and universal meaning, which it cannot annul nor deny ; thought creates, and is equally powerless afterwards to annul the dualism of subject and objects of thought. The aesthetic experience is one that fulfils these contrasts while comprehending and out-living them ; and while demanding the valid satisfaction of each of the partial moments of meaning, practical, theoretical, and the rest,

brings the factors of the movement of experience to a new equilibrium and poise in a meaning of essential immediacy. This conclusion is summed up in the motto placed opposite this Preface—τὸ καλὸν πᾶν.

There is just now a movement, of which the current Pragmatism is an extreme and less important phase, toward "a-logistic" views—to adopt the word "a-logism" from M. Bergson,¹ one of the leaders of the movement in France—and the negative result of my study is in that sense. The positive result, which gives to the functions of play and art an essential rôle in the development of Knowledge and the determination of Truth, is, so far as I know, nowhere else made out.

The method of publication, and in part also that of composition, are due to the form of the *Bibliothèque de Psychologie expérimentale*, of M. Toulouse, for which the work was originally projected. It will fill three volumes of that series. It has accordingly seemed to be wise to divide the English edition also into three parts, of which this volume is the first. Its French title is *le Jugement et la Connaissance: Logique fonctionnelle*. The second, dealing with the "Genetic Theory of Thought"—that is with the discursive or "logical" functions proper—is in press for early issue. In it the development of Belief and Judgment in experience—issuing in "experimental" processes of discovery and in the Reasoning of the formal logic, together with the theory of Truth and Falsity—is worked out. The corresponding French volume is to be called *Logique expérimentale*. The third volume carrying the treatment into the "Hyper-logical" functions Aesthetic, Rational, etc., and drawing conclusions for "Real Logic" and Philosophy, will be ready, it is hoped, in about another year. In the French it will be called *le Jugement et la Réalité: Logique réel*.

In conclusion, I wish to express my cordial thanks to the

¹ Bergson, *Les Données immédiates de la conscience*.

Editor of the English "Library of Philosophy," Professor Muirhead, for the suggestions, both as to larger matters and also as to details, which I have had from him; and also to the French publisher, M. Doin, for permission to publish the English edition without waiting for the French, which has been delayed by a strike among the printers of Paris.

There is a single matter of mechanical detail to explain. I have found from experience that readers require some mode of reference more fixed and constant than the page numbers. In successive editions and in translations the page numbers are usually changed, and difficulty and confusion of reference result. I have accordingly adopted a system of reference by chapter, paragraph (§), and "section"—the last indication, that cited in my own cross-references as "sect"., being an enumeration throughout each chapter by Arabic figures (1, 2, 3, etc.), independently of the paging. As the chapters are numbered consecutively throughout each volume, the citation, for example, vol. i. chap. 2, § 6, for a larger topic, or vol. i, chap. 2, sect. 12, for a minor discussion or a quotation, will remain correct, no matter what edition of the work may be intended. If to such a citation the words of the "inset" of the particular passage referred to be added, the reference is not only exact, but also suggestive, as for instance, chap. i., sect. 4, "Logicism," in this volume.

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THOUGHT AND THINGS
A STUDY OF THE DEVELOPMENT AND
MEANING OF THOUGHT
(GENETIC LOGIC)

Introduction

PART I

WHAT GENETIC LOGIC IS: THE GENETIC SCIENCE OF LOGICAL PROCESS

Chapter I

DEFINITION OF GENETIC LOGIC

§ I. SORTS OF LOGIC

1. The term Logic has been variously used and variously abused. Possibly it would be hopeless to attempt to give it a meaning which would "go" generally; and it is no doubt wiser to leave it in its ambiguity, attempting only to indicate relatively distinct fields in which it is used, and to describe the differences and relationships of these fields by modifying adjectives. This I attempt to do in this Introduction, not trying to distinguish all the current usages, nor to justify any of them; but only to distinguish clearly certain larger provinces to each of which the term Logic is more or less appropriately applied, and so to justify the separate treatment of that one of them which the present work takes up.

It seems clear, when we survey the literature that passes in modern discussions for Logic, that certain of these larger fields of inquiry may be distinguished with more or less justification; these I shall describe under the following headings: "Formal Logic," called also "The Logician's Logic"; "Dialectical Logic," called also the "Metaphysician's Logic"; and Genetic Logic, called also "The Knower's Logic." It is the last-named of these to which the discussions of this volume are devoted; and its problem falls under two main headings, which we may further distinguish respectively as "Functional Logic" and "Real Logic," terms which are presently to be defined.

Thought and Things : Genetic Logic

§ 2. FORMAL OR EXACT LOGIC

2. The oldest and most widely recognized form of Logic is what is generally, and I think appropriately, called Formal Logic. It is the Aristotelian discipline as refined and developed by the Schoolmen. Its problem is to state the rules which govern valid reasoning, together with the classification of the errors or fallacies into which argumentation falls when these rules are violated. It is a form of exercise which begins by making certain psychological assumptions ; these assumptions made, its procedure is afterwards quite independent of psychology.

The assumptions of this type of Logic are in general two : first, that there are certain meanings or "terms," to which names are given, which are so far fixed that they do not change during the course of the argument in which they are employed. That this assumption is made is evident from the fact that among the logical errors which it is the task of this sort of Logic to describe and classify, we find a group of fallacies arising when the meaning of one or more of the terms employed has been changed in the course of the argument.

It is evident that this assumption is necessary when we remember also that many of the processes which Formal Logic recognizes as valid are processes of *substitution*. It is not possible to take up these processes for detailed criticism here ; but it may be shown that the processes whose validity depends upon the consistent meaning of the Middle Term, are processes of substitution. But the process of substitution, in all the disciplines in which it is employed—notably in Algebra—requires the maintenance of fixed and definite values in the symbols which are thus interchanged.

It is just this requirement also, I think, which is more exactly fulfilled in the newer developments of logic of this type—those called variously Exact, Symbolic, Mathematical, and Pure¹ Logic. It is one of their claims that the interest of "exactness" is fulfilled by the use of mean-

¹ My colleague, Dr. Ladd-Franklin, in her lectures on this new logical development, has adopted the term "Pure Logic" as most suitable, although that term has had somewhat varied meanings, from the Kantian use of *rein*, to the *reine Logik* of the school of Meinong (see this author's *Untersuchungen über Gegenstandstheorie*, i. § 7).

ingless symbols instead of words : symbols which, by reason of their rigid neutrality, present no temptation to the user to import into them any irrelevant connotation.

It is, therefore, a presupposition of good reasoning, in the Formal Logic, that the "term" which is the unit of all its operations, be strictly defined and be invariable.

3. The other class of suppositions, of a quasi-psychological sort, made by Formal Logic, are those which take their character from the reasoning faculty itself : those formulated in the so-called "Laws of Thought." These "Laws," as for example that of Sufficient Reason, are supposed to represent absolute requirements of the logical faculty in its operation upon all materials whatsoever. The procedure which violates these laws, or refuses to conform to them—we are told by those who work in this form of logic—is illogical and irrational.

Without stopping to discuss the various formulations of these Laws, we may simply point out that they are assumed, and that any sphere of psychical operation, or of experience generally, in which they are not operative, is, *ipso facto*, outside the pale of this form of logical inquiry.

It will appear later on, however, that there is not only a sphere of cognitive experience lying outside the application of these Laws of Thought, but that it lies also outside the range of the assumption of the fixity of logical meanings, spoken of above. And it may be well at once to go further, and say that there is really no sphere of actual experience which does lie inside either of these two

The following is Lotze's definition : " Pure or formal logic is devoted to thought in general and those universal forms and principles of thought which hold good everywhere, both in judging of reality and in weighing possibility, irrespective of any difference in the objects," *Logik*, Th. I. Denken (reine Logik), xi. (Eng. Trans. i. p. 10 f.). In the same connexion Lotze indicates the possible genetic (as contrasted with such formal or pure) treatment of reasoning in these words : " Between the combinations of ideas there is a difference of truth and untruth, and there are forms to which these combinations ought to answer, and laws which they ought to obey. It is true that we may attempt by a psychological investigation to explain the origin of this authoritative consciousness itself ; but the only standard by which the correctness of our results could be measured would be one set up by the very consciousness to be investigated. . . . The history . . . can only have the second place. . . ." (*Ibid.*, Einl. x. ; Eng. Trans., i. p. 10).

classes of assumptions. The requirements of formal logic, in either and both of these directions, are never fulfilled, and cannot be, in our concrete mental life. It is a part of the task we are now setting before us to show this as a negative result of our positive conclusions. It is sufficient to say here that such are, indeed, the limitations of formal logic—however valuable and successful it may be within its limitations—and that the sort of logic which does not make these assumptions, but attempts to treat the functions of thinking more psychologically, should be clearly distinguished from this, even if necessary by the adoption of a different name. For this reason I shall call the formal logical inquiry “the Logician’s Logic”; it is certainly not the psychologist’s logic—that is, not the science of the actual thought process as the psychologist finds it—nor is it the logic of the knower himself in his processes of acquiring and utilizing knowledge.

The formal logician is, in view of these limitations, driven to the explicit recognition of the fact that his field is the “discursive” or reasoning function as such, and the purely “formal” or universal aspect of that function.

§ 3. METAPHYSICAL LOGIC

4. Another type of disquisition which has in later times gone by the name of Logic has come from the pen of metaphysicians. It consists in the attempt, from the **Metaphysician’s Logic; consideration of the cognitive faculty, to develop Logicism.** its implications as to the nature of the thinking principle, and also as to the realities which it thinks about. So far it is identical with Real Logic as defined below. Associated with this, however, is generally an antecedent view of reality, which assumes its “logical” character as “thought,” the processes of individual thinking being manifestations of the movement or dialectic of this reality in finite and phenomenal modes. In this sense the tradition of this school of logicians reached its fulness in Hegel; by whom the processes of thought are looked upon as those of an absolute principle of “objective mind” unfolding and “coming to consciousness of itself” in the individual and in the world.

On such a view it is difficult to say what philosophical problem we may not expect to be called “logical”; and the works of the writers of this school abundantly bear out this

expectation. Accordingly this type of metaphysics has been called "Logicism"¹; we may describe it as "Dialectical Logic."

Associated with this metaphysical view which, as I have said, seeks by its treatment of the processes of thinking to bring them into the larger whole of the theory of reality, there is the type of discussion which aims at the criticism, or, in the language of Herbart, the "rectification," of the concepts of knowledge, with a view to the developing of a consistent systematic theory of the world. This also amounts to a "real logic," so far as it can be freed from Herbart's ontology of "reals"; that is so far as the reality thus reached is attained by processes which start in the actual experiences of thought. But to the extent that it makes logic an *a priori* method of determining the content of reality, it may be classed for our purposes with the view described above as Logicism. The entire series of endeavours of this sort may fairly, I think, be called "Dialectical Logic," from their fundamental impulse to solve the problems of reality and thought by a deductive or dialectical movement. Either the dialectical movement of reality is rediscovered in thought, and illustrated by it, or the dialectical movement of thought is carried over to reality. In either case, one of the terms, thought or reality, is deduced from the other. It may fairly be described also, in contrast with the other sorts of logic of our exposition, the "Metaphysician's Logic."

¹ Hegel's great work *Logik* is the extreme case. Since Hegel the tendency has been to minimize the logical, in the sense of dialectical, character of the method by finding empirical data of experience to give some content to the thought principle, and the discipline thus more nearly approximates "real logic" as defined below.

I find in Lotze an exposition in much the same terms as that of our text. He says (*Logik*, § 150; Eng. Trans., i. p. 196): "It was in no attitude of investigation and reflection . . . that the Hegelian philosophy even wished to derive the world from its single principle; it only proposed to look on and see how the development followed from the inherent impulse of the idea. And from this intellectual vision, this '*speculative*' thinking, . . . it believed itself to have found a guide in the dialectical method, a guide which enables the spectator to follow the true course of the self-realizing development. . . . I shall appropriate the antithesis between speculative and explanatory theory for the purpose of describing the final shape which we aim at giving to all thinkable matter"—this last being also the purpose of "real logic" as developed in the present work. See also his remarks on Hegel's method on p. 263 of vol. i. of the same work (Eng. trans.).

5. So far as psychology is concerned, it is plain that dialectical logic does not escape the charge of making assumptions.

Dialectical Logic imports Formalism into Psychology. Logicism proper imports into the psychic process of the thinker the constructive principles of the reality which thinking is found to exemplify. It is difficult, for example, for the logician who assumes teleological organization as an ultimate character of reality to allow that the purposive organization of the individual's thinking has its natural genesis and method in psycho-physical and social selective processes.¹ It would seem to be hard for him, although Hegel himself was in this matter more of a psychologist than are many of his followers,² to escape a formalism which, to the genetic psychologist, who aims to find out the antecedent conditions of every movement and process, is absolutism ; and it would seem that absolutism is the last thing that should be sheltered under the aegis of Logic. Such a struggle between *a priori* formalism and the demands of empirical psychology is seen in Kant's doctrine of the Schema.³

The psychologist, therefore, naturally puts in a claim for some treatment of thinking which describes it before it interprets it, which really determines its place in the growth of knowledge, instead of allowing it to determine the place of everything else. The dialectical procedure ends by distorting the processes of thinking by the very weight of the load of responsibility placed upon them. It constantly commits the genetic "fallacy of the Implicit" described under one of the "Canons of Genetic Logic" below (chap. i. § 8, sect. 27).

We are accordingly led to ask what sort of Logic can be

¹ That is, processes of the type of Darwinian natural selection. The same difficulty is felt in accounting for "design" in nature by natural selection. The tendency is to make the "end" in some sort an *antecedent* thing, a "final cause," rather than a resulting thing, a natural adaptation or survival.

The reader may consult the discussions between Prof. Bosanquet and the present writer, in the *Psychological Review*, January, July, November, 1902, and January, July, 1903, in which this point is raised *a propos* of the theory of "Selective Thinking"; also Bosanquet's discussions of "Discovery" and "Selection" under the heading "Some Accidents of Inference" in his *Logic*, vol. ii. chap. i.

² See especially Hegel's *Philos. of Mind*, where the genetic point of view is consistently maintained.

³ Kant's theory of the Schema has further mention later on (chap. viii. § 6) in connexion with the theory of "Schematic Meaning."

built up, if we confine ourselves to the same rules of observation and hypothesis as those observed in the empirical sciences generally, and especially in the correlative branches of empirical and genetic psychology.

§ 4. GENETIC AS FUNCTIONAL LOGIC

6. The problem left upon our hands, after we put aside the two types of investigation described in the foregoing pages, is fairly definite and withal extremely interesting. It includes the series of inquiries which are brought in, usually in an apologetic and incomplete way, in the introductory portions of the great logical treatises, under the heading "Psychology of the Logical Operations." I say in an incomplete way, for the author is always the judge as to what he will include in this introduction, and it is his rule to include only what he needs for the purposes of the "Logic" which follows. Moreover, as we shall see later on, the functional process, which is one of the topics of the science we are to deal with, is not treated by him, but only the results—concepts, judgments, etc.—in which the processes issue. So soon as we ask about the processes, we "run foul" of the presuppositions made respectively and differently by each of the current types of Logic spoken of.¹ It is in view of this requirement—that we take account of processes—that we raise the series of questions which go by the name of "functional" problems, and that the distinctive term, *Genetic*, comes to characterize our whole field of investigation. It is the *mode*² of *psychic function called knowledge*, together with its objects and meanings, that is explicitly the topic of Genetic Logic.

It is our duty, therefore, to ask about thinking all the great questions that science is able to ask about its objects; not only, that is, the question What? of the physical or exact sciences, but the larger series of questions included under the Why? and the How? of the sciences of development, properly called genetic. It

Questions:
What? Why?
How?—of
Thinking.

¹ Kant can speak of the thinking function only as union of sense and reason, one of which without the other is "blind" or "empty"; Hegel only as foil to the objective mind; Bosanquet only as "identity in difference"; Bradley only as making the contradictions behind which reality disappears up the infinite stairway of related terms.

² The writer's use of the term "mode" is fully explained in the following chapter.

is not possible here to justify genetic science; its existence is its sufficient justification.¹ In biological science we have a great development, in which the details of many special branches of investigation are held together, illuminated and brought into unity of meaning by the theory of evolution; and in psychology, too, the theory of development has been applied to mind, to the gain of all the mental sciences. The questions put and answered by these theories are—How? and Why?—how did this organ, this function, this faculty, arise?—and what is its purpose and function in the economy of the organized system in which we find it? These questions are to be asked of every possible process of life and mind before genetic science is to be considered complete.

7. When we ask these questions of the function of thinking, we find no less than three lines of inquiry open to us. First, **Three lines of Inquiry:** that concerning the process proper, or function, of cognition, considered as a psychic operation, distinguished from other processes and functions, by what-
1. How Thinking goes on. ever marks we are led to recognize it. This question may be put most generally in the terms, *How do we think?* It is taken up in the following pages under the headings: "*How knowledge is made*" (Parts II., III., "Genetic Theory of Knowledge," as "Functional Logic"), and "*How thinking goes on*" (Part IV., "Genetic Theory of Thought," as "Experimental Logic").

8. We may then ask a broader question, one which takes us out of the peculiar domain of psychology for its full answer into the objective sciences of life and mind, biology and sociology: a question whose answer will determine the relative position and end of the function of thinking in the progress of mind, individual, racial and anthropological. This second general question is: "*Why do we think?*" or, "*What is thinking for?*"—(1) to the thinker himself (the question of "Interest," discussed in various connexions), and (2) in our general theory (one of the problems of Real Logic).

9. Finally, the actual outcome of thinking—the thoughts in which our thinking processes typically issue—is to be investigated. The great questions of psychic Objects, their variety and nature, together with the meanings
3. What we Think about.

¹ Certain indications are, however, to be found below in § 7 of this chapter.

we attach to them, and the validity they have for life and conduct no less than for thought itself—all this is legitimate in such a scientific endeavour. The field indicated may be covered by the question in turn: "*What does thinking result in?*" Its preliminary divisions are given in the chapter (II.) entitled, *What we think about*, in which the essential stages of psychological function and of logical meaning are set forth.¹

The discipline includes then all these great inquiries, which, however, are subject to various formulations and partial statements, according to the method of exposition. The term "Experimental Logic" is applied to the operations of judgment and thinking, since we find that they are developments of an actual process of Experimentation (see "Introduction" to vol. ii.).

§ 5. GENETIC AS REAL LOGIC

10. There is still another use of the term Logic sufficiently remote from those already indicated, but sufficiently related to them, to be mentioned and recognized; and the more so, because it is involved in the thorough adoption of the genetic point of view. This usage applies the term to the movement or development of any continuing process, considered under its larger and more uniform aspects. It is interchangeable for many with the term "method," meaning general rule or principle of continuous and orderly change. We speak of the "logic" of evolution, meaning the Darwinian or Lamarckian or other general principles actually operative in the evolution of life; the "logic" of social progress, the "logic" of emotion, the "logic" of science, etc. It is clear that this usage is secondary to that which applies the term "logic" to normal and sound thinking process, inasmuch as by a natural transition it takes *the results of such process to be valid and operative in the matter thought about*.² It would seem, therefore, to be an

¹ Frequent occasion will be found to refer to the newer literature of this topic called in German *Gegenstandstheorie* (Meinong).

² It is possible, indeed, that it is this somewhat hidden shade of connotation that has led to the use of "Logicism" with the meaning given above: viz., for the identification, as in Hegel, of thought-process considered as "logic," with real movement or dialectic (this last term being a word which has acquired nearly the same two-fold reference, i.e. to a thought movement and also to a real process).

The term Logicism, it may be added, is used here with no intention of

extension, so far legitimate, of the province marked out above as one of our great questions—what do we think about?—and it has the appropriateness under our conception, to which it cannot lay claim under other conceptions, of presupposing an essentially genetic or progressive movement in the objective content or system of knowledge. The problem of such a Logic, therefore, comes up in full force in any attempt to examine and criticize the claims of the thinking function to establish or even to postulate realities as having any trans-subjective or extra-psychic¹ value. For the very assumption of psychic development under continuous rules and methods involves the progression² not only of the series of objects it constitutes, but of the cognitive processes themselves, as having some sort of real existence and movement. The question concerning the “real” or extra-psychic reference of cognition in general raises, by its very statement, the great question of the truth, validity, reality, not only of the objective, but also of the psychic as itself in some sense real. We find ourselves, therefore, landed in a genetic Epistemology, from which vistas are to be obtained over the territory of the philosophy of the real.³

disparagement ; it is the theory which assumes that the “real postulate” is in some sense a logical or thought movement. Real Logic opens the inquiry broadly into the issue of the various meanings reached by cognitive process, with respect to that larger meaning called reality : it may, or it may not, in the outcome, reach the position Logicism starts with.

¹ The term “trans-subjective” is applied to knowledge as laying claim to reach objects separate from all subjective or knowing process. I shall use “extra-psychic” for this meaning when it involves independence merely from the *individual's* psychic processes. Objects, it is clear, may be “extra-psychic” (to the individual) but not “trans-subjective” (to all individuals). It is an interesting topic of discussion as to which is the real claim of knowledge, and as to whether and when both meanings exist together—a question that Berkeley should have asked, and one that our social psychologists must of necessity ask. Our first advances upon the topic are to be found in the treatment of “Common Meanings” in chap. vii. §§ 4-9, and in vol. ii. chap. iii., the results of which give distinctive character to the entire body of doctrine in “Real Logic.”

² The term “progression” is defined in § 1 of chap. ii.

³ Epistemology in a broader and withal a more definite sense than that usually given the term. Real Logic interprets the results of functional investigation, interprets also the *meanings* claiming extra-psychic force, and then reinterprets both in a theory of final or ultimate meaning. It has somewhat the scope that Meinong gives to *Gegenstandstheorie*,

This series of topics I shall call in their *ensemble* "Real Logic," or the "Genetic Logic of Reality," and this becomes the heading of the second great division of the discipline of Genetic Logic.¹ "Real Logic" will not be confined, however, to the later developed cognition of the thought-mode,² for it has to do with the movement of all possible constructions of knowledge, **Real Logic.**

so far as these represent typical developments within the general mode of cognition. It is, therefore, in the field thus defined, and under this connotation of Real Logic, that the investigation of knowledge of whatever stage comes within our scope; and also of the relations of these stages to one another, giving in the sense explained farther below a Comparative Logic, or Morphology of Knowledge.

II. From this point of view it is important to distinguish the problem proper to real logic on the one hand from that set by the dialectical logic, and, on the other hand, from **"Real"** what is often called "Applied Logic" and **contrasted** with "Dialectical" Logic, **with "Dialectical" Logic,** methodology of science. The "metaphysician's logic," described above as "dialectical," is *speculative* or ontological, and not *explanatory*, in the sense of the antithesis made by Lotze in the sentence quoted above (sect. 4, footnote). The speculative logic of the metaphysicians makes the logical nature of reality the prius, and the actual movement of thought its vehicle and means; the explanatory logic, on the contrary, studies the actual movement of thought as instrument to a genetically built-up and evolving reality, and interprets all its meanings in their hierarchical relations and complex settings. It may find the all-inclusive and ultimate meaning of experience to be given, not in the thought-mode, but

since it must recognize all possible objection constructions (Gegenstände); but it is more definitely psychological in its "first data" (functional Logic) and deals explicitly with "meanings" in its final interpretation. See Meinong, loc. cit. i. §§ 5 ff. and iii. § 5.

¹ In his recent *Studies in Logical Theory*, Prof. John Dewey allows the claim of this last-described sort of Logic, along with his "instrumental" or pragmatic—and essentially genetic—conception of the thought function in the narrower sense. But I do not find that he justifies the step in any explicit way or develops the topic (Dewey, loc. cit. chap. i. pp. 18 ff.). Indeed except as allowing this, and also certain further problems of Real Logic, which some of the writers in the volume take up (e.g., "Valuation," "Logical Aspect of Purpose"), it would be difficult to justify the title of the volume.

² On the concept "mode," see chap. ii. § 1.

Thought and Things : Genetic Logic

in a hyper-logical, an aesthetic, or even a mystical mode of experience.

As to "applied logic," although it is a hodge-podge of inclusion and exclusion in many treatises, it has its legitimate problem: it is just that of our functional logic in its largest sense—the actual method of progress of knowledge when dealing with this or that material. In so far as the material brings out characteristic or varying phases of psychic function, in so far there arise the series of problems of Methodology of the different sciences (as for example of quantitative or a-genetic science, in physics and chemistry, and of qualitative or genetic science, in biology and psychology).¹ The functional logic should trace out each such typical mode of thought-endeavour and characterize its leading motive and interest.

So far, on the other hand, as applied logic interprets the meaning of the real-modes of phenomena (as vital, psychic, mechanical, etc.) it passes over to Real Logic—a term indeed by which it has sometimes been designated.

It remains, therefore, for "Real Logic" (1) to interpret each entire series of objective constructions in terms of the sort of real which their cognition postulates of them, and (2) to interpret all of them together in the mode of reality in which their common cognition terminates, if there be such a comprehensive mode.²

§ 6. DIVISIONS OF GENETIC LOGIC

12. I should therefore suggest some such scheme as this³—

¹ This problem is recognized in many of the systematic Logics: Wundt's *Logik*, for example, includes *Logik der Geisteswissenschaften*, *der Sozialwissenschaften*, *der Biologie*, etc.

² This leaves open the possibility that the final meaning of reality may be, if so it turns out, dualistic, pluralistic, etc. See the Preface, for an intimation of the outcome of the discussions of this work. The topic of "oral Postulation" is treated in chap. iv. of vol. ii.

³ A comparison of this scheme with that of Lotze—an author with whose temper and views the present writer has much sympathy—will show the shifting of emphasis due to the adoption of an explicitly genetic point of view. Lotze's work is in three Books, treating in order of Thought (Pure or Formal Logic), Investigation (Applied Logic or Methodology), and Knowledge (Theory of Objects Known). Our own scheme redistributes the matter of his first and second divisions (the subjects of the traditional analytic treatment), under the one topic, Knowledge (Functional Logic), which takes on new subdivisions required by

Definition of Genetic Logic

Functional Logic—

Science of the Process and Procedure of Knowledge :

- (1) General Process : Genetic Theory of Knowledge and thought (Experimental Logic).
- (2) Special Procedure: Methodology of the Sciences.

Scheme of
Division.

GENETIC LOGIC {

Real Logic—

Theory of Realities as known :

- (1) Entire body of Truths of Science.
- (2) Genetic Theory of Reality.

The further justification of these positions and also the working out of their implications follow in these pages. It is, however, only the first topic of Functional Logic (Genetic Theory of Knowledge) and the second of Real Logic (Genetic Theory of Reality) that this work sets out to treat.¹

the genetic method, and gives to his third topic great division (Real Logic).

¹ It may be worth while, however, to note that it is this sort of logic that has constituted the problem of the works in genetic science I have already published, and which justifies the inclusion of the present volume in the same broad endeavour. The (Logic of) *Development and Evolution*, the *Social and Ethical Interpretations* (Logic), and the *Methods* (Logic) and *Processes of Mental Development*—all these titles are readily turned into the one under which this work appears in its "Real" division by supplying the term Logic in each case, as is done just above. In each case the meaning of Logic is that of the "Interpretation" of a body of data considered as a *theoretical or scientific system of knowledge in a particular field*, which issues, in so far as it is valid, in a *real logic of the movement or development within that field*.

Professor Bosanquet's attempt at a "Morphology of Knowledge," in his *Logic*, is avowedly genetic, but in my view much too "morphological" or formal and too little physiological or functional to cite his own contrast (loc. cit. i. p. 2), to be really so. His attempt seems to be to find a definition of judgment which will embrace all its various forms. A danger is that such a morphology may violate one of the canons of genetic procedure—that which forbids us to read a genetic sequence or progression *backwards* (see sects. 19, 27 of this chapter), taking our mature definition with us. It lands us in all the "darkening of counsel," of which the terms "implicit" and "potential" are the hackneyed catchwords. We may choose to say that the tree is implicit in the seed, and that the fruit is potentially present in the first swell of the new bud ; but what the genetic biology seeks is the series of actual functional changes in the growth from the former to the latter in each case. The opposite pitfall is that of defining judgment as vaguely and thinly as possible, in

13. It is necessary to point out finally that the demands of the last-named investigation—that of “real logic”—involving, as has been already said, the entire sweep of the cognitive function from its earliest forms of knowing to the latest, would seem to be fulfilled only when we report upon what may be called *pre-logical* and *hyper-logical* as well as *logical* (discursive) cognitions: those forms of knowledge in which discursive reasoning function is *both not yet and also no longer present*. The “real” reference of knowledge *antedates and also outlives* that psychic treatment of mental objects which in the restricted sense we call logical. Hence we will have to investigate the “pre-logical” modes of knowledge (in Part II.), and the “hyper-logical” in their place. This, while really pertinent to “real logic,” may yet be considered as introductory and supplementary with respect to the treatment of the function of thinking as such, called “logical” in the narrower sense.

The problem of Genetic Logic is on the whole best described as the Physiology and Comparative Morphology of knowledge. If it were only the Science of the Physiology (the function) of knowledge, we might call it “Theory of Knowledge” in the accepted meaning of that phrase. But the morphology of knowledge (its forms, methods, criteria, validity, etc.) is what is distinctive to Logic; and while the term is often restricted to a particular stage, the discursive or thinking stage, of knowledge-process, there is equally a logic of the form of process at each grade of knowledge. Memory has its form, method, criteria, validity, and so has aesthetic function—to cite instances respectively before or after thinking in the genetic

order to cover everything that seems like it, instead of seeking those actual conditions or motives which pass into judgments of one or another type. The danger of this last procedure is seen in Bosanquet's theory of Inference (*Logic*, vol. ii. chap. i.), in which his definition of inference leads him to call discovery an “accident,” and not an essential of inference. This is true of established inferential sequences, but it obscures the essentially instrumental meaning of inference considered as a mode of cognition. Inference can be justified genetically only from its utility for discovery, as it is our task to show in the volume on Experimental Logic.

Professor Bosanquet's extremely able and genuinely philosophical work escapes many of the genetic fallacies (which for example the *Outlines of Metaphysics* of Professor Mackenzie does not); but it needs supplementing, even when most true and vital, with the results of a radically functional genetic investigation.

series Implicit in each case in the function of knowing its own sort of object is its peculiar form.

14. Moreover the *Comparative Morphology* has its peculiar and in a proper sense logical problems. It asks about the relation of the forms and other logical determinations of the **and Comparative Morphology of Knowledge.** several modes of cognitive process to one another and aims to make out an interpretation of the series of forms as conditioned upon functions. The logical validities of one mode are found not to be those of the next—not to hold good in the next—but to be succeeded by others through the successive reorganizations of function. There arises, therefore, a comparative logic, a theory of the successive reinterpretations of logical concepts and meanings—of the forms, categories, postulates, etc., of knowledge.


Furthermore, in such an investigation, all possible view-points—representing typical meanings—are necessarily involved; and **It investigates all Meanings.** it is the business of such a research to adjust their claims, and say what their comparative and distributive validities are. Among these the genetic is one, the ontological another, the aesthetic a third, etc. As a comparative discipline it is not allowed, for example, to separate in any final way genesis from nature, truth from worth, subjective from objective, etc. These are meanings which are to be investigated. The genesis, relationships, relative validity and scope of each are to be made out. All this adjustment of meanings, of objects of thought of all sorts and from all points of view in a systematic larger meaning, gives the body of the doctrine of what is called above Real Logic. It cannot proceed without the theory of function, nor can it discriminate in any way beforehand in favour of any one of the sets of meanings prescribed at the successive stages of development.

This is only another way of describing, as above, Real Logic as Theory of Realities as known; for Reality is a **Theory of Realities as known.** meaning in some sense attaching to or excluded from all objects of thought, and the adjustment of meanings is an interpretation of realities.

15. There will no doubt be many who refuse to follow the use of the term logic here suggested, especially among those who **Relation to traditional Logic** find it impossible to give up the tradition which confines the use of that term to the discursive operations of thinking proper, called in my comparative treatment the “logical mode.” It is never well to prejudice an

essential position by insistence upon anything so superficial as the name by which it is to be known. I am accordingly setting forth as clearly as possible the exact scope of the inquiry, that those who wish to call it Psychology, or Epistemology, or to class it with Meinong's *Gegenstandstheorie* or Lipps' investigation of *Bewusstsein und Gegenstände*,¹ may be free to do so with no fear of doing the work injustice. As to names, *chacun à son goût*. It is the body of results that is worth presenting, and in this case they seem to cut across several fields in a way that strains the connotation of any one of the terms now in use. "Genetic Theory of Logical Process" is suggested, contracted into "Genetic Logic"; but it is not the name upon which one would wish criticism focussed, but the thing named.

The following scheme of whole and parts may be read either *from up down*, as I read it, or *from down up*, as many others shown by a may prefer to read it. To the latter let the term Table. "logic" in the topmost headings simply be erased! They may then call only the traditionally-so-named parts of the entire discussion "Logic," and the rest—whatever they like!



¹ A new work by Professor Lipps, just at hand as my proofs are being passed. It shows that the general question of "Objects," *Gegenstände*, is in the air. His opening paragraph shows that he too anticipates verbal criticism from the strict "definers" of "Metaphysics," "Logic," etc.

² This diagram shows just what the limitation of logic in the traditional way implies: it singles out the "discursive" as such both as

16. This is the province, briefly described, which I am denominating, in its first division, Genetic Theory of Knowledge, and which at the level of Thought, with its reference to all the meanings of reality, fills out the discipline of Genetic Logic. It treats Thinking as a living, working principle in the world, doing the work it is meant to do, and constituting a strain in the movement of the universe of things which science and philosophy aim to understand. It is "genetic," because it does not deny nor neglect the progressive movement and development which mind and nature, in certain of their most conspicuous aspects, together show. It is, therefore, not the "Logician's Logic," nor yet the "Metaphysician's Logic"; but it is truly, and in the first place, the "Knower's Logic"—the normal operation of that function by which the knower comes into what for him is valid apprehension of the world, society, the system of things, and by which he is able so wonderfully to react upon, provide for, estimate, reason about and contemplate the things that are.

We may, in short, adopt the formulation which Lotze uses to state the problem of his section on "Knowledge"; "it is," he says, "the question how far the most complete structure of thought which all the means . . . enable us to rear, can claim to be an adequate account of that which we seem compelled to assume as the object and occasion of our ideas." (*Logic*, Eng. trans., i. p. 12.)

§ 7. AXIOMS AND POSTULATES OF GENETIC SCIENCE

17. The definition of the science that may be properly called "genetic," over against that which is, in contrast with it, *a-genetic*, precedes any more especial effort to treat psychology or logic by a distinctly genetic method. Much confusion is current in the matter, and much discussion and disagreement have resulted even among those who

**Definition of
Genetic
Science.**

functional process (sometimes, however, denying itself even so much psychology as this) and as formal process, and includes in addition only the "Applied Logic" or Methodology. See an interesting discussion in Professor Hammond's St. Louis Congress Address, *Psychological Review*, January, 1906, in which he reaches the conclusion stated in the following words (p. 15): "Logic is a discipline whose business it is to describe and systematize the formal processes of inferential thought *and* to apply them as practical principles to the body of real knowledge."

have attempted to take a functional or developmental point of view. It has accordingly been part of the present writer's endeavour in the series of books dealing with development, and explicitly in one of them,¹ to define genetic science and state its method and limitations. It would be out of place here to repeat that attempt, seeing that it is a special province—the province of the psychic process called “Cognition”—and that only, that is here under investigation. Yet the treatment of the more restricted field involves recognition of the principles that regulate all legitimate inquiry of the sort, and so much restatement is justified as may be necessary to show the general scientific ground for the canons of procedure which are to be observed in the present work.

18. Such principles have been tentatively stated in the work cited above, under the heading, “Axioms of Genetic Science”; they are formulated in four statements as follows:—²

“*First*, the phenomena of science at each higher level show a form of synthesis that is not accounted for by the formulations which are adequate for the phenomena of the next lower level. By lower and higher I mean *genetically before and after*.

“*Second*, the formulations of any lower science are not invalidated in the next higher, even in cases in which new formulations are necessary for the formal synthesis which characterizes the genetic mode of the higher.

“*Third*, the generalizations and classifications of each science, representing a particular genetic mode, are peculiar to that mode and cannot be constructed in analogy to, or *a fortiori* on the basis of, the corresponding generalizations or classifications of the lower mode.

“*Fourth*, no formula for progress from mode to mode, that is, no *strictly genetic* formula in evolution or in development, is possible except by direct observation of the facts of the series which the formulation aims to cover or by the interpretation of other series which represent the same or parallel modes.”

The illustrations and proofs of these positions given in the work from which they are quoted are drawn from biology and

¹ *Development and Evolution* (1902), pt. iii. chap. xix., “Theory of Genetic Modes.”

² *Development and Evolution*, p. 323.

history, principally from the former. The description of genetic science, however, in contrast with a-genetic science, **These held for the Mental and Moral Sciences.** worked out on the basis of these "axioms," holds for psychology and the mental and moral sciences generally with notably increased force.¹

19. This contrast is embodied in the statement, also given in the same work, of certain "postulates of method," which are to be observed in any science calling itself genetic, as follows.

"*First.* The first or negative postulate: *the logic of genesis is not expressed in convertible propositions.* Genetically, **(1) Negative Postulate.** $A = (\text{that is, becomes, for which the sign } ((\text{ is now used}) B;$ but it does not follow that $B = (\text{becomes, } ((A.)"$ ²

"*Second.* The second or positive postulate: that series of events only is truly genetic which cannot be constructed before it has happened, and which cannot be exhausted by reading backwards, after it has happened."³ **(2) Positive Postulate.**

20. The relation between what are above called respectively

¹ The point at issue really is that between the functional and structural conceptions and methods. The cross-section of a given thing, showing its structure, cannot be assumed to exhaust the later "things" into which the given thing develops. It is a corollary from the fourth axiom, to be strenuously enforced, that a genetic series seen in a *longitudinal section* from before to after, can *never* be exhaustively interpreted by the results of the analysis of a cross-section through its structure. The passage from earlier to later is itself a problem, that of functional operation. This reinstates the problem of the relation of the sciences to one another, essentially the same as that of the earlier and later psychic modes, illustrated by the diagram in sect. 4 of chap. ii. The full treatment of the work named may be referred to, and also the detailed working out of the point of view in the important case of mind and body in *The Psychological Review*, May, 1903. See also Dewey, loc. cit., chap. i. esp. pp. 16 f.

² Ibid. p. 303. See the comment also on p. 308: "Genetic Science is competent to make the reservation always, in the presence of each of the applications and explanations of exact and numerical science, that *it is a cross-section, not a longitudinal section, to which the quantitative and analytical formulas apply.* . . . It is the genetic aspect we hold in such cases that has escaped the formula." The truth of this general postulate is illustrated in psychology by the evidence cited by the group of men called the Austrian School in support of the peculiar "form-quality" (*Gestaltqualität*) attaching to each organized psychic content, which is not stateable in terms of the partial contents that have entered into the organization. See the citations given in the *Dict. of Philos.*, "Form-Quality," and cf. Höfler, *Psychologie*, p. 153.

³ Ibid. p. 311.

(1) "axioms" and (2) "postulates" is that between (1) the matter on the one hand, together with the science which deals with it, at each mode or stage as *related to other stages*—giving *axioms of inter-relation of the sciences*—and (2) the assumptions, on the other hand, of a positive sort, upon which, *within any single science* a really genetic procedure must be based.

The entire hierarchy of the sciences, arranged in a series of ascending or developmental modes, must show the truth of the axioms; namely, (1) physics and chemistry (physical sciences), as preceding (2) biology and psychology (natural sciences), these in turn as preceding (3) anthropology, sociology, history, etc. (social sciences), which finally precede (4) ethics, aesthetics, etc. (normative sciences).

When, however, a method of procedure is in question for a science which is genetic, no matter what its place in the hierarchy to which our axioms apply, the "postulates" of genetic method are to be observed.

21. These postulates, thus stated in general form, lend themselves to certain more special formulations in one or other of the sciences in which a genetic method is necessary. Such formulations are requisite in as many specific forms as one may make out to hold universally within the science in question, and their great value arises from their use for the regulation of method. The fallacies into which an investigator may readily fall, and which might otherwise prove elusive and persistent, may be detected and avoided by the strict enforcement of such formulas or *canons*, as we may call them. For our present investigation in tracing the psychic modes these canons are peculiarly valuable and also of peculiar theoretical interest, since the modes through which cognition passes issue in very remarkable variations of points of view, and these it is of the utmost importance not to confuse.

§ 8. CANONS OF GENETIC LOGIC

The following formulations are so far distinct in their meaning and requirements that they may be given separate names. Their violation issues respectively in the sorts of fallacy given with them severally.

22. (1) *Canon of Continuity* (with the fallacy of *Discon-*

tinuity): *all psychic process is continuous*. The fallacy of Discontinuity consists in the treating of any psychic event as *de novo*, or as arising in a discontinuous series: so the fallacy of the historical distinction in principle between "sense" and "reason."¹

23. (2) *Canon of Progression* (with the fallacy of *Composition*): *all psychic process is genetic, not a-genetic, expressed by the formula*
(2) *Pro-* *A becomes B whether or not it is ever true that B*
gression. *becomes A*. The fallacy of composition, "cause and effect," or the "a-genetic" fallacy, consists in treating a psychic event as compounded or made up of or caused by other psychic events: so the fallacy of treating the sensation purple as made up of the sensations blue and red, or as caused by them.²

24. (3) *Canon of Quality* (with the fallacy of *Equality*): *every psychic event is qualitatively different from, not equal to, the*
(3) *Quality.* *next antecedent and the next succeeding event and also*
from its own earlier or later case. The fallacy of Equality consists in treating any two psychic events as equal, or any one as identical with itself when repeated: so the fallacy of fixity of meaning of terms and of substitution of one experience or experiment for another.

25. (4) *Canon of Modal Relevancy* (with the fallacy of *Modal Confusion*): *no psychic event can be taken out of its*
(4) *Relevancy.* *own mode and treated as belonging in or with events*
of another mode.

The fallacy of modal confusion consists in treating an event or meaning characteristic of one mode as remaining what it was, when taken up in the synthesis of another mode: so the fallacy of taking the meaning of reality-feeling as being still the same when in the thought mode.

26. (5) *Canon of Modal Unity* (with the fallacy of *Modal Division* or of *Abstraction*); *no psychic event or meaning can be*

¹ The value of this canon is seen notably in cases of what may be called, as in biology, "divergent" lines of change: cases of a dualism of meanings springing from a single root-meaning. The temptation is, of course, to trace one term of the dualism backwards, and to say that the other is without antecedents, or is *de novo*. Our method compels us to find the motives to the rise of the divergent strands which give the dual meaning. The method has revolutionized biology and completely killed the old "discontinuity" or "special creation" theory.

² See the further remarks on cause as a-genetic category below, sect. 29 (note in this chapter).

treated as being what it is except as in the entire context of the mode in which it arises. The fallacy of Division or Abstraction consists in treating an event or meaning as a static and separable "element" or unit : so the fallacy of giving either mind or body a constant meaning apart from the correlative meaning of body or mind.

The interpretation of all contrast-meanings, such as the great dualisms of self and not-self, etc., depends upon this canon. It is a topic that is to recur. The current use of the notion of "pure experience" involves this fallacy : pure experience is an abstract meaning of the logical or reflective mode, and its postulation requires a relative context of contrast meanings, such as the organism bearing the "experience," the environment of the organism, etc.

27. (6) *Canon of Actuality* (with the fallacy of *Implication, or the Implicit, or the Potential*): *no psychic event is present unless it be actual.* The fallacy of the Implicit or (6) *Actuality.* Potential consists in treating something as implicitly or potentially present when it is not actual : so the fallacy of finding implicit logical process in the prelogical modes or a "potential" self in the impersonal modes.¹

28. (7) *Canon of Revision* (with the fallacy of *Consistency*): *no psychic event or meaning is to be treated as original or unrevised except in its first appearance, since its reappearance may be in a mode in which it is essentially revised.* The fallacy of Consistency consists in holding the psychic process to any consistency except what it shows : so the fallacy of holding reflective meanings to the reference they had before taken up in the revision of reflection.²

29. Space cannot be taken up with an adequate discussion

¹ Cf. the topic "Potentiality" in the *Dict. of Philos. and Psych. I.*

It is a corollary from this canon that correct method requires us to identify first the clear and unambiguous case, not to strive to get a "first" case, to which, by a straining of meanings, an established term may be made to apply. This canon, thus interpreted, checks the rage for the "simplification" of what in its concrete occurrence is rich with shadings of complex meaning. So, for example, is the case of the "origin of volition," which I have treated as unambiguously present in "persistent imitation" (see *Ment. Devel.* chap. xiii.).

² A corollary to this canon is that no psychic meaning is ever to be considered final. A later organization may revise the given meaning, or from the point of view of the later mode, annul it. This is suggestively seen in the way "rational meaning" is often revised and repudiated from the point of view of meanings of worth or appreciation.

of these canons in this connexion. They are stated here as canons of method, not as theoretical or argued positions. Their justification would require a discussion of functional as opposed to structural psychology, and the adjustment of the claims of genetic and analytic methods. Occasion will be taken to cite the canons and point out certain of the fallacies as our further discussions illustrate them, and in a later place the discussion of the larger issues they raise may be conducted with more profit. The illustration cited under each fallacy will make clear the meaning given to each of the axioms.¹

Canons not discussed here.

¹ The essential requirement, I take it, if one would accustom oneself to thinking in genetic terms, is that one free himself from the compulsion of the mechanical and a-genetic concept of causation. We have all been hypnotized by the thought of cause of the type of impact, transfer of energy fixed in quantity, with a formulation of effect in terms of an equation with composition of forces issuing in a resultant—as in the “parallelogram of forces.” We are told that nothing can be in the effect that is not already in the cause. All this is a partial and forced interpretation of nature. If science deals only with such causation series, then the great body of what we may in the large sense call, “conditioning,” or “sequence,” remains uninterpreted. The Adaptations, Growths, Novelties, in nature are as much in evidence to the scientific observer as are the Identities, Conservations, and Effects. Why may not the subsequent term of a sequence have something in it not already present in the antecedent term? It usually does. The causal interpretation commonly gives an abstract meaning reached by excluding certain phases or characters of the event called the effect. The genetic progression recognizes *all the characters* of the event, allows the causal interpretation as an abstraction, but attempts to reconstitute nature in the fullness of her processes of change from the mode that conditions to the richer mode—be it what it may—that succeeds. The psychology that does not do this makes a fetish of physics, and sells her birthright for a mess of pottage.

This is, I am aware, in direct opposition to recent and current attempts to make psychology a “natural” science by forcing upon it the concepts of cause, energy, etc., of physics; so Wundt’s attempt to make psychic changes move by a sort of “mental energy” from which what is truly “energy” in the proper use of the term is eviscerated; and Ostwald’s explicit connexion of psychology with the *Energetik* of physics; and Münsterberg’s handing over the data of psychic content to an “atomism” of the physical type, all the while reserving the “real life” as something whose values are not thus exhausted. I agree with Münsterberg that science of an atomistic, cause-and-effect type does not get at “real life,” but I argue a different “therefore” from that premise: not saying with him, “therefore a science of real life is impossible,” but, “therefore the science of real life—of actual psychic process in its fullness—is genetic and not atomistic.”

Chapter II

WHAT WE THINK ABOUT : PROGRESSIONS IN THE COGNITIVE MODE ¹

§ 1. GENETIC PROGRESSIONS AND PSYCHIC

1. The recent relatively novel attempts in the literature to approach the logical processes from the genetic point of view have made it clear that a good deal of close psychology is still needed in this field.² What has impressed the present writer is the lack of attempts to trace out the series of determinations of objects at the successive stages of cognitive development, and the motives in each such "progression" from one "psychic object" to the next. The term "progression" is one which I have used in a somewhat technical sense elsewhere³; it denotes a real genetic movement of growth from one mode or stage of development or evolution to another, the whole presenting a "genetic series."

2. At this point we must assume that there are genetic series. What such series are and how they differ from other series, called "a-genetic," it is the business of the theory of science to determine. The present writer has found reason for recognizing, after a detailed study of the

¹ Cf. the preliminary statement and table in the *Psychological Review*, xi. 3, May 1904, where they first appeared.

² For example, the interesting work of Adamson, *Development of Modern Philosophy*, vol. ii. Part ii. B, "The Psychology of Thinking." Another fruitful work is the *Lehrbuch der Psychologie* of E. Jodl (2 ed.).

³ The *Psychological Review*, May 1903. I use the term "psychic object" in the sense of *whatever consciousness means or intends*; that is, whatever can be in any way, shape, or manner psychically set up, presented, or aimed at. Cf. the writer's *Dict. of Philosophy*, sub verbo, and see below, chap. iii. 3, 4. In the use of the term "psychic" (meaning *to mind itself*, as contrasted with "psychological," meaning *to an observer of mind*), I am also following the *Dictionary*. The latter contrast of points of view is also made a topic of discussion below in the sections on "The Psychic and the Objective" (chap. vii. § 3), and "Reflective Meaning" (chap. xi. § 5).

subject,¹ series representing growth, progressive organization, of the type called "organic," which may be interpreted longitudinally—from "before" to "after"—with profit. Without prejudice to the "cross-section" study of a thing—a state of consciousness, let us say—whereby we determine the elements of it *as it now is*, we ask the additional question as to what we find when we take a "longitudinal section," showing the strands which are undergoing continuous change or becoming, and which are progressively organized thus or thus in each successively chosen cross-section. Assuming, at any rate, that such an investigation of mental development, as of biological, will be profitable, we may work out such progressions in the growth of cognition, having care to observe the "canons" of correct procedure laid down in Paragraph 8 of Chapter I.

3. The term "mode" is applied in these discussions to any "character" or aspect of psychic process which is sufficiently distinguishable and sufficiently persistent to be identified and traced wherever it may occur. The term is applied both to the sort of function whose progressions we may be tracing out, and also to each characteristic stage in these progressions themselves. The *thought-mode*, for example, is that stage in the development of the *cognition-mode* at which we recognize and identify "thinking."²

4. The following diagram may serve to illustrate the conceptions connoted by the terms "genetic," "progression," and "mode." The expanding cone is the developing psychic life as a whole. Its "genetic" character is indicated by the increase in size, which no single cross-section (*o*, *o'*, Fig. 1), nor series of cross-sections, can represent. For the continuous growth, as from *o* to *o'*, could not be expressed in such cross-sections, and, moreover, no simple cross-section—*without that thickness which means genetic change*—is, as a matter of fact, possible. The minimum-thick section is a conic-section, having thickness, and larger in diameter at one end than at the other; and the entire question of genetic change is raised again in the interpretation of the movement which spans this thickness.

¹ See the work *Development and Evolution* (Macmillans), chap. xix., "The Theory of Genetic Modes," and in the volume to follow on "Experimental Logic."

² A topic treated in chap. xi.

The genetic interpretation is the tracing of a distinguishable character or "mode"—e.g. *the arrow* (*,* *cognition*—through its successive typical determinations—*O*, *O'*, etc.—which are the objects successively constructed: sense-object, memory-object, etc., each itself a mode of cognition. The series of changes which condition the passing of one such object into another, and which make the order of the series what it is, is a genetic "progression." I adopt the plan of naming a progression from its later term, and use the symbol (*(* to denote such a genetic progression. For example, *A((B* is a progression




FIG. 1.—To illustrate objective (or other) Genetic Modes: see the text. If we should consider the cone to represent the entire psychic life, developing from left to right, then the Cognition-Mode would be denoted by part of the cone, say, the expanding area above of the arrow *C*.

which reads "A becomes B." Thus if we let, say, M_B denote the dualism of Mind and Body, this is then the second term of what would be called the *Mind-Body Progression*,¹ should we write out a formula of which this is the second term.

5. It is most desirable that the sign of progression should be one quite free from established connotation. For that reason

¹ For this particular case, see chap. x. below.

In the discussion of "Mind and Body" referred to (*Psychological Review*, May, 1903), the use of such symbolism is illustrated. It is not attempted throughout this work, since it would suggest needless technicality; but there is no doubt that its use would serve the ends of clearness and precision. In the article cited the symbol (*)* was used, but as the relation involved is what the formal logicians call an a-symmetrical one, I now use (*(* instead. Dr. Ladd-Franklin's symbolism (see *Dict. of*

the equality sign, =, is not available; for both its "quantitative" and also its "identical" significations are to be excluded. The terms of a progression are not identical, just so far as there is change; and they are not quantitatively equal, since the conception of mode is one of qualitative marks, not of quantity. Furthermore, it is essential that our sign should be one that does not shut us up to any exclusive interpretation of the real nature of the change or "becoming" that is involved. We must be free from all constructions drawn from the strictly a-genetic sciences in which the causal sequence is the typical one. The birth of a new mode in the psychic life is a "progression" from an earlier set of conditions, not the effect of these conditions viewed as cause; and this is equally true of any new genetic mode, just so far as the series in which it appears is really genetic at all. Of course there is always the theoretical possibility of a reduction of such a series to an a-genetic sequence, causal or other; but when that is accomplished in any case, then the sign appropriate to such a sequence is to be substituted for that of progression. Such a reduction shows either that there was no new genetic mode involved in the particular case, or that by abstraction only the static and identical elements of the progression have been taken up for formulation.¹

§ 2. PSYCHIC OBJECTS AND THEIR DETERMINATION

6. In the preliminary demarcation of the field we may ask

Philos., "Proposition") would lend itself well to our purposes, her sign for "sufficient condition" (a split V or arrow-head) answering for my "progression" sign.

¹ There is, in fact, a growing tendency to account for the formulas of all exact or a-genetic science as due to such abstraction, and to hold that there are no real identities and precise conservations in any of the change-processes of nature. Is there any strictly "reversible" series of events in nature?—a question in which many writers formulate this inquiry. Interesting applications of this conception of "mode" have been made by the lamented C. L. Herrick in recent papers in the *Psychological Review*, May 1904, p. 204, and November 1904, p. 395.

It is such requirements as these that compel also the use of the rigidly defined term "progression," instead of the loose terms "development," "change," etc. A progression is a bit of psychic progress, typical, common, and normal, which it is the business of genetic psychology to find out all about. The progression is a regular and characteristic growth, whether in individual development or in racial evolution.

two broad questions : *first*, what are the conditions determining the construction of objects at any given stage of mental development ; and *second*, what are the psychic characters of the objects thus determined at any stage. Of course the treatment of "any stage" means the treatment of "every stage," and that involves the determination of the entire continuous movement of the cognitive function, with the ranging of all the objective determinations or specifications of psychic objects in a genetic series.

In the process of bandying this question about—making it every sort of psychic object!—I have reduced certain types of inquiry to fairly definite shape for discussion. If we take the traditional series of distinctions of sorts of objects, such as Sense-objects, objects of Memory, of Thought, etc., as starting-point, we may work out the more evident characters of such **Distinction of
Questions.** objects, arrange them in their apparent genetic order, and call them, as so arranged, the series of "objective modes." We may then endeavour to work out the factors of determination for these modes in succession from the simpler to the more complex, in so doing recognizing any finer distinctions that appear, and re-arranging the genetic order as we may find ourselves led to do so. This compels us—or has done so in my own case—to trace out certain relatively independent strands of genetic change, the transformations which certain great phases of psychic process undergo, along with the changes in the objects proper. These accompanying series, in so far as they are essential aspects of what we may call the "object psychosis," are indeed necessary to a full statement of the objective progressions. I find it at least interesting, therefore, —not to make dogmatic statements as to its possible value in each case for the main problem itself—to distinguish in the actual results to which the research has led, the following phases of consciousness,¹ traced in each case along with the objects through a series of modes in turn : (1) the *controlling conditions*

¹ This description of these series was drawn up in answer to a question raised by one of my students after the table in which the results were spread out was presented on the blackboard ; I say this to avoid the suggestion that the lines of inquiry were worked out under any pre-arranged scheme. On the contrary, the different modal series, as they may be called, resulted directly from the attempt to analyze and trace out the objective determinations in their proper order.

of the determination (that is, the "control" of the object,¹ a problem having points in common with the "control" discussed by Professor Dewey)²; (2) the *motive* to each of the determinations in turn; motive in the sense of moving principle, *motus proprius* (the problem of "interest," as "practical," or "theoretical," or other), which I find of extreme importance in the later discussions as to the determination of "truth"; (3) the *function* involved in each determination (the sort of process in which the actual interest finds its vehicle, and its issue in characteristic behaviour of contents, as to distinctions, dualisms, etc.); (4) the *meaning* of the object over and above its actual objective marks (here the question of "logical meaning" is, of course, uppermost, and with it the broader problems of "individuation," the "one and the many"; and the question arises of "real reference," or the psychic meaning of "reality").³

§ 3. CERTAIN PROGRESSIONS IN THE COGNITIVE MODE

7. The conception of genetic progression having been made clear, together with its application to the psychic, we may at

¹ The notion of "control" is fully explained later on; it is that aspect of determination which appears as regulation, limitation, less intrinsic conditioning and direction, under which the essential and intrinsic psychic factors operate. "Determination," further, is a concept taken over from biology, where the term is in current use, as in the phrases "determination of evolution," "determinate and indeterminate variation," etc.; it is the setting together of all the factors which enter into a process and make it what it is. The only other term which has been suggested, to my knowledge, for this meaning is "specification" as employed by Stout; but that is broader, and I think also, as he uses it, somewhat vague. The term *Auffassung* is a German equivalent of "determination" in the writings of Schrader (e.g. *Elemente der Psychologie des Urtheils*, p. 34), though he places it in quotation marks to signalize the departure from ordinary usage (cf. Möller in *Schriften d. Gesell. f. psychol. Forschung*, p. 15).

On "determination," as used by the "exact" logician Schröder, see Keynes, *Studies in Formal Logic*, 2nd ed. p. 378.

² On the concept "control," see Dewey, *The Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of Morality*. Univ. of Chicago Decennial Publications (reprint from vol. ii., 1903). In the writings of Dewey the conception of "control" is not differentiated from that of determination nor is it indeed, I think, anywhere explicitly defined.

³ Of course many other questions might be asked about the objective consciousness, as e.g., what its emotional colouring, its conative accompaniments, etc., but these might just as well be asked in other connexions—in tracing out the progressions of feeling or conation. Here we

once point out in a preliminary way the successive progressions in the development of the cognitive function. This involves, I think, the distinction from one another of certain modes of objective determination, certain modes, so to speak, or points of emphasis, in what is a continuous movement. These may be arranged in their genetic order, for discussion in later chapters, as follows :—¹

Table
jects
Modes.

Division as to Mode.

Object.	Mode.
1. Objects of Sense { Projective. { Perceptual.	1. Sense Mode.
2. Image Objects { Memory Objects. { Fancy Objects.	2. Image Mode.
3. Make-believe Objects.	3. Play Mode.
4. Substantive Objects : Mind and Body.	4. Substantive Mode.
5. Objects of Experience : Subject and Object,	5. Subject Mode : Reflection.
6. Judged Objects. } Logical	6. Belief Mode } Logical Mode.
7. Thought Objects } Objects.	7. Predication Mode }
8. Aesthetic Objects.	8. Aesthetic Mode.
9. Moral Objects.	9. Ethical Mode.

The stage of psychic life reached by each progression, in order, is a distinguishable genetic mode, and each may be characterized by the principal mark which sets it off from the next preceding. These several modes are named in the second column of the table.

8. Again, we may distinguish these successive determinations with reference to logical criteria, assuming here for convenience the results of certain of our later detailed discussions, as follows :—

Table as to
Logical
Meanings.

are dealing with what is found to be necessary in (1) the *determination*, and (2) the *characterization* of the object *quid* object.

¹ See also the combined results of these tables given in the Table to be found in the *Psychol. Review*, May 1904. This larger table will be given in revised form in vol. iii.

² Schrader uses the equivalent terms, *Gedächtniss-* and *Phantasie-Vorstellungen* in contrast with *Wahrnehmungen* for memory and fancy-images in contrast with precepts or sense objects, in *Elemente d. Psych. d. Urteils*, p. 137.

Division as to Logical Meaning.

- | | | |
|-----|-----------------|---|
| I | Pre-logical : | { Sense Objects.
Memory Objects.
Fancy Objects. |
| II | Quasi-logical : | { Make-believe Objects.
Substantive Objects.
Objects of Experience. |
| III | Logical : | { Judged Objects.
Thought Objects. |
| IV | Hyper-logical : | Aesthetic Objects. ¹ |
| V | Extra-logical : | Moral Objects. ¹ |

9. Our further investigation leads, moreover, to another distinction, which will be found in the sequel to furnish one of the essential positions of this work, that between "real" and "semblant" objects. The classification is as follows:—

Table as
to Real
Character.

Division as to Reality Coefficient.

- | | | |
|-----|--------------------|--|
| I | Real Objects : | Sense Objects.
Memory Objects.
Substantive Objects.
Objects of Experience.
Judged Objects.
Thought Objects. |
| II | Unreal Objects : | Fancy Objects. |
| III | Semblant Objects : | ² Make-believe Objects.
Experimental Objects.
Aesthetic Objects. |

10. A brief characterization of these several objects, reached progressively in the development of the cognitive function, may be given here, to aid us in the further discussion; for the relative novelty of this manner of procedure, and of the attempt to trace out the genetic progressions, may make the inquiry seem somewhat difficult to follow. Each of these kinds of objects may be described in terms familiar to

¹ So far as these objects are not made objects of reflection or of theoretical interest; when they are so made, they are logical objects. The same is to be said of "Religious" or other objects of sentiment or conation which, even in their cognitive aspect, the present inquiry does not include nor exhaustively enumerate.

² See *Dict. of Philos. and Psych.*, art. "Semblance," for a preliminary definition of a term whose meaning has detailed exposition further on (chap. vi. and chap. viii. §§ 6, 7). By "experimental" is meant all problematical or "possible" objects.

readers of current psychology, except possibly the two sorts of "semblant objects," for which the later discussions of the play and imaging functions give the key. The summary definitions proposed are as follows; they are the results of the discussions of the work, not the preliminaries to them:—

I. Projective Object of Sense: an object simply "projected" or apprehended, without further dualistic or other distinctions than those involved in its mere presence or determination.

II. Image Object: an object having whatever to consciousness means immediate "inner" presence, or comes afterwards to mean it. It comprises both "Memory Objects" and "Fancy Objects."

III. Make-believe Object: an Image Object treated as if it had what means or comes to mean reference to reality; it is the first determination of the Semblant Object.

IV. Substantive Object: an object recognized as either Body (and not Mind) or Mind (and not Body).

V. Object of Experience: an object distinguished by the Subject as either the Self (and not Not-Self) or the Not-Self (and not Self) of its experience.

VI. Judged or Logical Object: an Object of Experience which the psychic Subject as such is aware that it is in some sense acknowledging or controlling.

VII. Aesthetic Object: an object of higher Semblance in which the dualism of inner and outer controls is annulled in a state of immediate contemplation.¹

¹ It follows from the Canon of Revision stated in sect. 28 of chap. i. that these several objects are most accurately defined when each is considered the *latest result* in turn of conscious process up to its production. It is difficult, if not impossible, to prevent a "revision" or further interpretation of a meaning after a further process has become possible; as, for example, to keep a "percept" quite free from judgment in a consciousness that is able to judge.

BOOK I
FUNCTIONAL LOGIC

PART II

GENETIC THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE :
THE PRE-LOGICAL MODES

Chapter III

PRE-LOGICAL COGNITION : HOW KNOWLEDGE
IS MADE

§ I. INTEREST AND ITS TERMINUS

1. We may approach the subject of thinking by a well-beaten path. The distinction current whereby cognition—considered a generic mode of mental function—is set off from other psychical processes, lends itself to our purposes ; for however we may differ as to the specific marks of thinking—or of its product, thought—within the general series of functions which are called cognitive, there is no one who questions that it is within this set of processes that the more limited one is properly to be included. It also enables us to avoid the discussion of the question of the origin, or of the ultimateness, of the function of cognition as a whole. For the definition of thinking requires only that we point out those stages of process of the same sort—that is, of the cognitive—which immediately condition thinking, and which by their diversity determine the varied forms which thinking takes on.

We may confine ourselves, therefore, to so much description of cognition as will enable us to locate thinking within this function, and we may then proceed to ask where, in the development of this function as a whole, the special form of it which we call thinking takes its rise. Using the term logical¹ as an adjective of the noun-meanings of thinking and thought, and so calling this function logical, we may then dis-

¹ “ Logical ” is, therefore, the adjective not to “ Logic ” in the broad meaning of this latter term, but to “ Thought. ” The “ logical process ” is the “ thinking process. ”

criminate between the logical and the pre-logical forms and stages of cognition.¹

2. It may be remarked that there is a further distinct advantage in approaching our problem in this way : the advantage of finding, by the very statement of the distinction, that the genetic treatment of the question is the only fruitful one for a functional psychology or logic. If both the logical and the pre-logical are modes or stages of cognition, then the transition from one to the other is in its nature but the development of a continuous function. Whatever new-seeming factors and elements may appear whereby we finally identify a process or a result as logical, we may still say that the continuity of the larger movement, in virtue of which both the before and after-stages are cognitive, is unbroken, and the new factors and elements are to be construed as determining conditions or ingredients in the constitution of the end-states which it is the function of cognition to realize. It may be said indeed that by this procedure we are begging certain large questions—and perhaps reaping certain unearned rewards—which only later on come into the arena of discussion : notably the question as to the uniqueness of the thought-function as such. It will appear in the sequel that this latter problem and others of like scope are matters of intrinsic interest. Yet here it may suffice to say that our assumption at this point is mainly, if not indeed exclusively, methodological. That is, it concerns the approach to the process of thinking from the point of view of developing psychic function. In so far as it succeeds, it will be its own justification, for it will have shown that the transition from pre-logical to logical cognition has in fact involved no break in continuity ; and if it fails, it will have proved, by showing the locus of such a break in continuity, when it occurs, that our original assumption was unwarranted. It is in any case a legitimate test. Indeed, it is hard to conceive a more adequate proof of the independence of “reason” or thought than that which would result from the failure of the genetic method to make good the results upon which its assumption of continuity is based.

¹ “Logical” in this restricted reference to the “logical” or thinking function (as significant for Functional Logic), bears reference also to the object or meaning of such function (as significant for Real Logic). In the latter reference, all meaning becomes logical when it is meaning to reflection or thought.

Turning, therefore, without further preliminaries, to the distinction between logical and pre-logical cognition, we find it necessary to indicate the generally-accepted marks of cognition considered as a psychic mode.

3. A recent definition of cognition makes it "the being aware of an object,"¹ which is to be understood as not simply

being affected by contact with an object, but experience² which includes in itself "the being aware" as well as the being affected. This is expressed in the literature by various terms and phrases.

"Objective experience" means experience which has objective reference, experience which means to the subject the presentation of an object; it is thus distinguished from experience which has no such reference. This is too narrow. The use of the term "objective" in contrast with "subjective" marks a distinction which comes later on; the contrast between objective and subjective is rather a distinction within the awareness of objects, "subjective" properly meaning having reference to the "subject," as "objective" means having reference to an "object." The stage or mode of experience in which there is no such contrast between subjective and objective—that is, in which there is no reference to object and subject as such, and which does not oppose these to each other—has been variously called "pure," "projective," "protoplasmic," "a-dualistic," "presentative," etc. Not raising the question as to whether there may be strictly a-cognitive or "a-noetic" consciousness, we may simply take the consciousness that *does* have objects, and examine it.³

Accepting this definition of cognition, as any sort of awareness of an object, it is necessary to outline certain further distinctions which serve mainly to mark out the territory at points

¹ *Dict. of Philos. and Psychol.*, sub verbo.

² I use the term "experience," in spite of its restriction, later on, to subject-object consciousness or reflection; for our discussions themselves are, of course, in the mode of reflection, and we are, as theorists, making the psychic state our object of thought. To the primitive consciousness itself, it is not experience, but just cognitive awareness. See below, chap. v. § 5, and chap. xi. § 1.

³ On "Objective Reference" properly understood, see the remarks in chap. v. § 5, and chap. xi. § 2. We may safely say that those who hold that consciousness always and everywhere deals with objects (see Meinong, loc. cit., p. 2; also F. Arnold, *Psycholog. Review*, July 1905), confuse the psychic point of view with the objective or psychological. We know, for example, that an oyster is irritated by an object, when he turns

at which the boundaries are somewhat obscure. I am aware that in these preliminary distinctions there is much that is debatable; but it does not appear that the essential theory of thought which follows depends vitally upon them; they are presented in the interest of clearness and precision of definition and terminology.

4. In the first place, by object here we do not at all mean merely "external" or "physical" objects. The things of the physical world are merely one class of objects with which the mind has to deal. They are indeed objects, of which the mind may become aware; but they are not the only objects of which it may become aware.

In the second place, and positively—citing the position already taken in an earlier note¹—anything that the mind can be attentively directed to is an object. While this is possibly the most general way of defining a mental object, its full implications are seen only when we characterize the act of attention by certain other modes of mental behaviour

a grain of sand into a pearl; but does his irritation, however keenly felt, give him awareness of an object? When Meinong says that the object, and even its existence is a "psychological assumption," the remark is true if we mean that it is *our* assumption. This confusion, I think, underlies Meinong's theory of assumptions (*Annahmen*) so far as the pre-logical codes of cognition are supposed to have such assumptions. The subject of "Assumption" is taken up again in vol. ii. chaps. ii., iv. "Assumption" is the rendering given *Annahme* by B. Russell.

¹ Chap. ii. sect. 1. An able discussion of the sorts of objects—"Gegenstände," "Objekten," and "Objektiven"—is that of Meinong, *Untersuchungen über Gegenstandstheorie*, 1904, chap. i., to which we have already referred. "Object" is the best rendering of the convenient general meaning which the Germans give to *Gegenstand*.

A necessary distinction of terminology is that between "object" and "content." Content has two meanings, as is explained in chap. xi. § 1; but its essential connotation is common to the two meanings. Content is the mere stuff or matter presented to consciousness, considered as stripped of the special meanings and modifications peculiar to the psychic process then going on. The content, "this bird" for example, is that visual presentation common to your perception and mine, given and so far stable, whatever further meanings we, the perceivers, may give to it. In the modes before reflection it is "content of presentation or apprehension," as distinct from object; "object" includes the meaning and intent taken with the content. In the mode of reflection, as is explained later on, the entire object, meaning and all, becomes "content of reflection." Meinong's usage (cf. also Russell on Meinong, in *Mind*, April 1904, pp. 206 ff.) is complicated by his theory of "Assumptions" (*Annahmen*).

for which the attention serves as a sort of vehicle or for which it supplies the mechanism. Thus we may say : whatever it is possible to take interest in, whatever it is possible to describe, whatever it is possible in any way to apprehend or think about, to remember, recognize, forget, consciously identify, anticipate, intend, or mean¹—any such thing is a mental object.

5. The essential thing about a mental object, it will be seen from these illustrations, is that it is in some way grasped as a distinguishable unit of presentation or meaning, and treated as a separable part of experience for the purposes of the particular interests at the time under pursuit. It is just this way of doing—this singling out of an element from among the contents of consciousness, and holding it up as having a sort of self-integrity and unit-quality for our personal ends—that is the function of cognition ; and, apart from certain discussable limiting cases, this is the whole of it. We might go on the psychological quest for the final statement of this function in its lowest terms—for its rudiment, so to speak. We might side with those who say its ultimate mark is “ distinction,” or with those who say it is “ relation ” or “ establishing of resemblances,” or “ reference to the thinking subject,” or what not. That is a fair and necessary problem of an exhaustive psychology of cognition. But for our purposes such further quest is not necessary, for we have to do not with those simplest modes of cognition before which psychic process is supposedly not cognitive at all, but with those later modes within the cognitive function at which certain specific processes appear. We may, therefore, content ourselves with pointing out the essential characters of cognition found in the stages which precede its logical exercise. In this way we may hope to establish the marks or “ criteria ” of the mode which is later on to be called “ logical.”

6. It seems fairly clear, from the explanations so far made, that there is a vital connexion of some sort between the determination of a mental object, and the general course of development within consciousness, in the progress of which the object becomes what it is. If we agree to call the predominant psychic tendency of the moment, which gives direction to the change then taking place in

An Object a Distinguishable Unit,

whatever its Rudimentary Character.

“Interest” as factor in Determination of Object.

¹ It will appear later on that we have to recognize classes of merely possible and impossible, unpresentable, absurd, and unthinkable objects.

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the contents of consciousness, the "interest"¹ of the moment, we may then ask the following general question. What is the relation between this interest and the objective data in which the interest is centred? We say it is our "interest," now and here, to buy a new hat, to run a race, to refute a calumny. By this term, in all these cases, we mean a certain direction of the course of experience through the circumscribing and contracting processes of psychic selection which take place while and because the particular interest is dominant. Or, in terms of the behaviour of the contents, it means their progressive arrangement and rearrangement toward a better realization of that which more or less adequately fulfils the interest. In the higher modes of consciousness, there is what we call "voluntary" direction of thought to an end, as seen in voluntary control of conduct, deliberate reflection upon a problem, etc.; but the same characters attach to the development of interests in those cases in which such a deliberate purpose is absent. The bee, for example, has a psychic interest in building his hive, and the dog in chasing a bird, no less than has the man in marrying a wife.

Moreover, it is not hard to reach the assurance that the sort of object which will be formed in a consciousness, now or then, depends in great measure upon the especial interest which dominates that consciousness, now or then.

The Object
Varies with
the Interest. The interest with which a bird contemplates an earth-worm is very different from that of the great naturalist who writes a book about this lowly creature. The object itself varies throughout the entire gamut of cases possible in the respective arrangements of a more restricted or a more amplified body of psychic contents. The bird's object "earth-worm" is a certain group of sense-experiences taking on a determination as an edible whole; that is, it is determined by what we may call the gustatory interest. The naturalist's earth-worm is a group of anatomical and morphological data and relationships which are determined as a biological specimen; that is, it is determined by the "scientific" interest. The same variations arise also in successive "objective" determinations within the same consciousness; the bird determines the earthworm differently when its gustatory interest is compounded with its maternal

¹ Further discussions of "Interest" are to be found in connexion with the appropriate objects (see chap. vi. § 5, chap. viii. § 9, chap. xi. § 6, and vol. ii. *in loc.*)

interest, that is, when the worm is to be carried to the nest to feed the young. So the naturalist's worm is very differently determined if perchance it prove to be an edible snail to be carried home for luncheon.

7. The questions which arise after so much information about interests and their objects has been gathered are, for our present purposes, two in number. They may be suggested by two expressions: the "terminus" of the interest, on the one hand, and the "plan of development" of the interest, on the other hand. By the "terminus" of the interest what is meant is the sort of object or meaning which is the natural fulfilment of the interest. It is a "terminus," because by the establishing of such an object the interest reaches its satisfaction and completion. By the plan of development of the interest is meant the progressive selection, arrangement, and control of the contents in consciousness, whereby in time the required object is successfully attained. In other terms, these distinctions lead us to consider, on the one hand, the object considered as lead-up-to by the interest, and on the other hand, the interest considered as leading-up-to the object.¹

8. Many efforts have been made to determine the sort of object or terminus which is earliest and simplest, and various attempts also to describe the mode of cognition which would be strictly a-dualistic or, in a figure, "protoplasmic." With reference to our present problem, it is not incumbent upon us to determine whether there is any concrete consciousness which is not at all cognitive. It will suffice to inquire into the essential cognitive experience as now defined—that which is clearly marked as such. We may then go on to inquire as to the rise and presence in it of the varying objects determined as termini of appropriate interests.

9. Current psychological discussions are fairly at one in recognizing an early stage of so-called presentative conscious-

¹ Under one or other of these headings most of the larger topics of the theory of objects will be found naturally to fall. The various chapters of this work are not explicitly arranged with a view to such a division but they will be found to have to do either with the object as determined, or with the conditions—here in a large sense called the interest—operative in determining them. The topics of the one heading are those of psychic meaning, and those of the other those of psychic function and control. The distinction has further development in the chapters on "Meaning" (chap. vii., viii., xi.).

ness at which stimulation through one or more of the senses gives experience described as "sensational." Such
 Early Cogni- tion "Pro-jective." experience is no doubt cognized; that is, it is not exhausted when we analyze out from it modes which are clearly "affective" and "conative." However we may describe them, there are by common consent crude complexities of distinction and relationship¹ in the body of our concrete sensational experience. At the same time, when we approach this mode of consciousness from the side of the later-developed and more complex forms of cognition, we find it lacking in certain well-marked characters, such as—to cite certain evident ones—the apprehension of objects as distinct from the subject, the apprehension of the self or subject as its own presented object. Admitting in a general way, therefore, that there is this mode of relatively undeveloped cognitive consciousness, or first awareness of objects, we may give it a name to serve mainly the useful purpose of freeing it from the embarrassing connotations which attach to the term "objective" later on in the individual's development. We may speak of "projective" consciousness; and the presentations which, by a sort of analysis, we abstract from the mass of sensational happenings in which they are found—as the individual himself at this stage does not—we may call "projects."²

Such projective experience we may imagine to compare with full reflective apprehension of the world of things, very much as the canvas panorama of the battle of Sedan compares with the actual drama of the event, except indeed—and the exception goes far to vitiate the analogy—that the panorama would have to be experienced *before*, rather than *after*, the experiences embodied in the actual scene, and so rid of the meanings which constitute it in a proper sense a panorama. It is the rather an unexplained and relatively unmeaning canvas. It is the presentative first appearance of the data of later experience, not the re-interpretation of the real in terms of its primitive data. It is very questionable, indeed, whether the criterion of cognition which we have decided to apply has any evident applica-

¹ It will appear in the chapter on "Individuation" (chap. viii.) how far and at what stages such terms as "distinction," "relation," etc., are legitimate here.

² These terms are familiar to readers of the writer's earlier volumes; they are preserved also in the foreign translations, and have been taken up by other writers.

tion—the criterion, namely, of elements of content so far distinguishable that appropriate modes of treating them as fulfilling present concrete interests are possible. Yet it is just the notable thing about this phase of experience, that it is capable of the further progressions which do issue in special interests determined more and again yet more definitely upon special objects.

The following vivid description of early experience, called by him “pure experience,” is from the pen of William James (*Journal of Philosophy, etc.*, Jan. 19, 1905, p. 29):

“ ‘Pure experience’ is the name which I give to the original flux of life before reflection has categorized it. Only new-born babes, and persons in semicoma from sleep, drugs, illnesses or blows can have an experience pure in the literal sense of a *that* which is not yet any definite *what*, tho’ ready to be all sorts of whats ; full both of oneness and of manyness, but in respects that don’t appear ; changing throughout, yet so confusedly that its phases interpenetrate, and no points, either of distinction or of identity, can be caught. Pure experience in this state is but another name for feeling or sensation. But the flux of it no sooner comes than it tends to fill itself with emphases, and these to become identified and fixed and abstracted ; so that experience now flows as if shot through with adjectives and nouns and prepositions and conjunctions. Its purity is only a relative term, meaning the proportional amount of sensation which it still embodies.

“Far back as we go, the flux, both as a whole and in its parts, is that of things conjunct and separated. The great continua of time, space and the self envelope everything, betwixt them, and flow together without interfering. The things that they envelope come as separate in some ways and as continuous in others. Some sensations coalesce with some ideas, and others are irreconcilable. Qualities compenetrates one space, or exclude each other from it. They cling together persistently in groups that move as units, or else they separate. Their changes are abrupt or discontinuous ; and their kinds resemble or differ ; and, as they do so, fall into either even or irregular series.

“In all this the continuities and the discontinuities are absolutely co-ordinate matters of immediate feeling. The conjunctions are as primordial elements of ‘fact’ as are the distinctions and disjunctions. In the same act by which I feel that this passing minute is a new pulse of my life, I feel that the old

life continues into it, and the feeling of continuance in no wise jars upon the simultaneous feeling of a novelty. They, too, comprehend harmoniously. Prepositions, copulas, and conjunctions, 'is,' 'isn't,' 'then,' 'before,' 'in,' 'on,' 'beside,' 'between,' 'next,' 'like,' 'unlike,' 'as,' 'but,' flower out of the stream of pure existence, the stream of concretes or the sensational stream, as naturally as nouns and adjectives do, and they melt into it again as fluidly when we apply them to the new portion of the stream."

10. The earliest determinations in the life of the child of what we may, in a psychic sense, call interests, are clearly the outcome of native and largely organic needs. We observe the infant lying on his back, taking in with serene neutrality the panorama of projective experience as it floats before him—light and shade, touch and sound, you, me, and it. All is neutral so long as nothing touches upon his appetites, instincts, native propensities, and organic susceptibilities. But as soon as something does so touch him, there is then a change; some element of experience at once stands out from the neutral panoramic movement, and is found to be fulfilling, stimulating, embodying, and determining of his interest. What takes place seems to be only the striking event whereby something, whatever it be, is taken out of its neutral setting and given some of that sort of meaning and value which attach to objects of interest.

Early Interests
largely fulfil
Organic
Needs.

§ 2. FACTORS IN THE DETERMINATION OF SENSE-OBJECTS

11. The description given above of the "projective" type of experience is sufficient for our present purposes; the most striking phases of such experience are those which have only negative description from the point of view of the higher development of reflective consciousness. These negative aspects may be put together under the one broad characterization that such consciousness seems to lack dualisms. It has no depth nor polarity. It is innocent of the distinction between what is in consciousness and what is external to it (the dualism of "inner and outer"), of the distinction of the subject that thinks and the things it thinks about (the dualism of "subject and object"), of the distinction between one thinker and another (the dualism of "self and other-self"—"ego and alter"). In discussing it we may, without further ado, rule out all such complications, seeing that the factors

A-dualistic
Conscious-
ness.

which enter into the determination of projective interests, on the one hand, and of "projects," on the other hand, are to be found in two groups, i.e. those of the sort immediately psychic, largely preliminary to the determination of the object, and those which are in some sense foreign to the psychic—those which come to be extra-psychic.

The Psychic
and the
"Foreign."

In what sense and with what meaning the last-named factor enters, it is a part of our present problem to inquire ; it may be that the predicate "foreign" is one we have no right to use at all, for to be foreign to it would already, in some sort, involve some sort of dualism between the psychic and something else.

12. If, recognizing this point, we attempt to preserve the psychic standpoint strictly, we may say, I think, that there is in such a consciousness the awareness of the ways in which its experiences are progressively grouped. As outsiders we should assume the nervous organism ready for certain active responses, but as insiders we are shut up to just the panorama of psychic change. It is our task to make out the changes as they issue in this or that object, fulfilling its corresponding interest in this as distinguished from that, and these from those other progressive changes which do not issue in objects at all. Pursuing such a method, we find it possible to make out certain stages of psychic progression in the projective mode.

Original
Grouping of
Contents.

(1) The case of *maximum detachment, bareness*, and as consciousness develops, *unfamiliarity*, of the experience. To developed thought the term "novelty" is the appropriate one for all these marks ; but novelty means nothing as a characterization unless we are able to indicate just the aspect in which novelty consists. The writer is inclined to think that it consists, in the projective consciousness, in the maximum detachment of a content from other contents, which is the same as maximum bareness or lack of meaning.

Types of Pro-
gression in
A-dualistic
Conscious-
ness.

(2) The case of *minimum detachment or isolation*, in other terms, *of most meaning*.

(3) Cases of all grades between the two extremes : that is, *of more or less connectedness with other experiences, greater or less meaning and relationship, more or less familiarity*.

From the statement of these three cases—provided the terms used make them passably clear—a certain scale of values

A Scale of
Degrees of
"Complica-
tion" in a
"Context."

appears, having (1) at one end, cases in which the determination of the sort of objects we are dealing with appears almost entirely *a matter of pre-existing or reinstated elements of conscious content, which have through their recurrence become involved to some extent in a progressive movement*; and (2) at the other end, elements which are *novel in the sense of not having been in any degree thus incorporated in the texture of consciousness, nor assimilated to the patterns of it*. Between lie all the transition values. Let us call this fact of relative attachment and detachment *complication*, and the complicated objective "texture" a "context." These terms will acquire greater connotation as we proceed.¹

We may now go a step farther, still preserving the psychic point of view, and attempt to determine what it is that constitutes this difference between the two cases at the two ends of the scale. What is it that makes a content less detached, more connected and familiar? Evidently some integration or "complication" with other elements in an organized "context" or progressively developing texture. Here we find again a two-fold determination.

13. I. The new item "hangs-together" with other items²; takes its place in a context consisting either (1) of material following upon conative-affective processes, on the one hand, or (2) of contents shifting among themselves without such preliminary processes. This difference is a very real one. We are justified, I think, in saying that consciousness has a very different colouring in two such cases for example as these: the one in which an appetite has led to a train of movement sensations, after which the object of the appetite is attained; and the other in which there is the perception of the movement of a ball through a series of positions, as it bounds about the

Two Cases of
Complication

Active Processes
(1) Prominent and (2) not Prominent.

¹ "Complication" has been used by Wundt for the relatively unfused union, in a sense-object, of elements *from different senses*. This usage has little currency; and it is only a broadening of the term to make it denote the fact of *connectedness* in general in early cognitions. "Texture," or "make-up," is about what the German *Besiehn* means—ordinarily translated "subsistence" when used in contrast with *Existence*.

² Meinong, loc. cit., pp. 6, 12, uses the term *Zusammenhang* to describe the essential mark of an *Objectiv*, which is distinguished in his terminology from an *Objekt* by what in the higher modes (in *Gegenstände höherer Ordnung*) becomes relational character. Herbart's use of the term *Zusammen* as a substantive may also be recalled.

room. In the former case, the object is determined as terminus or satisfaction of the conative processes which envelop or lead up to it. They furnish the context, the means of selection, the leading factor in the determination of the object as what it is. It is these already-present active trains—movement series, appetitive and impulsive processes, etc.—which are the selective and assimilative elements of the complication. This has been much dwelt upon in recent discussion, notably in the higher cases of De- modes of object consciousness. It has been argued with emphasis that the active processes,¹ those constituting or developing an interest, are or may be those which determine the object as such to the thinker. We have here in the “projective” stage, the analogous fact that active or conative processes, being the medium of interest, may in a measure determine the psychic object.

14. It would seem, however, that this is not at all an exhaustive statement. The object is not, as to its content, exhausted by the statement of the active, dispositional,² processes which it stimulates, and which in turn select it. If such were indeed the case, there would be no possibility of experiences of unfulfilled and dissatisfied conation. The actual experience of such unfulfilled and impelling dispositions is in itself witness to the absence then and there of what is after all the kernel of the object. This appears in two very strongly marked experiences: that of the absence of the satisfying, and that of the presence of the unsatisfying.

15. In the absence of the satisfying, the active processes, experienced as sensations of lack, restlessness, and discomfort,

¹ Called variously “interest” (Stout), developing purpose” (Royce), “motor elements” (Baldwin).

² Although the general term interest is used on an earlier page for this factor in objective determination, still I think at this level of psychic development the word “disposition” is a better one, mainly for the negative reason that it is at this lower level that the use of the term “interest” to include native and appetitive tendencies, so largely organic in character, becomes somewhat strained. “Disposition” is used as defined by Stout-Baldwin in the *Dictionary of Philos.*; it is “an effect of previous mental process, or an element of original endowment, capable of entering as a co-operating factor into subsequent mental process”; of which it is said: “On the mental side, the characteristic thing about disposition is its preparatory influence in the determination of subsequent states of mind”—the matter under discussion in the text.

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do not themselves take on the form of the appropriate object. They may do so, it is true, when we reach the **Case of Unfulfilled Dispositions.** mode of the determination of memory objects as such, that is, when the further function of imaging suggests a vicarious presentative object-scheme; but in the case of early projective consciousness, the active processes may simply fill consciousness with feelings of lack and unfulfilled want. Memory images may indeed, when aroused, only serve to emphasize the absence of sense-reality.

In the other case, that of an unwelcome presence, the opposition and conflict of conative with presentative or sensation-
Case of Intrusion of an Unwelcome Object. al processes testifies to the impossibility of accounting for the object entirely in terms of the dispositions which contribute to determine it. The very marks which make an experience an object may be those which excite an attitude of revolt or rejection, and lead to disorganization of the presented context. Just for this reason the object is an *object—something to object to or avoid*. The determining factors always include active processes: without them the experience would remain detached and relatively unorganized, and in so far not an object; but so far from being constituted solely by the active processes, the data may inhibit and embarrass them, and prevent the development of the complicated context which is appropriate. This case is very fruitful for the development in consciousness of further modes of object determination, as appears below¹; here it is cited merely to show the falsity of the view that active processes may entirely determine the object.

¹ In the writings of Dewey and his colleagues (*Studies in Logical Theory*) the case made much of is that of embarrassment and confusion, due to failure of habitual dispositional processes to establish themselves; this is made the starting-point of all new constructions, which come as the establishment of new equilibrium after these crises. But I am pointing out the further case that often such embarrassment or disintegration is not the extreme case; for it often happens that a new and unwelcome object simply forces itself upon us. It is not content with knocking down our fortifications and necessitating our building new ones; it rides full-armed through our walls, and compels its recognition in certain of its characters, *for what it is*—say, for example, a round stone which a child takes for an apple and attempts to bite. As will appear, however, the most fruitful case is not that of extreme embarrassment, but that of only so much relative difficulty and partial novelty as to lead to hypothetical meaning with experimental testing (see the treatment of this in chap. vi. § 4, chap. viii. §§ 6 ff., and vol. ii. chap. iv.).

16. The second instance in the larger division made above—that of a series of relatively pure presentative data, as of the successive positions of a moving ball—gives this last point emphatic reinforcement. The object in such a case appears to secure a very fair objective determination and contextual setting, spacial and other, without the intervention of specific dispositional factors beyond those of the adjustment of the sense organs brought into play. The interest aroused is that of attentive observation, but this has the appearance of following in the wake of the successive determinations. It would be difficult to say that the terms of the series were determined by eye-movements and other active processes, or by interest, however defined. Yet the ball is determined as a series of definitely placed objects; in each position in which it comes to rest it is a distinguishable and distinguished objective content.

We have therefore, even from the strictly psychic point of view, to draw a distinction between *the interest and the datum* in each of the two cases mentioned, both of which illustrate objects of some connexion, assimilation, and familiarity.

II. Coming to experiences of the other type mentioned above—experiences of the relatively detached, unassimilated, and unfamiliar—what shall be said of them?

17. It is, of course, difficult to describe, from the psychic point of view, that which by definition is for consciousness detached. The description is perforce negative; yet the negative aspect is that which becomes of importance in our further discussions. We find that such an experience, while with little significance with reference to meaning, is most significant with reference to function.

An experience of this sort calls up at once a throng of affective-conative elements, a mass of kinaesthetic stuff, *arising as if to give it a context*, and reduce it to the plan of an established order. The new object (a blotch of paint) is treated as if it were an old one (an orange). Even if it remains quite unrelated and detached, it is nevertheless so grasped and embraced in an apperceiving mass of these kinaesthetic contents, that on its further occurrence it is set in a positive context, supplied by the reflex, trial-and-error, and other reducing processes. It may be a context of unpleasant tone, of restlessness and dissatisfaction, or the reverse. But the deciding factor in determining the sort of context seems to be the objective data themselves. The

sense-nucleus is such or such, and the psychic process must become such and such, to give it place and part in future psychic development.

If this be true, this case also falls, as to its determination, with those mentioned just above. It is not exclusively, nor in any great degree, the previously determined stream of elements, conative and other, to which the form of determination of the object is due. They supply, of course, the material of the surrounding context. But the actual determination of the object, as this object or that, this visual thing, that auditory thing, is that which the sense experience now coming in, with its stark and brutal demand, makes possible and necessary. Round it consciousness hastens to throw the glamour of familiarity; and the developing complexities go on to constitute the sense-object one of perception, a percept, a separate "thing."¹

There are indeed wide variations here and exceptional cases—cases of extremely strong suggestion and of actual illusion—but the regular case is that of a *visual object determined through visual sensation, an auditory object through auditory sensation, a taste object through taste sensation*, etc., each enmeshed so far as may be to a context of ready-made and familiar complication.

18. If we were writing out an exhaustive psychology of developed sense-objects called percepts, many additional things should, of course, be said. But our problem is the restricted one of determination, that is, of finding what the character of the percept as being this or that, and not another, consists in. And we find that, whether the moment of psychic drift, dispositional tendency, conative urgency, may set in this direction or in that, the resulting object is after all moored to a peg, held to a sense-process and term, *because of which the object is this and no other*. Give the calf rope—let this rope comprise strands of memory, association, selective interest, social suggestion, and other directive psychic motives—yet when all its coils have been unwound, the calf must feel the final

¹ Even novelty gets meaning only by being a case of least familiarity. The present writer had in childhood a recurring dream—a great, shapeless, gray, rolling, indescribable *somewhat*, advancing to engulf and destroy. It has remained to him the type of absolute mystery and novelty: compared with *it*—it remains simply *it* and always a new "it"—all ordinary novelties are indeed familiar.

tug and hold-up of attachment to this central sense-peg. The control is from the stimulating, intruding novel something that effects a new equilibrium and contributes elements to the enlarging context. When this is not so—when the dispositional or interest factor fairly prevails—then we have a new departure and a dawning dualism, which is matter of later study. The objects which do detach themselves, the calves that do break the rope, congregate in a sphere—that of images and fancies—which have other control and other determination than those of objects of sense.

This would seem to be the result from the psychic point of view ; that which declines to consider any facts but the actual movement of elements in the consciousness which is having the experience. When, indeed, we take the psychological or objective point of view, and bring in all that we know of the organic and physical processes concerned, the truth of this conclusion is overwhelmingly established.

§ 3. PSYCHONOMIC¹ CONDITIONS OF THE DETERMINATION OF SENSE OBJECTS

19. As soon as we take the objective point of view, that of the scientific observer of mind and the organism, we find that the very mechanism of sensation and action sets strict limits to the object-making function. We find a given sense-stimulation setting up a specific quality of sense-experience. Connected in many cases with this there are the congenitally active muscular, organic, and other processes which carry out the induced reaction. All instinctive reactions have relatively fixed channels of muscular discharge, stimulated by definite sorts of external conditions. The native appetites consist of localized reflexes brought into play by appropriate stimulation. In short, the conative, and in general the active or dispositional sense experiences which we have found to cluster about the sense nucleus in objects of perception, are of very definite character ; they are such as are fitted to fix, hold and regain, or to diminish, expel and avoid, certain sorts of stimulation. The stimuli them-

¹ Conditions "nomic" (*limiting or controlling*) to the psychic ; cf. *Dict. of Philos.*, art. "Force and Condition." This distinction is enforced under the same terminology in *Social and Eth. Interp.*, 3rd ed., Introd., and in *Develop. and Evolution*, chap. i. § 2.

selves, on the other hand, are those which in the economy of organic evolution are suited to stimulate sense processes appropriate to the environing conditions. The con-
There is always an appropriate Sensori-Motor Apparatus. text, meaning, psychic complication of a sensation is what it is because the apparatus has been moulded and adapted to just the stimulation which will excite these and no other sensory and motor processes. The whole is a circuit or arc of processes, giving in each case the psychic content which turns out in the event to be most useful. Historically and functionally the stimulus is the initial, stable, and determining term.¹

20. In the case, further, of stimulations which do not arouse such definitely established responses, the kernel of the objectifying process is still to be found in the sensation. The
Kernel is always the Sensation Process of Trial and Error. processes of accommodation to the new are, as has been made plain in recent discussion, those of motor response of a widely diffused and excessive character, by which such active adjustments are gradually effected as the present sense situation demands or will tolerate. It is a process of trial and error. But it is the active adjustment process which is the variable, selected, and reducible factor—not the sense content. The content is just the stable, persisting, again-and-again-repeatable thing, representing the recurring impacts of the given stimulus from the outside world. From the point of view of accommodation, both mental and physiological, the novel stimulus is an intrusion, coming in to disturb and embarrass the flow of psychic process. It is the business of the organism, through the mechanism of accommodation, to meet the demand for a construction—an objective thing—which will be a “safe and sane” reading of this fixed and recurring system.

21. For example, the spacial character of sense objects may be cited. Stimulations from the extended object give a certain
Example: Spacial Character of Sense Objects. order of sense impressions. The organism has in time evolved apparatus, the retina and the skin, which report differences of position, arrangement, and spacial extent. This has gone on *pari passu* with the parallel development of a muscular apparatus for adjusting the organ to this character in the stimulation. The result is an active process of dealing with spacial objects—anticipating, avoiding, measuring, etc., on the occurrence of the signals given

¹ This has been argued in detail in discussing the theory of organic accommodation by the present writer in *Mental Development : Methods and Processes*, chap. vii.

by the stimulations of light and contact. The stable factor has been all along the light and contact ; the sense organs of sight and touch have become of necessity about as fixed in function, giving relatively definite conscious states, with the least possible variation, when the organs are exposed to stimulation. The variable and adjustable factor, that by which the organism as a whole gets its life processes accommodated to the stimulations, is that of reaction, muscular and other.

It is accordingly quite evident that *it is the stimulation, not the response, that remains the controlling factor in the construction of sense objects*, so far as its space attribute is concerned ; and a similar inquiry would show the same of the other objective determinations, such as time-position, relative individuality, etc., which characterize sense-objects of the more developed perceptual grade.

§ 4. CONCLUSION ON SENSE OBJECTS

22. Combining the results of both points of view—while considering the psychic primary, however—we may say that the sense object is not determined, either entirely or largely, by the psychic dispositional process. The disposition and interest in this mode are for consciousness a mass of affective-conative processes of the reflex and kinaesthetic order. They are part of the made-up sense content, but they give it certain aspects only of its determination : its connectedness, its familiarity, its character as being a context. But there is always a sense residuum or datum. In so far as the felt conations surge in advance of the object's real presence, they are without terminus, except in a consciousness so far advanced as to have memory images of earlier objects, satisfying to the conation—a matter to be considered later on. Typical cases of the failure of native dispositions to constitute their own objects, despite their real psychic value, are seen in the restlessness, discomfort, and actual organic stimulation, characteristic of adolescence. Here there is the craving for satisfaction of unused impulses and instincts, which are and may remain lacking in definite content or objective fulfilment.

§ 5. FIRST DETERMINATION OF PERSONAL OBJECTS

23. It is important to note, moreover, that even in the constructions of projective sense objects a distinction in the con-

tent is already beginning to crystallize : that which afterwards becomes the distinction between persons and things. Experiences of this order take form as *person projects* or *thing projects*, according as their character is this or that. I have elsewhere gone into the ground of this early distinction in detail, the important fact being, I think, the essentially capricious behaviour of persons, and the difficulty of reducing them to the type of the regular series to which the dead things of the environment lend themselves. The fact of personality-suggestion is of extreme importance in the development of the "self-mode," to which we are to return later on.¹ Here we have to note the first beginnings of the setting off of certain contents as peculiar and difficult to read, by reason of their variability and apparent lawlessness. The child's personality is itself not yet formed ; he cannot read other persons as centres of experience, in any full sense. They are singular, and so far refractory to regular modes of treatment. At this stage a person is, from the psychic point of view, simply the source of novel, very interesting, very vital and pungent experiences. Yet it is just these values—realized in those satisfactions of his needs, ministrations to his pleasures, reliefs from his pains, etc., which the presence of persons generally brings—that reinforce the child's sense of the peculiar independence and aloofness of persons from him, and also from the impersonal objects about him. As soon as we come, moreover, explicitly into the memory mode, into which the experiences of perception insensibly shade, these characters stand out in high relief.

24. In other respects, however, persons are sense objects as long as consciousness is entirely or mainly in the sense mode. They have stimulating quality, compelling quality, contextual quality, persisting quality, and the rest. The child finds in persons, indeed, more than customary intrusiveness, stubbornness, and resistance, a matter made more clear and emphatic in our later discussions.

Otherwise
Persons are
Sense Objects.

§ 6. PRE-LOGICAL CONTROL

25. The general conditions of determination, at this early

¹ See chap. viii. § 9, on "Personal Individuation" for literary citations. The determination of the self, considered as progressive objection mode, is considered in chap. v.. chap. vi. § 6, chap. viii. § 9, chap. x. §§ 2 ff., and chap. xi. § 3.

stage of knowledge, may be summarized under the notion of "control." By control is meant in general the checking, limiting, regulation of the constructive processes. Evidently it is bound up intimately with positive determination. Often, however, the idea of regulation must have separate discussion, albeit the conditions be, in contrast with determination, largely negative ; and by putting separately the question of control we find it possible to make distinctions of some genetic importance.¹

As to the control in the construction of sense objects, the evident thing to be noticed follows from the negative statement that the psychic process is a-dualistic. To a consciousness where all is simply panoramic change, the passage from one state of apprehension to another is simply a fact. All is mere presence. The psychic process is self-contained, or "autonomic." The limitations, points of contact and retreat of the function, as a whole, upon a foreign obstruction, would appear only in those aspects of certain experiences whereby they became more dominant, stubborn, persisting, and detached than others. This is, indeed, just the psychic character of a sense object itself ; and we have seen that apart from the object's mere presence and relative detachment, no line of psychic distinction is possible. We may, indeed, go over to the observer's point of view, and say that the function is controlled by external things, by nervous processes, etc.—in a large sense by the "environment"—and that the control is in this case "heteronomic" and physical. In its own place and meaning this is true and worth pointing out. But if the mode of control is to become at any time psychic, it is most important to find out, if we can, just those aspects of the earliest objective determinations which are germinal or

¹ The distinction already made (above, § 3 of this chapter) as to what is essential or intrinsic, as contrasted with what is conditioning, limiting, controlling, has indicated the control problem which we are now isolating. I shall employ a development of the terminology already employed in the works cited, where the affix "nomic" denotes the relation of limitation or control (as in "bionomic," "psychonomic," etc.), adopting also the terms "heteronomic," "autonomic," "a-nomic," etc., as appears in the later discussions. In stating the general problem of control as such I may cite, besides the paper by Professor Dewey mentioned above, a notable article by Professor A. W. Moore in the same series (Univ. of Chicago Decennial Publications), entitled "Existence, Meaning, and Reality."

genetic to distinctions of control later on in the psychic development. Such later distinctions are indeed to be most clear-cut and genuine ones; all the meaning attaching to experiences of "voluntary," of "non-voluntary" and "in-voluntary," of "resisting" and "yielding," of "easy" and "difficult" process—distinctions themselves conditioning yet others—all these are to have their genesis.

26. The beginnings of a psychic control mode are to be found, I think, in the character already pointed out as possible in the projective consciousness: in the one genuine distinction present, namely, that of *relative detachment and novelty*. The development of an act of cognitive construction is by the reduction of what is relatively detached, and its accomplishment is in some degree the presence of psychic control. The variations already pointed out in this process, indeed, condition the rise of certain dualisms, and in these progressions different control signs or "co-efficients" become attached to the dominant experiences involved.¹

In the light of what has been already said in this chapter, the distinction of possible control co-efficients must reside in the relative value, in a given determination, of the two great factors involved: the mass of moving dispositions, representing the psychic drift and context, on the one hand, and the projective content-item, the datum of sense, on the other hand. We have found in this antithesis the final source of variation in the flow of the constructive function itself. The high tide of disposition—as appetite, conation, affection, or mere facility of habit—carries forward the function in relatively easy, flowing, "autonomic" psychic process. It is autonomic or self-controlled in the nega-

¹ It will at once serve our purpose, and also connect this topic fruitfully with a discussion familiar to many readers, to call these characters whereby control values arise "co-efficients." A co-efficient is a sign, mark, characteristic toning of any kind which makes a content or object, in a given sense or meaning, or for a given purpose, distinctive. The term "sign" is used in about the same sense in the theories of "temporal signs" and "local signs."

The co-efficients of control turn out later to be the "co-efficients of reality"; and it is well to state that in the determination of these we are really entering upon the discussion of the earliest form of the consciousness of reality, that which we call physical (cf. the writer's *Handbook of Psychol., Feeling and Will*, chap. vii., where the conception of co-efficient is worked out and the word employed).

tive sense of being undisturbed and facile. But over against this comes the case of obstruction, lack of reduction, limitation, embarrassment arising from the continued detachment and stubbornness of the sensation-content which we are calling the "datum." The "that" will not become a "what." And it is in this greater or less self-emphasis, this actual refractoriness, that the "that" becomes *for the process itself* a sort of contrast presence, of which *just this character is the co-efficient of regulation or control*. It is the conscious reflection of what appears objectively "heteronomic." In so far as all cognitive process in the sense-mode has this factor—and we have argued that it has—in so far there is a dual control co-efficient, accounting for the variations in the facility or difficulty of the function itself, and showing the scale of values described in detail above. In the extreme case of ungratified appetite, there is a sense of the lack of just that foreign something whose presence would finally control and fulfil the appetite. In the case of an unwelcome presence the control is there arousing the I-can't-get-away attitude. In the case of the agreeably familiar and welcome, it is the operation of autonomic sense-process in the production of the object, when no jar or hindrance comes to rouse the incipient dualism of controls.

Sense Datum
as Control
Factor.

27. Now it is by the development of these co-efficients, considered as marks of great masses of contents, that we will find subsequent psychic dualisms arising. This is to be depicted in detail later on. Yet here let us observe that it is a segregation of the unmanageable, the "stand-pat," the hold-me-to-it, the "heteronomic," that *yields the physical world, the first form of the external that is reached*. It comes as resistance sensations through one sense, as visual sensations through another, and so on, whatever we find in each case. The essential thing is this control co-efficient. It dominates or controls the construction of the object of sense; it is a limiting, or "nomic" presence,¹ and in it the reference to what is *extra-psychic* take its rise.

Control as
Reality Co-
efficient.

¹ For this reason possibly the best definition, from the psychic point of view, of this feature of physical reality (as of all reality, no doubt) is that which is used (if indeed it was not first formulated) by Stout—"the limitation of activity." Yet I find another equally important element in the full co-efficient of physical reality, that which guarantees *persistence*, not covered by this formula. Full reality of sense requires the sort of control present in the *memory mode*, called "mediate control" below

28. This control consciousness, such as it is, appears even here, however, to have reflected in it the germinating distinction between persons and things, characterized **Control by Persons.** in the preceding section. It is evident that the child's experience is controlled, both in his action and also in his perception, differently by persons and by things. In so far as the construction of bodies as objects is based upon the relative regularity of dead things—their stability, stolidity, passive motion, etc.—in so far his co-efficient of control is only their consistent "stay-putness," inertness, and given-quality. But he is controlled by persons in a different way. Persons are actually intrusive; they go off like guns on the stage of his panorama of experience; they rise and smite him when he least expects it; and his reactions to them are about equally divided between surprised gratifications and equally surprised disappointments. There is an important step which this distinction eventually leads him to take, as appears in his treatment later on of the corresponding memory material; but even here a certain advance in the control situation appears. He is able to discount the resistance and stubbornness of things, and indirectly to circumvent them. "The burnt child dreads the fire," is the easy formula of his continued use of things. But not so for persons; they remain essentially projective, unreduced; each is a self-nucleating capricious source of novelties, intrusions, and moral burnings. By no easy method can he discount and circumvent persons; in doing so, his astuteness is taxed to the utmost. For they will not "stay-put"; and when he wishes them gone, they will to "stand-pat."

(chap. iv, § 4), through which the objective construction is in an important sense beginning to be released from the immediate domination of the actually present datum. Stout's contention (*Anal. Psych.*, II. ix. § 5) that the memory co-efficient, as developed by me (in *Mind*, xvi., 1891, pp. 232 ff., now included in the volume *Fragments in Philos. and Science*, xi.), is "secondary," is thoroughly *un-genetic*, and fails to do justice to the entire body of facts cited and arguments made by the advocates of "controllableness" as a co-efficient, from J. S. Mill to Pikler. The persistence is no doubt genetically later than the resistance factor; but it comes by a real progression and reconstruction of the object in a higher mode, and only by it does *externality* arise. Externality includes that "independence of us" which Stout, loc. cit., p. 248, appears to consider "secondary and subordinate." The genesis and progression of persistence as a meaning are treated fully below (chap. viii. § 3, chap. x. §§ 1, 2; vol. ii. chap. ii. §§ 6 f.). The nature of external reality is to be discussed in vol. iii.

Whatever reason we may see for saying that things are, in some degree, what we make them, what we will them to be, what our purposes require,—does not hold in full for persons. Things may in a measure—some things, in some measure—submit to our moulding ; but persons—they mould us ! This is indeed one of the outstanding results of recent studies in social psychology.

29. Having thus examined the first psychic shadings of control as the more autonomic self-developing modes of objective experience begin to be coloured by such a sense, I think we may appropriately say that control in the things of perception is for consciousness *non-voluntary* ; it does not involve any necessary antagonisms or dualisms ; it is merely the ongoing of cognition under a certain *co-efficient of stability and limitation*. The sense of control in the experience of persons, however, is or soon becomes positively *involuntary* ; it works by arousing attitudes which are to become those of the individual's own dawning personality and sense of agency.¹ Persons remain, even after each vital experience with them, still the unreduced ; and the individual's mass of surging psychic tendencies and dispositions comes up again and yet again to the task of appropriating them in the moulds of habit and recognized fact.

¹ This in anticipation of the account of the genesis of the consciousness of subjectivity in chap. v. below. The involuntary comes to be an actual clashing of wills as soon as the young hero of the nursery begins—in his own words—to “put up a fight.”

Chapter IV

THE FIRST DETERMINATION OF IMAGE OBJECTS : MEMORY OBJECTS

§ 1. IMAGES AS OBJECTS

1. The imaging function is not a new thing following upon the sense function ; indeed, the presence in sense perception of data having a greater or less familiarity, by reason of presence in some sense earlier, has been presupposed in the preceding pages. The general psychology of memory is, however, not our object here. The function is of interest to us in this connexion as being the normal method of the recurrence or reinstatement of what to consciousness is its earlier experience of objects ; memory is a mode in the progression of psychic objects. It is thus continuous with sense perception.

Furthermore, it is only one group of characters attaching to memory states that concern us : that by which they are constituted psychic *objects*. A memory is a relatively separable, distinguishable, and complicated whole. We say we remember the object "tree" in the same sense that we say we saw the object "tree." It is an object, and for consciousness the same object, in the two instances. Our present question, in tracing out the successive genetic determinations of objects is the progression from the sense mode to the memory mode. We will note the differences in the objects of the two modes respectively, and the variations in the factors by the action of which an object passes from one mode to the other ; and of these factors, we will seek to isolate those which give promise of value in the further progressions whereby the logical as such is finally reached. In other words, it is the genetic progression of cognition into and through the memory mode that interests us.

2. The conclusions reached in the last section as to the

essential determining and controlling factors of sense objects gives us our safe point of departure here, and also indicate the line of continuity of cognitive development. We found that such objects were wholes constituted as relatively separable and complicated, and also as relatively self-nucleating, stubborn,

Memory as
(1) Represent-
ing, and
(2) Conver-
sion Mode.

subject to non-voluntary control. Each of these aspects of determination takes on an important variation in the imaging mode, and contributes to the progression from sense to memory objects. The aspect of separableness or wholeness passes into that of *actual removal from the sense context*, and the aspect of stubbornness or uncontrollableness becomes that of *continuing-ness or persistence*, these being the two essential marks of memory objects as such. We may call these respectively (1) the character of "*representing*" something, under which we may describe memory as "*Representing Mode*"; and (2) the character of continuing remotely or *mediately* controlled a sense context, rather than immediately, under which we may describe memory as "*Conversion Mode*."

As might be expected, we find that the simpler cases are those of memory of physical things. It is to such things, in the first instance, that these two marks apply; and our treatment will consider them as constituting the first and typical case. The function of remembering events as such, which have no evident *continuing-ness* or persistence, is considered later on in this chapter (§ 5).

§ 2. MEMORY AS REPRESENTING MODE

3. It has been intimated that one of the fruitful aspects of cognition in the sense mode is that of the relative separateness

Separate-
ness as a
Character.

or detachment of the object reached, and it may be well to enter upon a little closer study of this character at the stage of transition from sense function properly so named to that of imaging. It would appear likely that some ground for such a character would be present which would necessitate the further progressions issuing in characters found in later modes. Biologically or objectively considered such ground is not far to seek: it is discovered at once in those distinct modes of the physical and vital which require different and fairly constant reactions and adaptations.

Its Biological
Grounds.

If light falls upon an amoeba, it is light to which he must respond, not sound; and if it be acid that

touches him, he may not safely react to sweet. So no doubt a certain range of separatenesses, siftings, and classifications of experience has come to be necessary in the economy of the evolution of the psycho-physical system.

4. On the psychic side we have found a state of things that assures us of an adequate or sufficient reason for the separation of thing from thing, even in the midst of the reducing tendencies of psychic function as such : the presence of those more wayward and novel experiences *which the habits of conscious life do not at once and finally absorb*. Over against this there is, on the side of the psychic itself, the necessary moulding of the presentative data into wholes of recognizable and manageable form. The formation of the sense object is, in short, a whole of interest and datum. As grasped and held and used by active dispositional processes, the datum *appears only as reduced to a form that is habitual*. As stimulated and controlled by what is foreign, the interest *appears only as fixed upon and defined by a definite objective content*.

Its Psychic
Grounds : In-
dividuation.

These two factors—those of presentation and of treatment, of cognition and of interest or action—play in and out with infinite variety and issue in varied relative adjustments. The net progress of consciousness is seen in the organization, in a larger context, of the system of things it actually accepts and uses. In its progress great stages arise, which are so important that we may give the entire movement a name, calling it “Individuation,” and give to its progression in a later chapter such tracing out as we find possible (chap. viii.). The question of Individuation is that of how far, and in what way, objects are *meant to be separate or individual* ; it is that of the further progression of mere “complications” into distinguished units or terms of relational and other higher meanings.

We cannot attempt here, of course, to adjust finally the respective claims of perception and memory ; but only to point out wherein each mode has its characteristic emphasis. No doubt it is true that there is no full perception process, giving a separate object, without a sort of memory. Memory enters in the operation of the grasping dispositions which are already in some measure habitual. This is just the reducing or apperceptive process necessary to constitute the object. But still the actual presence of an object involves memory in a different way from that in which actual memory involves presence. In per-

ception, the sense factor is emphatic, merging into sense of recurrence; in imaging the recurrence or "free memory" is emphatic, leaving the sense factor behind. Investigations in comparative psychology show that animals may remember in the sense of showing some signs of familiarity with objects, in cases in which there is no evidence of their having free memories or images of the objects.

Let us concede here, therefore, that consciousness does progressively "individuate," and put this fact down as the first point made in tracing the development of objects of sense into those of memory or representation.

5. It is evident, however, that it is at first in its real presence that the object is made distinct and individual. The function is one of distinctive treatment of an object in the body of the present changing material which constitutes the larger panorama of experience. This "thing" is succeeded by this familiarity or by that novelty, etc.; but each is first individuated as a full-blooded real presence or object.

In memory, however, this is not so; the individuated object is, in some sense, remote, not present; and it is necessary that we inquire what loss an object has sustained in becoming a memory object. What does the remoteness or absence of the real thing mean to a consciousness which has attained the grade of memory?

6. Answering the question as to what the absence of the real thing means, we may say three things.

It appears (1) not to mean at first what it does mean later on—absence from experience itself, in the sense required by a dualism of experience and the thing. That dualism is not yet achieved; and, indeed, the development of consciousness in just the direction we are now describing is necessary to its later achievement. The object of memory pure and simple is not a persistent real thing existing somewhere else while I, perchance, am thinking of it here. Further (2), it does not mean *nothing*; the thing is not present in the full sense of the original experience.

(3) It does mean, I think, the absence of just that something which we have found to be the *co-efficient of control* of the sense object as such—its direct, stark, compelling, and limiting character as including the sense datum. Instead of this datum, the memory object has a setting, the context in which the cognitive function

Remote-
ness or
"sense of
ject of
Memory.

Memory, as
new Individu-
ation, lacking
the Sense
Co-efficient,

has more or less successfully treated it before. This is, indeed, the very process by which it was first individuated, and made a separable unit of construction, a thing ; but it has now become, just by reason of this process, a relatively manageable and in a figure "*liftable*" thing—*liftable* from the canvas of the original panorama. What we remember is a *context of separable yet associated objects*. The contrast comes out when we ask how this context, the system thus produced, compares with the series of actual data which made the corresponding sense objects what they were.

In a word it *represents it*, and this is what we have a right to mean by that term : *it fits upon it, excites towards it, means it, but is not it*. How not ?—we then ask ; and the reply runs—

Represents
Original Ob-
jects : how ?

(a) Just, as has been said, by not having that control co-efficient, that actual limitation and constraint upon its construction that the original thing had. And this, though negative, leads on the further characterization

Through its
Context. made possible when we then add (b) that the memory system differs by being a more complicated

context, made up of a series of separable objective units. This context is now ready for the assumption of another co-efficient of control, that characteristic of memory as Conversion Mode.¹

¹ A very interesting question arises here—one which I do not remember ever to have seen discussed—the question, namely, whether an act of memory requires, from its internal psychic constitution alone, that the object should actually be absent. I have used the term "*liftable*" of the memory context ; the further question arises—must it be actually "*lifted*" from the real external series ? I think there is no such demand. The memory may be fully constituted as memory in the presence of the real object ; all that is psychically demanded is that it be treated as a *liftable* or separable context. There are no doubt many cases of this : cases of the treating of a present scene or complex environment under the co-efficient of memory, the actual constructions being those of a memory context, while the practical adjustments, or the larger readings of the situation, are still fitted upon the present facts. We may fancy a sleep-walker, for example, pursuing a dream context directly fitted upon the real things of his physical environment ; and the reverse case arises when in pursuing a distant end we travel along a context, and are quite unable to say afterwards whether were experienced the intermediate terms as actual facts, or only remembered them. We may conceive also a memory working with absolute accuracy, and converting each term as it arises into its equivalent coin of reality. Such a progressive context would be one of memory, but there would be no occasion or need actually to "*lift*" any of the memory images from their "*fulfilling*" real things. Indeed, the rise of this need, on occasion, is

§ 3. MEMORY AS CONVERSION MODE

7. A memory series or train, with its ramifications, is controlled both as to its course and as to its terminus. As to its course (1), it is *held to the context*, to the order of the original construction, that is, so far as it is memory proper and not some other sort of image formation; and as to the terminus (2), it *terminates always, when its course is run, in the sense co-efficient again*. By this a memory object is re-converted into a sense object. This re-con-
Control (1) by its Context, and
(2) By its possible Conversion.
version does not indeed take place in the memory function, and yet it is part of the representing function that it should be possible. The actual holding of the memory train to its own context gives to the fact that the train lacks the present hardness of things, its meaning as representing, leading up to, and issuing in the things. The usable context becomes the same as the things perceived, and stands vicariously for them. *The full memory co-efficient of control, therefore, is a convertible context.*

But in finding this out we have laid bare another aspect of control which has had due emphasis in the literature in discussions of the same co-efficients considered as the
A Usable Context is so far Controllable.
cachets of external reality. Memory objects, of course, mean the real in much the same sense that sense objects do, and the inquiry is as to the signs or co-efficients of memory by which this "real" meaning is guaranteed. The answer usually is: the "controllableness" of the memory series—the psychic procedure of actually ordering the flow of experience along the context so as to secure the reconversion of the train into a sense object by following it to its terminus. The term "controllableness" is, of course, suggestive here, inasmuch as it raises already the question of "control."¹

genetically the motive to the further progression to the distinction between memory objects and those of fancy now to be taken up. Most of our ordinary "familiar" treatment of the external world is of this sort; we really deal with a remembered, not a perceived context, and when some of our convertible images fail of actual conversion, and our anticipatory reactions are mistaken, we are "brought up" with a violent jar.

¹ The term "controllableness," used in discussions of reality, refers rather to the postulated reality than to the psychic construction. We control reality by going to it, and so experiencing it. But antecedently to this there is the question of the control of the process of memory construction by which the representing and convertible objective context is secured.

8. Controllableness is in antithesis to the stubbornness or uncontrollableness of the sense object. Here we put our finger

**Rudiment of
Subjective
Control.**

upon a shading of psychic process of high importance—that of “subjective control.” It will appear and have its genetic rôle assigned it in later discussions. The individual does not control his memories in the first instance, either by voluntarily testing them, or by refusing to do so. He merely accepts their convertible character. So far as he does question memory and resolve to test it, he shows that he has become aware of the great chasm or cleft in his experience, which is now only beginning to open up—that between the system of his images and the world of sense objects existing apart from them. This—*the great inner-outer dualism—is now indeed fast upon him, but the function of memory as such does not involve it.* In the later stage of growth, when he is able and has reason to doubt whether an image is a memory of a real occurrence or thing, or merely a creature of fancy, he does indeed exercise control by deciding whether or not to follow up the series and test the case, and by so deciding also decides the issue. In this sense the decision is a “subjective one,” and the control is so far fairly called “subjective.” But memory as such does not require such a determination; its character is given simply in the fact of its being representative and convertible.¹

That it is thus convertible, is a gradually acquired meaning largely of what we may call an *ex post facto* sort. By this I mean that it arises from frequent experiences of actually faithful memories, terminating in the facts and things for which their contexts fit them. The sense of this result becomes favourable to the discrimination of such cases *as usable* for securing real things; and in this there arises the beginning of the subjective control sense. It necessarily involves a contrast between these cases and those in which the images do not thus bring in the real; so that it is a step in the progression to the inner-outer dualism, as has just been remarked.

9. This control factor, the convertibility of the memory

¹ No doubt the use of these traditional terms may seem to suggest the traditional “representative theory” of knowledge. Yet it is not suggested, when we remember that separateness in this psychic mode is purely as between contents, not as between subject and object. The representing character is simply one of vicariousness or substitution, in a continuously developing psychic function.

object by the running-down of the image context to its terminus, is a matter of great interest for the consciousness of reality in the domain of the physical world—
Persistence as indeed is also the analogue of it in later modes of reality consciousness. For by it the guarantee is not of a new object, but of the same, the original object, now brought again within the ken of the psychic eye. This imports the meaning of what has been called “persistence” into the object as thus brought to the bar for examination a second time.¹ How through this the function of individuation is developed—as recognition throws its flood of agreeable tone over and about the object—is a matter of later more extended remark.² Here it is enough to say that the real thing, the physical object, which is thus secured by conversion, can never again lapse into the mode of reality which is simply presence. Such a real thing must now be the thing which has lived through the processes of memory and conversion; and this becomes in our full apprehension of things an essential and productive feature. How productive may appear when we suggest that in this persistence meaning we have the germ of the notion of substance.³

§ 4. MEDIATE CONTROL

10. The foregoing description of the method of control in the constructions of memory introduces the conception of “mediate control,” a term by which the twofold conditioning of the memory function is brought out: the conditioning by the external world through the sense co-efficient, and the conditioning by the process of “running-down” a context under the new co-efficient of convertibility. The control in memory is “mediate” in the two senses in which—to state the case negatively—it is not immediate.

(1) In the first place, the memory construction is not controlled immediately by the sense co-efficient; for one of its essential characteristics is its separateness from the object of sense, or the latter’s actual absence.
The Sense Co-efficient as the object of sense, or the latter’s actual absence.
Mediate. I sit in my chair with my senses closed and indulge

¹ The remarks made above, chap. iii., sect. 27, footnote, may be here recalled.

² See §§ 2 f. of chapter viii. on “Individuation.”

³ A point brought out in chap. x. §§ 1-4, where, when taken together with chap. viii. § 3, further discussion of the progression in the meaning of Persistence is to be found.

memory. I find it accurate, without appeal to present fact. I do not call my images things, nor am I tempted to. The context of my reminiscence all hangs loyally together, and no sense fact is needed to help it out.

Yet it is controlled *indirectly* or *mediately* by that co-efficient, through the requirement of convertibility into the sense object by the following out of the series of terms which constitute the relative context. I do have something to rely upon in my acceptance of my memories. I have the sense that they would work, would fit upon realities, would bring me to real objects, did I follow out the suggested series of terms. So it is with this proviso that I dispense with sensation and "memorize" with my senses shut—that while sense objects are not immediately present, yet they are still vicariously or *mediately* present in the images which I might at will convert into the coin for which they are the notes.

This becomes very clear when we speak of the memory images as *meaning* the things, while the sense objects *are* the things. To any theory of meaning, such as that developed below (chap vii.) meaning is an accretion upon bare presence. While the sense object *is*, so far as control is concerned, a bare presence, the memory image *means*, not its own bare presented scheme, but the absent thing. It is only those images whose meaning is controlled mediately by contexts convertible into things that are memory. In the next mode of development, that of fancy, they fail of this also and so fly off altogether, losing completely the attachment to external things.

As to the external, therefore, and its control over the constructions of memory, we may say that *the control is mediated by the context which the objective whole of memory compasses, and beyond which it also radiates*. This is then the definite sense given to the term "mediate" here; it indicates *the first departure of the cognitive construction from its immediate touch with the external things of sense*.

II. (2) In the other reference, moreover, the term "mediate" is equally significant and suggestive: the reference, namely, to the sphere of the psychic itself. If we do not care, even for the purposes of exposition and negative characterization, to anticipate a form of control from within, from the psychic function as such, we may still, by taking the objective point of view, imagine a situation in which such inner determination of function—by a mode of self-direction

Subjective
Control as
Mediate.

or immediate volition—is present. Such a mode of control would be, if and when it was actually realized, *from the inner point of view immediate*.¹

We may say, without hesitation, that the control of memory as such is not “immediate” in this full psychic sense. It is not, as memory, accompanied by a psychic fiat of direct determination. On the contrary, its essential value appears only when there is the conversion through which the sense control regains its force. It is, therefore, *not immediately psychic or subjective*.

Yet it has, just so far as mental development makes it possible for it to have, an indirect or *mediate* reference to psychic function as self-determining in that aspect called “controllable-ness” in the exposition above. This appears in the growing sense of alternative outcome and meaning attaching to the imaging function when it is more or less tentatively exercised, and is felt to be only *more or less true* in its representing character, because liable to mistakes, illusions, and various inaccuracies. The growing need of testing an image’s claim to represent and prophesy real things, in this case or that, and the psychic plan so to do, illustrate a relative sort of control of the situation which, though indirectly in its issue under ban to the external object, yet is itself, in its initiation, so far psychically conditioned. In this germinal sense, as well as in the retrospect which arises when it is looked at from the point of view of developed psychic control in later modes, memory control may properly be called “mediately” subjective.²

From the point of view of meaning, here also, the case may be clearly stated. As contrasted with bare fact or presented scheme, a meaning is always a departure from the purely photographic rendering of data. This is due to some variation in emphasis or urgency in the determining conditions; and so far as these become more psychic and less directly foreign, a sense of alternative or selective meaning arises. There is a shading of this in most cases of memory: the sense of possible variations in the result, if the test of conversion were actually made. Yet

¹ Probably the acutest consciousness of inner control as such comes in the experience of playful personation described in chap. vi. § 7.

² It is through this mediate character of the memory object that consciousness is able later on to develop those methods of “substitution,” “short-cutting,” “abbreviation,” etc., which are its ways of treating nature and truth generally with economy of effort, the essential fact of convertibility always guaranteeing the final testing fact.

it is *mediated* by just the context which also mediates the external control. In the context we find the common meeting and emerging place of the two moments, which later on bulk so large in psychic development, and constitute so important a theoretical problem: the problem of truth that is objectively self-sufficient and independent, although at the same time selectively judged, endorsed, and owned by the private thinker.¹

The more positive side of the germinating psychic control, however, is not that of relative uncertainty in the presence of the untested image, but the surviving or retrospective sense of the usability of the memory object after its conversion value has been established. The psychic² may say to itself: "This is my memory; I know its value; I may turn it into reality *whenever I choose*." To pursue the figure employed above, the beginning of psychic control is found not so much in the "liftableness" of the memory context from the real series, nor in the process of "lifting" it; both these are largely processes to which the psychic as such is merely an awareness, an eye-witness. But the further sense of the possibility of *fitting-on-again* such a lifted context—fitting it to the proper real series—is that which serves to turn the eye-witness into an agent of control.

Context fitted
on to Real
Things.

And here too is its limitation, its mediate character. The psychic continues: "I did not make it real to me in the first instance, nor am I able to now. But still, unless I *allow* it to be so by having it in my context, and *mean it so* in my conduct and interest, it cannot be what I mean by real."

12. As to the mechanism of mediate control, it has already been found in the characteristic organization of the object in its own context, that which gives it its representing and convertible value. The older theory stated it exhaustively in terms of the law of association of ideas. Our own discussion has found it in the holding together or "contextuation" of content, due to the reaction of dispositional and other conative-affective processes upon

Mediate Control
a Psycho-
physical Syn-
thetic (active)
Process.

¹ These two controls *emerging and diverging* in this mode, *converge and merge*, after a career of marked opposition, depicted in the following chapters, in the joint control of the function of *judgement*, which is described in chap. xi. § 4 as "Higher Mediate Control."

² The "psychic," not the "subject," because the "subject" as such has not yet arisen: of course the simply psychic cannot "say" anything; but this is the meaning from the psychic point of view.

data of stimulation.¹ On the organic side, it is some form of psycho-physical process by which the essential accommodations made through various innate and acquired reactions are conserved and solidified in habitual ways of acting upon enlarged and enlarging objective wholes. Its difference from perception consists in the beginning of the remoteness from direct conditions of stimulation which allows intra-organic control processes to hold together as parts of a system only relatively dependent upon the outside world.

§ 5. EVENTS AS MEMORY OBJECTS : SECONDARY CONVERSION

13. Having thus laid down the main outlines of our theory of memory in its simplest and genetically earliest² form, we are able to trace its operation in the later modes. Memory, like all the functions, goes through its own progressions. Yet in the features essential to them, memory objects retain their characters; they are always "representing," always "convertible," and always subject to "mediate control."

Their representing character is so plainly present that it need not be insisted upon. However abstract, unreal, uncontrolled the original may be—a dream, a passing event, a verbal statement, a logical meaning—when we remember it, we reinstate a context which represents it or stands vicariously for it. When I ask, *What* do you remember? the "what" is not only the context of your memory image but it is of the essence of its meaning to you that it is also the "what" of the thing or event remembered. However symbolic or schematic the original context may have been, as embodying a meaning to you, it is that symbol or scheme which is now present as giving body and context to the memory.

There seems, then, to be no question on this score. The most unsubstantial events, whether historical or merely fanciful at the time of their occurrence, are, so far as remembered at all, reinstated as a context whose meaning in memory is in the original form and subsistence. However low in the scale the original

¹ This view is worked out in various "motor" and "action" theories of the physical basis of psychic synthesis; the present writer's detailed exposition of such a theory is to be found in his work, *Mental Development in the Child and the Race*.

² No doubt also psycho-genetically or racially, the early beginnings of memory were of this simple sort.

function of cognition may have been, it is that function whose fulfilment is again accomplished in the new context established in memory.

14. The other positive character of memory objects—their meaning for conversion—raises more debatable questions. The extremest case, that in which the presence of this mark and (2) **Convertible.** is most open to question, may be cited first, since it presents the sharpest problem. In what sense, it may be asked, can we say that a mere historical occurrence, a once-**How so, in case of mere Events?** happening and long-gone event, is remembered by an image or context which is convertible into the original event again?

15. It takes us considerable way toward a full answer to this question to observe that any event we remember is made up of **Substantive and Transitive Parts of a Meaning.** two different sorts of matter, which we may distinguish as its substantive parts and its transitive parts—following the usage of William James. We never remember or otherwise cognize an event without remembering the things or persons who figured in the event. There are the substantive terms; they are positive objects or objective meanings capable of their own individuation and memory. We say the event happened to or involved them. The event comprises, however, a further variable context of what is known as *relation*—action, passion, causation, etc.—in which the substantive terms figure. “Caesar crossed the Rubicon” may be considered as a transitive meaning—that of crossing—in which the separable terms Caesar and Rubicon are set; and to one of Caesar’s soldiers, who was present, the memory of the event is a complication of these substantive and transitive factors.

16. With some such distinction allowed, we may lay down the following proposition: that *the memory of an event always claims to have the same context, and also to be convertible into a renewed experience of the same sort and degree of control, as the original.*

Image is always Convertible into same Control that Original had.

It is the second member of this statement that raises the question of conversion. It is capable of certain different readings according as consciousness is more or less advanced in cognitive development.

(1) First, we may say that the substantive terms are always convertible into their originals. “Caesar I know, and the Rubicon I know,” would say the soldier; meaning, “I can identify either or both of them if you press me to do so.”

17. But in the early modes of cognition—before the rise of the distinct meanings we call relations—the distinction between the two sorts of meanings, substantive and transitive, is not made. Consciousness does not take a thing out of its setting of transitive happenings, and say that it might not have been set among them. The thing doing thus-and-thus, acted upon so-and-so, *is the thing*; the whole is apprehended as a single complicated object. An event happening to an object is not stripped from the object which produces or suffers the event. The child's memory is of the entire happening, and he accepts his objects of memory as large lumpy things, acting and being acted upon. He expects the entire happening to be confirmed by the conversion of his memory images.¹ This, of course, is crude and causes him great embarrassment; and he forthwith finds it necessary to make further distinctions.

We all know the period at which the child seems to read his fancies freely into his real memory series, not being able to distinguish between them. This, the cases will show, applies to the *transitive* parts or *events*, not so extensively to the substantive parts of his context. He only slowly learns that some things did happen to papa or to himself, while other things he merely fancied. He learns the lesson by finding that while the substantive terms—which become “substantive” just by this movement—do directly convert into resisting things, the rest of his fancied situations do not so easily find confirmation.

18. (2) The next stage, I think, in the progression of this conversion test of memory comes through what is called on later pages the “common” meaning of objective constructions. It is the recognition of the presence of other observers whose objects are the same. The co-efficient of direct conversion, on which the persistence of physical things depends, being lacking to the transitive parts of an event, appeal is made for confirmation to *the agreement established by the report of other persons*. The child may be observed going directly to his parents or companions with the question as to the truthfulness of his own imagination.

Such an appeal, however, embodies a new form of conver-

¹ Interesting cases of this appear in Miss Martin's experiments (*Psych. Rev.* May 1906, pp. 185 f.) showing the judgment of pictures to involve a mass of suggested or “associated” matter. Much that is commonly attributed to “association” is really simply the reinstatement of an *undivided whole meaning*.

sion. For with the development, to be explained below, of the distinction between the inner world of images as such and the outer world of confirmations and persistencies, there comes the movement which establishes the "common" character of the different "inner" worlds of various observers.¹ The inner objective context of the "alter" personalities is one with that of the "ego" personality; and the possibilities of the confirmation of actual happenings is enlarged by the social agreement and checking off, as to both things and events, both the substantive and the transitive parts of the imagined situation.

19. This is a "secondary" but still a real conversion process. The individual now reaches a terminus of essential control and confirmation, as foreign to his own inner life, and as conclusive for his purposes of ratification, as is the "primary" conversion into substantive existence. The result is that just as soon as he begins to lose confidence in the transitive parts of his context, by reason of the limitation of "primary" conversion to the substantive parts, then this "secondary" conversion of his image-context into that of others, becomes possible and necessary. The whole context may still retain its integrity in this new form of inter-psychic or common meaning.

20. Later on, this becomes of great importance to consciousness. The range of "common," or what we may in a general way call "socially established" meanings, is so much extended that it comes to take the place of "primary" confirmations of the perceptual or physical sort. The "things" of present perception and memory are woven into certain great contexts of transitive relation, and the tests and confirmations of these are also sufficient for those. Our acceptances of the contexts of history, on the one hand, and of science on the other hand, are rarely—and then mainly on the edges where they are undergoing extension—subjected to the demand for immediate ocular or muscular demonstration.² Testimony, tradition, written records, etc., embody the great mass of socially confirmed knowledges.

¹ Chap. v. §§ 1-3 and 7.

² The reverse reading of this is also an important moment in the establishing of the meanings of reality in later modes of consciousness. It is pointed out on another page (chap. on "Reality in the Image-Mode" in vol. iii.) that it is just the necessity of distinguishing between the sorts of conversion here called primary and secondary that motives the important distinction of *physical* from other external realities.

It is clear, therefore, that in this way the conversion character of memory is extended to apply to the transitive features of **All "Com- mon" Objects are thus Convertible.** objective contexts, whenever common knowledge can be invoked. So much we may say without going into the discussion of those features as separable meanings for thought. For such an inquiry we are not prepared. Yet we may go a step further in tracing the progression of this mark of conversion by making certain preliminary observations, which, with the conclusion drawn from them, we may place under a third heading.

21. (3) We are now led to ask, What becomes of those images, or parts of the contexts, of the memory mode, which do not get either physical or social confirmation, having neither **Are Private Memories Convertible?** primary nor secondary conversion? Does the acceptance of images as being valid memories stop with what is in one of these two ways thus guaranteed? Is there any further competence of what we may call sheer memory, as such, to know its own children?

I think there is what amounts to this, or is as good as this; but that it results from the action of the two confirmations **Practically by Joint Action of Sense and Social Tests,** already pointed out. The resources of the two when working together are very great, seemingly sufficient for the purposes of the mental life. For if we hold that all substantive terms are confirmable by both the sensational and the social testing—the former being the final reference and criterion—and that the transitive parts are also confirmable socially, it follows that these latter have further confirmation simply as attaching to and being known with the former in a whole context.

The separable modes of confirmation are really not distinct at all in practice. The social conversion runs over to the substantive term, and the sense conversion, in turn, partly holds **Which Over- lap and Up- hold Entire Context.** up the transitive parts of the entire context. So that there arises a certain attitude of discrimination and relative sense of security or the reverse toward the whole. In later modes it shows itself in what we call judgments of likelihood as probability. All the processes consciousness has later on for revising and controlling its experience, play down upon the memory field, and end by giving to it the stability and validity to which its own function might not in all respects lay claim. This is not a resort to "outside" help exactly, for the tentativeness of memory and its relative character are just what

motive the development of these later sorts of control—as we are to show in some detail.

22. This general statement is, however, preparatory to the more positive point, that much of the material left over after these
 Much Material left Undetermined, two conversions, *is not claimed by memory at all*. It does not do to say that what is not confirmed by conversion is, therefore, not memory and is mere fancy. We constantly accept image contexts under reserve, not having the confirmation, but not for that reason denying them credence. The attitude of acceptance, brought out by the verisimilitude of the mere fact of regular contextuation, is taken up; and 'tis only a residue of our images that are
 but considered Valid till Disproved, allowed to be positively *inconvertible*, or, putting them negatively, *actually disproved*. These we read off into a sphere of what is explicitly *non-memory of external things and events*. But there is a larger sphere of the *likely-to-be-memory*, the taken-for-real events, which get their likelihood from their association with the legitimate children of the conversion mode.¹

23. (4) We are thus brought to the final feat of memory, and as well to the final conversion of its objects : the feat of remembering one's earlier image contexts as having been then
 Memory of Earlier Memories or Images, either memories or mere fancies. We do accomplish this feat, without doubt. I remember now my yesterday's memory of my day-before-yesterday's doings and dreams. My memory of the yesterday's image I call valid memory, whether what it remembered was a real event or a mere dream. This shows the image function distinguishing not only between events and dreams, but then again applying its discrimination to the renewed occurrence, for the establishing of it as a valid memory or a dream.² Granted the foregoing to be an adequate account of the first discrimination—that between real events and fancies as established by primary and secondary
 such as Psychic Events, Dreams, etc. tests—we now have to ask what consciousness pro-

¹ The analogous fact in the sense-mode has been pointed out already ; the fitting in of an *invisible* visual context, for example, continuously with its visible parts, etc. Here in memory the substantive confirmations are like telegraph poles that hold up the connecting wires, unless and until they are shown really to have been cut.

² This last case occurs ; for example, I say, " I have dreamed the same dream a second time, after having talked about the first dream." I distinguish the memory of the first dream, and also the second dream as not a real memory.

ceeds upon in determining the validity of the memory of this memory or fancy.¹

24. We have here, I think, a very simple matter. We may put it thus: *The subsequent memory carries the conversion co-efficient of the antecedent image, or with that image lacks the co-efficient; it always has, however, a co-efficient of psychic conversion as such.*

The two clauses of this statement may be taken up separately:

(a) As to the first point, we have simply to recognize that a subsequent memory is not a new function having for its object the first or antecedent memory. Not at all; that is too shuffle-card and atomistic a way of interpreting psychic functions.² The second or any subsequent act of reproduction is a renewed phase of the original function; its object and end are just the original object or end. I remember *my friend*, the second time as I do the first, not the memory through which I before remembered him. Accordingly, the later memory is in just the position as to conversion and validity that the earlier memory was; as renewal of a function, it proceeds upon the data and has the motives of the original function. If, on the other hand, my former memory was of a dream, then my later is also of the dream, not of my memory of the dream. And in this case a conversion into a real event, which would prove it to be more than a dream, being positively denied to it, the second memory, like the first, reports it a mere dream.³

¹ That this is a real question, referring to a real discrimination, is seen in the various illusions respecting our earlier memory states. One of these is that whereby, in successive recurring recollections, elements originally known to be imaginary are finally accepted as belonging in a real context.

² It has its representatives, however. Such a position is seen in Stanley's theory that pain in its successive revivals is not pain at the original cause of pain, but "pain at pain," i.e. pain from the thought (memory) of the original pain from the cause of pain (H. M. Stanley, *Evolutionary Psychology of Feeling*, chap. vi.).

³ Of course it is not intended to deny that the renewals of function are modified and variously readjusted during their repetitions. Memory is notoriously influenced by such repetitions, especially when varying and larger contexts are established, and when active dispositional factors shift the locus of interest and purpose. This is especially the case when the sort of *tertiary* or psychic conversion now to be mentioned leads to a reading of a new psychic context into the original objective scheme (see immediately below, sect. 25).

We have, therefore, in a functional interpretation of memory a sufficient justification of the account of the matter given in the first part of the formulation made just above. There would remain the cases in which there is an explicit act of memory directed upon the former act of memory, or upon a former state recognized as being only such. The question then is as to what justifies the confidence that it is properly remembered or otherwise classed.¹

25. (b) This introduces us to what I shall call "psychic" or "tertiary conversion." It is *the conversion of a memory into the psychic state which it remembers*. Is there such a process, and if so, what is the mark or co-efficient upon which it proceeds?

That there is some criterion of memory of psychic states as such cannot be questioned. We distinguish between new fancies and old remembered fancies, between new dreams and old remembered dreams. Some mark of recognition attaches to the content of those said to be memories and not new images.

26. It is found, I think, in an interesting separation of two genetic motives before united: one the "secondary" or social conversion already spoken of, and the other the personal dispositional processes by which a content is controlled in the act of recognition. The latter is spoken of more in detail in a later place, where it is pointed out that the mark of "sameness" and "recurrence" attaching to an image object or memory, by which it is said to be in a persisting or continuing mental life, is the active control of such an object by the subjective processes themselves.² If we here assume this and also say that social conversion attaches to many such images, when we think of them as being also in another person's mind, we then have the data for a positive solution. What takes place is this.

There is already the possible conversion of a memory by appeal to another person. This assumes a control of the context in question in the mental life of that other person and also in one's own. If it be a real event, I have the social control as well as my own personal persistence as control.

¹ It is here that Mr. Stanley's "pain at pain" would come in: the pain that comes from the memory of the disagreeable quality of earlier memories or images, recognized for what they are or refer to.

² See chap. viii. § 3.

If it be a mere fancy, or a dream, I remember it as *lacking the social confirmation*, but as retaining the personal control given

it by my own persisting and renewed psychic process.
 that of Private Psychic Control. There is then a conversion back to that type of my own former inner context, already found to be *not a socially but a privately determined context*: a context from which all conversion marks were expressly excluded except those of bare familiarity secured by psychic recurrence itself.

27. This positive separation of factors is necessary. Without it an image could not be remembered as strictly private or psychic. Otherwise it might represent any former psychic state rather than only one of the peculiar sort called, as lacking "commonness," a private image or a dream. The conversion into a *psychic context* is what it has in common with images under secondary or social conversion; but it must be now not a socially available or common, but a merely private, psychic context. As conversion, therefore, this represents a new stage of progression. The progression is fulfilled in an image which is convertible into a context *itself not convertible by secondary tests*.

Of the positive mark of such private control more is to be said. It is the question of the determination of image objects as such—
 The Marks of Privacy. that such objects are determined in large part negatively—by lack of continuous contextuation, and by lack of those marks which guarantee commonness of meaning.¹

28. The entire conversion mode is, therefore, determined in three stages; it passes from the *direct physical co-efficient* (primary), through the *social* (secondary), in which the physical is released in favour of the *socially or commonly subjective*, to the *psychic* (tertiary) in which the social in turn yields to the *purely private*.

29. A single further movement may be mentioned in this place. It is evident that a mere psychic image—a dream—
 Memories and Fancies are Woven in a Continuous Context, and a memory of a real event, are brought into one and the same context as *psychic*, in the very act of discriminating their spheres of conversion. When I say, "I told him yesterday both my doings and my dreams of

¹ Of course, being remembered as *itself* a mere image, such an event may then be further converted, as the case may be, into a real event or into an earlier psychic state (as stated in the preceding section above). There is in that case a double, or even—in case social confirmation is further supported by a final appeal to physical fact—a triple conversion.

the night before," I bring up a continuous context of *what I told him*, in which both doings and dreams take their relative positions. This gives a chance for varying readings of this continuous context besides that which the strict demands of the different conversions require, and startling cases of mistake, embarrassment, or misrepresentation often result.¹

§ 6. SECONDARY CONVERSION AS MEDIATE CONTROL MODE

30. Evidently the resort to the context of another's experience widens the resources of control. By the checking off of objects as meanings secondary conversion adds a greatly extended context to the system of "mediate control." It is mediate because, like the individual's inner system, it is recognized as itself also inner though in the mind of another. It mediates, in the first place, the further appeal to the primary control co-efficient; for we may say to the other person, "prove your images before asking me to accept them." That is, it assumes that the second person's context has behind it a primary system by which it is finally controlled.

It is "mediate" besides in the additional sense—a sense also true of the individual's memory context—that it mediates subjective control of the context found in memory. The assumption of personality going with the inwardness of the second person's context carries with it the same degree of agency and selective direction of the conversion processes that one's own personality then involves. The main value of the new context, therefore, is that by it the range of secondary conversion is greatly extended. The child comes to merge his own and others' experience in a larger whole of *acceptable* detail, and becomes credulous and "suggestive" to a scandalous degree.

By this extension of the context of mediate control, however, real progress is made in the progression of control; and that in two ways.

31. (1) It follows from the facts just pointed out, that the assumption of primary control mediated by the second person's context—the assumption in other words of the re-
 It stiffens
 Inner Control
 in the other, liability of social suggestion—is in a stricter sense an *assumption* than is that produced by the same mediation by the first person's own context. It is a more remote,

¹ We all constantly fail in the redistribution of the details of such a context. Stories are told of lawyers who resort to skilful contextuation of evidence to the end that their clients may swear to details falsely, but without false intention.

more difficult, more indirect mediation. So the individual allows it to lapse more readily. He thus loses the final term of sense confirmation and comes to accept the control of the second person's psychic processes in its place. Moreover, the second person may have advanced beyond the rudiments of subjective control and may have come to speak with authority and word of command. So impressive and *impressing* is this to the child, for example, that the "social constraint" of current sociology comes to be a direct control, taking the place of the primary external system which genetically it only served to mediate. The authority of moral and other imperative modes of control also flows over upon the strictly recognitive context in question, and gives them also the artificial finality attaching to the sanctions of personal command. The child finds it hard to discriminate the controls, for example, in such cases of direction by his father as these: "You must not lie in reporting what you see," and "you cannot see that light as being any colour but red"; and he obeys the latter, though by so doing he may, if the light be not red, unintentionally disobey the former! This throws great emphasis upon the subjective type of control, as exemplified in the other person.¹

32. (2) This results, secondly, in giving a corresponding emphasis to the immediate inner control in the first person. The child's own competence gains support from the recognition of that of another. The mediating context, being loosed from its physical moorings—and in higher modes from its *trans-subjective* moorings—by the growing authority of personal assertion and legislation, comes to lose also its need of confirmation by any *external*—or *extra-psychic*—control. The autonomy of the ego grows by the recognition of that of the alter.

Thus a meaning is achieved which has interesting "common" value. In a later place we insist upon it. There arises through

As representing
Common
Meanings.

secondary conversion first a common meaning of the "catholic" sort—the "commonness-as-common" of chapter vii. § 6—and through this, by a reflection of the meaning exclusively into the individual's own control, a common meaning of the "syn-nomic," or *self-competent*, sort fully treated in a later discussion (vol. ii. chap. iii. § 6). The individual finds himself the mouth-piece and legislator of common meanings.

¹ This matter is developed further in the discussion of the "Pre-supposition of Commonness" in vol. ii. chap. iii. § 10.

PART III

GENETIC THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE : THE QUASI-LOGICAL MODES

Chapter V

THE SECOND DETERMINATION OF IMAGE OBJECTS : THE INNER-OUTER DUALISM.

§ 1. THE INNER-OUTER PROGRESSION

1. We have now depicted the progress of the psychic determination of objects from sense to memory, and two suggestive strains of development have arrested our attention : (1) that by which the separateness or detachment of the object passes into the "representing" character, and (2) that by which its simple presence passes by "conversion" into persisting character. In both these aspects the memory object is supplementary to the sense object, and serves genetically to carry the earlier over into the later psychic mode.

There is, however, from the psychic point of view, no new factor of determination : the materials, the method of organization, the attributes of the memory object are those of the sense object ; it differs from it only in the substitution of indirect mediate control for direct or immediate foreign control.

It is, however, in the lines of development now recognized that new modes of determination of content do arise. The detachment of the memory object from sense objects proves to be germinal to a further movement. The increasing detachment of the image renders possible a sort of determination in which not only does the actual presence, the sense co-efficient proper, disappear—what we have called

Separateness
and Persis-
tency of
Sense and
Memory
Objects.

Both Disap-
pear in the
Fancy Mode.

external or heteronomic control—but, further, *the conversion character is also lost*. The imaging faculty sets up an “object of fancy.” In the determination of this object one of the essential dualisms of mental development takes its rise, that ordinarily known as the distinction of “inner and outer.” This determination we may treat under the heading—the “inner-outer progression.” It has its roots in both the characters of memory objects as these have been already explained.

2. (1) The detachment of the memory object is involved. This feature of the determination of objects of memory has been sufficiently remarked upon above. It is necessarily precedent genetically to the further progression wherein the factor of mediate control is also eliminated, since in it the actual presence, with its sense control, first disappears. It is not in itself sufficient to lead to the dualism of inner and outer, for the constitution

of a memory object as normally valid guarantees the sense co-efficient always by that “permanent possibility” called conversion; and all objects thus guaranteed would have for consciousness the meaning of sense objects. The progression, therefore, in the first instance, takes us into the sphere of germinating subjective control as mediate. It is, on the other hand, in part through the failure of the memory train thus to reinstate valid sense experience—that is, in the absence or ineffectiveness of the memory co-efficient in certain cases—that the distinction arises whereby objects of fancy are distinguished from those of memory.

3. (2) The failure of mediate control is involved. The fruitfulness of the experience in which the memory co-efficient is at work resides in the fact, as I conceive, that the sense life is continuous with it, and the “intrusions” of new experience, accruing constantly, tax the powers of assimilation. Memory may be reliable, but at the same time the demands of life may not be fulfilled by accurate memory. New items come in to modify and disarrange the trains of memory. In other words, the development of new sense objects and contexts goes on contemporaneously with the determination of memory objects. Often the same material demands both sorts of construction at once. The new object of perception may only partially fulfil the permanent possibility which the memory co-efficient requires, or it may stubbornly refuse to be “in it” at all.

This is notably the case when any sort of conation, interest,

or other dispositional factors are largely determining in the memory object. The demand for such and such an object is not fulfilled by the re-conversion into the sense co-efficient. Consciousness is thrown into a series of affective states, which have been described in the literature by such terms as "disappointment," "suspense," "hesitation," "doubt," "confusion," "embarrassment."

4. Confining ourselves at present to the cognitive progressions involved,¹ we may point out the distinction now reached in consciousness between those cases in which the memory co-efficient under mediate control determines a valid sense object, and those in which the memory object, thus normally constituted, is not, in the same sense, valid.

To consciousness this can have only one meaning; it has no material for any other. It means that, in the former case, the co-efficient operative in memory has terminated in a sense object of *whose appearance there was in fact some uncertainty*; and that it is really *the result, not the process solely, that finally establishes the object*. The entire process is, therefore, found to have been in a sense detachable from its terminus. Even when the function is fulfilled there is consciousness of unreliability and possible discredit suggestive of the confusion and embarrassment which would come in consequence of the failure of the memory construction.

There arises at once, therefore—and this is the adequate progression to it—a bifurcation or division between the imaged content, or context, and those more intruding stubborn objects which sense perception reports.⁴ This is the root fact in the determination of the "inner-outer" distinction. In this the germinal opposition between datum and interest found in the sense mode has explicit development. The interest—directed now toward the memory context—again comes into opposition with the stable and controlling sense co-efficient.²

¹ See the discussion of the "Belief Mode" below, chap. xi. for further account of the relevant affective aspects.

² It may be held that many images are considered as fanciful simply from their variety, grotesqueness, and "accidental" occurrence; and this is no doubt true in later modes. But before the inner-outer dualism has arisen the meanings of "grotesqueness," "accidental occurrence," etc., are not differentiated. The establishment of normal meanings goes before the recognition of deviations from the normal. The child treats his images seriously enough, and only gradually learns that all that he thinks

I think that the facts cited in anthropological and sociological writings to account for this prime dualism may be shown, so far as they are really pertinent, to involve this psychic progression. The dream, for example, is no doubt a source of wonder to the primitive dreamer, as it is to the young child. But if the dream had such trains of possibly realizable continuous connexion with real life that the dream objects as remembered were not incongruous with the details of real life, wherein would dreams differ from other revived contents? As a fact, the dream does conflict both with the regular constructions of memory, and also with the constructions present to sense. It therefore illustrates, perhaps more sharply than do cases of waking imagery, just the sort of opposition of motives we are now signalizing. The case of dreams is interesting also for illustration in the later progression of "mind and body."

5. The very important fact of imitation, used by others as well as by the present writer in connexion with the development of the consciousness of self in its social relations, again illustrates this fundamental motive in the development of fancy objects. The child imitates the act of another, and in so doing what before he had only observed, comes to feel how the other feels. He thus learns to distinguish the arena of his direct feeling (the inner) from the larger range of presentative experience (the outer) from which this feeling was and may still be absent. This is, I think, quite true; and it is important as a step towards the rise of the "subjective" as such, of which we are to treat below.

Yet it is evident that it is the fact of the separateness of the two sorts of objects, and the essential impossibility of the conversion of one into the other, that leads the child thereupon to distinguish the two spheres. When he recalls the imitative experience in its own train and context, under the memory co-efficient, the fully realized sense object would be the goal of the re-conversion; but that is not realized. Instead he has the "inner imitation" detached from the original copy-object. Without this rudimentary dualism or opposition of sense and image, there would be in his mind merely a succession—one experience having an affective toning, following upon another not having it. Only through some contrast or opposition of co-efficients,

is not fact, that all appearance is not reality, that some objects are to be set aside as accidental because without context and grotesque because without sense fulfilment.

such as arises through the failure of the conversion claim to make itself good, do they come to require different interpretations. Imitation furnishes such an opposition, and for the reason and to the extent that its result does not yield a sense object, it is fruitful for this dualism.

The case of imitation takes on a peculiar interest because of the consciously representing character of the memory object as such. Imitation may involve, as we have seen, the failure of the memory and sense co-efficients to work jointly in one determination. The object, even when successfully but imitatively reinstated, is not really a present persisting sense object. The process gives a result psychically detached from the persisting thing of the world; and this is just what we found memory also to do. Yet it differs from memory, in that it invokes and carries out the mechanism of conversion in a way peculiarly its own,¹ which gives it further meaning in a later progression—that by which objects of the “semblant” mode are determined. The imitatively constituted objects are selectively and consciously produced and set up; they have the “experimental” or semblant marks later to be described. The object is treated as one which is determined *not either-as* one thing or as the other, *according as you must*, but *as-either* one thing or the other, *according as you please*. This distinction is one of far-reaching importance; and it is proper to make it here as showing that the representing context of memory is a different thing from the consciously imitative context of the later mode.

6. Quite apart from the presence of other apparently fruitful factors in the development of the dualism of inner and outer, we may say with confidence, I think, that this **Inner and Outer Mutually Exclusive.** dualism is essentially *the detachment of the psychic processes from their suggested termini.*² The inner is inner just so far as it is not outer. The inner is a theatre of quasi-psychic events, and there is besides a theatre of outer

¹ By what is known as the “circular” process of reinstatement characteristic of imitation. The difference is that a memory *comes about* as a direct result of a perception, and is sense-controlled, while an imitative context is *brought about* by action which is in some degree identified with subjective control.

² The process of Introjection, as depicted by Avenarius as the natural method of falling into this dualism, is no doubt in the main an actual one (cf. the *Dict. of Philos.*, sub verbo). Yet the imitative way of deriving the “introject”—to coin the term—is, I think, earlier and more fruitful than any other. Introjection secures the rise of a detach-

events. *The dualism is at first one of mutual exclusion*; no object can be both; and it is a further confirmation of our view, that the line of the outer is strictly drawn at the limit of the valid working of the sense co-efficient. This makes it necessary that all memory objects which stand fulfilled in a terminus, and issue in the successful reinstatement of a sense object, belong to the outer, though they may be recognized by an observer as personal and even illusory constructions. For the rôle of the memory co-efficient, in the first instance, working thus jointly with

that of sense, is not to determine a new object, but only to determine the characters of persistence and recurrence in the *one* external thing. This is, however, for its implications for the theory of reality, a matter of remark in another place¹; it is here pointed out merely that the original line of cleavage between the inner and the outer does not fall between sense perception and memory, as is often supposed, but between perception plus fulfilled² memory, and the sort of unfulfilled pseudo-memory³ which, just from its ineffectiveness, is now read off into a sphere of imaging *per se*. It is only later on, in a more developed mode, that the line of distinction, now reached between inner and outer, is revised,

able psychic state, i.e. one falling away from or "lifted" from the object which its own constitution postulates. Our own account has the advantage of detecting the earlier form of this detachment, in which not the entire mental life or "experience" as a whole is "inner" (as it is later on: see below, and chap. xi.), but only that portion of it which is essentially unfulfilled and inconvertible, the "objects of fancy."

¹ In vol. iii., on "Real Logic."

² In my usage, one experience "fulfils" another when it supplies its end-state, terminus, or satisfaction.

³ This term suggests that applied by Meinong, *Pseudo-existenz*, to the objects (*Gegenstände*) in general which have no reality (*Existenz*) apart from their presence in thought. I do not think Meinong's usage good, however, since his connotation of the term includes the later stage—what I call the "Substantive Mode"—of actual dualism between Mind and Body, in which the sphere of the inner or mental becomes quite as validly real in its own sense as is the outer or bodily in its sense, and both of the two are entitled to the existence predicate without the disparagement of the "pseudo." This disparagement is, however, psychically justified in the first rise of the inner-outer distinction, for this distinction is due just to the failure of the developing inner to make good its pretence (*ψευδος*) of being outer. Meinong's latest discussion of *Pseudo-objekte* is in his *Erfahrungsgrundlagen unseres Wissens*, § 10. In the same work (§§ 15, 16,) he has a new discussion of the "inner" and "outer" reference of images (*Einwärts und Auswärtswendung von Phantasie-erlebnisse*).

and all images, including those of accurate memory, are placed in the inner class.

§ 2. THE NATURE OF THE OBJECT OF FANCY

7. The fancy object—the thing of fancy—is thus what the descriptions of the psychologies tell us. It is a bare creature of detachment and seemingly accidental occurrence. **Object of Fancy lacks Control and Confirmation.** It lacks both the references which give mediate control its force: inner consent and outer confirmation. It lacks confirmation in any sphere of valid objective reference from its failure to make good its appeal to the sensational co-efficient (or any other real co-efficient, logical or other, which arises in more developed consciousness). There is, therefore, no apparent external control of fancy. There is also no inner control, even indirect, no sense of conversion-at-will into anything more real than itself; for the cases of such control are those which are already accounted to the credit of memory as such. The dualism of fancy, as we just said, is that of real process *versus* unreal process—whatever meaning these terms may afterwards come to possess—the latter being, by this limitation, without law on either side. Its creatures are bizarre, disconnected, fragmentary, temporary—they are merely a fleeting stream of inner happenings.

8. There is yet, however, one additional thing to note about these objects of the operation of fancy: their *psychic independence*, if it may be so called. I mean the fact that **and is not owned or made Object of Interest.** the conative dispositions and interests are not carried out, nor, in any great degree, implicated by them. We smile at the pranks of our fancy, and decline to be in any way responsible for its doings. There is a radical psychic aloofness and lack of ownership due no doubt in part to the failure of the “mediate” subjective reference, but by such an account not, I think, fully explained. It is due also, no doubt, in some measure to the thoroughness of the separation from actual life which the annulling of the real co-efficients produces. The development of interest, the forming of habit, the tendency of conation towards this or that sort of experience—each of these is a function of the determination of actual life with its satisfactions and its failures. These processes which by their lack of association and control approach the accidental with reference both to the external and to the psychic, have no claim upon our interest.¹

¹ On the psychic side no doubt the fact is largely due to the relative

This has its importance, as will appear later on, where a further dualism appears, that between the subject and its objects, or the "self and the not-self." The self-not-self dualism has its roots in the dualism of "inner and outer"; but the latter is not yet the former; and this character of the inner, whereby it lacks determination as either self (though inner) or not-self (though objective) while sufficient to cause us to stay our haste in reaching the fuller distinction, nevertheless anticipates the further development. The swinging of the pendulum over to the uncontrolled precedes its return to the dual control. In the New York of our fancy the streets are swept clear of Tammany police, that the new era may be one of direct control by intelligent law and civic righteousness! So this inner city loses its brutal compulsions that it may be controlled later on by self-legislated truth and ideals of reflection.

§ 3. THE INNER AS PSYCHIC MODE

9. Seeing that the distinction of "inner" from "outer," now found to be characteristic of the function of imaging in those genetic aspects known as memory and fancy, is to remain with us all through mental development,

lack of extended context, or to its discontinuity. The "radicalness" of this thing is seen in the relatively *a-dynamic* character of our dreams, their relative unconnectedness with appropriate movements of the body. What is called dynamogenesis does not seem to work so delicately for dream images as for waking images. Some time ago Bradley (*Mind*, N.S. iii. p. 373) discussed this matter suggestively. Not long since, during a severe illness, I made some notes comparing normal dream states, in this respect, with those of high fever. During the fever I was constantly awaked by my own movements of fingers, arms, members generally, which closely carried out the actions presented in my dreams. There was the greatest contrast with ordinary sleep, in which only exceptional and occasional memory images have their full dynamogenic value to stimulate actual movements; if it were otherwise our sleep would be excessively broken and unrestful.

Psychophysically it must mean a degree of remoteness or disconnectedness, in function if no more, of the dream process in the brain from the discharging or emissive centres. Yet our theories of cerebral action would lead us to expect the reverse. We should expect that when the higher associative and unifying processes, which are inhibitive and controlling upon movement, are deadened or "asleep," then the more automatic and isolated circuits would "go off" so much the more promptly and violently. The *connexions* between the imaging and the emissive centres seem, however, most pervious and dynamic in waking life and under the artificial stimulation of fever.

and is besides to be the starting-point for further great dualisms and distinctions, it may be well to give it closer scrutiny. The facts already stated may be formulated with reference more particularly to the genetic significance of the inner realm; the fuller nature of the outer is brought out in later connexions.¹

The inner *is not the outer*: that is, it is inner just in that it fails of outer fulfilment in the two essential respects now made clear.

(1) It fails, in the first place, and in its earliest mode, of the sort of *developable or representing context* which carries the (1) The inner value of convertibility. It is therefore apprehended as **fails of Convertible Context.** what is out of touch with the mass of materials already hardened into an outer system. *It may acquire a context for itself*, and this context may run a wide course in the development peculiar to the image world. It remains, however, somewhere radically discontinuous with the external system or organized context which has been established under the sense co-efficient. There is an abrupt break where the essential confirmation of actual contact with the sense world is appealed to and found lacking.

10. (2) The inner as such fails of that sort of detachment which guarantees *separate persistence to the objects of sense*. We have seen, in treating of the matter, how it comes that (2) It fails of **Persistence Co-efficient,** an object which is once recognized or identified as the same cannot be simply the momentarily past or the momentarily present, but must be *the continuous between the past and the present*: that is, the persisting. This character the object of fancy lacks, and so differs from that of memory—until indeed that is recognized as also an “inner-image”—for it is through its failure to make connexions in the context of external things as just mentioned, that it is first separated off as an inconstant and fugitive image.

11. It is interesting to note, however, that the objects of fancy do also in their own way *acquire a persistence co-efficient*.

The nature of it and its genetic bearings are matters of later study.² Yet it may be remarked that, from **but Acquires One for Itself.** the theoretical point of view, some sort of persisting quality attaching to the psychic itself would seem to be a pre-

¹ See chap. x. on “Substance,” and the treatment of “Reality” in vol. iii.

² Chap. x. §§ 1, 2.

requisite of the recognition¹ function through which persistence is attributed to external things. While this is true it does not follow that this theoretical persistence is psychic to the process of recognition itself, nor that it has the same character as that to which we give the same name in the case of the outer. As to the first of these points, it may be that it is only *after* the derivation of actually persisting objects under the co-efficient of convertibility, that the objects of the inner life are also recognized as persisting, even when, as in the case of images of fancy, that co-efficient is absent. That the inner persistence is also in some way different would seem to be supported by the fact that persistence in the inner realm is not an attribute of the particular object-images taken severally, but an attribute of the inner world as a whole in which the play of images takes place.

12. (3) Another and more positive character of the inner object is this—that not being externally detached and persistent, nor involving any further fulfilment to be realized by the following out of a context, it is in a certain sense owned, held, and carried about *with and in the process that has it*. This is true at first in the cruder sense that the image is not a thing separate from the perceiver's own organism, which is himself. The child establishes the relationships of the outer largely with reference to his own bodily form and presence. *His periphery is the boundary and criterion of outwardness*. The beginning of his orientation is outward from his body; indeed, the actual testing whereby he applies the co-efficient of conversion into sense objects is done by the efforts and explorations which bring about the contact of his body with things.

Indeed, this sense of the image's presence with, and in some sense *in*, the bodily person, exhausts apparently the meaning of ownership, or carried-with-me-ness, at this stage of psychic progress. And it leads to the placing of the body itself in a very anomalous and unstable position—a position so unstable that a great movement in advance toward the subject-object dualism is prepared for by it. The body of the owner is *outer* by reason of its fulfilment of the co-efficients of

¹ Recognition is the broader case of fulfilment of which the conversion meaning of a memory object is a special case; cf. the topic "Individuation," chap. viii. §§ 1 ff. The hints given here on inner persistence are developed in chapter x. § 2.

(3) The Inner
is Carried
about.

Anomalous
Position of
the Private
Body.

present sense value and persistence through recognition ; yet it is in some way the *locus et situs* of the images of fancy which are now set off as inner. The resolution of the ambiguity involves the carrying further of a social motive, the beginnings of which have already had attention, and which leads to a new specification of the inner *as including images of memory no less than those of fancy* (see sect. 23 of this chapter).

13. (4) The character of the inner as what is usually called "subjective," in its widest meaning, is now fast upon us, and we are able to see the genetic conditions of its rise. So far we have been dealing entirely with the psychic process as working upon its present content. From the psychic point of view, we have contended, such process is simply and only what it is—a movement or series of movements of contents. No attribution to this movement of intrinsic "subjectivity" is possible from this point of view ; on the contrary, subjectivity is the observer's way of reading the process. It becomes, therefore, a point of prime interest to ask when and how a process which is subjective to us *when viewed from our later derived vantage ground of observation, becomes also subjective to itself*. The question is : when does the psychically subjective arise ?

14. As a foil to this question it is instructive to remark that, while we have to ask later on the analogous question of the What, When, and How of the psychically objective, that question does not arise here. For the term contrasted in meaning to "subjective" in this mode is not "objective," but "external." The meanings "subjective" and "external" afford a dualism prior to that of subjective and objective.

The antithesis with which we are dealing, and which both the questions now raised serve to define, is that between what is internal as separated-off from what is not ; it is a distinction *between the internal and the external*. It is possible for either term of this distinction, once it has arisen, to take on relatively independent genetic progressions into later modes. The inner is determined as "subjective" in the way we now go on to depict. The outer or external remains antithetic to it only while resting under its own proper co-efficients of externality. It later on loses these co-efficients, and *in a quite different sense* comes into antithesis to the internal or subjective, in the special mode of "experience" or "reflection." The objective, psychically considered, is not

(4) The Inner
is Germinal
to the Subjective.

Independent
Progression
of either
Inner or
Outer.

co-extensive with the external. Any or all of the external things, when taken up as psychic objects, become experience, which is inner. All objects of thought are inner; only some of them carry besides the co-efficient of externality. In having defined the co-efficient of externality, therefore, the removal of which in so far determines the inner, *we have by no means as yet defined or derived the antithesis of subject and object.* As matter of fact, the inner as subjective attains considerable development, as relative to the external or physical, before the latter goes far toward becoming the reflectively objective. It appears that a *certain development of the subjective whereby the content of the inner itself becomes capable of determination as object or psychic content* is a necessary condition of the rise of the psychic dualism of subject and object.

It is instructive also to glance backwards and take in the meaning of "external" in the earliest dualistic modes. So far as it has been psychically present at all, externality has meant merely separateness of object from object, the significant case being separateness of sense and memory objects from the private body, which is likewise an object of sense and memory. The fruitful aspect of this one significant case is the fact that this private body has also "personal" characters attached to it, and through these the ambiguity arises which makes the fuller meaning of external—external to an internal—forthwith genetically necessary.

15. It is necessary to make these remarks because of the prevailing ambiguity already mentioned. The phrase "objective reference" is used (1) for the essential reference of cognition as such, as being the function of objective construction, whether or no there be a psychic reference involving a subject-object dualism. But the phrase is used also (2) for the reference of the latter type, that of a *psychic process aware of its treatment of contents as objects of its own subject-function.* The discussion of the rise and meaning of the dualism of inner and outer on which we have just been engaged does not involve the determination of the objective reference *in either of these senses.* The first sense is assumed in the assumption of cognitive process; the second arises later on, in the progression to the self-not-self mode. To the latter I shall apply the term "object reference," reserving the phrase "objective reference" for the reference of

External not
the same as
Objective.

"Objective
Reference"
an ambiguous
Term.

cognition as such, wherever we find it. In the mere inner-outer dualism the two sorts of content are equally objective in the sense of being cognized; it is only when one of them takes on the psychic function of knower or subject, in opposition to all its objects, *whether external or not*, that the "object-reference," and with it the "subject-reference," arises.¹

§ 4. THE INNER-OUTER MODE AS QUASI-LOGICAL

16. It may be asked in what respect we are justified in classing the inner-outer mode as "quasi-logical." This is indeed a fair question. We found that the memory object does not afford any objective determinations beyond those of the sense object. We now find, however, that in the failure of the memory co-efficient, in the fancy mode, the content is differentiated into the inner and the outer. This opposition is the beginning of the progression by which *the self is set over against the object of its thought*.

We shall have to address ourselves later on to the task of showing those further stages, in this opposition, which lead on to the clearly logical, as seen in the judgment and predication modes. But it is plain that the distinction is logically immature so long as the determination of self is merely inner as distinguished from outer, for the inner has no further characters than those of the play of uncontrolled images. It has no consistent or persistent identity. But the beginning is made toward the logical mode (and hence the term quasi-logical) in the fact that it is only in the material of the inner sphere—material, that is, which cannot be treated under the co-efficients of the

¹ The remarks made in the text suggest some of the difficulties of terminology in the treatment of this line of distinctions. The adjectives "objective" and "subjective" are so given over to the observer's—or spectator's—point of view, that it is useless to try to restrict them. We call consciousness "subjective process," meaning that it is psychic process, not necessarily, though indeed possibly, having "a subject." "Subjective" is thus synonymous with psychic, a usage which allows "subjectivity" as noun to the adjective psychic. I shall respect this usage, and for the narrower meaning of subjective as adjective of "subject" I shall use the latter word as prefix, with the hyphen (thus "subject-mode," the mode of the psychic or subjective, which carries the "subject-object" dualism, etc.). Similarly for "objective": all cognitive consciousness is objective; but only that which is also "subject-consciousness" is to be called "object-consciousness."

outer—that the factor of control is found which takes on, in the later mode, the form of the self that judges and predicates.

§ 5. THE PROGRESSION TO THE SUBJECT-MODE. THE PSYCHIC AS EXPERIENCE

17. Granted the dualism of inner and outer as now described, it would not appear necessary that the former should have the character of what we call a “subject”; in other words, that its psychic-process should be to itself “experience.”¹ The mere setting aside, as by a cleft in the context of cognition, of one body of data as detached in the sense of external to another body, this latter being *inner in some yet undefined meaning*, does not determine the subjective. The individual’s private body, it seems, claims in a way to be in both classes and to have both meanings at once. On account of this it is, indeed, that consciousness goes on to what we may call the first and later determinations of the subjective, in the way now to be pointed out.

18. (1) The first determination of the “subjective.” Long before the rise of the inner-outer dualism happenings have occurred which did not have the sort of sense co-efficients belonging to objects of cognition, but which were nevertheless attached to the physical personal body. Pains, pleasures, strains, efforts, dispositional gropings, urgent emotional cravings and rebellions—all of them psychic

¹ In a later place (chap. xi. §§ 1, 4, also in vol. ii.) it is pointed out that in the concept “experience”—as in so many others in use—glaring genetic inconsistencies are current.

“Experience” as an objective term is used of all psychic process. Even after the “subject” proper has seemingly evaporated, there is talk of “pure,” “absolute,” and other experience. But experience is also a psychic concept, and we must ask not only about experience as psychic process thought of by another, say the child’s experience as *I suppose he has it*, but also about psychic process thought of by its own subject—what *the child can call his experience*. When can he say, “I have experience,” or simply, “Behold, experience!”

For example, we may say that the earth-worm a day old has had a few hours’ experience; but could the earth-worm say, or mean, anything of the sort? He, or it, may have psychic processes determined by residual dispositional factors drifting down the tide of his inner mental life—coming from *what we call* his earlier experience—but it is only when these factors are in some degree isolated and held apart—*made his object*, in short, as he no doubt never does—that *he, the worm, would have experience*.

events of overwhelming strength and urgency in early infancy—did not have the characters which cognized objects have as relatively separable and revivable wholes; but they had assignment in the physical body. Pains are in the hand, foot, or elsewhere; pleasures are in the mouth; efforts are here or there in the active peripheral mechanism. All are crudely assigned their place, and such assignment is about all the objective meaning they have.

But the fact that they are so highly spiced, intense, and exciting does not mean that they have the "subjective" character which we later ascribe to them. They belong to the "personal project"; to Johnnie in the third person, not in the first. They are subject only to the one distinction to which we have found such person projects subject—that of being in certain ways not the same as "thing projects." The point is that such a personal project does not have—because it need not have, even in the case of Johnnie's own body—any further or second determination as belonging to a "subjective," or of being, in any definite way, in a separable subjective sphere.

19. (2) The second determination of the "subjective." There are, however, two motives of a genetic sort, which converge to a new determination and secure it. One of them arises from the anomalous position of the body as being in a sense in each of the two classes, inner and outer; and the other arises in the further intercourse of the individual with persons in the environment. Let us look at the two motives in turn.

20. (a) What I have called the anomalous position of the body becomes in the process of development an actually compromising one. The body is frequently caught *in flagrante delictu*, having intercourse with impersonal nature, while still posing as a virginal personal centre. Treated as a thing, Johnnie can at will touch and manipulate his body here or there, and this to an extent to which he finds other personal projects do not submit. Even in his pains *he can find and stroke the spot*; even in his pleasures *he can break off*—by closing his lips to the source of supply, let us say. There is a certain possible *range of wilfulness*, a certain jerkiness, *which clarifies greatly the events of the inner class*; for in these things his bodily action is further removed from the regularities of behaviour of dead things—further than are the actions of others' bodies, law-

Second Determination of "Subjective"—two Factors.

(a) The Body is in an Ambiguous Position,

at once Ex-al yet also contains his Inner Caprice and

less as the latter also are. No doubt happenings of this sort are to be attributed, from an objective point of view, to the psycho-physical organism taken as a whole; largely to the acquired and inherited predispositions in which the appetites and habits and overflow nerve-processes issue. They no doubt in some cases have a *certain shading of feeling of self-reserve, or initiation over against their very urgency and carry-me-with-them character*; but still it is all, I think, *part of the whole which the body is and means*. We cannot yet call them "subject-processes."

This shading of reserve is sharpest in the phenomenon which has been taken as the point of departure of historical theories¹ of personality and self-activity—the phenomenon of effort against resistance. And such a theory has some justification. But at this stage efforts also belong, I think, to the group of characters which constitute the body a "personal project." They are in the body, which is in this respect a peculiar object, different from external things. It will appear later on, when the mode of control called "experimental" is discussed, that this strand of genesis has its place of importance.²

21. (b) The further determination due to intercourse with persons is moreover also now struggling to free itself; it is this intercourse which discharges the electric spark into the mixture, and releases the pure water of the subjective river of life. The decisive cue to the child is, I think, the experience by which he is compelled to divide up the body project into two relatively distinct parts; one part belonging still to the sphere of the outer, and the other part now becoming in a fuller sense inner. Thus is the ambiguity of the body-self cleared up, but not at first in the case of the individual's own body. Search as we may, I do not think we can find any event so critical in the feeling and treatment of his body as to compel the individual to make this separation—any compelling line of cleavage in the mass of his quasi-personal but still organic self-material. *He might get along well enough*, as indeed the animals seem to get along,

(b) Further
Intercourse
with Persons

leads to
Division of
the Body into
Two Parts.

¹ Notably by the French School of *nouveaux Spiritualistes*, Maine de Biran, Jouffroy, etc. A recent book which may be cited is Bertrand's *La Psychologie de l'effort*.

² Below, § 6 of this chapter; also chap. vi. § 4.

with the two-faced, ambiguous, and crude personality that the body then is.¹

22. It is now his further intercourse with other persons that compels the recognition of the subjective as a mark or character, and later on for the first time constitutes what is "experience," although, as will appear, the material of it is that of his own psychic life. It is only in his intercourse with others that he is *compelled to divorce the inner as such from the body*. The kernel of it is found in certain situations

Same Inner
Stuff may
Attach to
Different
Bodies.

in which he finds the essence of what had been quasi-personal content *attaching indifferently, at the same time or at different times, to different bodies*.

Any situation that does this no doubt suffices; yet while there may be more than one situation that fulfils this typical function, yet the one normally of critical importance is, I think, that in which one individual consciously imitates another.²

By his imitations the child realizes the full meaning of action, expression, conduct generally. He sees another do this

Imitation
the Typical
Case.

thing or that, but it is so far simply the construction of a personal project. He falls to imitating the action,

and then the whole inner meaning to the person imitated, comes to himself. The immediate lesson is twofold. First, he becomes aware that in the person hitherto apprehended simply as outer, a personal outer, there is going on a

¹ The present writer has maintained elsewhere that the "interaction" theory of the relation of mind and body is an attempt to justify just this mongrel sort of a self, half-physical and half-something-else (*The Psycholog. Review*, May 1903).

² We may recall here the appropriate "canon of actuality" laid down in an earlier place (chap. i. sect. 27 (6)).

The point is developed further in the passage (chap. x. §§ 3, 4) in which it is shown that the dualism of mind and body requires the meaning of *actual separation* of the two sorts of thing. This comes when the "subject" arises, as is depicted in the text just above. The point is to be insisted upon, that mere lack or absence or failure of what is anticipated, while it establishes inner content, nevertheless does not suffice for the detachment of the inner as "subject" from the personal body. The ambiguous position of the body forces the further distinction which makes the inner a "subject." Imitation suffices as means to this. It may be that there are other equally adequate means, though I do not think the child makes this full distinction until long after he has fallen to imitating. Avenarius' theory of "Introjection," which points out the racial motive to the dualism of mind and body, goes very well with this.

class of happenings which he himself before felt *in his own body*—as characters of his private body-self. This mass of psychic stuff, therefore, is indifferently—so he now begins to find—in either of the two, and in all of the many who make up his social *milieu*.

Child Finds If this be true, then this series of happenings is just
(1) that other herein treated and thought about differently from
Person has “inner” and the “thing” part as such of the person; and in this
 distinction one term is now psychic. This is the “subject”
 consciousness now taking on distinctive form.

23. The second result, yet again, is that by this act of imitation he takes over into the inner a body of data of action and sensation which before this to his thought was essentially
(2) that the outer—in the sense of being external and not per-
“Outer” in sonal at all. *He discovers in imitation a way to renew*
General may and extend indefinitely the representing and convertible
become *memory series by a process the reverse of that of its establishment.* For
“Inner.” originally these characters came from the revival of memory objects and their conversion into those having the sense co-efficient, and the “inner” got its definition from the cases in which this promise of conversion failed of fulfilment. Now, on the contrary, in imitation he finds a way of getting images of the actually outer at will, which although they are inner yet do not fail of fulfilment as regards outer meaning also.

The subjective is therefore to him more than the merely revived inner, as before marked off in his apprehension. The subjective includes not only the characteristically inner—the image objects as such, together with the group of affective-conative experiences which now cluster about the inner contents—but all the outer also *so far as it is*
Experience *imitatively taken up and copied.* The whole body
as a Play of psychic objects, all the products of the cognitive
of Ideas. function now forthwith pass over into this larger field, the subjective or psychic as such: *the world of ideas*.¹ For it goes on to do so as his imitation becomes general and consciously directed.

It is essential, however, to note, that even in this achieve-

¹ There is no better use of the term “idea” than that of Locke: idea is “the object of the understanding when it *thinks*”—that is, when it does anything more than merely have “impressions.” For “experience” as here defined, however, not only are there ideas, but there is consciousness of them as objects to the present subject.

ment of becoming subjective, he has not yet come into the full dualism of subject and object of experience; for the reason that this does not imply full inner control of the content as such. He has the *motive to the dualism* in the distinction between the truly and intimately inner portion of the subjective—that portion which fails of the representing co-efficient—and the representative part, or that which does not so fail. But a relatively new and most interesting method of treating images has yet¹ to be developed: the method of treating the material of the subjective or psychic order *just with view*—speaking in terms of result—to the *sharpening and defining of this last made distinction*. This is the method called “experimental,” and its consideration brings us to the topic of “experimental control.”

§ 6. RISE OF EXPERIMENTAL CONTROL

24. It is necessary here, even before going into the characterization of the “play” mode which the topic introduces, to note the beginning of a sort of control which becomes fully developed in that mode; the more because it serves as a transition link in the series of terms of development of the “control mode” itself.

The body of the individual, although saved from one compromising situation, again “puts its foot into it,” and lands in another equally compromising. It is taken, as we saw, from the intercourse with the inner by being cut into two parts, its inner characters being reserved for that new mode, the subjective; while the body as “thing,” still stands as a sense object in the “outer” realm.

Personal
Body again
Ambiguous.

¹ “Yet,” not in a chronological sense, but with reference to completeness. The whole progression from the image to the reflection mode, is so complex that its elements have to be treated in order of apparent emergence, while the whole is still looked upon as a single vital movement. While the content is becoming inner-and-outer, and again inner as experience, the control is passing through its corresponding phases from experimentally inner to fully subjective, and with it all, the higher meanings of the mode of reflection, as described in chap. xi., are being released from the ambiguities which precede them. Chronological sequence holds, I think, only of the intrinsic terms of each progression, and then only of the earliest and simplest form of such progression, when no retrospective meanings have sprung up to complicate the simple forward-going temporal movement. It is, in part, to avoid the appearance of chronological sequence that this preliminary approach to the mode of reflection is put here: it is properly introductory to chap. xi.

This is resorted to first for the bodies of other people ; yet one's own body must suffer the same fate. But here ambiguities again spring up. For it is part of the lesson of the subjective, in the large sense now achieved, that all objects may be brought into it through imitative reproduction, and this must hold of one's private personal body. So naturally this private body must be subjective in the sense of being thus representative, although as "copy" for imitation it is an external thing.

Now the ambiguity that arises is this. The conversion and representing co-efficients do not apply to the private body in any adequate way ; on the contrary, it is the means or tool by which the imitation process itself works in rendering other bodies in psychic terms. The first term in any series of movements terminating in the sense co-efficient is in one's own body ; but it is also a term which is not a candidate either for external value or for representative meaning. It is an "effort," a strain, a kinaesthetic something. It seems to be *owned, held to, made a sort of fulcrum* ; and as such it falls

It is Tool of
all Testing of
Outer Things.

Effort Term
is still a
"Body" Term
though Inner.

on the side of the intimately inner. Its subtlest form is that sense of agency which is sometimes explicitly pointed to as the final kernel of all inner experiences and values. The "innervation theory" of effort, still surviving though so often slain, testifies to the fact that this experience, which is the essential one in the motor testing of the external, as well as the imitative rendering of it, *is still a sort of middle term only known by actually living in and using one's own body.*

25. In this innermost subjective experience a form of control arises which characterizes the progression into the "semblant" mode now immediately following. It arises in the situation depicted just above, that of the *actual testing of the sense and memory co-efficients of images.*

This Isolates
the Inner
Control of an
Experimental
Sort—

It receives emphasis when this testing is carried over, by the imitative function, into the effort to *manipulate and mould material of the imaging process apart from actual touch with things.* The child's own organism by going through a series of performances, is bent gradually to the purposes of the fulfilment of ideas, and so brought to control. The treatment

through
the Body.

is "experimental," in the sense that it is by a process of actual trial, selection, elimination, and reduction. And the remarkable thing is that it is the image series, itself controlled by memory co-efficients, that dominates and supplies

the models for this experimental reduction. The hold of the subjective on the organism becomes greatly developed in this way, *until the whole body becomes the tool of mind*.

The experimental control, thus established and exercised in subduing the body and training it to check, confirm, and interpret ideas, is directed upon all experience. The field of the subjective, embracing both the representing data of memory, and also the capricious objects of mere fancy, becomes the theatre of selection and determination; and that which *remains, after this process and to the last, only inner* is driven back upon itself in the way which we call not merely subjective—including objects also—but *the subject*, in contrast with *all objects*. This movement, however, is a topic reserved for treatment in the chapters devoted to Reflection.

§ 7. PERSONAL IMAGE OBJECTS

Were we concerned in tracing out in their genetic order the progressions of the self-mode,¹ we should have asked before how the memory objects of persons are constituted. The question may be taken up here in the more general form of the inquiry as to what we have in mind when we *remember another person as a self*. How is the content then employed determined and controlled?

26. It will no doubt take us a considerable way to an answer to this question if we recall the general principles governing the constitution of memory objects in general, whatever their kind. When we have recalled these principles, we may then inquire how they operate in the case of those memories which are "personal."

We recall at once the two great characters of memory objects: their "representing" character, and their "conversion" character. The first of these was found to reside in the complicated context in which the memory whole presents itself—a context in all its essentials identical with the original. This context was found to be *liftable*, so to speak, from the perceptual series upon which it is modelled, and in some cases also *lifted* from it and recognized as standing vicariously for it. This character, whereby memory is representing, exhausts the content which is determined as a memory object. Secondly, there is the conversion character. It is that character whereby the memory object is taken to be the means or medium by which

¹ A topic explicitly dealt with in chap. viii. § 9.

a contextual series may be "run-down" and found to terminate in the actual object. This is the control aspect of memory. Only such contexts as admit of such conversion, issuing in actual sense presence, are true memories, no matter how good the claim to representing character may, on the surface of the construction itself, seem to be. This character it was that led us to the conception of "mediate control."

So much accepted, as resulting from our earlier expositions, our questions now are, in what way and how far the memory of persons exhibits and illustrates these two characters of memory objects.

27. Taking up the two characters in their reverse order, for purposes of treatment, we find it possible to say at once, that the conversion character is in some sense realized in the case of remembered persons. It is true that my memory of Mr. So-and-So, for example, does hold out to me the possibility of finding Mr. So-and-So. When I want to see him, I have only to track out the appropriate context. I go down X-Lane, to the corner of Y-Street, ring the bell at the door of No. 6, and find myself shaking hands with Mr. So-and-So, and hearing his familiar voice.

But difficulties now begin to arise—not indeed in practice, but in theory. I ask what is the terminus, the end-term of the series, which so contents me that I report I have found Mr. So-and-So.

The difficulty of finding an answer to this question appears when we ask what it is that is looked for, what it is that really constitutes the presence of Mr. So-and-So. This takes us over to the consideration of the other character of memory objects, the content. It must be a content that may stand vicariously for the original body of experiences constituting the actual object—in this case the person of Mr. So-and-so.

28. The answer will depend upon the stage or mode of psychic development. In the early "projective" mode, there is no difficulty, because then the "person-project" is one among many objects, and stands before me embodied in the physical person of Mr. So-and-So.

29. At the stage which we have called the "first determination" of the inner, however, the question of the actual matter of the personal self comes up. The context which is to serve as the terminus of the conversion series of memory, must be in some sense inner if it is to be a person. At

The Conversion of a Personal Memory.

What is the Context?

At first it is the Physical Person-object.

How can the inner claim Conversion?

that stage the inner is set off as not-outer : as being, that is, not continuous with the series which has a definite course under the co-efficient of sense-reality. So the question arises : how is it possible for this aspect of the memory co-efficient to be in force to effect *the conversion, into some form of fulfilling reality, of a content which is essentially inner, but is still involved in a context that can be traced only under the co-efficient of the outer?* How can that which is characteristically inner prove itself by conversion into that which is in some sense outer ?

30. This is an interesting question, rather because it illustrates a position already taken, than because it brings up anything altogether new. It will be remembered that we decided that while at this stage the inner was beginning to take on the character of subjectivity, yet it was in each instance located in a private body. Certain embarrassments quickly arise from the fact ; yet this is nevertheless what is true. Inner character consists in freedom from sense co-efficients, and in relative capriciousness ; and this, indeed, is the nature of the person-projects in which the inner at first resides. The material of the inner life as such of Mr. So-and-So, expressly claims to escape being a terminus of a series guaranteed by the sense co-efficient. The result, therefore, would seem to be the identification *simply and solely of the bodily presence of Mr. So-and-So.*

Yet this bodily presence stands also for, or means, the inwardness which he is beginning to possess, *but which has no locus save in the body which is his.* With it all, indeed, there is beginning to arise the sense of further meaning attaching to the So-and-So context as inner or spiritual : the sense motivated by the difficulty of reading the whole object simply as a body or outer context. But this difficulty is at this stage becoming even more urgent, as we saw above, in the case of the private ownership of a similar body of one's own.

31. At the next stage of determination, however, the question of finding a personal context fitted to serve as conversion-terminus, becomes a distinctive and interesting one.

In the next Mode, The mode in question is marked by the division of the physical person into two parts, one part taken for a physical object among others in the real world outside, and the other taken over into the inner as psychic or subjective. This, we may recall, is made needful by the impossibility of continuing to treat one's own private body as exclusively external.

The difficulty is here met in a way that proves confirmatory of two of the more essential positions of the foregoing development. The memory process "runs down" the externally given series, the context, as in the case of any other external object. So far as the purposes of the identification are simply those of passing interest or curiosity, the bodily presence thus secured is accepted, as in earlier modes, as the required terminus. I am quite satisfied to say that I saw Mr. So-and-So in his pew at church. The demand for further confirmation of the individual's personality, however, cannot be so satisfied. For the strands of the objective context lead up to a chasm, or gulf, at the edge of which the sense co-efficient fails, and the process of conversion can go no further. It is a commonplace of the most superficial psychology that not by seeing nor by hearing can we apprehend the events of another's inner life and character; there must be additional signs or marks of spiritual meaning.

32. It is just here that one of the progressions described above has essential place, and this complication illustrates and confirms it. The individual learns to treat his own body as a tool for turning all the series of external things into copy for his mental manipulation. He thus achieves the wonderful step whereby all objects alike become *his* objects, *his* content of memory, *his* experience. On this basis he can now establish a larger psychic context in which the two partial contexts, *inner and outer*, are together integrated in the larger whole of experience. As series of external facts, it yet remains true that the psychic life of Mr. So-and-So cannot be realized as a terminus under the co-efficient of sense; but as *objective representing content constituted as experience*, both the bodily and the mental ingredients can be recalled and identified in one continuous context.

So there grows up, *in the mode of reflection*, a context actually lifted from the bodily Mr. So-and-So, and with this I work. As with other objects, so with him, I now deal with this, only looking for such physical confirmatory and fulfilling experiences of him as do not disturb my realization of his full presence. In this context all the rich variety of Mr. So-and-So's actual presence are anticipated and recalled: his characteristic sentiments, his emotional play, his sombre mood. The spiritual meanings attach without discontinuity to the images of his

voice, attitude, and physical characters in general. There is no sense of jar or incongruity because the entire set of data have now become alike *matter of experience as a whole, objects of thought*, in that larger inner context which merges the dualism between the inner and the outer in the later dualism of subject and object.

33. The other respect in which this result confirms a foregoing principle of development is this. So far as my friend So-and-So is considered, as of course he is, a veritable person, living and acting outside of my experience altogether, there must be some sort of conversion of the larger context which is constituted as experience : for not even the physical self can be finally guaranteed until it is established under the sense co-efficient. The entire context is, in fact, treated as fulfilled, in the fulfilment of the sense co-efficient, *so far as that goes* ; but there is meanwhile the reservation that further experience of Mr. So-and-So must confirm the confirmation, so to speak. This means that besides the present sense-test, so far successfully carried out, there is the filling in of the gap, the reading in of the inner values, *from the context of my larger representative system of experience*, so that Mr. So-and-So as a self not only fulfils the sense co-efficient on the physical side, but also fulfils the expectations raised by my consistent experience of him as inner and spiritual meaning.

34. This no doubt suffices for the requirements of memory pure and simple ; but once the chasm is established between inner and outer, it is no longer a matter simply of memory. As a person, Mr. So-and-So cannot be treated as a uniform objective context of my experience. It is a part of my expectation, in all my contact with him, as with other persons, that, in the midst of this my best contextual interpretation of him on the basis of experience, he will ever and anon demonstrate the inadequacy of my procedure *by being after all a centre of undiscounted inner life as every person must be*. So while, if I ask Mr. So-and-So about the past he will no doubt confirm my experiential context in those links and lines of it in which my sense co-efficients were supplemented from my larger system of meanings ; yet the justification of my experience will be found to stop there. It is only in respect to the general features of psychic life as such, that I can anticipate his thought or action.

So much, however, I can do : I attribute to him the inner

life of experience which in this mode I myself also have. This is what we have called "ejection." By it the "other" of my personal memory and knowledge is all the while the theatre of just that mode of self-centredness and subjective control that I am, in my own growth, now achieving. On this I finally fall back. I say, in my rising perplexity, however eccentric my friend may be in his assertion of spiritual individuality: "So-and-So is no idiot"; "So-and-So doesn't wear feathers!" The "funded content" of the self which So-and-So is—that dispositional, habitual, solid body of personal content which has experiences and memories similar to and confirmatory of my own—that is the final co-efficient of my apprehension of him as personal. My represented context runs up to it, as just described, leading me to accept its guarantee of Mr. So-and-So's past, and also largely of his present personality; but it is as a singular instance, within the larger meaning of the personal as such.¹

35. It is, finally, a corollary from this view, that the form of control is inner to the last. There is the express proviso, all the while psychically maintained, in the very thought of So-and-So as a person, that the spontaneity of personal control be unimpaired. Mr. So-and-So may break through the cordon within which my experience attempts to hold him; and I admit this, even though I be constrained to say of my friend "So-and-So must have been bluffing me, playing with me, for the real So-and-So could *not* have acted so-and-so!"

This is, indeed, only to say—what we must have a care to say—that once the self has come to be subject in the dualism in which *the whole of experience is object*, then the thought of another person as its own subject *must carry more than its determination as my object*. He too is subject; the very control which determines experience as objective to me, makes it possible experience also to him; and I must include in the object "him," that mode of psychic life which makes him *subject of his own processes as well as object of mine*.

But
inwardly
Spontaneous
and Self-
Controlled.

¹ The personal as "general" meaning is treated below, in chap. x. § 5.

Chapter VI

THE FIRST DETERMINATION OF SEMBLANT OBJECTS: PLAY OR MAKE-BELIEVE OBJECTS

§ I. THE CHARACTERS OF PLAY OBJECTS

1. The definition of a "semblant" object given above (chap. ii. sect. 10) may serve as introduction to the next mode of objective construction. It is an object which is given the semblance of a sort of reality, and is treated as being such although the co-efficients of that sort of reality are lacking. It is to be noted that "semblance" here is what may be called "psychic semblance," known as "self-illusion,"¹ as opposed to "psychological" or "objective semblance"—semblance to an on-looker—a distinction to be found in the literature of play.

The play psychosis as such has had very full discussion in recent literature. Apart from the general theories of play as psychological and biological function, the psychic characters involved in the play situation have also been very clearly made out. We are drawing in part on the analyses now current when we point out the following characteristics of the play-mode.

2. (1) From the psychic point of view it is *imitative*—in the sense of "reconstitutive"—of the situations of real life. What-

¹ *Bewusste Selbsttäuschung* in the German discussions.

Readers of Professor Groos' books on play will remember the distinction between the "make-believe" of a strictly biological sort—appearing as make-believe to the on-looker, as the "feigning" of certain animals—and the psychic make-believe or self-illusion of those cases in which there is in consciousness a sense of the artificial character of the performance. It is the latter that we have in mind in speaking of "psychic" semblance, as opposed to psychological or objective. See Groos, *The Play of Animals*, Eng. trans., p. 292, and Editor's Preface, ix. Professor Groos' second important work is *The Play of Man*, also translated into English by E. L. Baldwin.

ever we may say of the play impulse, motive, or interest, it is yet true that the material out of which the play object or situation is constructed is necessarily that of memory—memory of real life. The objective system, as held in the net of memory, is drawn upon. The child poses as father, pastor, or other person, and the details of the situation are worked out with more or less fidelity to the real or possible. This is not so, we may again note, to the observer alone, but also to the actor. The agent of the play consciously lives again, or makes-believe to live again, the copy-system of reality. This has become familiar to readers of the literature of play and art under the term “inner imitation.”

The meaning of this, in terms of our present exposition, is that in the play object the memory co-efficient of sense reality is again given a place. The lawlessness and lack of objective control of the object of fancy are no longer there. *Play is a representing mode.* The imitative character is just the “semblant” character, in so far as there is semblance of something specific. The image object, therefore, in this respect takes on a new determination, or at least seems to; for so far as this character is concerned, it seems to go back to the memory mode, with its claim to be valid as being convertible in its own peculiar sense. The player as much as says to himself, *this is real, or would be, but for the fact that I know that it is not*; it stands for reality in so far as I choose to let it so stand—by not altering or abolishing it. He has no such sense as this in dealing with the objects of memory as such, nor yet has he in dealing with those of fancy.

3. (2) A further character is this: that the memory co-efficient thus consciously used in the determination of play

objects is, nevertheless, not operative as securing legitimate sense reality. The memories stay in mind as images, but are not fulfilled as memories. The lines of representing context do not issue in their appropriate termini; if they did, they would be simply and only memory objects functioning to guarantee sense objects. This is the character of semblance so far as it is general, that is, so far as any object may on occasion take on the semblant *Schein*. The co-efficients are there, through the selective action of the imitative construction; but they do not realize themselves save in semblance, a state of things made possible through the earlier development, in the fancy mode, of the distinction of “inner”

(1) It is
imitative.

Invokes the
Memory Co-
efficient.

(2) As to Real
Presence,
it is Make-
Believe.

and "outer." This appears more explicitly in the next following characteristic.

4. (3) The entire determination of the play object—and of all semblant objects—is in the inner, as contrasted with the outer sphere. It presupposes, therefore, the antecedent determination of the fancy object as such.

(3) **The Imitation is "Inner."** It is accordingly a new modal determination, continuing the earlier progression. The reinstatement of the object imitatively is an "inner" imitation. The selection of the object for play is a "personal" selection, although in its context true to a possible or actual copy. The reconstruction of the real world, taking place earlier indeed in memory, and used for practical purposes in the pursuit of real interests, now becomes a construction to be distinguished as within the inner world, and as such to be brought into contrast with those objects, perhaps the same ones,¹ which have their existence in the outer world. Not only is the child using his imagination, but he is also aware that the construction is imaginative.

The contrast here psychically constituted is of great interest, and it has been shown, notably by K. Lange, that there is a subtle movement of consciousness in consequence of it. The real world, actually there, remains through the entire development, a sort of background of reference. The inner make-believe situation is developed against this background. Consciousness, even while busy with the play objects, casts sly glances behind the scenes, making sure that its firm footing of reality is not entirely lost. There

Oscillation Between Inner and Outer Spheres. a sort of oscillation between the real and the semblant object, taking place in the psychic sphere, giving an emphasized sense of the "inner-outer" contrast which persists in the further genetic progressions.

5. (4) Another character of this remarkable mode completes the picture, from the side of description, so far as our present purposes go: the character called variously, by different

¹ In children's play, indeed (and, of course, in most realistic art), the external objects are there as vehicle of the semblant meaning or symbolism, and all the devices of counterfeiting—costume, setting, etc.—are invoked to aid the semblant effect. The chasm between reality and fiction is most often not between the semblant and the real object which it simulates, but between the observer's personal self and the whole semblant plot or drama. He needs only to say, "*I* do not dress in this grotesque costume," or "*I* do not really know any such characters as these," to get the contrast.

writers, "freedom," "sense of agency," "personal detachment," and "initiation." The present writer has called it, with view of avoiding the genetic fallacy, the "don't-have-to feeling."¹ It is the consciousness of the essentially made-up and temporary character of the entire play construction. It might be true—but it is not! It involves me—but because I let it! It might be continued—but I stop it! It is a "conscious self-illusion"—a state of "semblance" in which I allow myself to appear and, for the purpose of the play interest, to be under temporary illusion; but, after all, it is self-illusion, something I myself allow and further. It is psychic auto-suggestion. It differs from other states of a similar kind in this, that the agent is all the while aware—with an awareness that pervades the situation in all its extent—that his interest and co-operation are absolutely necessary for the play movement, and that, therefore, it may be brought instantly and without more ado to an end. I won't play!—that is all that is necessary in order to prick the bubble. The player is essentially and all the while detached from the thing; he enters into it with this as a rule of the game; and he drops out when he will.

6. It is clear that when we ask the question as to the factors entering into the determination of such an object as this we have to recognize a singular novelty in our psychic progressions. A mode of seemingly unconditional psychic or subjective control is upon us. Perception, memory, fancy—none of these shows such a factor as this; and yet the constructions in which it issues are determined as to their contents by the co-efficients of certain earlier modes.

The progression to the object of fancy, as has already been remarked, has released the object from the objective control of actual sense-presence; in its place there is an imitative reinstatement of the content, by the "experimental" employment of the memory co-efficient suggested but not realized.

We now find revealed, on the other hand, a further difference from the fancy object. The semblant reinstatement of the memory co-efficient, even in this partial form, destroys the capricious and lawless character of fancy. There is then further development of the only other alternative; that of the mode of determination represented by the memory co-efficient itself,

¹ Editor's Preface to Groos' *The Play of Animals*.

or of the sort of *psychic selection* called above "mediate control." Being in the inner and of the essential stuff of the inner life, play must be determined by inner factors—inner interests, conations, native propensions, etc. But if in its content it is to be imitative, it can only be realized by the method of inner reproduction and reinstatement of real copy. So this is the result: *the selective or experimental determination of objects, situations, and the like, under the reservation, consciously faced and allowed, that it is only for personal and temporary purposes.* It is an auto-suggestion whose essential meaning is destroyed as soon as it is treated simply as being in any of the modes of determination characteristic of sense-presence, memory, or fancy.

7. The truth of this position may be reinforced by the consideration of certain additional facts of the play state of mind.

Limits of
Play : (1) In-
trusions of
Reality.

In the first place, as long as the self-illusion is preserved, we find the play now and again on the verge of going to pieces by reason of the intrusions of real things with which the playful imitation is more or less inconsistent. The child stretches his memory co-efficients to the breaking point in the licence of fancy; but there are limits. He says to his playmate: "You cannot be an earthworm, you have too many legs!"—"That can't be a bird, that safe—it's too heavy to fly!" "We can't play fire in the dark!" The imitative criterion must be preserved, despite the essentially selective mode of control of the situation as a whole. But, on the other hand, play is no longer play, but work or "earnest" when self-illusion ceases to be auto-suggestion and becomes compulsory, all-absorbing, and too real. It will not do to go over to the sense co-efficient; that would introduce a control essentially different. Personal detachment, the don't-have-to sense, then disappears; the outer sphere absorbs the content. *Both the inner freedom and the outer semblance must be retained; the latter gives consistency, pattern, dramatic quality, all that is meant by "semblance"; the former gives control, selective character, essential inwardness.*

8. The same general result appears from the somewhat different point of view of the development of the play interest.

Play as
Autotelic
Function.

The tendency to play, considered psychically, has recently been traced to the interest in exercising a psychic or other function as such, simply as such—and with no further end. It is on this view an *autotelic* function :

“play for play’s sake” is its motto.¹ The sort of object which such a function would demand, the terminus which would satisfy it, would simply be the objective determination normal to it. If we consider the two terms of the inner-outer dualism as possible spheres of satisfaction of their respective interests, as is done in the chapter on “Meaning,”² we have to ask whether either sort of object—and if so, which—is suitable for the terminus of the play mode? We may say, I think, at once, not the outer as such, for it would be impossible to isolate such an interest from the strenuous working motives which the outer world must inevitably arouse. Not only do we not let the child play with fire—he does not wish to! His interest in fire cannot but become *pragmatelic*³—the avoidance of pain, or of a conflagration. This destroys the play motive in a trice. So if real present objects were the only material of play, only those of pale and neutral character would do, and these only when treated as *by pretence being what they are*. Otherwise the “simulate” or semblant interest in the function set in play would be gone, and the child might as well go to work and have done with it.

On the other hand, neither would bare creatures of fancy serve as adequate play objects. They err in defect. The character of the function brought into play and its precise appropriateness to its object, are as necessary as is its playful indulgence. The object suited to stimulate a play interest must have meaning, relations, and dramatic possibilities. Contents known to be *rein innerlich* are not from the point of view of play interesting.⁴

¹ This, of course, quite apart from the other meanings of the play function, in which its real utility appears, when considered from objective points of view such as those of practice, recreation, social accommodation, etc.

² Chap. vii.

³ That is, consciously practical, utilitarian, or *end-seeking*, as contrasted with “pragmatic,” which I shall use for the *objectively* practical only, in discussions later on. The bird’s nest-building instinct, for example, involves a series of pragmatic activities, but it is an open question to what extent they are pragmatelic. Confusion of these two meanings runs through many discussions of teleology. I have elsewhere pointed it out in Professor Ward’s *Naturalism and Agnosticism* (cf. *Dict. of Philos.*, art. “Teleology.”).

⁴ It is an aspect of this requirement that the play-interest must be *fed* continually; monotonous repetition eventually kills it. The chips *that stand for money* seem to provide a species of interest midway

The motor apparatus, furthermore, is remarkably exercised—before and after—by play; and this requires objects which stimulate the active equivalents of the processes of real life.

9. Hence a compromise which brings on a progression into a new mode—one of the most interesting, as also one of the most fruitful, in all mental development. The play object becomes not the inner or fancy object as such, but both: its interest being "syntelic." nor yet the outer present object as such, *but both at once, what we are calling the semblant object*, itself the terminus of a sort of interest which later on develops into that called "syntelic" or contemplative.¹

§ 2. THE PLAY MOTIVE AS GERMINAL TO LATER PROGRESSIONS

10. There are no less than four capital modes of psychic life which take their departure from the play object, and which display in their treatment what is most novel and characteristic of the positions worked out in this essay. They may be concisely indicated at this point.

(1) Play objects make possible the determination of the great dualism of *Mind and Body*, a dualism developing out of that of inner and outer, but not possible in the mode of fancy. This is the progression to the "Substantive Mode," a movement in the organization of content. Play as Germinal to Other Modes.

(2) The Dualism of *Self and Not-self* also takes its rise in the semblant mode of consciousness. The progression is that to

between the monotony of the game without stakes and the work-interest of the too strenuous high-stake game. When the prizes of victory are too large, motives of competition and struggle enter to vitiate the quality of sport, as in much of our modern intercollegiate athletics.

¹ This does not, however, commit us to the view that the semblant function—play and with it art—is strictly autotelic. It is to the writer doubtful whether the question can be put in just the form which "function-for-function's-sake" requires (cf. Groos, *Play of Man*, Eng. trans., as to Play; and, for quite a different point of view, Hirn, *Origins of Art*, as to Art). For the cognitive function as such completes or fulfils itself only in its object, and the object is a context determined under some co-efficient. On a later page the semblant interest is described as *syntelic*, rather than autotelic, so complex or synthetic is the interest, especially in the higher aesthetic mode. When the boy says: "I won't play—this is no fun!" his lack of interest—what he means by finding it "no fun"—may be due to restraint upon or failure in any one, or more, of the elements of the play consciousness, as indicated above in the text.

the Subject-Self Mode : a progression in Control, issuing in the dualism of *Reflection*.

(3) In the development of these progressions we will then find appearing of itself the differentia of the *Logical* as such : the functions of Judgment and Thought, with the dualism of Truth and Falsity.

(4) The determination of the play object is the first of the type called "semblant," a type realized in later progressions in Syntelic objects of the *Aesthetic* Mode.

§ 3. QUASI-LOGICAL CHARACTERS OF THE PLAY OBJECT

11. Finally we may isolate the aspect of this mode which constitutes it in a positive sense quasi-logical.

In the play object there is a further development of the aspects we have signalized in the earlier image mode as being germinal to the logical as such, i.e. the dualism of inner and outer, and the rudiments of subjective control seen in the "experimental" or don't-have-to attitude toward objects. Both of these now receive further hardening and development in a way which takes us materially forward on our way. The preceding sections, exhibiting the characters which distinguish the play object as such, disclose the emphasis which the inner-outer distinction now has. Notably, as has already been said, is this the case in the fact that the play object is one which, while claiming to represent the outer and possibly to fulfil it, yet does not live up to the claim in fact. The operation of the memory co-efficient is within the body of the construction, giving it its imitative value ; but the whole is itself not brought to the test of external fact. This goes further in the progression into the substantive mode, taken up a little later on.

The other aspect, that of the rise of the sense of self as control mode, goes on to have early definition also. The self-function is in its essence a control function. It arises by the substitution of inner for outer co-efficients, in a partial way, which reinstates on a higher plane¹ a form of joint or "mediate" control.

These two general conceptions may be formulated for our present purposes by the further characterization of the play object under two aspects, both of which are involved in what has

¹ Found below, in chap. xi. § 4, to take place in the act of *judgment*.

already been said in the descriptive account of these constructions, but which enable us to isolate the rudimentary logical character of this mode of psychic life.

(1) The play object is what may be called an *experimental object*.

Play Object as
Experimental
and as serving
a new
(Theoretical)
interest.

(2) The play object is going on to be an object of interest *simply for itself*, that is, simply as one that stimulates and holds the interest processes *upon its characteristic context*; in this aspect it is on its way to become a *theoretical object*.

§ 4. EXPERIMENTAL OBJECTS

12. (1) Experimentation is but another name for one of the necessary psychic movements already described in the section on Experimental Control (chap. v. § 6). The development of the inner-outer dualism is possible only because of the disturbance and embarrassment brought into the regular series of sense objects, when the memory and sense interpretations conflict. Consciousness must readjust its attitudes and the organism its reactions in order to bring the two orders of experience into some sort of consistency. Images may fail; they must be experimented with. This defines the distinction between the two worlds. The outer series, under foreign control, stands fast; the inner lacks such control; and midway between are those objects which claim to hold in the real world, but have not yet been put to the final test. In the semblant mode these last-named objects are under suspicion, or indeed, are conscious make-believe, of inner meaning only, until found to be outer also. Such objects are then experimental.

The experimental object is therefore clearly *one which claims the value attaching to a memory object, while apprehended under the determination, so far forth, only of an image object*. The development into the play mode brings a partial determination of such an object just by that change whereby the image object is imitatively constituted; for the memory co-efficient of the outer world is again made operative. But here again the rule of external control is not completely reinstated, for the imitative construction as such is not in this mode brought to the test of sense. There becomes necessary, therefore, a further progression: one from the dualism of semblance and sense into some mode in which the middle

Progression
to a new
value, i.e.

term—the play object—may pass by a continuous psychic movement into one having some new and unambiguous meaning.

13. This is brought about by the process of experimentation. It employs, as we have seen, the private body, which is made means of control. The play object as such is experimental, in so far as it stands for a possible prospective solution, and leads on to it. Yet having its own interest, as an autotelic process, it does not go on to demand a solution. It is itself, in its essential genetic place, a mode of reconciliation of the sense and image modes. It is one factor only in the determination of a new interest, that by which *a new serious object is constituted*. So far as it passes into new psychic constructions, by an actual experimental process, it is because of the need of going back from the play world into that of practical adjustments and life processes. The urgency of practical need leads to many such concrete adjustments, and experience overcomes its embarrassments thereby. Hence the marked utilitarian or instrumental value of play, not so much in itself, as in its employment of the method of experimentation. In experimentation, therefore, play merges into earnest, and through its demand for control, issues in adjustment and discovery. This opens a vista of wide-reaching extent.

In short, to sum the matter up, while play is a mode of reconciliation and merging of the two sorts of control, it still aids their further development. For it provides for the relative isolation of the object and opens the way for its treatment by experimentation. How this treatment proceeds we are to see in the sections on "Schematism" below, and on "Selective Thinking," "Logical Schematism," etc., in vol. ii.

14. We may by anticipation say that the question here introduced is as to whether, in achieving this experimental method of testing objects, the only result is to make possible a further appeal to an external or environmental co-efficient of control; or whether with it there is preserved also some form of inner control, over against the external. The important issue as to the claim of an exclusively pragmatic or practical testing of mental objectives springs up here.¹ If such a position be held, the further

¹ It is of the essence of pragmatism that thought is instrumental to practical accommodations, and that the only sort of validity and the only criterion of truth are found in its success in meeting the demands of life.

genetic development of consciousness—in respect to truth, validity, etc.—will appear to consist in complications or refinements merely in this one practical and experimental method.

But such a solution will be negatived in case we find further modal determinations of the subjective sort of control, which are not directly practical or experimental in their reference. This possibility must be pursued through the great dualisms of “mind-body” and “subject-object,” now becoming urgent for issue from the matrix of the semblance in which so many meanings appear in germ.

15. Indeed, it may be pointed out that even in the first construction of experimental objects, the inner context is in a measure already free from external testing and control. No object can come to the barrier of experimental trial, save as it has already secured the *visé* of successful semblance; and it will be seen in our later discussion that it is the *schema as a whole*, the idea of the plot or drama, that is chosen for experimental testing, not in the first instance the elements, parts, or relations of this whole. These latter are, even in the experimentation of play, already given in the context of the imitative constructions which are then treated as experimental wholes.¹

§ 5. THE PLAY INTEREST

16. (2) The second aspect of the semblant object which entitles it to be called quasi-logical is led up to by the remarks immediately preceding. The selection and actual determination of the play object are accomplished in the pursuit of *an interest which isolates the content from its external setting and distinctly negatives its external control*. The semblant content thus satisfies a germinating interest in a detached and self-controlled meaning. In this sense, *it is not pragmatic*.

In the chapter on “Meaning” below² it is shown that many “meanings” have this origin: they are determinations of

If this be so, it is hard to see how in the “thought mode” we are to discover anything not already given in the issue of the experimental method at the level of the play consciousness.

¹ See the topic of “Individuation” in the semblant mode, chap. viii. §§ 5-7.

² Chap. vii.

a selective sort due to the relatively partial interests or dis-
 positions which their contents fulfil. The play mean-
 ing arises in one of the early and fundamental progres-
 sions of this sort. The germinating subjective control
 is an interest ; it is fulfilled in the isolation of a content for per-
 sonal purposes—for free manipulation, for play, for that twisting
 and turning and experimental readjusting of which the context
 thus chosen and held up may allow.

17. This interest is quasi-logical in the sense that it is rudi-
 mentary to judgment, or—anticipating our theory of judgment
 —to that form of control which involves a psychic
 acceptance and endorsement of a content in the very
 constitution of it as an object. This interest now
 insists that the object shall not be actually real,
 but that it shall be only quasi-real, of such a character as the
 psychic itself—the present self—chooses to set up and develop.
 The direct practical interest in the thing as fact is lost in the
 subjective interest of the personal treatment of it.

Yet it should be again insisted that the two aspects, the
experimental and the *selective*, are united in the play object :
 that is its specific character. It is our reason-
 able expectation that once united, their separation,
 should it occur again later on, will be in some essen-
 tially new mode in which this genetic gain will not be again lost.

§ 6. THE SEMBLANT PROGRESSION

18. We are now in a position to isolate the motives which
 urge on to the determination of the dualisms of Mind and Body
 and Self and not-Self. The advance, in its first stage,
 we may call the “semblant progression,” seeing that
 it is a direct outcome of certain facts of the semblant pro-
 cess, whose urgency secures the new construction. There are
 two factors at work.

(1) One has already been indicated in the subjective con-
 trol brought into play in actual experimenting : the process
 whereby such control issues in one object or another under
 the co-efficients of the outer and the inner respectively. Each
 semblant object when tested becomes either a sense object or
 a fancy object.¹ Thus the great distinction between the inner
 and outer realms is extended and made more definite.

¹ Two results corresponding to “the true ” and “the false,” when
 the experimental process is reinstated in later modes.

This is the source, as will appear in the chapter on "Individuation," of the successful treatment of experiences in

1. **Reduction of Semblant Objects to Real Classes.** groupings of various sorts there minutely described. The process of generalization results in the reduction of manifold experiences to groups or classes, through the formation of habits of action, by which details are rendered subordinate, and likenesses are embraced in wholes. "*Mind and body*" means classes of minds and bodies.

19. (2) A second fruitful character of the semblant object, implicated in the inner nature of the entire construction, is that called in the later German literature of aesthetic

2. **Sembling (Einfühlung) is Attribution of "Inner" to Semblant Object.** objects, *Einfühlung*. I shall here render it by the term *Sembling*.¹ It is the making of any object into a thing of semblance or "inner imitation," with the added character that such an object has a greater or less degree of *subjective control attributed to it*. There is a certain *feeling-into* the given object (*Einfühlung*), now made semblant, of the subject's own personal feeling: an attribution to it of the inner movement which its construction requires.²

There is no doubt that there is this "sembling" of an object when we play with it, but the extent and meaning of it are still under discussion. The suggestion which

It follows from treating the Object as Subjectively Controlled. I now make is that it is simply the full reading of the semblant object itself: the reading of it, not only as an inner construction, but also as under the form of relative spontaneity which inner constructions must have. Their control we have found to be in a peculiar sense subjective, characterized by "don't-have-to" consciousness, the germinal reserve-sense whereby the self begins to stand apart from its content. It is now considered as also inner as part of a self, and as having *inner determination*, or self-

1 Present participle of the verb to "semble," the early active usage—to make like by imitation (see *Standard Dict.*, sub verb.). This has the advantage of the adjective and adverb forms "semblant," "semblable," and "semblably," all going with the noun "semblance." The committee of the *Dict. of Philos.* failed to find any available term for *Einfühlung*, and the rendering here made has since then occurred to me. In general usage, the intransitive verb "dissemble" has survived the active form "semble."

2 It has been called "aesthetic sympathy," "inner sympathy," etc.; cf. the *Dict. of Philos.*, "Sympathy (Aesthetic)" where citations of literature are also to be found. Excellent instances are reported by Miss Martin, *Psychological Review*, May 1906, pp. 184 f.

control. The Doric column of Lipps' illustration¹ seems to spring upward, by a sweep of its lines, because just by thinking it as an inner object we give it the self-stimulating spring of action by which our own function springs up. It is only the factual column, not the "sembled" thing of inner imitation, that stands set and rigid in all its lines.

20. Now this somewhat innocent-looking process of "sembling," of giving objects that mode of control found in the arrest of external co-efficients, with the resulting relative detachment and spontaneity of its objects, will turn out to be the genetic fountain of certain of the meanings of the life of reflection. It implies both a before and an after in the linkage of the progressions in which it appears.

(1) It implies that all the objects so treated are already materials of the "inner" life as such. This has been fully developed above.

Implications of the Semblant Progression. (2) It implies that any material of the inner life may be so treated. This is also clear from the general character of the imitative function, and the method of its operation.

(3) It means, finally, that any such bit of "sembled" or "semblable" psychic stuff has its two opposed meanings: that, on the one hand, of object pure and simple, existing under the co-efficient reinstated by the semblance; and that, on the other hand, of a self-determining sembled whole, free from these co-efficients so long as it itself does not terminate its freedom, and fulfilling its rôle simply by being in this vibrating semblant mode.

(4) This mode of construction, moreover, constitutes any content, in turn, *either subject or object*. We have already seen that it is by reason of its being taken up and identified with the *control of the inner life* that one's own body has a quasi-subjective character. It is the generalization or extension of the same genetic motive that makes any bit of content available on occasion for the same function. The content becomes *subject of an inner life of its own*, by its sharing in the sort of control that the subjective alone lays claim to. In so far as it is itself held in control by "outer" co-efficients of this sort or that, in so far as it is set up as a psychic *object*; but whenever in turn it is used as inner means

¹ Lipps, *Raumaesthetik und geometrisch-optische Täuschungen*, p. 5. Lipps emphasizes *Enföhlung*, especially in works of art; to him it is essential to the aesthetic.

of control to other contents, it has a sembled inner life of its own and becomes *subject*. This is the rudiment or first suggestion of that higher mode—*Reflection*.¹ The dualism normal and proper to reflection is that between the subject-self and all its objects treated as inner experience or objects of thought. This is anticipated here in a playful and semblant way.

§ 7. PLAYING AT BEING A SELF

21. The character which we have just mentioned, and which has led us to adopt the term Sembling, as rendering of the German *Sembling* *Einfühlung*, has been discussed mainly by writers present in Play as well as in Art, on the aesthetic consciousness. It has been held to be an essential ingredient in the experience of the appreciation of art. It has, however, a singularly marked development in the play consciousness also, and its presence there serves to give additional justification to the theory which connects these two psychic modes with one another under the common term Semblance.

Broadly understood, the process of Sembling consists in the reading-into the object of a sort of psychic life of its own, in such a way that the movement, act, or character by which it is interpreted is thought of as springing from its own inner life. We have considered it as showing the psychic tendency, operative in the semblant consciousness, to consider the object as detached from the external, and thus as under inner or subjective control. This leads to the thought of the object as having inner control, or a spring of action and initiation—in short, a psychic life of its own.

Coming to examine the play mode with this thought in mind, we find it surprisingly confirmed; and further, the confirmation of it here serves as additional proof of its presence in the higher form of semblance of the aesthetic mode. The phenomena in the sphere of play are of certain describable sorts, now to be isolated from those larger features with which we have hitherto had to do.

22. (1) Play is a way of making an object, for present and personal purposes, *what it might be*; and being for "personal purposes," it takes on, in a great variety of cases, personal form. The child's impulse to imitate is directed mainly to persons. The play impulse, being imitative in its choice of materials to play with,

and Links the
two Modes
Together.
Objects of
Play are
Personalized
or made
Animate.

¹ See the detailed development in chap. xi.

naturally shares in this preference for persons. So we find the objects of play personalized, personified, made up as "make-believe" persons, and treated under this form of semblance. At the early stage, when the distinction of persons from other animals is not yet advanced, the child's playthings are prone to take on the form of animals. Here is a crude beginning of the process of sembling.

23. (2) There is, again, a little later on, after the markedly "animating" period of the child's play, an actual socializing of the function. In the early and more spontaneous plays, the players either require companions, or at least shun the lonely game¹; and later on there comes a real demand for companionship in the sport.

Play becomes Socialized; Objects take on the form of Social Fellows. The lonely ten-year-old finds it hard to amuse himself; he misses an essential stimulus in the lack of some one else to share the illusion of the game, and agree with him in its rules and methods. This imports another strain of personal quality into the play situation. The playfellows are, of course, persons; they have the inner life, the subjective control; and so far as they pose as something which they are not, they exhibit the essential movement of selves having experience. They too, then, invite the individual to indulge in Sembling.

24. (3) The striking impulse to "show-off," the "self-exhibiting" impulse—made much of, and quite properly so, in the literature both of play and art—also carries on the sembling motive. This impulse is, of course, directly socializing; and when indulged consciously, it is directly social. But it also means the setting up of a show-person, motivated not by actual normal function, but by artificial and experimental make-believe, in the presence of another who is the spectator at the exhibition. Moreover, its content is always imitative of actual self-material. It is a show-self, made up for the purpose. It has, therefore, all the characters of Semblance.²

This impulse, too, lends itself immediately to the sembling

¹ There are animal plays best classified as "social"; see Groos' *Play of Animals*, Eng. trans., Editor's Preface, viii., and *Play of Man*, Part ii. 4 (Eng. trans., pp. 334 ff.).

² All semblance which is for a spectator is in this sense showing off. Of course, there is besides the highly "conscious" showing-off of reflection and self-conceit, which is a very different thing. "Self-exhibition" in the sense here intended is of very early biological origin, appearing in connexion with the gregarious and mating instincts.

interest. All the other characters of the game, and with them
 and in his all the things which are taking on personal and
 Fellows. animate form, are thought of as also exhibiting them-
 selves. They too are showing off, otherwise they would not be
 fully in the game. But as thus showing-off they are acting
 essentially from motives of inner determination and control.
 If, the child may say, they are on their part in any degree *dis-*
sembling in their treatment of me, then I am, *in so thinking them*,
 on my part, *sembling in my treatment of them*. There is here
 it finds the requirement that there shall be an *audience*, an
 an Audience. admiring coterie, and all the play objects fulfil this
 rôle. As such, therefore, they must have an inner life of appre-
 ciation and sympathy.¹

25. (4) And yet again must we note a further fact—so
 richly complex is this play-mode. The motive to play—motive
 in the narrower sense, the interest—sweeps away all
 The Interest is Fulfilled in no external Object. heterotelic and even pragmatelic checks and limita-
 tions. At least, that is its ideal and claim. The play
 construction becomes a meaning, developed in the
 progress of an interest which admits no external fulfilment
 or terminus. At the same time, however, it does submit to
 a make-believe, a *Schein*, a pseudo-real character. The play
 object is a double-faced sort of thing, free for me who play,
 but bound to things; it is a fact as well as a meaning; it is
 a temporary solution of the demands of two essentially opposed
 methods of control. So the construction bears the face value
 of what it is : *a limited and struggling life*. It seems reasonable
 —after we find it so, at any rate—to expect that an imitation of
 the real, thus produced and so used, will not be merely a dry,
 hard context representing an objective order; but that it will
 have, in its very release from the dead and inanimate, a certain
 rebound, a vitally-semblant and more-inclusive richness of mean-
 ing. This appears, I think, in the sembled meaning given the
 object. It shares the player's own freedom, and joins him in the
 unformulated and somewhat mystic—or let us say vague—for-
 ward movement which is just the growth of the personal self.²

¹ In these combined motives I think we are to find the philosophy
 of the child's preference for dolls and puppets. So far as their shape
 may do so, they enhance and reinforce and facilitate the act of sembling.
 Given an audience of dolls, and a seven-year maid will play the livelong
 day; given a regiment of tin soldiers, and the lonely boy will put to flight
 the armies of Gath!

² This is one of the *motifs* that give character to the developing reli-

26. There is, however, a profounder way of looking at the matter than the empirical citation of the aspects of actual games would at the first glance serve to suggest. In Play Object must be individual and Self-determined—the materials of play—and notably in those of art—we find what, from the objective point of view, we must describe as *common*¹ meanings. So soon as the game involves a social situation, in which each player has his place, and all recognize the place of each, then the unfolding of the game requires that all its objects should take on form which is usable for the thought and action of all the group in common. The play situation reinstates the mode of real social organization. So far, so good: *it reinstates it*; but *it must not really be it*, otherwise it is not play, nor is it art. It must have its general character, it must become a universal, in the meaning which we, the players, now attribute to it; but its essentially semblant or semblable character must at all hazards also be preserved. So the semblant object, in the very face of the claim to validity and publicity, asserts its individual character and essential privacy *by an inner impulse and determination of its own*. It is thus and only thus semblable material. Play may be, or it may approximate, the drama of life; but after all *it is drama and not life*. Art may be realistic to the breadth of a hair, but if it be photographic, it is not art. The inner impulse to idealization, the impulse to be a private self, is the final and effective protest of the semblant consciousness against the generalization of meanings that turns them all into the sort of public property we call facts.²

§ 8. PLAYING AT BEING A SELF: SELF-SEMBLING

27. A final consideration comes to mind in this connexion.

gious consciousness; the freedom and spontaneity of persons is really a thing of mystery. Schleiermacher, it will be remembered, long ago pointed this out. The present writer has traced its development in the child, in *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, chap. viii. § 5. The great Other-self of the religious consciousness is not only an "eject" of the personal, it is also, and for that reason, an object sembled with inner character and attributes.

¹ In the next chapter (vii.) the different stages of "Common Meaning" are distinguished and the topic has development in chap. iii. of vol. ii.

² The references to art made here are only those which suffice to include it in a semblant mode of consciousness; the discussion of art-objects is to follow later on (vol. iii.).

The sembling of objects in general, in the play mode, is startlingly illustrated in the protean forms in which the **Play Induces an Artificial Self, and** *self sembles itself*. The play and art performer is a *poseur*, from start to finish. This becomes sublimated and obscured in developmental refinements in the art consciousness, but in the play-mode it stands out in all its naked frankness. It is not only exhibition of self—that is normal enough—but it is exhibition of a false self. “What part will you play?” “Who will you be?” “What mask will you wear?” These are the normal questions both of the nursery “play,” and of that transition mode of art which goes by the same name.

It is curious indeed. The player is not content with the inner determination which the legitimate indulgence in play affords, with its construction of objects of semblance; but **proves Subjective Control by willing to Lose it,** this screening of external reality extends to all the objects which come into the scheme and plot. As a participant he also must not be his real self; he must be a play self. So, all in the name of *vindicating control by self, he must abnegate the self that controls, and pose as controlled by a self foreign to the very construction which alone would illustrate and fulfil his normal subjective control*. Truly the sembled Self is the apotheosis of *Schein*!

28. Yet it bears out amply our interpretation to the effect that, as a psychic mode, play is a swing of the pendulum toward control that has the psychic value of freedom. The **and Emphasizes the dawning Sense of Freedom.** self, the playing self, is not content with being its own self, with asserting *itself*, with denying all sorts of foreign control: it goes further, saying, “I will prove this to you by being, according as I will, some other self, by choosing what sort of a self I will to be. I will be a soldier, a wet-nurse, a hobby-horse. Yea, verily, I will perchance lose my life to find it; I will prove my self-hood by un-selfing self: I will be a mummy, a football, a door-mat, ‘any old thing’ that even those who claim that I am, though a self, still under external control, would never in their wildest moments seriously take me to be!”

It brings up here in an early form a contrast which complicates the aesthetic problem later on, that between the producer’s and the spectator’s points of view. The imitative construction, the motive of self-exhibition, the common ejjective material of the entire drama or plot as sembled, all require objects *fit to be*

looked at and appreciated by the spectator. Yet the whole is a free construction of the producer ; he must feel—"I don't have to, I can change the plot, for it embodies my personal meaning." In the context, therefore, however strictly imitative and "truthful" it may be, surges the personal meaning, not only giving an inner life to the object, but finally bursting through it. The producer wishes us to appreciate his work, and if it be a work of art, to buy and own the material embodiment of it ; but nevertheless it is eternally his conception, and it will always be known by his name.

29. In this case, finally, of the sembling of self-materials, there is to be found the germ of value that we found in the play-mode as a whole : that of passing over into a method of experimental treatment of content, with view to its adequate distribution under real co-efficients. This is, however, a process already sufficiently described, pending the detailed treatment of those progressions through which it issues in the great dualisms which are to follow.

Passes over
into Experi-
tial
method.

Chapter VII

ON MEANING

§ 1. THE RISE OF MEANINGS

1. It is in the passage from the bare recognition of each item presented as being just what it is, to its treatment as being **Datum and Meaning.** in some sense not what it is, but what it may become or be used as, that psychic meanings as such arise. Meaning appears most clearly, from the psychic point of view, in the experimental erection of objects which have some hypothetical determination as other than that which they simply are. This appears generally in the cases in which displacements take place in the representing function when reference is had to the possible external or other fulfilments which inner objects may secure. The present psychic value of an object, its immediate given character, is then supplemented through its establishment in the outer world; this gives it characteristic meaning. So we have, first, a system of data of simple apprehension, first-things of presentation; and, second, the same system as being referred to, meant, or intended, that is, as embodying meanings.

The detailed transformations which the presented system, or the items of it, may and do undergo in this process of the acquisition of meaning are to be indicated in later discussions. It is here our business to investigate meaning considered as accretion to the skeleton or form of the object which thus has, or comes to have, the meaning.

2. Having given this very general indication of what meaning is, it may be well in this place to treat more fully of its rise and limits. It is evident that the case given above, that of a psychic meaning clearly supplementary to the apprehended content which has the meaning, represents a special and highly developed instance, one from which it will be possible to work

backward to simpler cases. In order to be clear we may now

Meaning as Intent. apply to meaning of this sort the term Intent. We

say in such a case—the case in which we are aware of importing into the object, as actually presented, some meaning due to our temporary or otherwise special interest—“this is what I now mean or intend.”¹ This indeed sharpens, in a way which we are not always able to justify, the dualism of object or thing and meaning, for it is only the extreme cases in which this dualism of fact and meaning is actually present to consciousness.

3. From the point of view of such a dualism it may be said that meaning is not possible until *meanings* are possible, for in

Meaning Involves Meanings. so far as the meaning is a variation upon the object due to its fulfilment of some special interest, it would

follow that any different interest under which the thing might be approached would suffice to determine it as having a different meaning; and this, of course, is true. But it is necessary to distinguish carefully between the two points of view, the psychic and the psychological, in the matter. To the outside observer, taking the psychological point of view, there is always the possibility of some different interest, disposition, or conation coming to motive the determination of the object, the meaning actually reached being but one of

Psychic and Psychological Meanings. many possible variations that might spring up under such varied interests. From the psychic point of

view, however, this is not always the case. The meaning described above is, when involving a distinction of meaning and fact, the extreme case. So soon as we look at the simpler cases, in which the object is not considered *as having*, but *as being* the meaning, this distinction disappears together with the alternative determinations. There is then simply “this object,” found to be just what it means. In the higher mode of experimental treatment of contents, in which the intent is read into what is a bare schema of various alternative meanings, the individual may say: “I take this for what I now mean, but I might take it for what I apprehend it barely is, or it might be taken by me for something different

¹ For instance, I may answer a supposed critic, who suggests another use of this term, by saying: “That, I am aware, is what the word is, and that is also what the word usually means; but this is what I now mean or intend by the word in my present discourse.” In so saying I distinguish both the bare verbal object, and also its established and recognized meaning, from its value as fulfilling my present purpose.

from both of these, if I so intended." But so soon as we go down into the modes in which the process of cognition is exhausted in the construction by which the present object is determined, there is only the object, and the meaning is simply it. Then "things are what they seem."

From the strictly objective point of view, for instance, the dog has the meaning "bone" when he snaps at the shadow in the water; but psychically there are two cases. The dog may not distinguish the meaning "bone" until he finds out that it is not a bone. Only then may his object cease to be simply the object that it was, and come to mean or not mean that which fulfils his appetite. *Then there is object and meaning.*

From the psychic point of view, therefore, simple apprehension and memory, in their naïve and spontaneous exercise, functioning true to its respective rôles, would be bare of meanings—a proposition, however, which is hardly worth making, since the conditions of such machine-like function are never realized. Yet we may go so far as to say that in many actual situations there is no conscious distinction between the two factors of full meaning, content and intent.

4. From the objective point of view the question of meaning repeats in part that of our earlier discussion of "the what" and "the that." We found that there is no object which is simply "that"—a bare datum, having no make-up or subsistence.

Intent may be Lacking as Special Meaning. The competence of the cognitive process is due to its motivation under the pressure of inherited and **Meaningless Object a mere "That."** acquired dispositions, which set now this way and now that, are now fuller, now thinner, now urgently selective, now vaguely contemplative. The object is always one among many that are possible, even when it is embedded in the simplest panorama upon which the infant directs his vacant stare. If this be true, then every conscious function gives an object more or less subject to dislocation from a supposititious exact datum. It throws emphasis here or there, imparts what-ness or meaning. This will become clearer and its implications more apparent when we have inquired more closely into the chief modes in which our fundamental meanings take form.

§ 2. THE DISTINCTION OF MEANINGS

5. The development of meaning goes on by two movements, whose progressions lead up to the most vital questions of logic and philosophy.

(1) There is the determination of an object as meaning *that which the co-efficient of present recognition guarantees* as given in a convertible context of factor existence of one of Meaning: sort or another. The object thus held and guaranteed by recognition has a co-efficient of external or extra-psychic control; it may be said to have a *Recognitive* meaning. This develops into what is known as *General* meaning.

(2) There is the determination of an object as meaning *that in which a present interest gets its fulfilment*; it is the *Selective* meaning of a content determined under a greater or less degree of subjective control. This meaning is characterized later on as *Abstract*.

6. The origin of meaning in general, as described above, justifies and requires this distinction. In so far as an object comes to mean something not fully given in its original objective construction, it must be by variation or relative adjustment of the essential factors which give it its determination. These factors we have seen to be two: one the interest-mass—dispositional, conative, etc.—or the apperceiving psychic process itself, and the other the objective datum or *minimum cognitum* about which the interest clusters and takes form. It is evident that, so far as *the interest factor gets the upper hand*—that is, in so far as the tendencies and impulses to find such and such an object become dominant—so far those objective features which lend themselves to this interest are those actually brought out.¹ The reduction of the stimulus is by a process which *constructs the object appropriate to that interest*. This is the meaning of *psychic selection*; it is also the dominant motive in *logical abstraction*. The object, then, under this sort

(1) Interest Isolates a Feature of the Content; so Produces Meaning.

¹ An experimental proof of this is afforded by a research of Külpe (*Bericht über den ersten Congress für exp. Psychol., in Geissen, 1904*), of which Dr. J. W. Baird, to whom I am indebted for the reference, gives the following report in the *Psychol. Bulletin*, February 15, 1905, p. 83: "Experiments with various groups of nonsense syllables show that a given complex is apprehended differently when one is interested in its form, or in the colour, the number, or the nature of its components. Certain partial contents (form and colour) are more readily abstracted from the complex than are others (number and nature), i.e. it is least easy to determine how many and which letters are presented. [In terms of the distinction of the text it is these latter which constitute the representing and convertible contents standing more stable and less variable in

of selection, in the process of construction, acquires a meaning which is not in all respects that which would have been determined by bare recognition.¹

7. On the other hand, and in contrast with the foregoing, there is the case of meaning of the type described above as mainly recognitive. The cognitive features of the object are conserved as relatively constant, representing, and convertible. The co-efficients of memory remain so far rigid and persistent, and about them there develops the type of meaning which belongs to the object kept as far as may be the same.

Of this we may say, in the first place, that even the process of recognition is subject to greater or lesser variation. In (2) Recognition the process of the reproduction of the most elementary data, such as rectangular forms, certain Contextual Meaning. regular alterations have been pointed out by recent authors.² The conversion co-efficient, giving rise to the sense of sameness, often issues in mistakes of identification and errors of inclusion. The progress of the sort of meaning which consists in the extension of the representing character of knowledge must involve the creation of methods of checking, revising, and extending the contexts in which the object takes on its more or less adequate psychic form. This development takes place in the ways of which we are to treat in detail in the discussions of individuation. The vague general habit which is prone to accept details without sifting is refined

the play of the special interests.] Külpe concludes that psychical processes must be distinguished from our consciousness of them . . . [a dualistic conclusion from which a functional point of view would have saved him : the process is one, the results varying with the presence of this or that dominant interest in the apperceiving mass]. He defines abstraction as that process by means of which the logically or psychologically effective (*wirksam*) is separated off from that which is logically or psychologically non-effective (*unwirksam*) [a distinction quite in line with ours of the greater effectiveness of that which is forward in the fulfilment of the dominant interest, and the lesser effectiveness of the elements relatively neglected.]”

¹ We may note, as a clear example of this, the difficulty a child or untutored adult has in giving an objective or as-it-is definition of an object. It is what his interest finds or makes it : a plate is “ what you eat off of,” etc.

² E.g. experiments by Baldwin, Warren and Shaw (*Psycholog. Review*, May, 1895, p. 236) show a normal enlargement of the memory image with the lapse of time : a rectangle really larger is recognized and identified as the one before seen.

and broken up in the course of experience, and the relationships of fact are extended, so that they present an ever-enlarging network of terms which may be treated as stable and established data of knowledge and action. The first stage in this development of what has been called above the recognitive type of meaning is that described in the section on Schematism below as the "experimental" or "hypothetical" treatment of objects.

8. It is now evident, we may well add, that so soon as consciousness itself becomes aware of this great dualism of meanings—that of fact, and that of fulfilment of special intent—its pursuit of each is motivated by its own type of interest. So far as the co-efficients of fact are being developed, held free from the special tendencies and intentions of the moment, so far this is itself an interest—the interest of the preservation of the integrity of the system of fact. It is accordingly proper to suggest that we find here the beginning of that diversity of interests which appears in later modes as the pursuit of facts, on the one hand, and the pursuit of values or worths, on the other hand. We are not yet in a position to take up so wide-reaching and important a problem, but we may note that in this first great bifurcation of essential interests we have the trickle of a rill which is to gather the volume and flow in a mighty river.

It is also of moment to remark here that this is quite in accord with the view we arrived at on an earlier page¹ as to the dawning dualism between the self, taken with its body of subjective process, and the not-self, or self's object, considered as a verifiable and convertible context. It is the organization of the inner control factors, those of affection and conation and interest, that becomes the subject-self, and the meanings determined by these as interests of the self are the fulfilments of its cravings, its values or worths. So, on the other hand, the meanings for recognition, the general characters of objects, those which are relatively stable and repeatable in the domain of objective fact, have been set up as such just by the growth of consciousness in its recognition of what is not inner fulfilment, but bare outer presence and limitation.

9. It should be said, however, that we must be careful to correlate the twos progressions involved. We cannot say that

¹ Cf. chap. iii. § 5—a topic carried further on a later page (chap. xi. §§ 3, 4).

the derivation of meanings follows from the distinction of inner and outer, or self and not-self. On the contrary, **Inner-Outer Dualisms are these latter are themselves meanings.**

For all psychic dualisms and distinctions are meanings in the sense that they are differentiations from earlier and more simple apprehensions. *The distinction of inner from outer is, from the start, a great meaning of the recognitive type.* Later on, when the child's practical activities and interests involve a line of satisfactions which attach to certain of his experiences, these take on increasing selective meaning. Over against this he is led, as we have seen, just by the stability, persistence, and convertible character of the objects to which these meanings attach to place them in an outer always recognizable world of things. Though attached to the outer, however, the selective meanings are worths for the inner.

Then he goes further—and this is a different way of tracing out a movement already described in another progression in the place cited. He again distinguishes inside the inner those recognizable and memory-fulfilling items which lend themselves to objective construction as objects of thought—objects in the inner—and again the realest inner, the subject, shrinks further away into the sphere of selective and subjective interest. The distinction of subject and object now has meaning over against that earlier meaning found in the dualism of inner and outer ; since the interest of description and recognition has taken over the whole of the convertible and presentable content, including that empirical content, the “me.” Selective meanings may attach to all objects of thought of whatever kind ; and it is now the subject-self to which these meanings—including those attaching to the content of inner experience as such—are worths.

10. These remarks lead on, however, to the limiting question in the theory of meanings : namely, are there any distinctions at all which are not meanings, and if not, **Does all Cognition give Meaning ?** is not meaning bound up with the very act of cognition ? The stating of this question introduces one of the knottiest problems in the history of speculative thought, that of the apprehension of relations. While we cannot well discuss it here, yet some light on the psychology, at least, of the topic may be expected¹ from its treatment by the genetic method in a later place.

¹ See chap. viii. § 10, and vol. ii.

I think we have to say that every cognition, as a concrete object or fact, is, has, or at once acquires meaning. If indeed we could find a case quite without recognition and, at the same time, not in any way the fulfilment of a more or less independent and self-determining conation or disposition, then that object would have no meaning. It would be simply the isolation of the datum or *cognitum primum* of theory. The approximations to it which we find are those in which we are able to strip from an object one sort of meaning after another. But even at the lowest stage there is, no doubt, in each case a somewhat that interests, or a somewhat that is recognized—some thin veiling of apperceptive process which enables the datum to conceal its absolute bareness and lack of meaning.

11. It may be said, indeed, that even then there may not be the sort of dislocation or lack of balance between the two factors involved which is necessary for meaning as such. This would mean that the object of such a cognition *was in no degree in relations of meaning for recognition*, nor in any degree made abstract by emphasis towards the better fulfilment of some dispositional process. Now while again in our theory we may suppose some cognitions quite neutral in these respects, yet the changes in the life of concrete thought are so constantly occurring, its objects are so unstable, its experiences so disturbing, that such neutrality is really never realized.¹ In short, we may say that there are always both complications of content and fulfilments of interest.

12. These general indications may serve to introduce the question of relation. It is evident that the two sorts of meaning set the problem of relation in rather different form. On the one hand, the recognitive meanings involve the question of the relation of whole and parts,—the question which is a first form of that of one and many. The meanings are those known in logic as denotation, extension, generalization, etc. I shall discuss the psychic function involved under the term Individuation in the next following chapter.

¹ It is for this reason that the function of language is of such utility. It holds meanings fairly constant for the purposes of communication and description. Moreover, we see in the formal sciences developments of various symbolic devices intended to secure artificially a degree of fixity and constancy which the psychic meanings themselves do not possess.

A somewhat different question arises in reference to the selective interests, and the relational meanings in which they are fulfilled. These topics also come up for notice in their place (see on "Judgments of Appreciation," vol. ii. chap. ii. § 5, also vol. iii.)

§ 3. THE PSYCHIC AND THE OBJECTIVE

13. The distinction between the two points of view indicated by the terms "psychic" and "objective" (or in the case of those objects which are themselves minds ¹ "psychological") has been already made. It is the familiar one, often reiterated in the literature of psychology, between the immediate awareness or direct apprehension of a process or content to the consciousness, feeling, or whatever we call it, of the one who has it, as contrasted with what the owner or some one else, as observer of this process, takes or understands it to be. My toothache is psychic to me; your toothache is objective and psychological to me. This appears to be a plain and relatively unambiguous distinction, yet its preservation is difficult in many cases; and its violation, entailing great confusion of theory, is all too common.

It is evident, when we come to inquire into the relation of these two points of view to each other, that certain alternatives come before us. We might possibly consider the two as equally fundamental, and equally reliable, simply saying that it is the nature of mental process that it be psychic, and it is equally its nature that it be open to the scrutiny and observation of itself or others, who care to observe and interpret it. This is the common-sense point of view.² But it is very naïve. Quite apart from the difficulties which have been urged by critics who find it a problem to justify such a two-fold way of reporting conscious process, there are certain considerations suggested by our present genetic method which have not been so commonly made matter of report. Two of

Psychic and
Psychological.
gical.

To Common
Sense both
are original
and trust-
worthy.

¹ This I shall call a "psychological or mental object," i.e. a mind or mental event of any kind looked at objectively as *itself made object*.

² An opposed interpretation is that common to many forms of epistemological idealism: a subjectivism which emphasizes the priority and immediateness of the psychic point of view. With this we will have something to do later on. An examination of its claim in connexion with one of our great genetic dualisms, that of mind and body, in view of the requirements of our present method, has been made in an article entitled "Mind and Body from the Genetic Point of View," in *The Psychological Review*, May 1903.

On Meaning

these are now relevant in this introductory consideration of meaning; they relate to the possible presence and the relation to each other of meanings from both points of view.

14. (1) It is quite clear on the surface that the psychological point of view requires the ability—and the corresponding degree of development in the observer—to apprehend objects; and among them objects which are in some sense conscious or mental. It involves, that is, a distinction to the observer between objects or things which have minds and those which have not. If he be not capable of this distinction, then the distinctiveness of the object as psychological disappears, and no comparison of the meaning the object has with that reached from the psychic point of view is possible. This requirement becomes *the recognition*

Psychological requires ability to cognize an Object as Psychic,

*of the psychic point of view as part of the object or as itself a meaning attaching to such an object.*¹

The difference, therefore, between a psychological object and any other is that by the former I mean an object which is itself possessed with the psychic point of view, from which what I take it to be can be re-read. For example, your emotion is my psychological object, for it is essentially referred for its confirmation to your psychic report of it. A mineral is not a psychological object because it has only the one, the objective, meaning.

Moreover, the psychological point of view is still more complex; it involves another sort of distinction. It requires the determination of the object observed as in some sense separate from and known by the observer. It is determined under some co-efficient of objective existence.

Now we have only to remember that the psychic as such does not involve either of these distinctions—either the distinction of minds from things, or that of objects as

The Psychic does not involve either of the foregoing.

separate from the process that objectifies them—to be convinced *that the psychological is a later and genetically derived point of view.* If so, it is a legitimate

problem of the genetic method to inquire into the progression through which this derivation takes place.

15. (2) Again, another point is suggested by our present method of inquiry. The question arises on the threshold of any consideration of this topic, as to the implications of the situation from a *third and more complicated point*

¹ Thus we cannot speak of "pure" or "early" or "simple" experience, or "psychic aspect," except as *part of our own objective meaning.*

of view, that of what is "common" or social. In the lines just penned above, the question is as to the same mental life being object of, or presented to, both points of view at once : let us say events now taking place in my parrot's mental stream. They are psychic to him, psychological to me. But now suppose we ask whether, and how far the same mental stream can take, or be subject of, both these points of view at once : how far my parrot can be at once psychic in his apprehension of his own process, and psychological as apprehending what is going on in the mind of his companion in the neighbouring cage. Here, again, to state this question plainly is to make necessary the answer that

Can the same
Psychic life
be also Sub-
ject of the
Psychological
point of
view ?

this is only possible when the psychic process in question has reached that stage of development at which the objective reading is added to the psychic ; that is, when he is able to treat the other parrot just as we ourselves are treating him—as object which

is itself psychic in its full meaning. In the case of the parrot, indeed, it is a fair question whether any such meaning is present ; that is the reason of my selecting the parrot for illustration. The force of this is to strengthen the result we intimated under the first heading above : it serves to compel the thought that the psychological as a form of objective observation is a later and more developed mode, into which our method suggests further inquiry.

For me the case is different. The mineral, for example, may be my object from both the psychic and the objective points of view at once : it is psychic as immediately present to my psychic process ; and it is objective as something observed and thought about. This is to say that all objective process is also psychic process, though the converse is not true. For example, to have a memory merely is psychic : the point of view of the baby that smiles at its mother. But to say " I think this memory of mine is accurate," is to observe the memory psychologically, while also having it psychically. In the case of the mineral there is the further subtlety that so far as I think of it as object of my thought, it is an idea or content of a psychic process, and so becomes a psychological object also.

As to the psychological, we will find later on that such a meaning is not fully present until the rise of the dualism in which the " inner " is set off as subjective ; and that the objectifying of the meaning requires the process of objectifying one's own inner life, as a context of " objects of experience." The full psychological point of view is possible, therefore, only to a consciousness which

has reached the *mode of reflection* (more fully characterized in chap. xi. below). Yet it has its stages of development, with the perception and memory of persons considered as minds. The psychological apprehension of persons proceeds *pari passu* with the apprehension of self as inner life. That is, the development of the psychological point of view is in the first instance the development of the reflective mode. So in the paragraph on "Personal Image Objects" (§ vii. of chap. v.), it is explicitly shown that the context in which the memory of a person is set, is largely the external physical world in which the *physical person* is, and that it is only gradually that a body of psychic image content as such grows up, representing the growing inwardness of the personal self-thought.

Moreover, the "common" implication has now been hinted at. For it is evident that so far as conscious function departs at all from the simple direct and unambiguous apprehension of the present and immediate, the given, the projective, and develops any inkling of the separation of certain contents off into objects of the psychological sort, it begins to have a shading of meaning which we may call in some sense "common," in contrast with simple. My parrot No. 1, named Nip, has simple apprehension of things, including No. 2, named Tuck, so long as his meaning of Tuck as "psychic" does not merge into or become absorbed by that of himself, Nip, as also psychic, however crude and organic this latter meaning may be. But so soon as Nip does have *the meaning which means both*—the meaning, let us say, Nip-Tuck—so soon this becomes a common meaning, of the type called below "meaning as common," or syn-doxic.¹ It is not a simple meaning, so far as it involves Tuck's apprehending him in the same sense.

16. I do not mean to make this position depend upon any particular view as to the point at which such common meanings arise; it is simply to say that they arise in the progress of the distinction between the two points of view. The purely psychic could not have common or social meaning, because this involves psychic duality as part of the meaning itself, which thus be-

¹ See the definition of "syn-doxic meaning" in paragraph 5 of this chapter and its more extended illustration in vol. ii. chap. iii. I think the parrot does have it as an "intent" due largely to his native adaptations to his kind, but much less, in my personal observation, than do more gregarious animals. Cf. the case of the dogs baying the moon, cited below in this chapter, sect. 22, footnote.

comes psychological. In my personal opinion, also to be explained further on in this discussion,¹ the higher objective or reflective point of view *überhaupt*, in all cases, requires the sort of meanings I have called syn-doxic. This is to be taken up, as I said, later on ; but for clearness here, let us resort to the parrots again.

Nip has, we may say, psychic process—the simple psychic point of view of our theory. He is developing the objective—i.e., the apprehension of objects in general as separate from himself ; and these objects are his meanings. *In doing so* he gets the other parrot as also an object (that is the first and general point) ; *and he cannot do so without* getting the other parrot,² which, moreover, he apprehends as itself having psychic attributes in common with himself.

Here then (and this is the second and more special point), the other parrot, Tuck, is apprehended as capable of having objects and meanings *now so far common to both of them*. Nip apprehends Tuck, for example, as knowing and valuing the pea-nuts on which they both are fed. It is in the development, therefore, of the psychological point of view that common meanings of certain types may be expected to appear. The matter cannot be treated in detail, however, until after the distinctions of various sorts of “common” meaning are made out, as in a later paragraph. The full treatment of this form of commonness is to be found in vol. ii. chap. iii. §§ 5, 6, under the heading of “Commonness through Secondary Conversion.”

§ 4. FOUR ASPECTS OF “EXPERIENCE”

17. Having seen that the same process may (1) be both psychic and psychological object, and may also (2) be subject of both points of view, the further question arises as to whether all four of these determinations may attach to it at once in its own inherent subsistence as “experience.” This question is not a mere subtlety, nor is it put for the sake of disputation merely. It is a matter having extremely interesting genetic bearings. That it is a real problem comes out when we leave the parrots aside, by saying of them, that the answer is “no” ; and then find that of the reader or any other human adult the answer is “yes.” The parrot plainly cannot take an event of his own life—say his dinner—and read

**The same
Process may
both have
and be both
Meanings.**

¹ Vol. ii. chap. iii., in which it is held that all judgment is syn-doxic meaning.

² His experience of the other parrot being of course assumed.

it the four ways that the man can. The man has dinner first as immediate gratification (the psychic); second, as present object (objective thing); third, as being "my gratification" (which another also might have, or is having: psychic to the "subject"); and fourth, as being a very different dinner experience from the one of the day before (experience as object). It is simply the familiar complication that the process which has the meanings one and two, can turn inward his objectifying in the Mode eye, and look at his own present process. This is of Reflection. what is called reflection. Our object in pointing it out here is simply to make plain that it involves a genetic advance in the progression of meanings. It will not do—to take up the burden of a many-times repeated song—to once-for-all distinguish the two points of view, psychic and psychological, and then think we are done with it. For the distinction is itself subject to progression and refinement; and later on in the process by which reflection arises it becomes itself the relational meaning that we call knowledge. The sort of movements it enables us to point out finds illustration in the very next paragraph, where the forms of "common" meaning are considered. It is there seen that there is a constant conversion and reconversion of the meaning of commonness from one of these points of view to the other.

18. Of these four readings, we may say that the simply psychic is earliest; that it continues along with the development of, The Pro- second, the objective, through all the modes of cognition, as we are tracing them out; that, third, the gression. psychic to the subject, with common objects, comes only with the subject-object dualism; and that, fourth, "experience as such" is a psychological meaning in which all possible constructions are treated as contents toward which the subject takes the objective point of view.

These four aspects all attach to what in the current literature of epistemology and philosophy is indiscriminately called "experience." It will serve the interests of clearness if we give each its own designation. They are "simply psychic," "simply cognitive (objective)," "subject" and "object of experience."¹

¹ It should also be reiterated that the "simply psychic" is an abstract meaning of our reflection: that is, it is a *meaning* only to a consciousness that can have an *object that means this*. While itself by definition psychic, yet it is as a meaning psychological. It will also be remembered that we found in chap. v. § 5, a mode of the "subjective" that is not yet a "subject": a subjective that is not yet able to view itself objectively, psychologically, or dualistically.

§ 5. COMMON MEANING : OBJECTS IN COMMON

19. The general notion of common meaning is simply that of knowledge which in some way has objects not entirely, and from **General sense of Common.** all points of view, quite private, unshared, and peculiar to one psychic process. If we, in the first instance, grant that so far as this term has any recognized connotation, this is about it, we may go on to distinguish more closely the cases of commonness of knowledge or meaning, reading into the terms "private," "unshared," etc., such further definition as our discussion may lead us to adopt. In this way we will hope not only to clear up our first hazy conception, but also to arrive at a view of the rise and development of common meaning.

If we take the term "unshared" as characterizing knowledge which is not common, we will have a starting point from which to consider common knowledge more positively. It is knowledge that *is in some sense shared*. This in turn requires that we consider two or more sharers in such knowledge. But as the fulfilment of this condition does not require that the individual shall be aware or know that his knowledge is shared by another, we may eliminate such a possibility, and reach the idea of knowledge which is in whole or part the same in two or more individuals, but of which they themselves do not know they are holding it in common. The element of common-
Common as "Aggregate," yet simple objects; ness in the meaning of the term thus reached is such from the outside point of view of another party or spectator—the "psychological," in contrast with the "psychic," point of view. This is then the first sort of knowledge fitly styled "common." I shall call it, in order to fix it *as a meaning from the spectator's point of view*, "aggregate knowledge," and its objects "aggregate objects." It is an objective and psychological meaning.

20. It is further evident that the individual, or any one of the individuals, having this aggregate knowledge, not being aware that it is aggregate, finds it in no way at all different from any other knowledge : it is to him simply knowledge, and its objects are simply objects of knowledge with whatever meaning the objective co-efficients may guarantee. So we may call his knowledge—understanding that it is indeed aggregate, but that we are speaking of it now *only from the psychic point of view in contrast to that point of view from which it is aggregate*—

"simple" knowledge.¹ Its objects we will call "simple" objects under the general class of private objects to be specified later on.

21. It may be pointed out, in the way of general remark, that the objects of both these sorts are meanings. The aggregate object is of course such, since it is a matter of **Both are meanings.** observed relationship between the knowledges of two or more persons, both objective to the person making the observation. The "simple" object is also a meaning to the extent to which it is a constructed object in the mind of him who has it. It includes, indeed, the limiting case of our theory of meaning, that in which the meaning vanishes in the mere skeleton of original presentation. But neglecting this unrealizable case, it will do to substitute the term meaning for the term object, and speak of aggregate and simple meanings.

This then, *the aggregate object of different simple cognitions, is the first determination of commonness: it is "meaning in common."* So far as these simple cognitions are of persons, they begin to have psychological meaning and so to suggest another phase of commonness.

§ 6. OBJECTS AS COMMON

22. It is now a natural procedure to remove the supposition made just above relative to aggregate knowledges—i.e., that the individuals do not apprehend that the knowledges are aggregate—and suppose the case in which the particular individual whose knowledge we choose to **Knowledge becomes (1) Aggregate Meaning and (2) also a Psychic Object.** examine, *does so apprehend*. His knowledge of the object is now so far changed that he cognizes the object as one which is also cognized by somebody else. This is an added element of meaning—the content remaining the same—and we must now hit off the sort of commonness characteristic of his knowledge. First, we may say that his knowledge becomes aggregate; for he now thinks of himself and another as both holding it. It is an aggregate meaning. But it is taken over to the *psychic point of view*.² As being his own private

¹ It is knowledge due to the "simple cognition" of the earlier paragraph, when that cognition is "common."

² This typical and developed case is not meant to forestall the discussion of cases in which the commonness in this sense is the sort of meaning called "intent," which may be largely organic, affective: say the shading of meaning in a dog's mind when he "bays the moon" in common with another dog; how far has he the meaning "moon as bayed

knowledge, not of necessity shared by the other individual, it is also simple. This case of *private knowledge which is held as a common or aggregate meaning* I shall distinguish as **Syn-doxic Meaning.** "syn-doxic" knowledge and meaning (Greek σύν together, and δόξα opinion). In view of its important place in the full discussion of common meaning, it should have a special name; indeed, this term will save us later on from certain confusions.¹ We may call it the case of "knowledge of commonness," or *common meaning as common*.

Here as before, except more plainly so, we are clearly dealing with meanings to a definite point of view, the psychic. The limit of the meaning is seen in the fact that, from the psychological point of view, it may be mistaken; others may not share it as the meaning itself presupposes they do.

§ 7. OBJECTS AS COMMON IN COMMON

23. Again we may take a step in advance. Let us suppose that an outside party yet again thinks of the knowledges of the two or more persons, *and considers them, each in its private meaning, as syn-doxic*; that is, thinks of each person as thinking his thought as common to him and to one or more others. This carries the syn-doxic meaning over again to the psychological point of view by removing the limitation pointed out a sentence or two above. The object to the observer is not syn-doxic, but the meaning *which he thinks it to have to the other minds is*. Such a thought, knowledge, or meaning, we may appropriately describe and designate as "con-aggregate." *It means an aggregate of syn-doxic knowledges.* This case we may call that of knowledge of "the relation of commonness of meaning as common"; it is the meaning *knowledge as common in common*. It is evidently a meaning to the psychological point of view of an observer of syn-doxic knowledges.

also by my friend, Carlo?" It is, also, we may add, aggregate to an outside observer, say of both dogs, only so far as the meaning is objectively well founded; that is, in this case, only when both dogs are actually baying the moon. Cf. the remarks on commonness of "common function" in vol. ii, chap. iii. § 5.

¹ I have searched the literature for old terms for this and the following meaning, but without success. Chap. iii. of vol. ii. is devoted to the detailed discussion of syn-doxic meaning.

§ 8. THE RELATION-OF-COMMONNESS AS SOCIAL MEANING

24. The next refinement, still proceeding genetically, is that in which the *con-aggregate meaning is again made private or psychic*: the case in which one of a group of individuals having common meaning, not only knows that fact, *but thinks of the other individuals who have that meaning as also knowing the fact.*

Social Meaning. His knowledge is private in that he, so far as this meaning goes, is alone in recognizing it; and he may be mistaken. It is the relation of commonness as meaning which is now in question and which is as such his private meaning. This I shall call, following the terminology justified by extended discussion of the facts elsewhere,¹ "social meaning," or meaning which involves "social commonness."

It is a meaning *to the psychic point of view but of the psychological point of view as such*: as, for example, my meaning, "you and I join in recognizing our common social duties." The commonness here presupposed is that of reflection.

§ 9. SOCIAL COMMONNESS AS PUBLIC MEANING

25. Finally, we are able, as observers, taking the psychological point of view, to mean, talk about, interpret, and act upon, such meanings as those just described as social. This we do when we assume a social group of minds each thinking thoughts *in common*, thinking them *as common*, and thinking **Public Meaning.** these latter, as being both *in common* and *as common*, again *in common*. This is "public meaning." It is the highest and most refined sort of commonness as meaning. It is, as a last thought, itself private, not aggregate; for it is the observer's final way of meaning commonness, and he may be alone in meaning it this way. But as common meaning it is "public."

§ 10. ILLUSTRATIONS. TABLE OF COMMON MEANINGS

26. To illustrate these distinctions, let us suppose certain children each apart gazing at the moon. The moon is to us their Aggregate meaning; but it is to each of them a **Illustrations.** Simple object or meaning. Suppose a certain two of them are seen by a third to be looking at the moon as he also is; then the meaning to this third child is Syn-doxic. If we now consider the case of the three different children, all aware

¹ This and the next determination, "Public Meaning," are discussed in the work *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, chaps. viii., xii., where these two terms, (but not the others here suggested) are employed.

that they are alike perceiving the moon, then to any fourth person who might observe the situation, the meaning of their object would be Con-aggregate. If further, the fourth person thus described includes himself also as one of the group, the meaning is now Social; and to yet another observer, who thinks of all the children as having the Social meaning, the final meaning is Public.

27. We have, accordingly, two series of determinations of what is common, according as we take the psychic or the psychological point of view. The psychic or private objects are those which the psychic itself *has or means*; the psychological are those which the psychic is taken by someone to *be, have, or mean*. All of them, except the first psychic meaning, the simple object, are *common meanings*; the simple is common only in that it is one of the psychic meanings correlative to that which is common when the same situation is taken in the psychological sense. The term "private" as used here serves simply to designate the individual psychic point of view; the question how far there is knowledge that is private in any other sense also remains to be considered.

The cases may be thrown together in the following table, which will serve as point of departure of the discussions of a later chapter (vol. ii. chap. iii.):—

COMMON MEANING

<i>Psychic or Private.</i>	<i>Psychological or Objective.</i>
1. (<i>Simple</i>): Object or Meaning.	1. <i>Aggregate</i> : Meaning in common.
2. <i>Syn-doxic</i> : Commonness as Meaning (common Meaning as common).	2. <i>Con-aggregate</i> : Syn-doxic Meaning in common (Meaning as common in common).
3. <i>Social</i> : Con-aggregate Meaning as common.	3. <i>Public</i> : Social Meaning in common.

It is later on our more extended task to trace the range and inter-penetration of these various sorts of common meaning. Of course, the obverse side of the problem will have the interest of enabling us to see what knowledge or meaning remains over when all the common meaning is thus set apart. The result should throw some light on that obscure and neglected, but important, topic—the social factor in the construction and validity of our various objects of thought.

Chapter VIII

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MEANING: THE INDIVIDUATION MODE

§ 1. THE INDIVIDUATION PROGRESSION

1. In the genetic progression whereby objects are apprehended and treated as being or meaning in some sense one or more, the process called Individuation, we again find ourselves compelled to distinguish the stages already marked off as pre-logical, quasi-logical, and logical. This is what we should expect from the explanations already made. With view to the later discussions under this head we may, as heretofore, consider the pre-logical mode to cover sense objects and memory objects; the quasi-logical to comprise the objective constructions which intervene before the rise of the distinction of self and its experience (the subject-object mode); and the logical mode of individuation to arise if not then, yet certainly not earlier.

2. We may ask the meaning for consciousness, at each of these grades or modes of cognition, of the categories of individuation, or the modes in which objects may be apprehended as in some sense individuals. I shall, for the purposes of our exposition, consider these to be the following—"unity," "plurality," and "group." For example, as to unity we may distinguish, from the psychic point of view, the simple unity of apprehension as pre-logical, certain midway unities of meaning or intent as quasi-logical, and the unity of judgment and predication as logical. The same terms would serve to characterize in a preliminary way the progressive determinations of plurality and of group. It may also be recalled that Individuation is to be considered throughout as determination of *meaning* in the sense of that term indicated in the preceding chapter.

§ 2. PRE-LOGICAL INDIVIDUATION

3. In the determination of objects in the pre-logical modes, those of sense and memory, individuation is not a separable or abstract meaning; it is an aspect of the cognitive function as such incidental to the objective point of view. Cognition, as we saw in some detail, establishes a psychic object which has a certain complication. The complicated content is so far individual that its presence is determined as "what" or "this," and not as "that or other rather than this."¹ There is no comparison of this with that in a single construction. The "feel" of the object as a whole, having about it an indefinite and obscure penumbra, is its individual presence; it is "this presence."

4. The introduction of the memory co-efficient, however, raises other and interesting aspects of individual meaning, certain of them psychic no less than objective. As we shall see, in the later discussion of the existence-meanings, the memory co-efficient is already on the way to being the sort of detachable mark which it afterwards becomes in the image and play modes. And even in the case of the purely memorial presence of an object, a certain continuity is necessary between it and the sense co-efficient which it fulfils. The memory train is the psychic mean or medium of the recurrence of the sense object, and the identification of the sense object thus secured is not in all cases simply an immediate psychic fact. We discover in our theory of recognition cases in which that function is a variable and mediate mode of determination. Recognition is then the confirming individuation of the object already available by the operation of the sense and memory co-efficients. As confirming the sense co-efficient we may cite recognition of objects in the sense-mode before the memory-images of those objects are formed; and as confirming the memory co-efficient, recognition of memory images and of recurring objects and events.²

¹ Just what degree of negative significance is involved is treated below in chap. ix. on "Negative Meaning."

² That is, we may reproduce a content without recognizing it (cf. the remarkable case of Helen Keller's reproduction of "The Storm King," as given in her *Story of My Life*). I have myself read with interest the pages of a book, thinking it quite novel until I came upon annotations in my own handwriting in the margin, these annotations being also the same comments in tenor as those then coming with apparent freshness

There is no doubt, indeed, that the individuation of an object by recognition may give a fuller and richer meaning than that of sense perception. The added element of meaning is the retrospective reference of the content to the original object-mode. The identification of the recurrent object as being

Object now
Persisting.

the same object as that before experienced—that is the mark of this higher individuation. With it the additional element of meaning known as persistence of the object is much developed. As we saw on an earlier page, the full force of the memory co-efficient is to render psychic the transition from presence-when-present to presence-after-absence, and this psychic meaning grows into that of the continued persistence of the object. A crude identity or immediate-sameness is given in each second or later individuation, and the value of this in the later progressions toward the richer meaning of the object is that of persistence, as it is our explicit task to show in the following paragraph (§ 3).¹

into consciousness. So there are not only illusions of recognition—as that of the well-known *déjà vu*, and certain of the paramnesias—but also alterations in the direction of failure of recognition of contents nevertheless found to be revived. This is partially the case in apraxic patients, who forget the use only of an object otherwise familiar and real. In cases of so-called “absolute recognition,” the sense of familiarity seems to be quite independent of the relational features of the content which usually constitute the recognition co-efficient. On the interpretation of these and other instances I may be allowed to refer to my book, *Mental Development in the Child and the Race* (chap. x. § 3, on “Recognition”; and chap. xiv. on the “Mechanism of Revival”).

The case mentioned first above—that of recognition of sense objects as such without the medium of memory images—carries the function of recognition down into the sphere of “primary attention” in the sense mode, instead of making it a late stage only in the memory process, as is often done. We may presume, for example, that a low organism having crude sense objects only, has along with them feelings of familiarity (the meaning called “present sameness” in the next paragraph, where the meanings attaching to the later cases of recognition are also explained.

¹So much quite apart from the mechanism of the recognition process, which the writer holds to be simply that of attention considered as a progressive function. In the work mentioned in the preceding note the writer has worked out an analysis of the functional elements of the attention, finding three genetic grades: primary attention (attention as objectifying merely), class recognition (attention to classes of objects), and individual recognition (attention as individuating singulars). It is there maintained and argued that in all these cases the attention is psychophysically a synergy of motor or habit processes. It is not necessary that such a detailed psycho-physical theory should be brought in here ;

5. It appears, also, that in its more derived aspects as determining factor in the later image mode, the identification of the object by recognition has meaning, as well as in its guarantee of immediate presence and persistence. It involves the further psychic determination of individuality found in the object of fancy; and it is an important contributing factor in this movement, since without it that essential dualism characteristic of the image mode—that of inner and outer—could not arise. A mode of psychic determination involving only present objects, together with memory objects also convertible into present objects, but without the further meaning of possibly not representing the original objects, would give rise to no meaning not exhausted by sense experiences. The moment of urgency in the separation of fancy objects from those of sense is the failure of just this meaning to have fulfilment in the case of some presentations, while it succeeds for others.¹

In order to analyse this situation more in detail, we may recognize the two sorts of meaning already distinguished as the context of recognition on the one hand, and the special or abstract meaning and intent on the other hand, and ask separately as to the presence of one or the other.

6. As to context, it appears that *pre-logical individuation*, before the rise of the inner-outer dualism, whether in the sense or in the memory mode, is *nothing more than the normal cognitive determination of objects*. It means that and little more.

This mode, indeed, being pre-logical and thus a-dualistic, has *no psychic distinctions corresponding to unity, plurality, and group*. There is *unity felt as cognitive determination*, and there is *lack of unity felt as confusion and failure of unity* in determination; but the *unity of the object determined is the only unity*. For recognition of unity there must be more than the oneness of simple apprehension—that is, for unity as distinct element of meaning. It is only to an observer that consciousness in this mode gets “*this* rather than *that*” object, or one object and not more. To the psychic it is simply object, or in its absence, no object.

yet the symbolism of the genetic formula there given will be found useful in certain of our discussions, and it is briefly explained on a later page (chap. x. sect. 31).

¹ Cf. above, chap. v. §§ 1, 2.

7. It may be claimed that in the individuation by recognition the present object is in its content different from that earlier experience which is recognized in or by the present object. But this again is a distinction to the observer only. Psychically the recognition is a mode of re-constitution of the former object. Either the object is recognized or it is not; there is no question of recognized or non-recognized, that is, of different contexts, to the psychic process itself. After the recognized image or object is recognized there may be, indeed, a harking backward to the original experience; but so far as that occurs it introduces further distinctions characteristic of the image mode to be spoken of below. In the simple case there is only a co-efficient of familiarity—a *Bekanntheitsqualität*—attaching to the object now present to consciousness.

The question is suggested here as to whether the psychic sense of difference has the same status in this mode as that of sameness. It appears to me that it has not. It is the identical process of objective construction that has the sameness co-efficient, and there is no reason that in the absence of this construction there should be anything corresponding to objective difference.

In other words—and this is the nub of the matter—the thing that holds together an original and a recurring psychic state is the memory co-efficient of identification; of this we have assurance in the actual fact of recognition. But there is no corresponding state of mind attaching to the *quite unrecognized whereby it is constituted for consciousness as different from earlier states*. The mere fact of lack of recognition is, of course, due to what is a real psychological difference; but how is consciousness to be aware of positive difference simply from the absence of that one of the terms which is familiar? The meaning or sense of difference involves two or more positive constructions.¹ Difference as meaning comes only when sameness has undergone certain developments, as is pointed out below. Before that there is sense of change and interruption, but this does not attach to the content as the meaning “different.”

8. It is interesting to note, however, that from the objective or psychological point of view there are very great variations

Recognized
Object not
Individuated
as Distinct
from the
Original.

No Difference
Co-efficient in
this Mode.

¹ See chap. ix. § 2, on the negative meaning of lack or absence.

in this first form of individuation. Judged by the standards set up in the developed modes of the observer's thought, the child's identification of individual objects is crudely inadequate, and his meanings full of error. His recognition process allows the most remarkable substitutions of one object for another, condones modifications or omissions of what afterwards become the most essential marks of individuality, and passes over unnoticed additions which seem to us most obtrusive. Nothing disturbs the child's assured sense of sameness. He accepts suggestion readily as to the meaning of the shadings of relationship in the content, and even calls upon his senses, when occasion seems to require it, to report what indeed is not there. All this is so striking that the observer who takes the developed logical point of view is often mistaken in reading into the child his own point of view, and attributing real logical generality to these objects of sense and memory. Such procedure is, of course, a confusion of genetic modes. But from the psychological point of view these are *as if* "general," and for the sake of the progressions which follow this character should be noted. This mistaken and confused treatment of things has been called "vague generalization," and its object the "vague general," or the "general of the first degree."¹ It would be better to use some more exact term, instead of general, and for this I employ the word "schematic" in the later discussions.

It is important to note this vagueness in the first objects of cognition, because it is due in part to variations of the psychic determination itself. With the growing influence of the dispositional factor, the present established context means more and more in the determination of the object. The specific interest, at first so largely that of native impulse and dominant organic tendency, works over the novel more completely into the form of the familiar. Such treatment is the essential method of psychic

¹ Observations of this are sufficiently trite, the child's tendency to "generalize" being illustrated in all the child-study books. Typical cases from my own experience are cited in *Mental Development*, pp. 325 ff., with this comment: "What this really means is that the child's motor attitudes are fewer than his receptive experiences. Each experience of man [for example] calls out the same attitude, the same incipient movement, the same co-efficient of attention on his part, as that with which he hails 'Papa.'"

digestion; and in the variations that thus arise in the determination of the raw materials of sense there is the development of divergent lines of meaning as different interests come upon the psychic boards. The unity both of the original sense object, and also that of the recognized memory object, allow this diverse reading of the full meaning.

§ 3. SAMENESS AND PERSISTENCE

9. Let us turn now to the other question of meaning in this mode of individuation, that of the selective meaning attaching to objects of memory, which, in their contextual meaning, remain, as we have seen, relatively unchanged.

In the function of individuation by recognition, the psychic shadings of meaning begin to come into their own, for the reason that they reflect the formation of more or less permanent interests. These interests are selective; they are themselves built up by processes of habituation in certain lines, and the further assimilations of data are preferentially along the lines that fulfil them. It is accordingly as we get away from the immediate control by the stubborn and limiting co-efficients of sense, that the psychic factors and their appropriate meanings become more articulate. In this first beginning of dualism, therefore, the selective and abstracting interests develop their characteristic meanings.

The growing mass of special meaning shows itself mainly in two cases of recognition which are to be distinguished. In the first place, there is recognition of a present object; and, in the second place, recognition of the memory of an absent object. These two cases have in common the context which our preceding discussion found to be relatively unchanged from the original sense object, now further embodied in both of these experiences. The sense in which the original experience is embodied in the two recognitions respectively is now to be explained.

In our life of developed memory the two cases seem to lose all difference of meaning. We say: "I remember this pen—it is mine," or "I remember my pen—it is this." In both cases the meaning, over and above the context presented, is that of *sameness*, as between a certain known pen and the present pen. In the first case, the verbal form would be "this is the same as it"; in the latter case, "it is the same as this."

10. Yet in their genesis the two meanings are different and are successively acquired ; they represent stages in a progression of meaning. The form "it is the same as this" involves **Recurrent Sameness.** an actually "lifted" and recognized memory context, apart from the fulfilment of this context in the present experience of a pen. I identify the present pen because I am antecedently able to recall and recognize my pen. It includes the simpler meaning of the other formula, "this is the same as it," as is seen in our ability to get this latter meaning when dealing with an image simply for itself which we also find to be the same as the original object. In this sense, therefore, the cognitive meaning of an image may be the same as that of an object. Both fulfil the common original which one of them is.

The case, therefore, of sameness in the meaning "it is the same as this" is that of the attaching of an earlier recognized meaning to a recurring case. The sameness of the memory image is carried over to the recurring object. This I shall call the meaning "sameness as recurrence," or "recurrent sameness," with respect to the constant context recognized.

11. The meaning, "this is the same as it," in its simplest form, may attach either to a memory image,¹ the object being absent, or to an object of the simple sort whose independent memory is not yet taken off or "lifted" as representing it. The gradual transition from sense to memory has been spoken of, and the point made clear that an object may be recognized in a direct way before a detached memory image of it is formed. Accordingly, when we ask what sameness it has, we are led to distinguish two genetic stages. One of them we may call "present sameness," or the sameness of a present object ; the other "remote sameness," the sameness of an image with a remote or absent object. It is evident that the former is genetically first because, in a case of conversion, the context secured by the conversion co-efficient, say my pen, when I go and find it, is then present to me with the present-sameness meaning attaching to it. That is, remote sameness includes and reverts to the simpler present sameness.

12. We have then, to sum up, three stages of meaning, called sameness, given successively in the three successive cognitive

¹ The meaning of "recurrence" occurs, of course, also for recurrent images. An image may be identified instead of a present external object.

modes already distinguished. *First*, there is *present sameness*, attaching to a present context, whether its presence be continuous or interrupted.¹ *Second*, there is *remote sameness*, a meaning attaching not to the re-establishment of the original control, but to the establishment of a convertible memory context. *Third*, there is "recurrent sameness," the meaning attaching to the re-established object as recurring, or the meaning attaching to the confirmation of remote sameness by its repeated fulfilment. For example, I take the successive ticks of my watch to be *the same sound*, I remember them by a context that means *the same sound*, and I declare the subsequent ticking of this or another watch to be *the same sound*.

Of these meanings it is evident (1) that the third is the carrying out of the conversion which is claimed by the second, and (2) that the second stands for and represents the sort of control possessed by the first. The second of these points has already had full consideration. Let us notice the first a little more in detail.

13. The rise of recurrent meanings, whereby the demand for remote continued existence is fulfilled by actual recurrence, is possible wherever an experience is present in which agreement between two contexts occurs. There are two cases of such fulfilment: one, the direct re-experience by the original observer, the other the experience of a different observer in a form in which the original observer may avail himself of it. The latter case has great interest as opening the question as to how a second person's experience can become available to a first, and stand in place of the latter's direct experience of the same sort.

This is secured by the process called in the discussion of "Events as Objects" (chap. iv. § 5), "secondary conversion"—the process of confirming one's own context by an appeal to that of another person. The experience of the other reached by this appeal becomes a supporting or repeating or recurring experience of the original event. In this

¹ Continuous presence might conceivably give the rudiment of this meaning, especially when by its duration it outstretches the temporal grasp of a single cognition. It is a close question just how much meaning would attach to mere continuance within this grasp. No doubt *discontinuance* would at once sharpen and define such a meaning. In discussing "inner persistence" below (chap. x, § 2), an analogous question is taken up. It is the case of re-establishment after interruption that clearly establishes this meaning, whatever we may say as to a still earlier form of it.

way the demand is met for recurrence as a mark of persistence ; and the important step is reached—to be spoken of again below in the treatment of common meaning ¹—that persistence of the external sort can be secured simply by inter-psychic or so-called “ social ” agreement. Instead of waiting to see whether I will find in Washington, when I go there again, a certain statue which I think I remember in that city, I simply ask some one who is familiar with Washington. And so, too, of the transitive part of my memory which represented the scene that took place about the statue on a particular day. The other person’s memory stands vicariously for a renewal of my own experience, and the persistence of the objective event which would fulfil both experiences is thus established.

With this analysis before us we may ask as to the significance, for the individuation of the object thus variously recognized, of this progress or development in the **Substitute Sameness as Meaning for Recognition.** however, we will speak in terms of meaning of the samenesses thus distinguished, rather than in terms of the function of recognition, which is their common vehicle. We shall thus avoid the ambiguities into which the term recognition would otherwise surely lead us. The great meaning which is thus shaping itself, and of which we are now ready to treat, is that of the persistence of the objects of individuation in this mode.

14. It has been intimated in certain passages above ² that the persistence co-efficient of objects is given in the conversion character of the memory mode. And it has been stated **Bearing on Persistence.** that the present reality, the mere presence, of an object, however guaranteed or controlled, could not give the meaning of persistence. We are now able to point out the accretions of meaning that come in the memory mode.

So far as present sameness is concerned, its limitation is that only present objects have it, and it is essential to persisting objects that they do not need to be present. The **Present Sameness and Persistence.** continuance given in uninterrupted presence, and its reinstatement after interruption, taken *per se*, give no assurance of the meaning of remoteness, and of persistence during detachment. There may be foreign control, and again foreign control ; but that is all.

15. In the meaning called above “ remote sameness ” we find

¹ Vol. ii. chap. iii. § 5.

Chap. iv. § 3.

a certain doubling of the control co-efficient upon itself: the meaning demands the *leaving out of the control as presence*, because it need not be present. Yet it need not be present in turn because it *is still meant*. Everything is excluded which has not possible presence. So there is left only *what has presence, but does not now need to embody it*. This is the essential meaning of the *detachment* or remoteness of a memory image or context. It is a positive meaning, remote-presence: a first moment in persistence. It is the essential link of meaning between present-when-present and present-after-absence.

While thus really a first stage in the development of the meaning of persistence, it yet does not go far; for while it prophesies the conversion of a given memory and issues in a control series which may reinstate it, that is still not all that is meant by the persistence of the object through a series of recurrences. A mere fancy image might have the value for consciousness of remote presence, and might claim conversion into a present object having the control of a foreign co-efficient which would hold the psychic meaning finally to a single result. But this might be merely prophetic, not recurrent. In illusional states all sorts of pseudo-persistences prophesy external objects, and also in fact attain them by the reading of the meaning forwards into a mistaken sense terminus.

r6. What is lacking is the confirmation secured by running the context of conversion *the reverse way*: that is, from the present object now newly experienced, back to the context of memory and remote recognition; so that the present sense-controlled object fulfils the context before claiming such fulfilment. This is the full meaning of "recurrent sameness" as given above. It is the meaning of sameness where-with a real object is assigned to a former recognized memory image, as being its fulfilling and controlling term.

In this final factor we see the recurrence-after-absence of an object which has already had the meaning absence-after-presence, and it is the union of these two moments of meaning that the full persistence meaning of a detached object embodies, before the rise of judgment. The real recurrence is mediated through the detachment of the earlier remote sameness meaning. This meaning is permanently embodied in the object on its new appearance, and continues through its successive reappearances.¹

¹ The need of the ingredient of meaning called remote-sameness—the

17. It is still, however, a meaning characteristic of the mode, one which recognition processes and conversion alone suffice to import into objects. It is "outer," as over against inner, only so far as such objects are set over against those which do not meet the tests of the conversion involved, and so have not this sort of persistence. The remote sameness is a development in detachment, which later on means externality. Nor is it as yet a "general" notion, nor a "judgment of identity." These developments are still to follow. Yet in this meaning, here achieved, the basis is laid for the dualisms of substance and thought in which these higher meanings mature.¹

§ 4. QUASI-LOGICAL INDIVIDUATION IN THE FANCY MODE

18. The selective meanings are much developed in the progression which leads on to the fancy mode. We have seen that this progression arises in the urgency of the demand—and the embarrassment of its lack of fulfilment—that the sense and memory co-efficients work harmoniously in a joint determination. This harmony is not of itself always present. The object identified by memory, and recognized as the one now familiar, turns out to lack confirmation, either from the mere fact of alteration of interest, or from variation in one or other of the determining conditions, such as social suggestion, sense relativity, etc. The resulting confusion, disappointment, and lack of successful action leads directly on, by the progression worked out above, to the great distinction of inner and outer. It is in this distinction that we have the beginning of psychic indimention supplied by the conversion co-efficient—may be seen in the defectiveness of cases of recognized recurrence when that stage has not intervened. Such cases are *recognized events*, as distinct from recognized things. Events *occur* and *recur*, but they do not *persist*; what is lacking—the reason of it has already been discussed in chap. iv. § 5 above—is the memory co-efficient of conversion. On the other hand, the things and actors figuring in the events—the positive terms of the context—*do* have the full meaning of persistence since, as separable objects, they have the conversion meaning of remote sameness.

¹ This we may make more definite by pointing out that the remote-sameness meaning as a *schematic of in futuro* meaning (see § 6 of this chapter) is essentially experimental; and that the "recurrent" meaning, now merely one of fact, becomes, in the thought mode, a "*singular*" meaning, taking the form of the *judgment of identity* through a return of the formula, "this is the same as it," which thus reinstates our earliest sameness meaning, that of "present sameness," in the logical mode of individuation.

viduation of a quasi-logical sort ; for the sense of possible alternatives gives the one meaning set up a hypothetical and experimental character.

The individuality of the object of fancy, as such, is in several Characters respects a different thing from that of the objects of the Fancy sense and memory. It has some characters that the Object as sense and memory. It has some characters that the Individual, latter lack.

19. In the first place, it is recognized not merely as an object having marks that it might not have had, but one lacking marks that it might have had. The determination is made in one or other of two alternative forms. There is the consciousness of bifurcation, of confusion and conflict, issuing in the object as actually determined. The Germ of Cognition of Difference.

The psychic object includes the *mark of distinction and difference*, as well as the simple recognition of object as such ; for this latter recognition has now a co-efficient of sameness which is positively exclusive of the other member of a dualism. Moreover, a positive meaning attaches to the co-efficient of the outer which seemed alternatively, but in the event was not actually, present. Two positive meanings, "inner" and "outer," are held together in mind, while only one of them is realized.

I think it is in this distinction, arising from the need of more specific and concrete determination of the habitual, that the unity of simply being an object passes over into psychic discrimination and individuation as between Judgment of objects. The meaning is *this thing and not that*.¹ The Difference ; "this" becomes "what" because it is in some degree what-not. I say it is a *meaning*, for so it is. We cannot call it—that is, not yet—the *assertion, predication, or judgment of unity or difference*. It is so far only preparatory to the judgment mode, and is quasi-logical as rudimentary to the logical ; but in it the meaning has not passed from what may be called "bare cognition of difference" into a judgment of distinction or relation.

The meaning attaching to difference here comes out when we say that it is the meaning arising in opposition to the "sameness" characteristic of this mode. The sameness of the mere image mode is at best only of the type called above "remote

¹ Cf. the development of the corresponding negative meaning or Opposition in the progression from "this and not other," to "this and not that," below (chap. ix. §§ 2-4). Negatively, the meaning here is dual and exclusive.

sameness." An image can be "the same" only by some "remote" reference (or indeed by the simpler claim of continuous presence); so that the meaning of opposition or negation is no more than "not-same." Only so far, therefore, as the "not-same" meaning requires *two terms held in a cognitive whole*, is difference a cognitive mark and a positive meaning.

We may say positively, I think, that there is *difference as cognitive mode* in the determination of objects as inner and outer. These two terms are always correlative, and the determination of any single image object supplies its contrasted outer object. We have therefore in the distinction of inner and outer the sufficient reason for the cognition of both unity and difference—as indeed in any other distinction arising from the concurrent operation of two or more relatively inharmonious co-efficients establishing objects which have "remote" sameness and persistence.¹

20. If we say so much about unity in this stage of development, what may we say about plurality? Objectively speaking, plurality is meant whenever unity involves differences. Unity is a determination within the vague schematic whole which the outsider calls plurality. Psychically, however, the plurality is not a positive determination of the object, in this mode, in the sense that unity is, but only a felt plurality of motive or intent, until the determination is of more than one object.

This may not be the case. The issue may be preceded by conflict or rivalry of more than one interest, and it may be determined under joint or rival control co-efficients; but the successful determination it is which, just by working itself out, puts an

¹ There is, no doubt, in the sense or feeling of plurality mentioned as preceding the cognition of difference, a negative value or shading which is preliminary to the individuation of the different. It may be called, I think, *difference as negative intent*, so far as it enters into the scheme of meanings—negative, however, only as embodying a sort of opposition to the positive simple construction which it displaces. For example, a printed word seen at a sufficient distance may suggest "horse"; and it may show obscure difference even when not read as showing any particular difference. As a mode of opposition it is of the indeterminate form called "privative" below—"that and not other," horse and nothing else—except that here the indeterminateness is in the positive term, and the negation is of something determinate—"this and not that," "something else and not horse." This makes it more properly a case of "exclusion."

end to the conditions which meant felt or indeterminate plurality. Here, again, I think our present method enables us to point out the fallacy of confusion of modes which finds the cognition of unity in its earliest stages only where there is that of plurality and difference. The plurality may be only on the side of the psychic interests and motives; *they feel different*. But this plurality or difference is annulled by the determination of objective unity in an act of positive cognition.¹

21. It is here, in this complication, I think, that what we mean by "group" is first developed in the scheme of psychic meanings. The earliest group meaning is what may be described as unspecified plurality, where specification is no more nor less than objective determination at any stage of mental development. As meaning a group may be only an intent, an awareness of complexity. Cognitive plurality as a positive determination, over against unity, is a later and derived meaning. I do not mean to say that groups may not be cognized; they may in many and various ways. But they need not be. A group is the form of complexity which first enters into the psychic sphere as conflict and rivalry of motives to determination. The issue of this rivalry is a cognition of unity as a character. The unity is set over against lack of unity, and lack of unity, when thus negatively present as a mere sense of complexity, is not itself a determination. It is sufficient—and the case is often realized—that there should still remain the residual group-sense, or feeling of difference, surviving the actual determination of the object as unity. Cognition of plurality with difference, on the other hand, involves, as we have seen, *a whole individuated as plural*.

22. The individuating progression, to sum up our result so far, is: (1) Cognition of *object* and recognition of *same object*; (2) Psychic experience or feeling of *group*; (3) Recognition of *unity of object*; and (4) *Difference, Plurality, and Group as cognitive mode*.²

Résumé:
Stages in the
Progression.

¹ The objection may be made to this, that the *unity* as such is then annulled also; and this may be true of a *judgment* of unity, but not of the simple meaning "unity" of the act of cognition reached in this mode. In the judgments of unity, or identity and difference, we go over to the psychological point of view of reflection which is not yet here attained.

² Yet it should be again noted here that we are not yet dealing with judgments of unity (identity) and difference; that topic is discussed

§ 5. QUASI-LOGICAL INDIVIDUATION IN THE FIRST SEMBLANT MODE

23. It is in the progression of the inner-outer dualism toward that of mind and body, in the play mode, that psychic meanings take on the signs of positive logical value for later mental development. This appears, on the one hand, in that aspect of the play object which we have called experimental; for it is from it that schematic or recognitive meanings develop. But, on the other hand, it is in the possibility of the playful treatment of objects, their use as semblants, that the initiative and control pointed out as subjective show themselves. Here the interests so peculiarly psychic or personal are constituted, and the abstract and selective meanings are furthered. The great distinction, to neglect minor ones, becomes that between the object of semblance held up and experimented with, and the inner control by which this holding and experimenting is made effective.

The further development of individuation as cognitive mode now takes on the form of the specific meanings which arise through the use of the Schema.

§ 6. SCHEMATIZATION : A FORM OF QUASI-LOGICAL MEANING

24. The development of meaning as so far traced introduces us to a mode of individuation which requires further characterization, especially in that respect in which it may be considered as a progression toward the logical. We have found the play or semblant consciousness to show very marked characters, in respect both to its content and to its control. As to content, it is imitative, but in the peculiar way called "inner imitation" with "Sembling" or *Einfühlung*; and as to its control, we found it to be of the transition mode, in which the "mediate" joint control of memory passes over into the subjective form known as "don't-later" (vol. ii.). In this mode not judgments, but ideas of the grade of image-objects, are characterized as having unity and difference.

But it may be suggestive for the discussion of the judgments later on to note that *unity and difference* are in their rise not strictly correlative. The individuation of the object as unity is a function of recognition following upon felt plurality or group; while the individuation of objects as different is a further achievement—probably reached first in the difference of inner and outer—in which contemporary or successive objects are *cognized together*.

have-to." We should expect that the treatment of such objects as individuals, especially in view of the rise of meaning in the sense defined, would show some departure from the modes of individuation of objects in the sense and memory modes.

This, indeed, we do find. The play object does not mean an individual in the same sense that a memory object proper

**Play Object
has Experi-
mental Mean-
ing: the
Schema.**

does. is—to use a term now made familiar—an “experimental” object. It is held and controlled with the express psychic proviso or reservation that meaning is yet to be made up. It is constructed, but not assigned; it subsists, but does not yet have a sphere of existence. The further determination of meaning may be either in the inner or in the outer; either the fulfilment of the play interest, or the establishment of some further real meaning through the play. The individuation, therefore, just at the time of the play function, is one that reads what may be called “experimental meaning” into an image: holds it as an object fit for, and so far standing for, *alternative meanings*. It is this construction, essentially characteristic of the play-mode, and of the higher semblant or art consciousness, that I propose to call the *Schema*.

25. It is evidently a necessary preliminary to the further development of both sorts of meaning. Selective individuation, issuing in that restricted object which fulfils the interest making the selection, is in it already begun, for the very establishment of the construction of play is due to an act of selection under the lead of a restricting interest. The play interest itself supplies the motive to the determination of a special meaning. But the process of experimenting advances also the range of the co-efficients of recognition into new contexts of fact; it is difficult to see how it can be advanced in any other way; for all learning, so far as it involves new organization of psychic material, involves, we are now told by the psychologists, a trial and error process, which is experimental. Yet the essence of the play function is just that neither of these determinations of meaning is carried out to its end-state; they exist together, and either can be utilized under subjective control as the interpretation in which the play motive is principally to develop itself.¹

¹ It is partially for this reason that the play function is often considered autotelic—having no end but just its own functional exercise (cf. the note above, chap. vi. sect. 9).

Such an object, embodying the undeveloped meaning or intent which makes it hypothetical, we may call a Schema or Schematic Object. The term Schema suggests, of course, and is suggested by, the usage of Kant, whose doctrine has important analogies with the position developed here.¹ The process of schematism gives us an object which is prophetic both of selective or abstract, and also of general meanings. In respect to the former, it isolates aspects of a context for experimental treatment; in respect to the latter, it treats the image object as having a prospective meaning which some other image might have been chosen to subserve. These two modes may be looked at a little more closely. The first of them may be called the "Schema as Selective Meaning," and the latter the "Schema as Instrumental Meaning"—the order of treatment being the reverse of this.

**Schema a
Term used
by Kant.**

§ 7. THE SCHEMA AS INSTRUMENTAL MEANING

26. The instances which we may find it well to cite are those contents which are of such importance: for the further development of the individuation mode—mind and body. The distinction between inner and outer, with which we have already had so much to do, develops both the two meanings, selective and recognitive, in respect to each of its terms.

**Mind and
Body as
Schemata.**

(1) The outer, in its recognitive aspect, now becomes a sphere which is illustrated by a variety of objects. Each such outer object is, before its determination as outer, an experimental schema. It is to have that co-efficient which determines outer-ness, but which many objects alike are also to have; and the meaning is now in this aspect to gain an advance in respect to what we may call its range of application.

It is an advance upon the "vague general" of the projective mode—a meaning that we found in an earlier place to arise from mere *indeterminateness*, or largeness of habit, and to be due to the operation of the most inclusive co-efficient of recognition—and the advance consists in the fact that the psychic experience of group has arisen, and that in turn has passed over into the cognized

**Instrumental
Meaning of
Schema.**

¹ In another place I hope to take up the relation of the two positions to each other. It has been a very interesting point to me that the development of the text seems to organize certain details which Kant detected with his fine psychological instinct.

marks of difference and plurality. The outer as a meaning, therefore, here and now in the schema, is a province in which a group of different objects are treated experimentally. It is a group such that any one might be the schema of the group, as a certain one is, and be treated in semblant or experimental fashion. This value of the schema is, of course, not in any sense that of a new cognition; it is rather a meaning attaching to the image-object, which objects of perception and memory did not have. While proceeding upon the determination already made, its value as schematic is yet entirely prospective and instrumental to further determination.

27. This schematic use of a psychic object occurs at a well-marked stage of development. It has had emphasis lately **Seen in Trial and Error Process in Animals;** in the literature of child and animal psychology, in the consideration of the individual's active adjustments. It has been fairly well established, both for the child and also for the higher brutes, that their learning processes proceed largely by a process of "trial and error," in which the muscles are made the instrument of the testing of the possibilities of concrete situations. An object, properly speaking, does not have a "general" meaning, to fully justify action in novel circumstances, but only so much schematic meaning or intent as to serve as instrument in actual practice for the overcoming of embarrassments or difficulties due to variations in the concrete situation.

This has been described in effect by Hobhouse,¹ who has brought observations in support and illustration of it. He has used the unfortunate term "practical judgment" for the sort of adjustment effected by this schematic use of experience. The cases he describes illustrate well the function which I am describing under this heading. Indeed, it is only his term that I should criticize.² The animal—a dog, for example—has in mind, let us suppose, a situation as he has experienced it; the new development consists in his so far disengaging some element of this earlier experience from its original context as to adjust his former reaction to a new situation, which contains this element. If by pushing a table, for example, a bun is made to fall off, then he may push the table again to dislodge his dearest enemy, the cat. Such action, together with the mean-

¹ L. T. Hobhouse, *Mind in Evolution*, chap. vi.

² Apart from a certain difficulty I have in getting his exact meaning, due, I think, to his use of logical analogies,

ing, is experimental and in a sense hypothetical, for the results are achieved only if and when they are; it is preliminary to the "general" meaning though quite different¹ from it. The "general" comes later on through the instrumental and practical use of these schematic meanings.

28. In the animal this process is still exceptional and rare, for his trial and error procedure is largely hap-hazard and but accidentally successful; but in the child we find it elevated into the principal method of his learning. The phenomenon of "persistent imitation" or "try-

and in the
Child's Try-
try-again.

¹ Different to me, for the reasons—in which Mr. Hobhouse possibly would not concur—given below in chap. x. § 5. Hobhouse's book combines good science with a certain use of logical analogy, which is the reverse of sound method. He takes logical inference as the typical psychic function, and reads it, vaguely enough, into all the lower modes of cognition. Why can one not forget one's philosophical allegiances when one stands in the presence of facts?

In answer to this question a well-known writer who has seen this passage in proof writes as follows: "Because H. would probably say, we are dealing with *genesis*, and there the end overshadows the beginning. . . . It is judgment you are coming to, and unless your processes are judgment in germ, what light can they throw on it?" I quote this because it is so representative a position, and also because it involves what I call the "fallacy of the Implicit" on an earlier page (chap. i. § 8).

In the first place, I may take space to reply, it is not true from the point of view of *psychic meanings*, "that the end overshadows the beginning," but only from the point of view of a philosophy of "final cause" or teleology. There are various other and rival interpretations of the series of genetic modes. And, in the second place, judgment, as we shall see later on (chap. xi.), involves and embodies a dualism of psychic meanings—that of *subject and object of experience*—which at this stage of development is *not present*. The dualism of reflection requires a redistribution of factors of control quite new, and not present in this "practical" and "schematic" use of contents. Moreover, if this point be allowed, the "pragmatist" is not slow to say: "this *is*, indeed, a sufficient determination of judgment; all true judgment is of this type; and the more logical analytical sort is a dead form—not a live judgment" (cf. *Thompson* in Dewey's *Studies in Logical Theory*, p. 109). Now who is to arbitrate these rival claims except the observer who gives each mode its actual meaning and that alone? It is as evident a fallacy to say that practical adjustment is a form of logical inference, as it is to say that logical inference is a form of practical adjustment; and there is no justification for saying either. Professor Dewey (loc. cit. p. 44 f.) states this well so far as refuting the claim of "thought" to swallow up the prelogical modes is concerned; but is not he open to the opposite charge of *reducing* the logical mode by feeding it into the maw of the instrumental? For our part, let us observe and enforce our "Canon of Actuality."

The Development of Meaning

try-again" has been the subject of detailed investigation by the present writer, and it has appeared to him to be a case of just such use of a schema as that we are now finding instrumental in the progressions of the individuation mode.¹ The child holds up before him an image-copy of an act, sound, or anything else, and succeeds in getting it right by reproducing it in a variety of ways. He learns the differences, unities and diversities—in short, the possible combinations and relations of parts—all clustering about the one copy of a presented situation. Beforehand the copy is a schema, charged with possibilities; it is hypothetical and experimental. Later on, we find, he has progressed, by his use of it, to the apprehension of the system of meanings we call "general" and "singular."

29. (2) The inner object has also an instrumental meaning. An image which fails of outer fulfilment stands experimentally or schematically for a sphere or group of inner objects, any one of which might, if so selected, be the schema instrumental to the further development of the group meaning.

Yet in the case of the inner objects we have to follow out the complication remarked upon in an earlier place: the complication, namely, that the inner objects retain to the last that reserve of subjective control by which the selective aspect of individuation develops. *Each person individuated as content is itself a centre of subjective life and interest.* The objects of the inner life are as objects, to be sure, recognizable and describable meanings, made up under the co-efficients of convertibility, inner persistence, recurrence, etc. ;

¹ *Mental Development in the Child and the Race*, chap. vi. § 4, and chap. xiii. § 2. This experience of imitative "try-try-again," is there considered (*ibid.*, chap. xiii.) as the typical and, in normal social conditions, genetically the first undoubted instance of volition in the child. Such a function would, it now seems, serve well to develop the selective meanings which we are now about to trace; for volition is the extreme case of subjective control. The next following paragraph in the text, therefore, which traces the progression of selective meaning in the play-mode, where imitations are selectively indulged and the material dramatized, may serve as further evidence that it is here that subjective control comes into its volitional phase. The point, in brief, would be this: subjective control, when selective and persistent, is volition, and it is *finely illustrated* in the free development of selective meanings in the dramatizations of the play-mode. Art too, it may be added by way of anticipation, so far at least as it is imitative, is a dramatization of selective meanings.

but *the inner in each of them*, in the large sense of the subjective, is not itself so controlled. There is still to arise the inner as subject, to which all objects are objects, and it is the development of the interests of this "innerest" subject which gives selective meaning later on to all objects whatever—to all thoughts, those which mean the empirical self no less than those which mean the external—as context of experience.

30. This complication requires that we clearly distinguish the following moments: first, the individuation of the personal content in general as so much objective and recognizable material, calling the result of this mode of personal individuation, "instrumental personal meaning"; second, the treatment of the same material under the development of a selective interest, a mode of personal individuation giving "selective personal meaning," the development so far showing no difference from the corresponding modes of treating outer material; third—what is now peculiar to personal individuation—that aspect of personal meaning which is read into the object by the process of sembling, giving the person as an object having its own inner life of selective interests peculiar to it. All of these cases are thrown together in the paragraph below (§ 9) on Personal Individuation.

§ 8. THE SCHEMA AS SELECTIVE MEANING

31. In its other function, as vehicle of the fulfilment of selective or abstracting interest, the schema becomes even further removed from the bare image or context of description and recognition. The interest not only selects, but eliminates. The meaning is in contrast with the neutrality and deadness of the mere cognitive image. We may imagine a dog's object "dinner-plate" as having a mass of meanings to which no one concrete feature of the present plate is essential. It is only a peg to hang his meaning upon. The dinner interest is a mass of urgent appetitive dispositions, which the actual plate serves to stimulate, but does not in any respect fulfil. This becomes more apparent as selection grows more refined in the progress of individuation. The elimination of details proceeds by the *gradual erosion*¹ from the object as presented of those marks not then available nor meant.

¹ A process already called "erosion" in the writer's account of Abstraction in *Handbook of Psychology*, i. chap. xiv. See also below, in vol. ii.

32. On the other hand, the arrangement of contents which does in a measure fulfil the interest, in the line of its selective and abstract meanings, is subject to direct and fruitful development. The imitative context, which is charged with the meaning chosen and put into operation, receives accretions through the play of the semblant motive. The child treats the broom, let us say, as a nurse, and having so decided, he gathers an unheard-of mass of details about this first essential meaning. The surrounding objects, the room, the house, the neighbourhood, become the proper *milieu* for the exploitation of this semblant nurse-personality. Apart from the need of keeping true to the larger requirements of imitative construction and possible make-believe, the imagination is given wide range and licence, with the glamour of semblance cast about the whole.

This process of development of the meaning read in by the selective interest, when once the great leap has been taken from the recognition co-efficient to the free function of playful imagining, we may call "dramatization." It is the essential method of all constructive imagination. We speak of the "play of imagination" in all hypothetical and schematic treatment of contents. The phrase is true to the original semblant meaning which retains its selective character.

The act of selecting out this whole of meaning—the nurse, or the church, or the regiment, or the bull-fight—is the essential thing; by it a sphere of meaning is established, in which once for all the rules of the hard and stern external system are abrogated. The semblant consciousness is now brought in, and it is only a matter of maintaining it parallel with the actual world which it counterfeits and parodies, and in touch with it, while the development of an appropriate internal context of make-believe and verisimilitude develops itself to the satisfaction of the dramatizing interest.

33. Of course, this sort of development of selective meanings is extreme in the play-modes. Its freedom from all external interference is guaranteed by the explicitness of the initial assumption of the don't-have-to attitude toward the imitative constructions that follow. This is realized only in the semblant modes as such. Yet we should remember the genetic preliminaries to it. It becomes possible only as divergent claims spring up in the treatment of the representing and convertible meanings of actual situations of

Development
of Selective
Meaning

as Dramati-
zation,

which is
Extreme in
the Semblant
Mode.

life. Meanings arise, it will be remembered, as variations which presented complexes take on for the satisfaction of varying dispositions; and in the extreme case of such loosening of images from their moorings in the world of recognizable things, place is given to the selective control that finds here its opportunity.

§ 9. PERSONAL INDIVIDUATION

It remains to gather up the threads of development as they are woven into the context of personality. This suggests the explicit topic of "Personal Individuation."

34. The individuation of persons proceeds, in the main, after the method of the individuation of any other objective content: the content distinguished is what gives character to the object individuated. Yet in the case of the matter which goes on to be determined as personal, certain movements arise of a very interesting sort, which have had more or less adequate recognition in the recent literature of social psychology. Our development here will find its main interest in the way certain aspects of the topic are put together in the whole of our theory.

As to the general type of content available in the construction of personal objects, and the main stages in its organization—that has been treated in the recent literature of the development of the sense of self.¹ We may assume this organization as taking

¹ My own detailed and explicit treatment of the Self is to be found in the volume *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, 3rd edition, 1902, of which, indeed, it is the principal topic. The positions here taken are only those on which I apprehend there would be somewhat general agreement among social psychologists. The factors in the development have already been characterized in the treatment of the early modes: the marking off of a body of material of social suggestion as projectively personal (first stage); the imitative absorption of this same material and its assimilation in the psychic mass of organic and dispositional tendencies (the subjective stage); the reproducing or ejection of the content thus found subjective into the alter-personalities of the social environment (ejective stage). The empirical self is thus a growing identical content subject to a give-and-take or dialectical process, in which a body of personal and social values are together constituted; the self is not only "ego," it is also a "socius."

Expositions of the same general tenor are those of Royce in *Studies of Good and Evil*, vii., viii., and more briefly in *The World and the Individual*, vol. ii. p. 261. Prof. Royce's emphasis on "Social Contrast Effects" differentiates his treatment from my own; but in the theory of individuation contained in this volume occasion is offered for more

The Development of Meaning

place in the manner thus currently described. We may with advantage also recall to mind the theory of meaning, and give it application to personal meanings, in the way now to be pointed out.

35. We may first note that the matter of the self is, in the early stages, purely objective content ; not indeed apprehended as content, but simply and solely as objects here and now. They are objects of the *person-project sort*, passing through the memory progressions and becoming objects having certain peculiar marks remembered under the co-efficients of recognition and convertibility. Now it is with reference to these co-efficients that the person remembered has his further right to distinction, for it is just in respect to these that the divergences characteristic of the personal mode begin to develop themselves. It has been pointed out in the exposition of the inner-outer progressions that it is in their essentially capricious character that persons begin to have their peculiar meaning ; and this character it is, of course, that makes the later identification and treatment of them different from that of things. This is the first stage—the person-project—in the development of the personal mode of meaning.

First Stage:
Meaning is
Person-
Project.

In the rise of the inner-outer dualism the second stage is prepared for. My body bearing certain inner characters, together with your body also with inner characters, is contrasted with other outer things which have not such characters.

Second Stage:
Bodies
having Inner
Characters,

Then, in the development of selective interest with its harvest of fulfilments, the inner becomes abstracted as subjective, while the outer, the body, passes over to the thing-world, under the co-efficients of recognition.

and later on,
the Subject-
ive.

The personal content then finally becomes the subject-self over against all objects, including the objective or empirical self. The latter is common, a self-thought ejected into all persons ; the former is the “ subject ” of reflection. This may be called the third and final state in the development.¹

Third Stage:
the Ejective
and Subject-
Self.

explicit recognition of the contrast and separation of individual selves. Cf. sects. 41 f. of this chapter, §§ 6 ff. of chap. x., and § 3 of chap. xi. See also Ormond, *The Foundations of Knowledge*, pt. ii. chap. x., and Mezes, *Ethics, Descriptive and Explanatory*, chap. vii.

¹ These movements are given detailed study in the following pages (chaps. x. and xi.).

36. (1) Our first result, therefore, is that after the rise of the inner-outer dualism, *the personal content is inner content as such*, no matter in what further progressions it may enter.

37. (2) And a second position is also guaranteed by the earlier developments, to wit, that through the imitative processes all persons are constituted by the same content. This appears when we consider that it is first through the imitative absorption of personal suggestions that the subjective control is established. The self is constituted a personal schema having the prophecy of abstract and general meanings. The content thus controlled is personal and inner; but it also has the *character of meaning other cases which might also stand as schema of the group*. It is this controlled content which is passed over by ejection into the body-person of each alter; and each such alter-person, so far as he is a recognizable and persistent object, is a re-reading of the mass of content which alone has this mode of organization and control.

This our second result, therefore, in tracing the personal individuation progression is as follows: *the person is the same describable and recognizable content—not a double or plural content—which functions as schema for the group of personal objects including both ego and alter persons*.¹

It is in fulfilment of the recognition co-efficient that this result is reached. The personal meaning, as now instrumental and recognitive, is a fairly constant and recurring mass of content.²

38. (3) When we turn to the fulfilment of the selective and abstracting interests which control the personal object we find another phase of the progression. A third strain may be detected as we follow out these interests. For it appears that in the experience of persons, the projective residue is in each case that capricious and unreduced behaviour which does not recur for recognition. The co-efficients of repetition and convertibility are herein set at nought. It appears

¹ The identity of the ego and alter for all individuals is developed at length in its social implications in the work *Social and Ethical Interpretations* (3rd edit., 1902).


² These two meanings are together referred to as "Instrumental" in sect. 23 of this chapter; the two following points—(3) and (4) of the text—are also indicated in that place in the same order as here.

clearly in the motive to dramatization spoken of above. It is the constant progressive reduction of this residue to the body of the describable, it is true, that motives the child's constant imitative and accommodating attitudes. But over and above the content thus successfully determined and reduced, the inner as such retains its unique character and retreats into the *more recondite subject self or agent*. When this has taken place, or is taking place, the abstraction of a substantive self is being made ready.

39. The child's selective dramatization, referred to above, deals with the personal meanings in a very marked and striking way.

Child's Dramatization of Persons. In play, the preference seems to be for personal material; and that on both sides of the ego-alter contrast. The self of fact and recognition is deliberately converted into an imagined character—a soldier, a priest, a hero—and the other selves of the prosaic real situation are made to set themselves up as conniving make-believe personalities. So by this convention of the pretending social group the dramatization proceeds. The instrumental value of this, as a form of selective schematism, is enormous; it has had much emphasis recently on the social side.¹ It leads on by a natural progression through certain stages to the "ideal" meanings of personality to be brought out later on, just as, on the other hand, the recognitive meaning discussed above leads on to the "general."

40. (4) Yet another phase of personal individuation is to be remarked upon; that spoken of on an earlier page as issu-

An inner Control Self goes with the Content Self of the Alter.  the meaning of the personal object as one of continued Sembling. In the private self the subject is the control aspect of a definite self-schema or content. It follows that in the ejection of this content in various concrete persons this aspect of meaning goes along with its schema; and the alter person comes to mean *an inner life with its own content and its own subjective control*. This subjective or control aspect of another individuated person is not itself a content, nor is it a describable and

¹ Its social utility is the practice and experience it gives, considered as actual training. I have pointed out in the volume already cited another way in which the youthful plotter develops his selective interests and private purposes: he takes advantage of his knowledge of others to excite desire, awaken curiosity and induce beliefs which further his own designs. Certain types of children's lies have this genetic motive (cf. *Soc. and Eth. Interps.*, chap. iii. sect.. 70 ff.).

recognizable character of the total construction. It is rather, as just said, an aspect of the meaning of the alter-self or person, to the psychic life which individuates it as a person. *You mean to me, in short, whatever positive and describable psychic contents I have reason to understand your inner life to comprise; and besides that, you mean to me a self which controls its own inner life in the same sense, and with the same competence, as I find true of myself.* It is just your right and nature to be what I make my own subjective self to be, since I "seemble" you with inner self-direction and control.¹

This then we may put down as a third phase of the progression of personal individuation: *each person is individuated as an inner psychic function controlled in some degree by a self in fulfilment of its own subjective and selective interests.*

Here we may pause, as at the corresponding stage of other modes, only remarking, as in the other instances, that with this mode of individuation the personal meaning also is ready to pass over into the logical mode.

41. It may appear, however, that in this development we have not accounted for certain features of the person as individuated in his singularity. The separateness of the personal individual would seem to be its distinctive mark rather than its general and schematic character.

In the sense, however, in which this is true two different genetic moments may be detected. One is the attribution, just remarked upon, to each person, of that sort of self-determination or control of its own processes which makes it essentially subjective. This is a real meaning, not to be divorced from the generality of the personal content even when it is most general, but marking the sort of individuals the general is to comprise.

It is essential to this meaning that it allow and guarantee that concrete separateness which, however, still fulfils the generalization of minds as over against other objects. In the case of minds the separateness is an aspect of that unique character which constitutes each a member of the general class; the uniqueness and singularity are just the marks upon which the generalization proceeds. Mind is a logical class of objects which as particulars are marked by separateness and singularity.

42. The other aspect of the separateness of the individuated

¹ The process of Sembling, it will be recalled, is described above, chap. vi. § 6.

person is that to which the term individuation has been exclusively reserved in certain recent discussions.¹ It is that aspect under which the one person individuated becomes the object of an exclusive interest, an interest which no other would or could fulfil. This we now see, when realized, would eliminate the co-efficient of group recognition altogether and determine the individual, on the side of content, exclusively in terms of the original co-efficient of its single and lonely perception. It would seem, so far as it is pure, to be not a reversion to a simpler mode, for in the simpler the interests are always less exclusive, but to some re-determination of the co-efficient whereby the object is stripped of its schematic and contextual meanings and held in isolation. This is the true interpretation I think; it is brought out in the treatment of Singular and Ideal Individuation in a later chapter.²

§ 10. RELATIONS AS MEANINGS

43. The foregoing developments serve to introduce the question of relation. In so far, indeed, as there is the establishing of meanings by individuation we are in the net of relation, and we are never able again to escape from it. For if meaning is always attached to that character of a cognitive whole which constitutes it a context, and if such a character is never absent, then we seem to be committed to a further account of that context. The context itself is by its discreteness and complication nothing if not relational.

Going back to the first individuations again, it is clear that any psychic unity, even when of least meaning, is a whole of some complexity. The determination involving interests and dispositions imparts complexity as well as wholeness to the object. Even though we go so far as to deny that there is sufficient detachment of parts within the whole to constitute a psychic apprehension of difference, still each such whole has the character of discreteness which makes it that object and not another. In every case there is some discreteness of parts in the cognitive whole, and the psychic awareness of this is so far the beginning or rudiment of a meaning which we may call *Relatedness*.

¹ Cf. Royce, *The World and the Individual*, ii.

² Chap. x. §§ 6, 7.

If we call these first things relations, however, it must be with the greatest circumspection. To consciousness **Mere Togetherness**, the meaning is not yet relation, it is *mere togetherness or joint participation in a cognitive whole or object*. Yet it is germinal to relationship as meaning in the following ways.

44. (1) It is the ground of that aspect of individuation which we have called selective; for it is by a return upon certain of the **as Ground of Selective and** participating parts or discrete elements of a complicated whole that the more special interests fulfil their selective motive. The original discrete whole, say the orange of the young babe's cognition, presents points for reaction in the relative distinctness of its sense characters: it is sweet, yellow, round, etc. It is through such selective reaction that the discrete parts of the whole become terms of a possible relation. Their isolation as termini of special movements of individuation constitutes them separable objects or terms.

(2) This "togetherness" meaning leads on to relation also because the elements so constituted now become representing and convertible wholes in memory and recognition, and are **Recognitive Individuation.** ready for the transformations characteristic of these and later modes. As so treated they become recognitive or contextual meanings, not mere selections of temporary interest. The meaning is thus fairly started on its progression towards the schematic and general.

It is by these two conjoined movements that the relational term is isolated. Its isolation means just its *separate individuation as both interest-fulfilling and context-sustaining*; and it is only by this treatment, by which it is no longer merely an element of a larger discrete whole, but is itself a whole, with its own discreteness and unity, that its availability for relational meaning or relation proper is made good.

45. There are four great stages in the progression through which the psychic meaning attaching to relation has to pass.

(1) First there is the mere togetherness of parts of any cognized object as such. It is always a complication, and its complication constitutes it an object. The first **Four Stages:**
(1) Mere Togetherness. mode of meaning, therefore, due to what we may call, speaking from the objective point of view, the presence of relations in the object, is the phase of mere discreteness and discontinuity called above *Relatedness*.

(2) Second, this is the stage we have already described as

Group consciousness, attaching to what is not yet taken up and individuated as different. This meaning is clearly
(2) Group Meaning. present in the domain of affective or conative tendencies or dispositions, which enter as rival or conflicting factors in a whole state of mind. Simply as such, given in their raw presence, competing impulses, desires, etc., have group meaning; yet they are not cognized as terms of a related objective whole. This is the first advance on the meaning called above that of mere relatedness of parts in the simplest objective whole.

This meaning is one involving active rivalries and progressive adjustments, and as such supplies the motive to the cognitions in the mode of discrimination called *Difference*—a movement we have already described.¹ Rival or competing active processes lead to opposing objective constructions which as thus individuated are different.

(3) The third stage in which relation is reflected in psychic meaning is that of the recognition of explicit parts in an entire context, these parts becoming, through the pursuit of
(3) Cognized Relationship. varying interests, themselves objects or wholes of cognition. This we may call psychic or cognized *Relationship*. The relation itself as meaning is an aspect of the larger context into which the separable objects or terms are in present recognition held together. The relation, however, is not itself a term or separable object of cognition.

(4) Fourth, that aspect of related terms by which they are constituted into a context *may itself be what fulfils an interest*.

(4) Relation as Object of Thought. The individuation process then terminates upon this aspect, with the result that the relationship itself becomes object. *It is individuated for itself.* It is in this sense that we talk about relations, apart from the things related, or of things as illustrating such and such a relation. It is the product of a higher act of selection which isolates a character already present in a larger objective whole.

46. It is of importance to distinguish these different forms of the relation-meaning, for they represent the essential progression of the relation-mode as such. The theoretical
The Progression of the Four Meanings. treatment of relation should carefully distinguish them. Of the first—which is indeed genetically first—we can say very little beyond what is already said in the characterization of cognition as such. Of the second, we may

¹ It is also seen in the rise of "dual exclusion" as a form of negative meaning or Opposition (see chap. ix. §§ 4, 7).

say that it is immediately psychic meaning, or intent. It is best called "felt relationship." It is preliminary to the cognized relationship that comes on next. It is the prevailing meaning in cases of the cognition of wholes which are going on from mere discreteness into the stage at which elements differentiated into terms. The "group" consciousness precedes the "unit" as "separate-term" consciousness. Then follows the third stage, in which the terms are so far cognized as separable units as to be held together in the mode of meaning called "cognized relationship." Of course, such a movement may not take place : the working out of an interest which terminates on a larger whole may not require the isolation of separable terms. Felt relationship is also a meaning arising after that of separable terms in cases in which actual fusion or relatively indistinctness of elements serves to obscure all but this more vague sort of meaning.

The meaning known as "cognized relationship" characterizes most of our fluent knowledges ; and it is that which is assumed in many of the recent discussions. It is simply one of the more or less explicit characters of a discrete cognized whole of separable units or parts. The knowledge of the whole has this relational feature, no matter how legitimate and necessary the actual separation of the terms may also be. Relationship in this meaning is a direct and first-hand aspect of knowledge, standing upon the same footing as any other of the characters which knowledge shows. It does not claim to treat relations as separable terms or objects of thought. That comes only in later mode.¹ Such an interpretation of it is, indeed, not legitimate.

The fourth case, that of relation as itself object, puts the cognition of relation on the same plane as the cognition of anything else *that is individuated as a unit meaning*. It involves, however, the high development of the individuating mode seen in thinking, since in it the demands of an interest are fulfilled which deals with experience or ideas as such. This is to be brought out later on. It should be noted, however, that this sort of relation makes

**Most Known-
ledge is in
Third Stage:
Relationship
a Character
of Objects.**

**Relation has
the same
Reality as
Other
Objects.**

¹ This, it will appear later, justifies criticism of all the theories which discredit knowledge of reality on the ground that the relation is a third term interposed between the two related terms (see vol. iii.). This is true only of a mode of knowledge in which relation as such is cognized as a separable term.

no special claim to reality apart from the separate things or terms related; and that these latter are, in the form of ideas, also abstractions in much the same sense that the relation is. The object-relation as such is a term in a context of meanings erected at the modal level at which all cognitions are constructed under the selective interest called theoretical.¹

47. A further thought is not without interest. It appears from the foregoing that relation in the second and third senses mentioned is to be classed as meaning; that is to say **All Four are Meanings.** relationship is part of the meaning of an object. Felt relation attaches to an experience whose meaning is largely its discreteness or complexity. This is what is felt or experienced in the crude forms of relation-consciousness. Relation as felt is no more nor less than consciousness of discrete plurality or group: one aspect of its entire meaning.

So also of cognized relationship; it too is meaning. The terms related are now put in a recognizable context, which we may contrast with the state of nakedness they show when later on they are thought of as out of relation.

In the case of the relation considered as itself object, we may make the further remark that so far as it can be cognized without specification as holding between particular terms—so **But Relation as Object Means the Terms Related.** far it is itself not only not a meaning, but further *it has no meaning.* This is the case with all abstract meanings as such; the “as such” cannot be realized, since the interest involved cannot work in a void, and the recognition co-efficient persists in holding its own in supplying a concrete case as fulcrum for the lever. So we have to say that in such a mode *the relation is the object and the terms related are the meaning.* For example, the abstract term virtue, when made itself the object of thought, has no meaning except as illustrated in certain recognizable acts standing in relations of virtue. When thus embodied in the illustrative cases, we say quite properly that such cases are *what we mean by virtue.* So while from the point of view of the recognition and description of facts, *virtue is a part of the meaning of the facts related,* nevertheless, from the point of view of our abstract interest in virtue, *the facts are the meaning of it.* The meaning of relation as object of thought cannot be fully made out, however, until we have advanced our general exposition into the logical mode.

¹ I shall call this meaning alone “Relational,” within the entire class of meanings that are “relative.”

Chapter IX

NEGATIVE MEANING

§ 1. THE OPPOSITION MODE

1. The great class of meanings which are called negative confronts us, of course, in the working out of a theory of psychic meanings. It becomes a matter of first-class interest in the higher reaches of function to which logical value attaches; for the progress of the logical treatment of objects is as much through negative as through positive meanings, and the laws of opposition are, from the formal point of view, fundamental to inference. The process of negation is, moreover, even on the surface, so characteristic a movement, as embodying belief, that it is of great moment that its early and rudimentary forms be pointed out, and the progressions traced through which this psychic mode is furthered from stage to stage.

It will be well, moreover, without committing ourselves to implications which the genetic method does not warrant, to preserve as far as possible the terms already in use in logic. We have the term "negative," and its noun "negation," applied to a certain type of meaning; and also the terms "opposition" and "privation" used in technical meanings familiar to the formal logicians. Seeking to avoid purely terminological discussion, I may simply say that the usage here adopted recognizes these meanings while, at the same time, insisting upon the "elasticity" required in treating of functional process. The term "negative" is used as adjective to the noun Opposition; and the noun Negation, denoting a positive psychic function, has application to a determination which is reached rather late in the mode of Opposition. These distinctions of usage will be clearer as we proceed with the development

**Nature and
importance
of Negation.**

**Certain
Terms.**

of the mode of opposition and the meanings that arise in it. The terms "exclusion" and "privation" are defined later on.¹

§ 2. PRE-LOGICAL OPPOSITION: LIMITATION

2. When we go back to the sorts of objects which come first in the cognitive mode, and look for the marks which are rudimentary to negation, exclusion, contradiction, or any other form of opposition, we naturally examine the first complexities and complications found in these objects. We thus recall that we found at least two marks of a sort that justified us in calling the simplest object a "complication": they are, first, the immediate contextual character of the presented content as such; and, second, its relative novelty, stand-offness, or separateness.

The latter character, however, we found to consist, so far as the content was concerned, also in a more remote sort of togetherness or linkage with what was already an established psychic context. The novel, foreign or separate, in the early sense mode, is the relatively unassimilated and context-less. So while distinguishing these two marks from each other, we may at once say that they are different aspects of the one fact of complication of context.

These two aspects of the general fact of context, so distinguished, we may call respectively "inside" and "outside" complication. Resort to introspection serves to bring out this

¹ In § 4 of this chapter. The reader may compare the usage of Bradley, *Principles of Logic*, chap. iii., a book recommended to psychological footcians. In applying the term "Opposition," with the adjective "negative," to the mode in which all shades of "otherness" and "difference" are made meaning or intent, I am following philosophical rather than strictly logical precedent. The justification for it lies in the view brought out below that *limitation* or control is the root-meaning of all negation. What is called below "limitative opposition" is the first form of that meaning described by Sigwart in these terms (*Logic*, Eng. trans., i. p. 120): "All that the negation aims at is to confine within limits fixed by the nature of the given ideas, the subjective and fortuitous movement of individual thought, which in fancies, questions, conjectures and erroneous statements extends beyond what is objectively valid. Thus it presupposes a subjectively arbitrary and contingent thought. . . ." (cf. also the interesting footnote to this pregnant paragraph, in which Kant is quoted). To Sigwart and others, however, "negation" is a function of *judgment*, and I follow that usage of the term; but the pre-logical function of analogous limitation and control is here covered as well by the term Opposition. See also the note on Privation in sect. 22 of this chapter.

distinction. An object of attention is so far a whole that some content is "inside" it and the rest of the psychic field at the time is "outside" it. What is sometimes called the "span" of consciousness or attention has its whole of content thus defined by limitation; and justification for the present distinction is arrived at simply by employing this special case—in which the span of attention is also the span or grasp of the **The Limitation of Span.** interest or other dispositional processes that determine the object—to illustrate the larger conception of determination by whatever function it may be whose span or grasp is subject to limitation.¹

3. It has been made evident, however, in our earlier discussions, that the circle of division or limitation is not one essential to the nature of the content itself, or imposed by it, **The Limits are shifting.** except in a very relative way. The immediate datum given as "that" is so quickly overlaid and glossed by a flood of assimilating kinaesthetic contents that it becomes at once a what; and this "what" is the larger context of a more or less successfully apperceived order. It has a fringe radiating outward toward the margin. It thus comes to pass that the line of limitation of a content as a "what" is relative and shifting, varying with the processes of habit and interest under which it is cognized.

Yet we may truthfully say that such a limitation is always there. It is made necessary by the fact that consciousness moves by successive constructions of objects, each determined in a limited span or grasp.

4. Of this first distinction, in which we simply recognize the actual limitation of cognitive wholes or objects, we may say **opposition is a Meaning.** that it involves, from the very start, the beginning of a psychic meaning.

The contrast between fact and meaning, it will be remembered, is that between the positive objective construction, on the one hand, as actually held to its proper model, and, on the other hand, the determination of content which is in whole or part the terminus of a special interest. For the derivation of meaning it is only necessary that there be some degree of dislocation or differentiation of the habitual processes involved, so that quite

¹ Various terms are in use to mark this fact of relative inclusion and non-inclusion: contents are described as "focal" vs "marginal," "clear" vs "indistinct," etc., attention is likened to vision with a "direct" and also an "indirect" field.

restricted must it be to just that mode of mere limitation in which any further characterization of the content thus excluded as significant beyond its mere presence is also ruled out. For example, all sorts of negation of existence are as such impossible in the sense mode.

To be known as Limitative Opposition. It is, accordingly, only to be true to the literal mode "limitative opposition," and to write it down, under this term, as the first sort of negative meaning.¹

§ 3. QUASI-LOGICAL OPPOSITION

6. The next point of emphasis, at which opposition seems to appear, lies considerably up the line of development. It appears only after the growing skeleton of distinction has considerably hardened. In memory, viewed simply as representing and conversion function, no new phrase of opposition would appear

In the Image Mode Opposition is so long as there was no dislocation or jar in the fulfilment of its co-efficients—an ideal and theoretical

case which does not in fact appear, as we have already said. Yet so soon as dislocation and jar do appear, due to the failure of certain images or present objects to fulfil their prototypes by simply reinstating them—when the fancy mode is emerging with its dawning dualism of inner and outer—two important phases of opposition take their rise. First, there is the consciousness of *the lack or failure of an image or object to be something familiar*—issuing in "privative opposition"

¹ If we had to give a verbal form to such opposition the expression would differ from that for positive complication about as "this, *but* more" differs from "this *and* more." On the side of the positive context the meaning might be said to have a "penumbra of indeterminate otherness." It is here that we find the germ of the meaning called long ago *limitation* by Kant in his scheme of judgments with respect to "quality" (affirmative, negative, and limitative). The *not-it* (or "other-than it") is a positive meaning or intent, and passes, as we see below, into determinate content, both by being determined as "it," and also by definition as not "it." This progress into other modes of meaning should not obscure the reality of the limitation. Lotze's remarks, to the effect that limitation is an "unmeaning product of pedantic ingenuity" (*Logic*, i. p. 64), on the ground that we cannot picture such an "idea" or content as "not-man," are quite beside the point. The indeterminate is always unpicturable, of course; but we have such meanings or intents often enough (cf. Ladd-Franklin, *Mind*, 1892, p. 130 f.) As will appear later on in detail, reality is unpicturable, limitation in most of its modes is also, and so is privation to the end of the story.

in its earliest form—and second, there is the constitution of the object under the form in which it does establish itself, in positive contrast to that in which it might have been established.

This we may call “dual” or “relative opposition,”¹ also either (1) Privation or (2) Exclusion. in the first form in which it arises. As modes of negative meaning the first of these may very well be called “Privation,” and the second “Exclusion.” The essence of Privation in this and in later modes is that, in respect to the matter or meaning of which the object is *deprived*, it is indeterminate, simply “other” or whatever else it might have been or have tended to be. In this it is opposed to Exclusion, the meaning in which a determinate somewhat or “term” is shut out.²

These meanings develop through the modes called quasi-logical, and then merge into the full form of logical negation of the predication mode. We may therefore simply refer to these modes of negative meaning as those characteristic of the quasi-logical modes. We will now take them up for more detailed study.

§ 4. PRIVATIVE AND EXCLUSIVE OPPOSITION

7. The verbal mode expressive of the privative meaning is, for our language, the form “this and not —” We find it developing through the cognitive progressions already described, from (1) “this and not other,” to (2) “this and not that,” and each of these shows special forms characteristic of the semblant and subject-object modes of consciousness.

Negative
Meanings
(this-and-
not—) in
several
forms.

In the semblant mode, with its inner control, they take on the *imperative* forms (1) “(let it be) this and not other,” and (2) “(let it be) this and not that” (with the footnote, “so far as in me lies”)³; and also the experimental forms in the shape of the disjunction (1) “this or (it may be) other,” and (2) “this or (it may be) that.” These meanings in the semblant mode have a reference *in futuro*, seeing that the positive constructions of this mode are always prospective and experimental in their reference. They are transition meanings to those in which the constructions issue after further appeal is made to fact.

¹ It is “relative” whenever there is duality of terms; “relational,” only when the relationship of the terms is itself cognized as such.

² A justification of this usage of terms is to be found in the footnote to sect. 22 (4) of this chapter.

³ The general motive of subjective control, or of selective and abstracting interest, shows itself strongly in the play and art modes; and these imperative forms of negative meaning are developed significantly there.

After the fact, however, or in retrospect, the negative meaning, as is the case with all meanings after the fact, is no longer under subjective control (imperative), nor is it indeterminate as to control (experimental); but it is under external control. This gives *necessary* meaning, having the forms (1) "this (must be) not other," and (2) "this (must be) not that." These forms thus succinctly stated will have more adequate setting when the genetic motives involved in the several cases have been pointed out.¹

The phases of negative meaning or opposition embodied successively in the verbal forms given above show the stages, indeed, normal to the progressions through the quasi-logical modes. We are describing simply the negative side of the development of the objective modes as already worked out. The progression may be considered either on the side of indeterminate "privation" of the "other," or of definite "exclusion" of the "that." Each of these passes through successive determinations as the meaning of the entire "what" or positive content takes on its later forms. Let us now examine Exclusion and Privation a little more closely.

8. In *Exclusion* we find that the "that" excluded is at first a sense or image object, set up over against the "this," also a sense or image object. Later on it becomes a sense or image object set up over against some form of experimental or semblant object, which it is determined *not* to mean. And, finally, it becomes an object individuated in some general meaning springing up in later modes of cognition. In other words, *the object, separated off by exclusion, is simply one of the sort which the objective mode at that stage would normally construct in case the mode were affirmative rather than negative. These possible constructions are those of the individuation mode at these respective stages—as worked out above in the treatment of positive individuation.*

On the other hand, the positive content to which the meaning attaches—the "this" itself—has its construction under the control peculiar to each in turn of the several stages of the quasi-logical progressions. It gives the affirmative modes distinguished as categorical (recognitive), problematical and disjunctive (instrumental and experimental),

¹ So much may be stated here without raising the question of negative meaning in the logical mode, which it is not my object to discuss just here. The corresponding treatment of the positive or affirmative meanings of judgments must precede it, as found in vol. ii. chap. ii. § 4.

and necessary ("again-recognitive")—the "is," "may be," and "must"—forms of positive meaning. All these have the corresponding negative meanings of exclusion of the form "this and not that." It should be added that we are dealing with meanings which may or may not have passed into the logical forms of judgment to which the terms "categorical," etc., used above, are usually applied; that is, the meanings are "relative," but may not be "relational," to cite a distinction made out in the treatment of Relation (chap. viii. § 10. See the footnote to sect. 46 of this chap.).

9. As to *Privation* proper—as distinct from exclusion—embodied in the verbal form "and not other," the fact that the "other" stands for indeterminateness in respect to the content thus "deprived," raises interesting echoes of our earlier discussions. We have found the first form of opposition in that "penumbra of indeterminate otherness" which is the background or margin of limitation of a presented or projected content. So soon as this passes into the mode of negative meaning that we are now calling privation, the sphere of actual indeterminateness is much more restricted. The use of the memory context comes, as we have pointed out, to supersede largely that of present external things. We go about among things with skill and safety, having very little actual need of revising our expectations as to their character and position. There is, therefore, in the background or penumbra of the psychic process little that can be called strictly indeterminate. If, indeed, we did come to each new situation virginly innocent as to its points of novelty, and waited what details might unfold, then a mass of content not yet **tive "Other"** explored would hang about as "indeterminate other"; **passes into** but this is not the case. We read into the mass an **Exclusive** appropriate context; and only revise the objects thus **"That."** constructed as we find we have to. So far as this is the case the meaning is one of exclusion: either the exclusion from what is actually perceived of that hypothetical but definite other by which we interpret the margin, or, when this is replaced by a truer construction of the actual margin, by the exclusion of this latter. That is to say, *negative meaning in the quasi-logical modes tends to pass naturally from the meaning called privation into that called exclusion*, so far as it remains negative at all.

Suppose, for example, I am told to go into a room and

gaze at the first thing I see on a given table, which, however, is strewn over with various things. The case of strict privation would be that in which I at once saw only one thing and by confining my sight to that ruled out "the others" (the case, "this and not other"). But "the others" here, even though they be quite strange things, are not altogether indeterminate. I tend to assimilate the marginal elements of my conscious field (the entire table) to known and anticipated things. So far as this takes place "the others" become "those things"; and my negative meaning is "this article and not those" (the form of exclusion, "this and not that").

It may be remarked further, while these early forms of negative meaning are being discussed, that in "limitation" the meaning is indeterminate in the sense of the meaning called in formal logic "infinite" or "indefinite" (see Keynes, *Formal Logic*, 2 ed. §31); the "other" is "whatever else of anysort except just this." The "privative," on the other hand, as is remarked above, is due to the failure or variation in a process of determination, and its meaning is the more restricted "other" of "what might have been." This is not "indefinite or infinite," but falls within an appropriate or customary or habitual sphere. In the illustration above, the privative meaning is "not such-and-such other somewhat appropriate articles."

10. In the modes properly called quasi-logical and logical—after the rise of experimental objects—it is doubtful whether the opposition strictly called privative, in this first **form in which it is characterized by indeterminate-ness, is actually realized at all.** The sense of privation is shot through with rival hypothetical contents of negation or exclusion, and the meaning "not other" passes into the meaning "not this, that, or any other": A is not (anything that is) not-A. There is, indeed, a further and higher mode of privative meaning, that belonging to the semblant and aesthetic consciousness; but that will come up in its proper place below.

It may have been noticed that a few lines above it was said that the opposition of simple privation tends to pass over into that of exclusion, "so far as it remains negative at all." This "so far as" is an important qualification. In the very process by which indeterminate marginal or penumbral content takes on determinate form, it becomes subject to just the contextuating process which

enlarges the positive meaning of the object then in the centre of interest. The circle of limitation by which the positive meaning is hemmed in is pushed back upon what is still undetermined. For example, it may be that the table of objects of the former illustration contains only one that is familiar, and my meaning in apprehending it is of the privative form "this and not other (the rest)." But the case is different when all the objects are either familiar or in their type well known. I then say either "this (one) among those," or "(all) these and among them this (one)." In the latter case, the negative meaning seems to have disappeared altogether, so far as the act of cognition is concerned: the privation of the indeterminate has become not the exclusion but the inclusion of the determinate.

11. This strain of development strengthens our doubt as to whether mere limitative and privative meanings should be called negative at all. They seem to be capable of progression into positive inclusion as well as into exclusion. They are, however, without doubt rudimentary forms of opposition.¹

The progression itself is a matter of considerable importance. It illustrates the germinal or genuinely genetic rôle of the mode we have been calling privation. It is a root-form of meanings which are both positive and negative. It is, therefore, not with a connotation in any sense exclusively negative that it can be construed. Privative means positively determined as to *this*, while negatively limited as to anything *other*. When the limitation is removed by further determination, it is the positive meaning that is extended, and some further motive to negative meaning must arise for the development of exclusion or negation within the whole context. For example, if left to itself, my perception of the things on the table extends until I apprehend them all; and it is only because I am told to mean only the one, that I then exclude the others.

If this be true, we are at once confronted with the question

¹ I take interest in saying that Dr. Ladd-Franklin informs me that both this point—that privative may pass into determinate positive, as well as into negative meaning—and also the point that limitation in the field of cognitive content is the earliest form of opposition, are thoughts to which she has also arrived and which she is taking account of in her forthcoming treatise on *Symbolic Logic*. I use the term "positive" rather than "affirmative" for non-negative meanings which are not yet judgments.

as to whether there are any cases in which privative passes spontaneously into exclusive meaning ; or whether it may not be true that *exclusion of the first sort given above, may not be true that exclusion of the first sort given above, Exclusive and Negative due to positive rivalry and conflict, is always the original Meaning. mode of determining negative meaning*, since it produces a situation whose issue is at once positive of "this" and negative of "the other."

A good deal may be said for this point of view. It would lead to a revision of the position taken above that mere limitation involves the germ of negative meaning. The balance of current opinion on negation would, on the whole, probably endorse such a view from the analysis of logical meanings. Such theories make negation either *an original psychic mode*, or find its origin in *situations involving rival co-efficients, active processes, etc.* To such theories all negative meaning involves relative or dual Opposition.¹

12. I think, however, that such a conclusion would be hasty. The situation is, as has been said, one of those genuinely germinal ones which our present genetic method enables us to interpret. The fundamental process of exclusion, as so far dealt with, we called above "Relative or Dual opposition" *in its earliest form* (as contrasted with privative opposition) ; we now go on to trace the development of negative meaning in a second or higher mode of relative or dual opposition, in which *the motive of privation is not lost, but plays an important genetic rôle* (sect. 14 of this chapter). There are also certain negative meanings in which a real negation is after all privative.² This is proof that our first decision, giving privation the fundamental place, was the correct one.

§ 5. OTHERNESS AS NEGATIVE MEANING

13. The development of the relative or dual mode of negative meaning involves distinctions in the psychic value of what we call otherness or the other. In the discussion of the verbal expression of privative opposition, "this and not other" was the formula commented upon. We find, however, a new shading imparted to the meaning as soon

¹ They may be said to include (1) logical theories, and (2) pragmatic theories, the former making all negation a form of dual or relational opposition, the latter making it a mode of rival practical attitudes of adjustment toward an established environment.

² See below, § 6.

as consciousness reaches the recognition mode and identifies the "this" as the "same." In "the same" there is a variety of meanings, as we have seen above, upon which *the further modes of difference and relation depend*. It is, accordingly, of importance to inquire further into the meaning of sameness, to see whether it carries, by limitation or privation, any determination of the "other" which is a further progression of meaning upon the indeterminate privative already described.

As soon as we state the form, "same and not other (or not different)" and allow its normal force to develop in our minds, we see that its meaning is not the same as the earlier, "this and not other." The meaning *not different* is quite distinct from the meaning *not anything else*. And the former meaning, being still privative, shows the negative aspect of that progression whereby "this" has given place to "the same."

14. The positive movement we have seen to be that which gives recurrence and persistence to the content recognized as the same. In the mode of individuation which has not yet developed general meanings, *sameness* includes a *temporal sign*. The cases in which the familiarity mark arises are those of real recurrence; and the cases of the absence or failure (not-sameness) of this recurrence to make itself good are those that the psychic goes on to find *different*. This we have already pointed out, together with the progress of the merely disparate—the group feeling—into the meaning of difference as psychic mode of cognition.

Now in this progression of sameness, "not other" is at first privative of all but the positive meaning at each stage reached. But as duality arises in the meaning of "same," it is also present as exclusion in the concurrent sense of "other (or different) and not same." In the mode in which "difference" is a cognitive mark, there is real duality and the beginning of the apprehension of relationship. We have, therefore, to recognize in the opposition of the recognition mode, an advance in the progression of negative meaning toward relative or dual negation.

But so far as this result holds, it follows that the advance is again one from privative or indeterminate, to exclusive or determinate negation. The germinal duality of meaning involves the taking on of determinate character. We have, accordingly, a further confirmation of the develop-

(1) Not any-
thing else,
and (2) not
different.

Not-same
as Recogni-
tive Meaning.

Not-same
is Exclusion.

and no longer
Privation.

ment seen above in the actual passage of what is marginal to a cognitive state over into what is central.

But there is now an essential difference. The negative meaning which was at first purely limitative, and then privative, is not destroyed. It does not pass into positive meaning with the growth of determination. On the contrary, with the rise of the positive meaning of "difference," the negative meaning, "not same," remains exclusive although fully determinate. In this we have, I take it, a demonstration of the point that indeterminate opposition, as privative meaning, is an earlier and simpler form than dual or exclusive opposition.

15. When we take fully the point of view of the recognition mode this appears very clear. In the earlier modes the cases, whether positive or negative, are determined under one co-efficient only. What is reached is always "this"; and the privative is no more nor less than "not other." The privative is, in other words, always an implication, a limitation, of the present content. In the later modes, however, when the meaning of recurrent sameness has arisen, and there is a longitudinal before-and-after reading of meanings, we have a two-fold possibility. If, on one hand, the issue is "the same" then the negative meaning is, **Duality when not-same means different.** "not other"—meaning "not-any-other-but-just-this-original." But, on the other hand, if the issue is a definite other-not-same—a new positive construction, a "different"—then the negative meaning of "not-same" arises. The full meaning is then "this other and not-same." This advances the mode well along towards full duality of terms; for the recognition co-efficient was ready to determine one definite content, while the actual determination has issued in another definite content.¹

16. There is a next-following stage, however, in the progression of negative meaning, which brings the return of privative opposition. As a meaning it is most fruitful and significant. It occurs in the semblant or experiential mode, being indeed most characteristic of it. It illustrates the possibility of certain subjective meanings which arise under the free play of the sense of agency or of subjective

¹ It is not necessarily, I think, fully dualistic as to its terms; for we have to recognize the case of simple determination of an object as "other than what is familiar," though not a definite other—the case of difference which is felt, but not cognized. It is here also that we have the germ of "disjunction" meaning, an indeterminate content having the force "this or that, whichever it may turn out to be."

control. I shall call it "Semblant Privation"; it is a stage in the development of negative meanings.

§ 6. SEMBLANT PRIVATION, A FORM OF OPPOSITION

We have already had before us the case of negative meaning which arises with mere lack or want, due to the non-fulfilment of the sort of co-efficient anticipated. We found the issue to be that form of novel presence which we hit off as "this other and not same." When the meaning arises in the mode of consciousness in which the "same" would have been determinate, it is "this and not that"; and when the meaning is indeterminate privation, it is "this and not other." We find, hereupon, when the semblant mode is pretty well developed, that a new meaning comes, which gives privative opposition a genetically more developed statement.

17. One of the characteristic things about the semblant constructions is their *selective* meaning. The entire play meaning is a set-up, make-believe, thing. This involves more or less direct elimination, intentional dropping of characters—a high degree of that pursuit of an abstracting interest which isolates elements of content and treats them under special aspects and for special ends. Along with this, in the semblant stage of growth, there is more or less conscious apprehension of actual things in their real setting, as we saw above, giving a background to the play-whole. If this is so, there must be negative meaning involved, a meaning of "this and not other" *in the imperative mood*. The meaning is, *I choose this and no other*; I make this to be my present make-believe; and by so doing I neglect, discount, and refuse the other aspects of the real-world which do not now suit this my present play interest. This is a vital and important return of the motive of privation; for it is a stripping-off of the co-efficients and characters of the present real object, *for the deliberate purpose of play*. This meaning is a *negative intent*.

18. It is so far indeterminate that it does not stop to construct or examine possible objects, for the sake of negating or excluding them. It is, therefore, not to be called, in the first instance, exclusion. What is ruled out is not all positive content, for a restricted content survives in the imitative and dramatic construction of play. *What is ruled out is a certain control*, the control by the points of reference, the co-efficients of

conversion and persistence, which would, if operative, make the construction a real object and no longer a selected thing of Schein. "This," may the individual say, "being what I select and control, is not and shall not be what is externally controlled. I, by my own act, now deprive the objects of my play of that which would otherwise constitute them external realities."

This is, indeed, therefore, *a case and a new case of opposition by privation*. It is constituted by the inner control and initiative which are characteristic of this mode. It has its peculiar meaning in that it is not the privation or exclusion of a content or class of contents—not a meaning of separation of cases or of overlapping of classes—not a matter of individuation by generalization at all; but it is an aspect of the selective meaning which fulfils a special interest and purpose.¹

19. A somewhat analogous meaning appears in a case of positive individuation treated in other connexions—the case of the individuation of the Singular. Given that positive movement, still to be described, whereby a content is taken out of its aspects of possible generality, and treated as unique, private, and singular—that movement carries with it the explicit banishment of any controls which stand in its way.

In the case of the semblant, this takes place by actual selection and subjective control. In the case of the singular, this meaning may be determined in this way, and in this sense all semblant constructions are singular; but of the case of singular individuation proper this cannot be said. A singular object is one whose control is still external; and whose singular meaning is determined by that control. So

**Singular
Meaning as
Privative ;
when
entirely
Selective,**

¹ The question may be asked whether the semblant form of privation is an essential stage in the development of negative meaning. In answer I should say that it is essential in the same sense that the positive semblant meaning is essential in the genetic series of objects. The negative meanings are all along but phases of the positive—until negative judgment is reached, at any rate—and have no separate development. So if it is true, as I hold it is, that the semblant mode is an essential link in the cognitive progression as a whole, then its negative meaning must take a corresponding place in the development of opposition. The point comes up again in the discussion of the higher semblant or aesthetic consciousness, where it is shown that the semblant form of privation is the negation of the dualisms in which the exclusive oppositions preceding it have their embodiment.

while semblant meaning is always singular, singular meaning may not be semblant but factual.

In the case of factual singular meaning, moreover, the opposition mode cannot be called privative, except when the control by selective privation is superinduced upon the thing or both **Recognitive** found to be singular. There are many instances of this : **and Selective.** there are things we recognize as unique, and also choose as unique for us. The child's doll and the lover's girl have both these elements of meaning ; one the recognitive meaning involving exclusive opposition, and the other selective, requiring privative opposition.

§ 7. DUAL OR RELATIONAL OPPOSITION : NEGATION

20. The course of the further progression in the mode of negative meaning comes out fairly clear, if we hold the positive **Relationship** constructions consistently to their genetic course. **vs. Relation.** We found the rise of dual meaning, as cognized relationship, to be a preliminary step to the cognition of relation as such. The individuation of two terms as together is not the same as the individuation of a relation between two terms : it is the rather preliminary and genetic to it. The latter is the outcome of a further abstracting interest, and as an object thus reached the meaning is very abstract.¹

The sorts of negative meanings which are possible are, of course, in some sense those correlative with the corresponding positive meanings as they arise. The negative meaning attaching to the case of least-togetherness-in-fact, **Exclusion as Cognized Relationship of Difference.** though the terms be in thought re-instated together, is that of mutual exclusion. It arises in the pursuit of the interests under which the great class-meanings are derived. So far forth as the content of a cognitive whole is divided into classes,² the members of which retain their concrete character, we have the germ of relational negation, "this and not that," which is a first form of the dawning meaning of the predication "this is not that." The essential thing is the mutual exclusion of the contents held together. It is relational in the sense that it means *cognized relationship* ; and it illustrates *opposition by exclusion or division*.³

¹ See the discussions of *Relation*, chap. viii. § 10, and vol. ii. *in loc.*

² The great genetic instance now arising is the mutual exclusion of mind and body in the Substantive mode.

³ In logic, "Contradictory Opposition," which is mutual exclusion. It precedes genetically, I think, the "Contrary Opposition" of one-sided

21. The next step is that from cognized relationship to the cognition of relation, a progression worked out in another place. With this, there comes the meaning which is now for the first time properly called *Negation*. It is the explicit privation or exclusion of what may also now be affirmed or declared. It is a positive thing, real negation—a positive function and achievement—and it passes through the several forms of meaning that we cover by the terms *privative, exclusive, and relational* as to the content involved.¹ But in pointing out that this is so, and wherein the earlier forms of opposition are preliminary and genetic to this latest form, we have fulfilled our present task. The working out of the relational mode of thought is still before us, and its negative determinations no less than its positive determinations must wait upon the tracing of yet other strains or progressions in psychic development.

§ 8. OPPOSITION AND CONTROL : RÉSUMÉ

22. It may serve a useful purpose if we now gather up the developments of this topic in its relation to control. The earliest negative meaning—that of cognitive limitation and mere “otherness”—is due in part to the original discreteness of content, and in part also to the limitation of the span of cognitive attention and interest. It is therefore a meaning arising in that first mode which, because it has no distinctions of control, has no consciousness of control beyond bare *Limitation*.

This passes, then, into the meaning of absence, felt as lack and want, called *Privation*: it illustrates the dawning contrast of control modes, through the isolation of the co-efficients of external fulfilment, and their failure on occasion to work. It is indeterminate, but not in the logical sense indefinite.

Along with this, we find, in the image modes, the sort of early dual determination which gives to “the other” a definite meaning. Here the meaning called *Exclusion* arises. This is the meaning of opposition in the mode of “mediate” control—the transition to the dualism or partial exclusion; for the latter involves the further development of the mode into that of cognition-of-relation.

¹ Wherein we reach *judgements* of privation, exclusion, and negative relation.

of the two controls, external and subjective—as it appears in the memory-mode.

In the play-mode, the pendulum swings over to the subjective control of the semblant consciousness, and the negative meaning of *Semblant Privation* is upon us. Here the psychic means the negative, because it wills to the mean negative. We have called it the *Imperative Negative*. As negative meaning it is intent, "the other" being indeterminate.¹

¹ In adopting the scheme of terms of this chapter, I have taken as point of departure the historical use of *Privation*. Sigwart somewhat obscurely says (*Logic*, Eng. trans., i. p. 128): "Comparison with things related in other respects . . . forms the ground for the privative judgment; something which, to judge from the nature of the subject in other respects, might belong to it, does not belong." A recent author (Peirce on the writer's *Dict. of Philos.*, art. "Privation") defines Privation as "the negation or absence of what is natural or customary" (citing Aristotle's illustrations of blindness as privation of sight, and matter, *ύλη*, of form). All negative meanings of the *indeterminate* sort are necessarily of the character of privation; for the indeterminate might be, or might be expected to be, consonant with or to "belong to" the object of thought; and evidently so in the earliest mode, in which limitation is the only beginning of difference as positive incompatibility. Any further or higher modes of opposition are absent; and the limit set by the indeterminate content is the beginning, the *fons et origo*, of all grounds for later negative meanings as of what is not natural, customary, and to be expected. Put in other terms, when knowledge is just beginning, there is no meaning of what belongs together and what does not; the "does not" is the later and developed meaning now taking rise in simple limitation and indeterminate otherness. So the entire meaning of the negative here is the meaning of limitation or control by or in a sphere which might be, and but for this would be, part of the positive meaning.

This is confirmed by two of the positions taken in this chapter: one that of sect. 10, in which it is shown that the indeterminate privative passes normally over into the determinate positive (that which really does extend, go with and belong to the object), and the other that of § 6, in which a higher or semblant privation is pointed out, in which the privative meaning is one of selective prohibition, for personal purposes, of all contents, especially those known to belong in their natural objective contexts to the objects thus created. It is only, therefore, to trace opposition back to its genetic beginnings to make indefinite limitation and privation the fundamental negative meanings, while the ordinary distinction of privative judgments from other negative judgments is seen to be a derived, and for logic, a trivial matter. The important distinctions are those covered by the terms limitative, indeterminate, and determinate opposition, since they reflect the positive meanings of control as differentiated or not into spheres of exclusion. When control is dualistic, then the negative meaning is dual Exclusion; when it is not, then the negative is Privation or Limitation.

From this point of vantage in turn, we see the self or agent of subjective control identifying itself with the special interests that seek fulfilment, or, less figuratively and more truthfully speaking, existing and developing in them. These issue in those special objects which represent typical individuations, and are subject to the negative meanings which such classes and their relationships allow.

5. Relational Opposition. While the whole is selected under subjective control yet the context of inner relationship in the whole has the control of the co-efficients severally involved. The negative meanings are those of *Relational Opposition* in the various forms which anticipate the individuation of Relation as such in the Thought-Mode. The Imperative meaning is, however, retained in cases, such as that of the "Singular," in which the object fulfils both the controls—that of subjective selection as a whole, and also that of recognitive meaning in a contextual system.

Finally, the line is crossed into the logical, and the individuation of *Relation-as-object* gives the positive and negative meanings arising in the processes of judgment and thought. Here the control is a development of that function of self which stands as judging subject over against the objects of its thinking. This is a topic to which detailed treatment is to be given later on in the discussions on the Logical Mode.

Finally, I may say that a better illustration of Privation in the sense here employed could not be wished than Aristotle's case of "matter" defined as the privation of form. Matter, the $\nu\lambda\eta$, is the indeterminate, and in this sense it is in opposition to all determination or form. It is also worth while to note that Aristotle (*Cat.* cap. x.) makes Privation one of his sorts of Opposition, Affirmation and Negation being another.

Chapter X

THE SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESSION: THE MIND-BODY DUALISM

§ I. PERSISTENCE AS A CHARACTER

1. We are now in a position to pick up again and trace further the strands in the development of the essential dualisms of consciousness. The distinction of inner and outer has merged into that of recurrent images and persistent things; the contrast between the relative lawlessness of the inner and the stability, arising from external control, of the outer, has yielded to the quasi-subjective or experimental control which semblant objects display; the inner has become enriched with all that body of affective and conative process which such subjective control carries with it; and the experimental method of treatment has developed into that mode of using the personal body whereby it takes its place as the instrument of further accretion to both poles of the hardening opposition. All this serves to sharpen the distinction with which it all started and to prepare the terms of the great substantive dualism—that of Mind and Body.

2. The actual development of the requisite co-efficients on one side and the other comes, I think, through the recognition function, by which recurrences are read as persistences. We have already dwelt upon this in the case of the co-efficient of the external or outer: *the outer is not only the present-separate; it is the same-present-or-absent-separate*. It is that which is the object of present memory with the meaning that it may be secured as also object of present perception; and it is object of present perception with the meaning that it is also object of recurrent memory.¹ It is per-

¹ Recalling in the more technical terms of the earlier discussion, that the full meaning of persistence is the "recurrent sameness" of renewed perception added to the antecedent meaning of "remote sameness" of memory.

ception or memory either fulfilling the other—this is the meaning of external persistence. Thus only is memory fully justified of her children.

Furthermore, so reliable is this found to be, that in the mode of semblance, the further process of life is staked upon this method of singling out those sorts of images which will, when treated as memories, measure up to the test of conversion by the formula, *memory presence standing vicariously for perception presence*.

3. The co-efficient of persistence so far reached is, however, from the point of view of later development, still defective.

Its limitations are those of meaning as intent, over against that which is a judgment of identity. The sameness of felt familiarity in this early form need not hark back to an original object identified through a memory image as the same, although indeed it may do so. Persistence is simply a character of a present object. It is the case of literal "sameness of indiscernibles"; for there is a fusion of all the elements of meaning in one and the same object.

4. Another defect of the co-efficient of persistence, as seen by a critic at a later mode of psychic achievement, is that after this co-efficient comes to have application in the world of the inner as well as in that of the outer, there would be then, if this were all, no further way of telling which of the two a given image really was.

**Distinction
from inner
Objects that
also Persist.**

Let us take, for example, my memory of one of my dream states. On its first recurrence, in the play of my images, I find it lacking in outer persistence and so call it inner. But on its later recurrence, as itself object of memory, it is found to have persisted in just the same sense and mode as do images which were, in the first instance, real memories. In respect to the character of persistence, therefore, *considered as recurrence*, there is now no distinction between the persisting inner and the persisting outer. There is not, it is true, usually any actual embarrassment in such cases; for the memory of the real object preserves its character of double conversion—conversion first into an earlier memory which is inner, and second, conversion of the latter into a perception that is outer; while the dream state has only the one conversion, into the original dream-image which was inner. But the question arises, as **Two Sorts of Persistence.** to whether consciousness does go through such complicated conversion processes: whether indeed the dualism of

inner and outer is not carried further by the development of additional distinctions in the later modes, whereby *persistence of different sorts or meanings is recognized*, one sort attaching to the recurrent inner and the other to the persisting outer, which has come, through memory, to be also a recurrent inner.

This is the case, I think. Not only is the co-efficient of inner persistence different, but the difference between it and outer persistence is hardened into the terms of the great "substantive" dualism.

5. Before going further, however, it is worth while to state in general terms, and in positive form, the truth just negatively brought out. Outer persistence is secured and guaranteed by the conversion co-efficient, and so becomes just the mark of distinction between the inner and the outer. In the further development from the image-mode into that of play, however, images of all sorts are found to recur and come up for experimental treatment, whereby a direct mode of corroboration tends to be substituted for the mere presence of the persistence co-efficient. With this the persistence mark falls into second place except in cases whose meanings are so plain that no experimental tests need be resorted to, or so meaningless, on the surface, that the tests are inapplicable, as is usually the case with dreams. Dreams are so bizarre or so detached from any "real" context that they are discounted without more ado. A further reason for the adoption of the method of experimentation in place of that of mere identification under the meaning of sameness and persistence, is that by the former knowledge is actually advanced. Experimentation has a prospective reference *in futuro*, it is an instrument of discovery and selection; while the mere reading of contents as "the same" is retrospective; its reference is to the past. The child is not content with recognitions; he needs inventions, and he achieves them.

The result is that the persistence mark comes to attach to experience as such; and if it is to have further use as a mark of distinction between inner and outer, it must itself take on some further differentiation whereby *these two modes are found to persist differently*. The meaning of persistence as

The Persistence Progression.

general recurrence character is to be broken up into the dual meanings of persistences as attaching to mind, on the one hand, and to body on the other. The advance thus motivated I shall call in the following treatment, the "persistence progression."

§ 2. THE PERSISTENCE PROGRESSION : INNER PERSISTENCE

6. It is through the development of inner persistence, I think, that this progression moves. The question arises at once

—a question which corresponds to that with which we have had to do in the determination of the mark of outer persistence—as to why images persist or recur at all. Put more pointedly : what leads to the recognition of recurrent images with the glow of sameness diffused over their surface ? Analysis leads us to an answer to this question which is the same from either of two different lines of approach.

(1) Do we find the conditions of the rise of sameness in the case of sense objects duplicated here in whole or part ?

(2) Do we find other factors, additional psychic processes, also taking a hand ?

To both of these questions we may answer by anticipation, Yes.

(1) The coefficient of persistence under which the sense-mode has the character of sameness is, as we saw above, double ; the **Images have persistence Co-efficient of Context.** two elements of it, "representing context" and "conversion value," both being involved in the function of recognition. One of these is a character as such, an objective mark ; the other is a mode of control, that called "mediate." When we come to ask how it is that images persist, simply as images, we have no reason to deny either of these elements of the persistent co-efficient. Images have the representing character so far as sense, memory, or fancy objects are represented by them ; the glow of familiarity then goes out upon the image as a familiar context, whether the earlier construction itself was representative of an external object or not. This type of meaning is that called above "present sameness."

This is true also of the conversion factor considered as a mode of control ; but with an important qualification. In case **and of Conversion into Image Mode—** it is an inner or image object into which a recurring memory is convertible, it is in this case not the bare image scheme, the cognitive complication, which is taken up into the sameness meaning : it is, the rather, the full-blooded inner of the psychic whole which is set over against the outer, in the progress of the development of the subjective. For it will be remembered that there is a mass of material of the conative-affective sort—pleasures, pains, stresses, strains,

efforts, impulses, appetitive tendencies, etc.—waiting for some sort of objective attachment; and as soon as the inner begins to have appropriate fulfilment in an image, so soon do these tendencies cluster about and upon it. The inner thus takes on subjective form; and the recurrence, which gives the “recurrent sameness” meaning, is of this full whole, not simply of the image which stands as the nucleus of its recognitive meaning.

This subjective factor is wanting in the conversion of external meaning from the image-mode into that of sense. The external object as remembered, and remembered ever so many times, does not have its final warrant in its conversion into the next earlier occurrence in memory; if that were all, it would still be liable to confusion with the fancy object which is also remembered. It goes further in having final conversion into hard and resisting external fact. This the inner object as such lacks. So in spite of the operation of the factors which work as well upon the memory of an external object, as upon what is purely inner, the latter still lacks final fulfilment under the sense co-efficient. Its fulfilment must be in some sense subjective, a mode of fulfilment whose essential force is just that which is stripped from the meaning of the external as such by its final confirmation.

7. The truth of this result is fully evident when we note that the sameness meaning as attaching to remembered images—as for examples, dreams, air-castles, etc.—seems to extend only to present sameness or recurrence of a sort that does not carry with it the “remote sameness” meaning. We do not mean, when we say “my dream is the same a second time,” that my dream has persisted, in an independent way when I was not dreaming it. The vagaries of our fancy come and go; they do not continue to be or persist in the intervals of our sober life of thought.¹ And the sort of recurrence they do possess is only so far “inner” that it includes the meaning of an inner life in which the recurrence takes place, which continues to be in some sense “the same.”

8. As thus subjective or psychic, inner persistence would seem to reside finally in what we may describe as the continuity

¹ Psychological readers will recall the current criticisms of the Herbartian and other “pigeon-hole” or “photographic plate” theories of what is known as the “retentiveness” of memory. Functional views have entirely displaced such theories.

subject and object. Here we find that the persisting inner something again detaches itself from the separate constructions which it still pronounces the same under the co-efficient of recognition. It retreats into a further inner sanctuary of subjectivity, and as subject and agent, holds up all objects of thought, be they inner or outer, to its scrutiny and identification. The subject still claims persistence ; but it is also able to say, " Behold, how separate I am ! " All empirical content, individuated as the same or different, is now object of thought to a persisting inner subject which is agent and thinker. This seems, as was just intimated, to remove the inner persistence, at least in that dualistic mode called " reflection," still further from the meaning of persistence which comes by the identification of an objective content as recurrent or repeatedly the same.¹

13. On the other hand, and finally, there is a transfer of elements formerly identified as inner, when frequently or vividly objectified, out into the external series. We repeat our dreams, narrate our adventures, contextuate the details of our imagined history, and do it so thoroughly that when we come to recognize the whole as in some sense the same, we body forth into external fact the creatures of our fancy. Children do this often, adults sometimes ! ²

14. (2) This leads us then to the affirmative answer to our second question—the question whether there is something peculiar about the persistence of the inner by which its meaning as being and continuing the same is secured. Its peculiarity consists in the passing over

found " the same," because they are recognized. The possibility now suggested presses the inquiry further back, raising the question as to what it is in a recurrent cognition that gives it the character of recognition. This is the general question of the psychology of recognition.

¹ This appears explicit in the mode of reflection, in which the entire context of experience becomes objective as a world of ideas, having its only persistence, as such, imparted to it by the grasp and control of a subject-self.

² There are certain other facts more or less germane to the discussion. One of them is the ability of consciousness to conceal the discontinuities of its content : we know no break due to deep sleep, for example, simply because we are not conscious of anything that could represent the break. To have anything to represent it, would be *ipso facto* to fill it in. Furthermore, in cases of divided consciousness, with split-off memory trains, each such train, so far as continuous, would fulfil all its positive motives and so stand alone with no sense of loss from its separation from the others.

Images tend
to get outer
Persistence.

Inner Per-
sistence has
reference to
Self.

of the "sameness" to the inner control aspect. In the case of external persistence it is, on the contrary, a character of the object found to be a *separate thing of outer meaning*. The facts of experience are plainly on the side of this reading of the case.

When I say I have "the same fancy or idea of a thing," what I mean is that my present object, my idea, is the same in that it has the same meaning; or that the same experience as that in which this image came to me before is renewed in me again. That is, I either use a co-efficient of objective meaning, or I treat the image as such as a mere recurrence, a symbol or counter whereby I invoke the subtler sort of persistence which is conveyed by the expression, my experience. It is this last case that exhibits real progress, and develops the something peculiar to inner persistence.

In saying that this is the development of the inner control factor we are only carrying farther a statement already made

Undertone of continuous Interest.

above. The factor of inner control is the solidification of those conative-affective dispositions which are the constant undertone of the life of interest and action.

This goes farther in the gradual retreat of these subjective elements before the enlarging scope of the objective, which comes to stand in contrast with the subjective. That aspect of the progression, however, we must leave over; since it is the development of the dualism of external and internal, not that of subject and object, which we are now working out.

15. The two persistences, looked at from this point of view, are correlative though not equivalent meanings. They represent the hardening dualism of controls. The external content, and with it the recognitive context of every sort,¹ persists as "the same" in the sense that a form of control not subjective is recurrently and convertibly at work in it. Over against this the inner life persists as "the same," not in the objective context which it holds, but in the control which this context

The Two Meanings are both "the same."

embodies and is employed to fulfil. External persistence is a meaning of discontinuous function, remoteness, and recurrence; inner persistence is a meaning of continuous function, intimate ownership, and immediate presence.

¹ This covers the case discussed above (chap. iv. § 5) of remembered "events" which are not external objects. So far as they have any sort of recognitive context they are in a real sense both representing and convertible.

§ 3. THE TWO CONTROLS : SUBSTANCE

16. In the derivation of the two kinds of persistence as now indicated, we have traced also the opposition of the two classes of objects called minds and bodies. The material hav-
Substances are actually Separated. ing the characters of mind is in its own way a mass of persisting data, as is also that which has the characters of body. The further stage attained in the substantive mode as such, is that whereby they are not only divided off as separable classes by the process of individuation now to be described, but as *actually separated*. This latter meaning cannot be considered to follow upon the former as a matter of course. Psychic classes as individuated in this way or that, are not of necessity made to mean separated substances. It becomes, indeed, a question of interest as to the motive to this new and more thorough-going kind of separation which we discover in the mind-body dualism.

It comes, I think, by the movement briefly described above toward the end of the chapter on the development of the subject-mode as such.¹ It will be remembered
Separation by Imitative reading of the Inner. that the subjective as experience was found to arise through certain progressions in which the personal body is divided into two parts, thus resolving the psychic embarrassments arising from its dual and rival meanings. The requirement of actual separation of inner content from outer material bodies seemed to be met in the experience of imitation, whereby *the same imitated content could be read into two or more bodies or personalities*. This motive of actual separation once awakened, however—by whatever urgency and in *whatever situation, imitative or other*—then the dualism of persistence modes at once takes over the separated contents. The subjective psychic life, now a more or less self-controlled subjective mass of data, is free from the outer persistence co-efficient. Over against it, the externally controlled objects, now separated
 ff from the subjective, remain contents that fulfil the persistence-guaranteed, in the “remote” way, by the conversion co-efficient of memory.

In short, the substantive mode is but the knitting together of the essential factors of the advancing dualism of controls—one control resident in the subject or self now found detached

¹ Chapter v. § 5.

from any particular body, and the other resident in the context which is or means such bodies.

On the content side, there is the opposition of two meanings of persistence and sameness: the inner and the outer.

Two Contents under separate Control. The two contrasted masses of content, each persisting as the same under its own recognition co-efficient, are, however, separately controlled. The separateness of the control centres results from the actual separation of the contents, at a stage of consciousness at which no larger grouping is yet attained or possible inside of which both may be considered parts of a larger whole of experience. The dualism of substances is the necessary hardening of contents in the mode in which the psychic becomes "subjective," but not yet fully "subject." It is not the final dualism, therefore, for that of subject-object follows hard in its wake; yet, as we shall see, the later mode, in which all knowledges become objects of experience and all knowers subjects of experience, proceeds upon, and does not obliterate, the line of cleavage thus established.¹

¹ It would seem that our position here is in a general way justified by the results of anthropology. The theories of the rise of belief in separate souls may be divided into those which rest upon cases of apparently *varying persistences*, on the one hand, and those which cite cases of recognition of *differences of control*, on the other hand. Death is a case of evident failure of life, the inner, to persist, while the body does persist; and death is the great evidence of dualism to the primitive wonderer. Opposed to this, portents, omens, visions, auditions, etc., all illusions of the presence of the departed after death, are cases of persistence of the soul without the body. On the other hand, dream phenomena, possessions, ravings, religious and other ecstasies, etc., are phenomena of alteration and variation of control, on one side or the other. It is relatively distinct as a motive to dualism, from the persistence cases, since both sorts of persistence here alike endure; the spirit in control takes the place of the proper soul in the body of the possessed.

The events commonly attributed to spirit control are simply legion. Fetichism is a primitive device to cope with it (cf. the mass of data gathered by Nassau in his *Fetichism in West Africa*). This latter motive, indeed, has never been properly isolated in the theories of the ethnologists.

An adequate theory of the rise of dualism will have to recognize these two factors and adjust them genetically to each other. The indications, drawn from the progressions of the individual's psychic development, would be that a stage built upon persistence phenomena, with a dualism of presence or absence separately of soul and body, has preceded the fuller dualism of separate substantial existences. This is undoubtedly confirmed by the early thought of spirit as in some sense a form of more

Given this coalition of motives—actual separateness of content and characteristic “persistence”—it is difficult to find any further genetic movement involved in dualism of substances. Of course—as has been already intimated—there remains the subsequent account of the individuation process by which the *general meaning* of these contents is derived, and because of which they become concepts ; and that is, indeed, necessary to a full account of substance.

17. This progression, like all others indeed, is one of gradual and continuous refinement. The processes of accommodation and assimilation constantly raise problems of the reduction of ambiguous material. But the development in the use of the body establishes an experimental method whereby presentations generally are brought to the test of one co-efficient or the other and thus confirmed.

One of the situations thus arising is of special interest. It is that of the erection of a content into an experimental object in the play-mode, and later on of the analogous process in the “experimental” consciousness generally. We have seen that in this situation there is a temporary emphasis upon subjective selection and initiation, arising from the detachment of the chosen whole from its external moorings. This emphasis issues in the function of “sembling,” by which the inner determination of the psychic is read into the content, and so far as it is not, for the present, construed as forbidding treatment as being a self, it *is* so treated. The spring of its activity is read as inner, simply because it is not outer.

There thus arises a certain one-sidedness in the dualism : a

refined body, having the same control, that is in kind, as the body vacated, and only individually separated off from it. To this view the disembodied shades are still material shapes. Later on there is the identification of the persisting spirit as a mode of self-controlled and independent inner life. This latter, however, is a stage of considerable refinement, corresponding to the development of the subject-object mode in the individual, in which experience is a self-determining inner life. In another place, in tracing the history of Psychology considered as an evolution of the conception of the mental life, I have pointed out that this distinction holds also there. The dualism of mind and body before Descartes did not involve the substantive postulation of mind and matter as *both distinguishable and also separated substances*. Such fully-developed dualism came in only with Descartes (see the *Psychological Review*, May-July, 1905, for the paper, prepared for the St. Louis Exposition Congress of Arts and Sciences, in which this point is brought out).

sense that the outer control is to be accorded only as tested, while the inner control is in some way already in possession. This appears to be so because the semblant mode is genetically intermediate between those of the inner-outer and mind-body dualisms. It does not appear that there is any disparity in the standing of the terms mind and body *when once the dualism is developed*. But there is this first assumption of inner control, otherwise there would be the mere drift of the uncontrolled. So long as the content retains its relatively ambiguous character with reference to its final classification, it is sembled with a sort of inner determination.

Moreover, as was said in the treatment of sembling above, this tendency is reinforced from another movement. So far as the full meaning of an object as being externally persistent is not yet complete,¹ it falls in the class of phenomena which are just by that fact possibly inner; and so long as the final determination is held in abeyance through later stages of development, this first assignment is not revised. *The unaccounted for is then at first blush inner, and the inner is the mysterious, capricious, and self-controlled*, which has only the kind and degree of persistence that the thought of the inner has then acquired.

18. It is worth while to make a point of this, for it has been an assumption in a certain "subjective" theory of the origin of categories into which a genetic or dynamic strain seems to be spontaneously read by common sense. "Cause" is often called a re-reading of experiences of effort; substance, a comprehensive somewhat, is considered an abstraction from some higher common inner mode of control; and even space is considered an abstraction from direct muscular and other inner experiences.² We are not justified, I think,

¹ Rather than, as in the case just cited, of make-believe explicitly chosen. The indication of a sembling motive here in the substance progression is fully confirmed from the side of anthropology. All the facts of the personifying of the forces of nature, of the interpreting of objects as animate, lend themselves to the view that, until experimentally proved to be regular and physical, everything is erratic, capricious, and wilful; that is, in some crude sense, analogous to what is self-determined in the way that persons are when at the same genetic stage.

² The ablest treatment of certain of these notions, called by him the "volitional" or "dynamic categories," is that of Professor A. T. Ormond, in his book *The Foundations of Knowledge* (Part II, chaps. v.-viii., "The Volitional Categories").

in drawing such conclusions from the events of this stage of psychic life ; but it is only stating a fact when we point out that there is this strain of semblant and inner life attaching to the objects of all sorts which still await determination under an external co-efficient of control.¹

It is from these beginnings that the finer meanings of the nature of substance take their rise—time relations, extensity property, inherence of qualities, etc., matters to come up later on. The further topic of immediate urgency just now is that of the “general” meaning of objects in the substantive mode.

§ 4. SUBSTANTIVE INDIVIDUATION

19. In the passage of consciousness into the substantive stage, through the progressions in persistence and control indicated just above, we find a further marked development of the individuation mode. Up to this point the dualism of inner and outer has been one of direct contrast of marks subject to immediate recognition. But in the semblant mode, as we have seen, the schema is erected with two-fold meaning : first, its meaning as representing a group of cases any one of which might serve ; and second, its meaning as selectively determined as to which of its marks is to be significant, and so as being, in the sense defined, instrumental to the further development of meaning.

The development into the substantive mode as such carries the individuation process farther. It gives the progression from the schematic and instrumental meaning to that of *real kinds*, in which the results of the experimental treatment of the schema are cast. Mind and body are real kinds, inasmuch as they are no longer merely schemes of hypo-

¹ In a later mode the question recurs and may there be more fully recognized. The inquiry would seem to take this form : whether the assignment of this or that content to the side of body, and the rise of a body-substance from such assignments, does not remove from that term of the dualism all inner control and meaning ; and if so, whether there is any higher mode in which the semblant construction comes again into play in a construction which reinstates the inner shading of control in the meaning in which it then issues. The customary uncritical reading of voluntary determination into the phenomena of mechanical causation is fallacious, unless it can give some such further account of itself in the higher modes, as is also the mechanical reading of the categories of minor organizations.

thetical construction of the possible, but existences guaranteed by some sort of confirmed co-efficient.

20. The immaturity of the schema and its inadequacy to the meaning of knowledge we call "general" appears in its essentially *tentative and prospective character*. We have seen that from the playful experimentation of the semblant mode, consciousness passes to serious experimentation as its prime method of discovery and confirmation. To use a term recently imported into epistemological discussions—the schema is "instrumental." *It is a device of a pragmatic sort to aid reconstruction, induce accommodation, and relieve embarrassment.* In so far as it is, as we have intimated it is, the universal method of reconstruction, in so far we may say that all knowledge is at least, whatever else it may be, instrumental to the furtherance both of practical life and of the context of knowledge.

So important is this in the sequel, that we may at once dismiss the claim of any *knowledge as such*¹ to escape the schematic and experimental or instrumental stage, so far as it has any grounds or tests in the mind of the thinker who has the knowledge. This last qualification is necessary in order to exclude knowledges which arise in the lower modes before the process of schematic individuation is at work at all.

We may use the current term "experimental" for knowledge "**Experimental**" which is in this schematic, prospective, and instrumental stage; and, indeed, for all knowledge so far as it is or may be made the object of this sort of treatment at any time in consciousness. Of experimental knowledge we may say certain things.

21. (1) It is individuated as schematic, *but not as general or universal*. It is a meaning in the line of what was mentioned above as sometimes called the "vague general"—i.e. the merely large, undifferentiated, and habitual. Its schematic character is just its value; for it is *as if general* in reference to the cases with which it urges consciousness to cope. It is instrumental to an end,² but it is not a general meaning; it

¹ That is any cognition made up under a given co-efficient of control, and so having reference to a sphere of fact or fancy in which it claims its fulfilment. We cannot here raise the question as to "objects of thought" which do not fulfil this condition.

² Even this is too advanced an expression—so needful is it that we be exact here, while many are "claiming the earth" for this sort of know-

does not have *any co-efficient of generality by which the cases are related* under the schema. As we are to see later on, *the general, as a mode of meaning, does have such a co-efficient* : it is the individuation of the cases as *separate terms in relation*. It is in a *related whole* that generalization finds its characteristic meaning.

It is just at this point that the current pragmatic theories are open to destructive criticism. We are told that the concrete experience, the schema, functions as a universal or general, and through this functioning its instrumental worth is established. As a matter of pragmatic function this is quite true. But it is incorrectly assumed that *this is general knowledge*. On the contrary, it is a schema of experimental value ; it functions just for the determination of further cases, new constructions, adjustments, etc. ; it issues in new cognitions of relationship, and so leads genetically to the recognition of those relations of resemblance, sameness, number, etc., by which *the whole of the truly general meaning is constituted*. Now this is, as we are to find in detail below, not at all what general and universal objects of thought mean. They have characters quite the opposite from those which fulfil this hypothetical, prospective, interrogatory, and problematical meaning of the schema.

To illustrate : I see a newly discovered quadruped, and on the strength of my speculative zoological instincts say, "Horse ?" —meaning, can it be a horse, is it in the horse class ?

Illustration. When I do this I am using my schema horse in a large experimental, questioning, hypothetical way, to include this new creature ; and I expect my zoological friends to confirm, or to laugh at, my guesswork. My state of mind is one of *suspended decision, lack of conviction, and inhibition of action*.

But when, on the contrary, I go from pen to pen in a menagerie, from cows to pigs and finally to the familiar horse, and then say, "horse !" —my psychic state is removed world-wide from the former. I do not now mean to ask a question, to make a test, to advance a theory, to expose my ignorance. Quite the contrary ! I now proceed *with assurance among well defined cases and relationships*. So far from placing the present

ledge. The "end" here is an intent, an *intention*, not a thought or object ; for what it is to be is not yet worked out. The schema is a definite context, but its meaning is to be modified in the process of individuation as "general."

animal in a schema of a yet undetermined class, which is thus guide and instrument to further adaptations to nature, I now do quite the contrary. I treat the horse to sugar, beware of his legs, and assume all his general characters as so much familiar background for the description of this horse as an individual of his kind. The meaning horse is now general.

The experimentally schematic is, therefore, very far from meaning a general or, as appears further below, a universal¹; it is what I shall call a *hypothetical* meaning, using that word, together with the term *hypothesis*, as scientific thinkers use it. A hypothetical meaning is one that is erected as a hypothesis, instrumental to further discovery.²

22. (2) The hypothetical meaning goes on to develop its earlier distinctions toward the true general, through the stage usually called "disjunctive": a stage of meaning which we have already examined in one of its implications in pointing out the negative meaning of determination by exclusion.³ The case in question is that of the schema when it allows *alternative* meanings, but is to motive the determination of one of them only: the meaning, "it is this or that."

As just indicated, this is a striking psychic mid-way stage

¹ This distinction will appear to have considerable importance in our later discussion (see chap. xi. § 5); and it may be well to sharpen it here. As meanings, the two objects of construction, the schema and the general or concept, are distinguished as the one *selective and prospective*, the other *recognitive and retrospective*. The schema has the meaning *I intend*, the concept the meaning *I acknowledge or recognize*; they represent *that fundamental divergence by which meanings take on distinctive character*. One meaning is *à faire*, the other *fait accompli*; one is a *project*, an *expectation*, the other a *fulfilment*. It is, in the later progressions, the difference between a conjecture and a truth. In logic, it becomes the difference between "this may be, is it?" and "this is, therefore"; between the question of research and the assertion of proof; between utility and reasonableness. In short, it would be hard, in all the range of distinctions of meanings, to find one that is more sharp in its opposition or more germinal in its epistemological bearings.

² This usage is not new. It confines "hypothetical" to meanings of the sort often called "problematical" in logic (see also vol. ii. chap. ii. sect. 53 below). I shall use the term "conditional" for propositions of the form usually known as "hypothetical," when the meaning is "contingent" in the sense given in § 9 of chap. ii. vol. ii. Cf. Keynes, *Formal Logic*, 2 ed. § 127.

³ Chap. ix. sect. 15, note.

of meaning, inasmuch as it requires the dual relationship presented by the alternative terms "this" and "that."

Disjunction is both Dual and Selective. It is, as a construction of content, a mode in which there is individuation of difference, either as cognized relationship, or (later) as a cognized object. Indeed it is a close question whether it is not always the latter; for the realization of one or other term of the alternative, involving the denial or exclusion of the other, would seem to carry the separation and distinct individuation of the two terms. For example, in the substantive mode, in which the two terms mind and body are not only held in relationship, but are also separated as mutually exclusive, the experimental schema of an image yet to be assigned to one or the other meaning, would appear to involve the cognition of the relation of difference. Yet it would seem possible that the vague consciousness of psychic plurality or group, pointed out in the treatment of individuation in the pre-logical modes, might carry, within its determination as a complex whole, the value of a disjunction. For example, in the early play-mode, two practical determinations of the same object—say that of playing ball with an apple, and that of eating it—may indeed suggest a real alternation of meanings, without developing further, or may develop into one of them, without the sharp discrimination and exclusion of the other.¹

However this may be, in cases of relationship between two positive terms or meanings, we must, I think, at least recognize the germ of alternative meaning in all instances of privative opposition, where one or other of the meanings is indeterminate. Privation takes its rise in failure or lack in respect to a possible, that is, an *alternative*, construction. This granted, it follows at once that the schema as indeterminate or problematical meaning has in it the germ of alternation. It is the progress from this germ that we discern in the positively alternative or disjunctive meaning of the dualistic modes.

Yet alternative meaning remains also hypothetical and **while still Hypothetical** schematic. The whole-of-dual-relationship is held up for experimental determination. It fulfils in all respects

¹ Would the disjunction in meaning be removed, indeed, if each of two boys, playing ball with the apple, took a bite out of it every time he caught it? There would not of necessity be a relation of opposition, or of real difference, established between the edible-object and the ball-object. Instead of raising such an issue, they might say, "let us have both."

the characters of the schema as such : it is prospective, it is selective of the whole this-or-that disjunction, it is a condition of question and suspended belief.

Let us call meaning of this type, in all the modes in which it arises, "alternative meaning" or the meaning of "Alternation." As a mode of schematic or hypothetical meaning, "this or that," it does not necessarily develop through determination by exclusion, "this or that, but not both," although it may; for the issue is still open to a conjunction, "this and that," as well as to an exclusion, "this but not that." In this feature the essentially hypothetical character of the meaning is again seen.¹ For example, the words "he is like him" (*Gospel of St. John*, ix. 9) may be read as meaning either "he is like him and (hence) is he," or "he is (merely) like him, but is not he."

23. Its relation to both the purely semblant or schematic and the general appears, when we ask as to the mode of control in the disjunction. It has, on the one hand, that selective value as a whole which, by its semblant origin and determination, marks it as a personal intent; but in the relationships which make it an imitative and complex context, it has the verisimilitude that warrants its hypothetical use. Indeed the possibility of the transition from the purely personal and playful meaning which is its original warrant to that emphasis upon the real possibilities which the alternation brings to the test—the possibility of such a transition without

¹ So far as a negative meaning is necessarily included—as for instance the privative "this and not other" seen above to be germinal to all alternatives—it is referable to the larger sphere outside "this and that" taken together. The negative aspect of alternative meaning when fully expressed is, "this or that, one or both, and not whatever-is-not-either." This result confirms the position of Keynes (*Formal Logic*, 2 ed. § 317)—whose use of the term "alternative" is also here adopted—so far as the meaning in general is concerned. But inasmuch as the reason here given for the position is that the meaning is hypothetical and its motive one of further determination and discovery, the question would come up again in the theory of propositions of the disjunctive form, in which the motive is one not of discovery but of distinction and communication. As matter of fact, a *proposition* of the form "this or that," and also the judgment back of it, conveys the further meaning "but not both." And the reason for it is obvious: it is because, not being for the sake of discovery, but of imparting information, the conjunctive form "this and that" would naturally be used if that were meant. It may be well, therefore, to reserve the term "disjunction" for its customary use in formal logic (cf. below, vol. ii. chap. ii. § 8).

discontinuity or jar—is witness to the presence throughout of the external or objective co-efficient of control. What was erected as an intent, a whole meaning of subjective interest and fulfilment is developed as involving relationships of objective stability and convertible worth.

*The alternative meaning, therefore, is a stage in the passing of a semblant schema into a general concept.*¹ By the limitation of the subjective control to the mere alternation, its sweep as determining the final meaning is much restricted. This movement is evidenced also by the corresponding negative meaning. In the disjunction or alternative, before its solution is reached, the negative meaning, as intimated above, is “one of these or the other, but not what is not either.” It is not simply “this or not-this” as in the simple hypothetical, for the “not-this” has now passed part of its meaning over to the determinate “other,” which is a positive member of the alternation. The expectation has become that the issue will be *one of the two*. The negative meaning has thus passed from privation of all other to the experimental inclusion of this other. This is of course progress in objective determination ; and it restricts the range of subjective control.

Seen also in
Negative
Meaning.

§ 5. GENERAL AND UNIVERSAL MEANING

24. It is in the substantive mode, moreover, that the passage is effected to the meanings called general and universal, though not in their full logical sense.² The logical general and universal involve that further phase of dualism which is known as the subject and object distinction, in which the distinctive act of judging appears. Yet in the achievement of the dualism of mind and body considered as

Meanings not
yet fully
Logical

¹ This is to justify, for this stage of development, the statement made by the writer some time ago of the hypothetical and disjunctive judgments : “ The disjunctive judgment has, in addition to the categorical statement of belief [in this mode, the selection or acceptance of the meaning as a whole] . . . also a hypothetical reference. The categorical assertion extends only to the entire disjunction, and rests suspended in reference to the single alternatives. . . . There is, however, a direct mental tendency to further assertion, by the erection of one of the alternatives into an hypothesis [in this mode, an experimental schema], when the judgment takes on a distinctly hypothetical form ” (*Handbook of Psychology*, i. *Senses and Intellect*, first ed., 1889, p. 299). Disjunctive and other special meanings of the logical mode are reserved for treatment in vol. ii. chaps. ii., iv.

² The passage into full logical meaning is traced in chap. xi.

distinct substances this latter is being prepared for ; for it is in the persistence of the mental substance that the subject-self of inner control and agency is to find its nucleus.

The first and more crude sort of general meaning appears as the after-math or clearing-up of the situation described above

as experimental in the large sense, as embodying the
General hypothetical and alternative. The issue of each experi-
Meaning mental meaning is a positive construction, of course ;
succeeds the but a construction which does not banish the meanings
Schematic. attached to the several alternatives before the fact. The mean-
 ing of the schema as being one case, for which some other case
 might have been substituted, is now succeeded by the deter-
 mination of *what cases might be substituted*. That is, the element
 of hypothesis in the experimental meaning gives way to a
 refinement of definition and distinction which is fruitful in two
 ways : first, in the individuation of the particular as such over
 against the schematic meaning ; and second, in the individuation
 of the group as a whole of related particulars. For example,
 the schema horse is my first experimental meaning when I see
 a strange animal. My meaning is "horse, or cow, or some
 other ?" In using the schema horse, however, I proceed by
 cautious experimentation. Supposing it turns out to be a
 horse—rather than a cow or something else—the result after the
 fact is this : I now individuate the general class as horse over
 against the alternative meanings cow and other. This clarifies
 all my distinctions. I now recognize definite relation. I distin-
 guish clearly the differences between the horse, cow, and the rest,
 and at the same time develop the aspects which they have in
 common as members each of its class. I have in one act, there-
 fore, determined both the particular and the general meaning ;
 that is, the individuations whereby the objects do (as particu-
 lars) or do not (as generals) have the same meaning.¹

When related as particulars, the individuals all mean
 "horse" ; when related as generals, one means horse, another
 cow, and so on.

25. We may put the matter in terms of the distinction of
 meanings involved. The actual testing of the case by the use

¹ This use of particular accords with and is anticipatory to that
 current in formal logic. The particular judgment ("some men are black" ;
 it might better be called a "partial" judgment as meaning part of a
 class) is a judgment about cases as particulars under a general meaning.

of the schema results in the development of the internal content of relation, the general meaning ; but it also clarifies **General and Particular arise together.** and refines the special meanings which the fulfillment of the special interests in the several classes involves. There is, therefore, the development of the two meanings cognitive and selective. The general meaning is such just in that respect in which the earlier mere schema was lacking : determination of the inner relationships which were not established by the mere selection of the schema as a whole. This inner determination of whole and parts, of general and particular meaning, is the fruitful *result of the experimental process* ; for the schema, as an experimental forecast, is a meaning in which these determinations *are not yet present*.¹ In the result,

¹ This is what we may call the inherent justification of a general meaning as such : it is general only in so far as it is a complex or group of related particulars. This will appear clearer in the logical mode, where it is pointed out that induction—considered as the enumeration of particulars—is not the mode of origin of the general or of the universal meaning. The particular and the general arise the rather by the one movement described above.

Since this passage and the corresponding ones on "Schematism" (above, chap. viii. §§ 6, 8) were written an article has appeared by C. S. Peirce, the "father of pragmatism"—("What Pragmatism is," *The Monist*, April 1905)—in which he claims for the "experimental proposition" (proposition meaning hypothesis in his usage) both instrumental and also true general meaning, thus seeming to distinguish his personal view (now called "Pragmaticism"). He finds that there is not only "a sincere doubt in the experimenter's mind as to the truth of his hypothesis," but also that he must take account not of "single experiments" but of "general kinds of experimental phenomena," of "general objects as real" (wherein Dr. Peirce calls himself a scholastic realist). This would seem to widen the meaning of the "hypothesis" and allow to it a true general character, as covering already "experimental phenomena."

Far be it from me to quarrel with this as a statement which recognizes the need of the two meanings and distinguishes them : it is near to the outcome of my own research. But with these two meanings read into the same context of knowledge we are dealing with *two meanings* with which the context is *successively charged*. It cannot have both meanings at once and with reference to the same cases.

Dr. Peirce's argument seems fallacious in identifying the attitude of the experimenter to his result *in futuro*, with the attitude of the thinker on experimental phenomena in general to other cases of the same experiment, also *in futuro*. These latter are not *in futuro* as meanings, but only as facts ; as meanings, they are covered by the case already tested, and this is just what is meant by calling their meaning general or universal. The implication of "uniformity" in experimental phenomena is discussed in vol. ii. *in loc.*

however, the range of selective intent is also extended, for the class now established may be again charged with hypothetical meaning by the erection of the particular into a schema. Thus knowledge is continually advanced.

26. The actual difference of meaning between the instrumental and the general is seen in the fact that it is confirmation, extra-psyche control, that is secured in the latter, while it is only assumed or postulated¹ in the former. The assumption as such cannot prescribe the form it is to take—the relationships in which the experiment is actually to issue. *Only after the fact* do these relationships appear as a recognitive context and compel that assent-following-consent which issues in the categorical “it is” following upon the imperative “let it be, if possible.” This comes out strongly in the judgment-mode, in which the two meanings are united in a form of higher mediate control,² a state in which the *established context of fact is acknowledged to be also the fulfilment of the selected schema of hypothesis* (see chap. xi. § 4).

27. The fundamental difference between the hypothetical, or instrumental, and the general meaning proper, is further emphasized when we come to recognize the rise of the *universal meaning* in connexion with both of these. The determination of the object issues in the meaning now found to be general, on the side of the individuation of the content as one and many. The progression has issued in the establishment of external control. We saw that the first erection of the schema for experimental treatment was controlled subjectively or selectively; that the whole as such embodied the meaning then and there chosen. We now find, however, that it is part of the method, when the semblant manipulation passes over into a means of discovery, that the object is passed back into the sphere of existence of the co-efficients of actual fact and external control. The uncertainty which made its meaning hypothetical now disappears, therefore, and the positive construction stands firm, no longer open to question. The meaning of definiteness and relation attaches to the finished, made-up thing, of which there is no further event. The control now external has issued once for all in *this result and no other*. The note has been converted into the gold coin of existence which

¹ On Postulation, see vol. ii. *in loc.*

² See chapter xi. § 4.

is now to be circulated¹ with a value that is once for all established. This meaning falls into two moments : first, the result is what is called *necessary* ; and, second, it is *without exception*.

This aspect of the meaning is, I think, what we call "universality" in its first mode. It is a return of the co-efficient of control from a foreign source, under which the general meaning becomes now *what it really is to be and remain*. It is not an added mark or character of content ; the content is exhausted in the general and particular meanings. It is the successor in direct line of descent to the aspect called before the issue hypothetical. That which was hypothetical was in so far open to varying possible modes of control ; that which has taken form as general meaning has nothing further hypothetical about it—it is *universal*. *It stands through all repetitions for what it is.*

The two moments distinguished above may be separately stated here, their detailed discussion, however, being reserved for the later treatment of the corresponding judgments in vol. ii. *in locis*.

28. (1) The universal is the *necessary* or irrevocable. This meaning arises in opposition to the earlier hypothetical meaning ; the necessary is opposed to the problematical and alternative. It is the establishment of one of alternative controls after the alternation has been erected and solved. The meaning "must" is an individuation of an object as being under a control that is related by exclusion to all others.

(2) The universal is a meaning which is final in the sense of *admitting no exceptions*. This aspect of meaning arises on the side of the content, which involves a *relationship of repetition*. In so far as the conditions of the meaning are fulfilled at all, they are by the terms of the construction so completely fulfilled by a single case that cases which issue differently are by that fact not particulars of the general meaning of which the universal in question is an aspect.²

¹ It remains to ask, in each particular case, what the foreign control consists in : whether physical, social or other. The discussion of the social factor is carried forwards in vol ii. chapter iii.

² It is evident, indeed, that irrevocableness and finality must attach to any individuation whose meaning is essentially a relationship of repetition or of successful conversion cognized as a repetition. For the only question is, "Does this case convert into the object of fact which I am supposing to be its meaning," and so repeat it ? Only so far as it does, can the general meaning arise, in which the particulars have the relation-

§ 6. INDIVIDUATION OF THE SINGULAR

29. It will be remembered that in discussing "Personal Individuation" above, we intimated that the recognition of a person as singular presented a problem that we were not then in a position to discuss with profit.¹ It recurs now in connexion with the larger question of the apprehension of the singular as such. How is the unity of a single object individuated?

So far as we have gone, it appears that the meaning called "unity" has passed through certain modes. The unity of simple apprehension is merely the wholeness of the object. As a psychic mode or meaning it would seem to be merely the form of the content as limited and set off from the "other" or rest of its cognitive background or penumbra. When felt difference springs up, through the plurality of competing or conflicting active interests or tendencies, then unity is rendered through the negative meaning of lack or privation. The cognition of the object fairly begins to issue in the meaning of unity when a dual construction succeeds the state of felt plurality. With it the cognition of difference, as we saw, also springs up. Then it is that an object cognized as unity takes on the special meanings of sameness, persistence, identity in difference (this latter only when the relation itself is abstracted and made object of thought). These meanings, however, do not yet render singularity as such. For we have seen that each such unit whole of cognition becomes a schema of meaning, bigger and of wider application than itself. Its prospective or instrumental value and meaning are not yet stripped from it by any procedure which serves to compel its limitation to *just the single object for its own sake and with its own content alone.*

30. The singular meaning comes only in the movement just

ship of repetition among themselves. Granted that it does—and that is what the general meaning *means*—one case is as good as a thousand, and makes the thousand unnecessary. For the thousand would only be further particulars and would add nothing to the meaning. It is, therefore, a vain wish and a false quest to seek to show how a general meaning can be universal in the sense of being necessarily and finally true within the range of its application. For the particular cases are such just by the relationship of repetition which organizes them in such a meaning.

¹ Chapter viii. § 9.

described by which the general succeeds the experimental or hypothetical meaning: a process by which the singular as such is shaken out of the matrix of still undetermined meanings in which it was earlier embedded. Until, that is, the inner relationships of the true general—the relationships of the many within the one—are developed in the way we have just described, the singular cannot be isolated as an independent meaning.

Singular individuation is, therefore, a form of special meaning—very special. *The meaning is not merely* “one,” in the sense of “this,” nor “this one” in the sense of “not that”; further *it is not* “this one” as typical or schematic or representative of these or those; it is more special than any of these characteristic meanings of the preceding modes. It is *this one determined as but one*. It has marks which determine it as itself alone and un-interchangeable with any other. “John Anderson, my jo, John,” is its formula. It is, it is true, man, the general meaning, but it is a single and unique man who is determined as John. So far as John is made the schema to determine “man,” he loses just that singular individuation, which the phrase “my jo, John” brings out. But so far, on the other hand, as he is one of those cases whose “particular” meaning illustrates the general “man,” he is one among many. The special interest in him as John is fulfilled only by refusing to stop with that meaning by which he is one of the class “man,” and also by refusing to erect the meaning into a schema for further generalization. Not only is John, “my jo, John,” unique among known men, but no other like him could be discovered among all men.

31. It is in the singular meanings as thus determined that the most refined special interests find their fulfilment.

The formula of attention already suggested on an earlier page¹ enables us to show this and also to illustrate further the relations of the instrumental to the true general. If the psycho-physical process of attention be indicated by Att , and the elements which are actually in play in the function of attention in this case or that, by variations of A , we may distinguish the following cases: $Att=A$ is the formula in the sense-mode, before distinctions arise in the line of developing individuations. The A is the grasping function

**Genetic
Formul
Attention.**

¹ A formula worked out in my *Ment. Devel.*, chap. x. § 3, xi. § 2.

of attention, ready to take in whatever comes along: a big vague habit or disposition with mouth open for devouring its undistinguished prey. So soon as the experimental and hypothetical or disjunctive modes of treating objects arise, we have $Att = A + a$. Here the elements (a, a'), brought into play in class recognitions and distinctions, have arisen and added themselves to the gross A elements which went before. Besides being simply attended to, objects are now recognized and made schemata for the experimental processes. Individual objects are, of course, taken in, but with such a wide hospitality of meaning that they are interchanged, mistaken *inter se*, treated as possibly this and possibly that. Finally, after these grosser determinations, as the attention becomes the vehicle of the cognition of difference, plurality, relation, etc., the recognition of unity as singularity springs up. Then the attention formula is $Att = A + a + a$, the refined elements (a, a') being added to the mass of process which before classified but did not genuinely relate. Each singular object is now unique and uninterchangeable, although also still held in the larger whole which gives to all the particulars taken together their general meaning.

Under this conception, we may plainly see the genetic difference between the instrumental or experimental schema, and the true general. The elements a, a' , etc., giving is now read in
Retrospect. mere classification and schematic meaning, are in the one case not yet defined by the individuation of singulars a, a' , etc. The formula is prospective in the sense of actually developing from A to $A + a$ and then to $A + a + a$. The singular as a meaning over against the general is not born before the time is ripe for such a meaning; until then the a is still hypothetical. So soon, however, as the formula is complete, so soon as, by the actual determination of the relationships which justify the particular meanings as such, the general arises, then in the class a singulars are also constituted. Before that it was a whole of habit, a form of control, a selected meaning; now it is a class of individuals, a context of related things, a meaning filled with particular facts. The formula is now retrospective in the sense that it is *read backwards, in the light of its last term, the a* . The singular things it is which *fill the classes and stimulate the continued interest of the whole process*.

32. The question is still to be asked, however, just what aspect it is of the particular object which constitutes its meaning *singular*. The answer is, *that element of its meaning which is*

made object of exclusive interest, purpose, or end. It is a selective interest in contrast to that which generalizes a content and makes it universal ; and the bit of recognitive meaning which is charged with such a selective interest may be any character capable of being so treated. This is illustrated in two contrasted cases.

(1) An object is singular in that respect in which it does not permit of generalization. In this case its singularity seems to reside in the resistance offered to the progress of a meaning which is selective in the sense of being hypothetically available. For example, the robin meaning would apply to this black bird but for the fact that it is black. So soon as we call it a black robin, its blackness constitutes it a singular, while in virtue of its other marks it is a "particular" meaning. In such a case the exclusive interest involved is that of the recognition of such isolated and ungeneralized characters. This form of the meaning we will have occasion later on to refer to as "essential singularity,"¹ seeing that the character that is its mark is essentially present in the recognized context. It was called "factual" in passing above (chap. viii. § 9).

(2) The meaning just described merges easily into another : that whereby the interest in the singular becomes not only exclusive but also *selective*. Any mark, character, or aspect of an entire meaning may be selected for treatment with reference to an exclusive, or rather in this case, a privative interest, purpose, or end. This is *a* robin ; it is also *my* robin. I make it a single robin by this my personal interest. And the ground of my interest may be any mark—colour, shape, habit—which marks it as belonging to this my present interest. This form we may call "imported singularity" in contrast with that named above "essential," seeing that the mark of singularity is now the imported meaning due to fulfilment of an interest. A case of it has been before us under the name "semblant" singularity.

Of course, this meaning arises early, in the lowest stages of selective or abstracting function ; it is not always nor most often a conscious interest or intelligent end. The great individuating movements whereby wholes of selection are developed as schematic meanings have as foil always this narrower selection and fixing of more private meanings. Yet in the early stages the distinction is not itself rendered psychic as a difference between sorts of meaning. The schematic has all the force of personal selection and interest ; and the meaning that is to become

¹ See vol. ii. chapter iii. sect. 20.

singular has the schematic force. It is only when the schematic has passed into the general and particular that the singular becomes for the subject a meaning of contrast, into which the private selection and purpose retires, and finds its reserved domain. The contrast may be seen in the actual rivalry of the two meanings when embodied in the same object; the validity of the general meaning is undisputed, but the singular case is reserved for special treatment.¹

The relation of these two aspects of singular meaning to each other is well brought out in the case of the individuation of persons as singular explained in an earlier connexion (chap. viii. § 9). The uniqueness of the mental life, whereby each is peculiarly, and by right, an individual, is made the mark of generalization for minds as a class; yet it is the same psychic qualities of the individual, considered *as unique* and not capable of duplication, that constitute the personal meaning to the friend or lover to whom the one person is of all things the most singular.

§ 7. THE ONE AND THE MANY

33. In what has now been said, we have justification for finding the meanings general and singular in the substantive **One and Many** mode. These meanings involve *cognition of relation*, and it is by the progression into the substantive mode **a distinction in Substantive Mode**, that this is first achieved. The full operation of the function of individuation as general is realized, I think, first for the objects body and mind. There are interesting variations, however, in the development of the two terms of this dualism, as has already been remarked above, where the movement on the part of the mind term is briefly sketched.

On the side of the mind, as we saw, the movement is toward the passing of the subjective factor into the subject-self, over against the organized material of both the general and a **Movement on Side of Inner** self as object and the body. The object-self is the self common to the several individuals which constitute the class of objects called minds; such a self is commonly and quite properly called the "empirical self"; it is also the "experimental self." It is an identical self-content developed by the method of experimentation with the self-schema:

¹ In another place I have illustrated this by drawing a contrast between the "thing of fact" and the "thing of desire" (*Social and Eth. Interpretations*, sect. 243). We sing, for example, the praises of the American public schools for the children of the land, and then send *our* children to private schools!

the self of habit confronting social experience, ready for new acts of accommodation. Through such new acts it takes on constantly new general forms, over against the particular individuals which in turn illustrate and realize it. This movement has its special features by reason of the character of individual persons as singular. We may recall certain of these features.

Object-Self
General and
also Singular.

(1) First, we have seen that inner persistence is peculiar, as involving a content subject to continuous inner control. As over against the nucleus of the control-self now going on to be subject, this content constitutes the objective or empirical self, capable of generalization in a class of selves.

Résumé :
(1) Inner
Persistence.

(2) Second, we found that there is great difficulty in the achievement of the actual separation of mind and body. It is achieved as a dualism of control-modes, represented in the two sorts of material both now treated as persisting. We have then two substantial classes each individuated as general, "the one," and each comprising its peculiar individuations both particular and singular within the class, "the many."

(3) Third, another important aspect of variation arises in the contrast of the two cases of individuation—mind and body—as singular. On the side of mind its root appears to be the tendency to the psychic sembling of content, which is not explicitly under external control.¹ Of course the body-substance, just by its determination as exclusively under external control, escapes this tendency; with the result that the particular case, this body, once individuated as a member of the class of bodies, must have its singular meaning also under that control. It is singular either because it resists generalization or because it is chosen to embody a selective and privative interest, or for both reasons.

34. The singular on the side of mind, however, is in the subjective control mode. It is subject to the mode of determination which the sembling function produces. The self—even the most fully-understood and empirical self, such as the three-year-old's self as I look upon it—is an ejective self: a self that is distinguished from things in that it has by subjective right its own centre of interest, action, and control. If this be true, such an object cannot be read as once for all

Self is
Universal.

¹ Chapter viii. § 9, on "Personal Individuation."

individuated as a singular recognized for what it is. For its being what it is includes the character of becoming what it now is not. Instead of the meaning "this thing is recognized as what it is," as of the singular body, we find in the case of mind the meaning, "each person is acknowledged to be what at present he is and is to become."

This difference, which shows its rudiments here, becomes later on of capital importance, and that in two ways :—

35. (1) The later problem of abstraction by which the two classes form modes of the one abstract thought of reality is set in a peculiar way by reason of this diversity of meanings. How can one reality comprise such different singulars? In the history of philosophy, notably in Descartes, substance remains riven in twain, each term of the dualism abstracted from its own body of contents; and on the other hand, notably in turn in Spinoza, it fails to find any content of individuation at all, but reaches a certain formal solution. Of course the problem is just that of the ontological interest which the philosophical impulse embodies and aims to fulfil; but it is interesting to see that it is already taking shape in our early genetic meanings. And so much of an intimation of alternatives may be legitimate here as that conveyed by the formulation of the problem in genetic terms somewhat as follows. Is the dualism reached by the substantive progression outgrown in a later mode of objective construction; and if not, is it, rather than any earlier mode of construction, our most fulfilling reading of all our objects? One of these forms of inquiry anticipates the later functional development of the psychic into still higher modes; the other examines the respective claims of the several modes to be final for the determination of objects that satisfy and fulfil. The matter is given further statement in the exposition of the subject-object progression, which issues in Reflection. But certain distinctions should be made at this point.

36. (a) First, it may be pointed out that the difficulty in reaching a monism of meaning (the one comprising the many) arises in the construction not of *particulars*, but of *singulars*. Particulars are meanings which embody and illustrate the general. There is but one motive to individuation at work in particular and general. If it were only a question of the relation to each other of two or more general meanings each with its related particulars, then the rationalistic method of solving the dualism by a further process of abstraction might result in a valid speculative

solution so far as this one difficulty is concerned. But the stubborn opposition, on the contrary, for the theory of ultimate meaning, is that between general and *singular*; the singular being a meaning in which the motive to generalization is resisted and essentially opposed.¹ This creates a dualism of meanings which no development which merely emphasizes one at the expense of the other can ever successfully overcome.

(b) Second, it may be pointed out that the terms, mind and body, as general meanings, are correlative terms in a dualism which we may call a *contrast meaning*. We have seen that these two terms have not had the same history. Certain important elements of their respective meanings are not homologous, even when, as in what we call persistence, they have the same name. Further, their genetic progressions have not been marked by just the same stages. Nevertheless, the meanings, when the opposition of mind and body is fully developed in the substantive dualism, is one of *separation from each other*, exclusion as between two terms whose whole or dual meaning is requisite to the meaning of either. The consciousness that has the meaning body, must also have the meaning mind, because either is possible only when the relation mind-body is individuated as a contrast meaning.²

§ 8. IDEAL MEANING : IDEALIZATION

37. (2) The closer consideration of the singular individual on the side of mind, leads us to detect a motive to further meaning which is now first clearly emerging. It is that in which the meaning takes on explicitly the form of a progressive but unfinished organization. The character of self-determination or control, motivated by a prospective and yet undetermined issue, is so marked that it may be expected to colour all successive meanings of the psychic individual; this it does, imparting to the self-thought at every stage of its growth a shading of meaning which we call the ideal. We say quite properly of some of our objects that they have an ideal character, as well as a real character : *they are individuated as*

¹ This opposition is reverted to in later connexions, as in vol. ii. chap. iii. sect. 22, and discussed in the volume on *Real Logic*.

² A detailed interpretation of this meaning with reference to theories of the relation of "Mind and Body" is to be found in an article of that title in *The Psychological Review* for May, 1903 (see also vol. iii. of this work, *in loc.*).

going to be something as well as being something ; and this is notably true of persons. We are now in a position to give this meaning its first genetic interpretation.

38. In the treatment of personal individuation in chapter viii. § 9, it was pointed out that the personal is, in the thought of any one, a single content which is common and thus general; a content having the marked peculiarity, however—and in this it is different from all content which is not personal—that one of the aspects of its generality is also that which constitutes each person essentially singular. This aspect is, of course, that of the control under which each individual is thought of as determining his own psychic life. Persons never give up their private inner control even when viewed as objective and external. We may now see the further bearings of this in two genetic movements, both of them important.

One of these aspects is that spoken of as ideal, and the other is that which is described above and interpreted later on under the heading of “common” meaning. Both of these present problems reaching beyond the modes of objective construction hitherto described as pre-logical and substantive. Indeed these distinctions are of quite enough importance, in view of the genetic movements which they illustrate, to justify our drawing them up in more formal terms.

39. If we take the mode of consciousness in which both personal and impersonal objects are clearly individuated as singular, we may distinguish the following meanings attaching to them :—

(1) The single thing and the single person, as apprehended by the single perceiver. This meaning we have now traced in the development of the many and the one : the *General-Singular Meaning*. It is the form that “private” meaning takes on in the substantive and “general” modes. The question is taken up later on in what sense it is private (vol. ii. chap. iii. sects. 22 ff.).

(2) The single thing or person individuated as not merely a thing or a thing-self, but as *an object seemed or charged with further unfulfilled meaning : the Ideal Meaning*.

(3) The meanings of things and persons as meant in common by some or all persons : *Common Meanings*.

It is the second of these modes of individual meaning in its first genetic form to which we are now to give our attention.

40. The meaning called ideal has been analysed in various

The
Development
of Inner
Characters

issues in two
Meanings,
Ideal and
Common.

Modes of
Singular
Meaning

recent publications in connexion with the theory of value or

(1) **The Ideal** worth, notably in discussions of ethics and aesthetics,¹
not a Special and the ideal mode of consciousness described in
Content, but
a Meaning; some detail. As characteristic meaning, an "ideal"

we may say—by very general agreement—is not a special content, but a special meaning which may be attached to a content.

(2) **not a** Furthermore, it is a development of meaning not
Recognitive exhausted, although always furthered, by the elabora-
but a Selec- tion of relations and establishment of context due
tive Meaning. to selective treatment. If we ask what it is that is added to a plain statement of fact, or to the determination of an object as "general" or "singular," whereby it has "ideal" meaning, we are then in a fair way to identify the mode.

One of the added things that constitute a meaning ideal is, as was intimated above, that wherein the individuation does
By Exclusion not reduce the object entirely to an objective context.
it seems a
Phase of Per- This is true of all personal individuation, and it is
sonal Control. true just because the person is thought of as being under subjective control.

Now, in the substantive mode, this is the only factor which is genetically determining, besides those already taken up in general and singular meanings as such. We would seem, therefore, to be shut up to the view that this aspect of meaning may be a phase of the inner control mode characteristic of persons.

This we may put down as our first result. When made applicable to other stages of development as well it may be formulated thus: *persons as such always have ideal as well as general and singular meaning.*

41. If we go a step farther in this direction, and ask about the distinguishable cases of such personal control as already made out, we have the following :—

Cases of Selec- (1) The construction of the empirical self, through
tive Control all its genetic modes is attended by ideal meaning.
of Objects.

(2) The sembling of objects generally, in the semblant mode, whereby they, so treated, take on the semblance of self-determined and inner-controlled objects, is attended by ideal meaning.

¹ A recent important book is Ehrenfel's *Werttheorie*. An attempt to characterize the ideal consciousness as such is made in the writer's *Handbook of Psychology* (Feeling and Will, chap. ix.), to which the reader may turn for fuller statement of the characters which the present text treats only very selectively.

(3) The meanings of other selves, as also having their own inner control, have the ideal character.

42. These three cases, thus drawn out in formal order, have already had careful treatment. The self and the other selves have, as we saw, a peculiar sort of singularity—even when made members of a general class—arising from the fact that the content of self is always one, and is in its nature inner and autonomous. In the case of sembled objects, we found the tendency³ to read-in an inner life under certain conditions, as part of the selective and experimental moulding of the material.

Summing up these results, we may say that the ideal meaning resides (1) in the objects constructed out of certain materials—

Ideal Meaning these materials, that is, *not allowing any construction*
attaches *which does not have something of the ideal meaning—*
to certain *and (2) in the treatment of other materials in the*
Contents. *same way, that is, as if they also had the characters which normally*
take on this meaning. The first case is exhausted in the identification of personal content as that which has the ideal meaning by essential right. It is the second case, therefore, that now invites investigation.

If we distinguish the ideal meaning in the case of persons, or things sembled as persons, as “personal ideal meaning,” we have to ask whether there is “impersonal ideal meaning,” or meaning of the same type attaching to things cognized as purely objective or recognitive.

43. This question we are led to answer affirmatively when we analyse a little further the meaning itself. The ground on which, indeed, ideal meaning attaches to persons is not that they are not objectively controlled, but that they are under *progressive* organization and control. The personal meaning is always thus progressive; and as such its full meaning is also always in some degree ideal. So with things sembled as personal; they are taken up into a mode of progressive control. It is our further question, therefore, to ask whether there are other meanings, impersonal meanings, which, while remaining objective and recognitive, as impersonal contexts, nevertheless take on a form of progressive organization that gives them the ideal character.

44. We may recall here a fact already remarked upon, that all hypothetical or schematic meaning as such is prospective, and by its essential claim progressive. Its relation to sembled meaning is suggestive. As we said, the semblant treat-

ment of control passes over into the experimental ; the semblant, whereby the object is selectively charged with a meaning *not at all realized in fact*, passes into the schematic, wherein the selective meaning is *not yet realized in fact*. In the latter, the chosen meaning is held to have possible real fulfilment. The element of progressive organization supplied by arbitrary selection, in semblance, is superseded by the "appropriate" or "fit" character attaching to the hypothesis. The expectation of real fulfilment is motivated by this sense of the "fitness" of the proposed schema to further realize the organization already going on in the context so used. The intent that it *is to be so furthered and realized* is just the ideal aspect of the meaning of the context held to be "fit." In the statement "this is a horse," the meaning is general. The reference is retrospective and the control established. But in the statement "this is the better horse," or "this horse might be better," the shading of fitness-meaning with reference to a progressive organization of the same sort toward the "best" or "ideal" horse is imported into the entire meaning. The schema "horse" is treated prospectively and hypothetically with reference to contents progressively "better" and more "fit."

Furthermore, the method of experimentation as such assumes the progressive organization to which it is instrumental. A hypothesis is put forward to solve a problem ; the ideal is the problem solved. But so far as the proposed solution is still hypothetical, the ideal is a prospective and unrealized meaning. It is rooted in the earlier meaning for which it suggests the completion. Such considerations lead us to the second point : that *there is impersonal ideal meaning, and that it is always of the schematic and experimental sort.*¹

45. By these preliminary distinctions we have now so narrowed the ideal mode by exclusion, that its positive characterization follows almost of itself. It is characteristic of the organization of psychic stuff as such, to be progressive and selective ; to have intentional meanings no less than accomplished meanings ; to aim at something no less than to recognize something ; and these are the characters of the sort of meaning we call ideal. It is progressively embodied,

¹ We have here another of the proofs which spring up at every turn, that the schematic or instrumental meaning is different from the general. The general is a finished, retrospective, relational meaning, from which in its very conception, ideal reference is excluded.

but never completed, in the meaning already fulfilled. It selects and intends a fuller realization than that already accomplished. It sets up ends for attainment which are definite only so far as they embody insight beyond the present fact.

46. No sooner, however, do we put these aspects of the ideal clearly before us than we become aware that we are explicitly recognizing meanings which have come before us already as attached to personal and experimental objects. The relationships of the two cases are of peculiar interest. The material of self and other-self, in the first place, and the material of things in general, so far as it is taken up by the process of sembling, is normally the vehicle of just this sort of meaning: meaning to which each of the three characterizations made above applies, when we throw the mode into the form of a genetic progression. All such material (1) fulfils the objective construction demanded by certain co-efficients and is thus really objective; but (2) its distinction from the actual external things is that the meaning is not finally generalized and disposed of under this organization. On the contrary it is the vehicle of the continuous inner impulses and interests which constitute inner control. Again (3) these selective and abstracting interests are instrumental in the reduction of the novel, the attainment of the real, the advancement of knowledge.

Later on, when its methods of manipulation become more refined, when the means may be chosen for distant ends, when the subject-self attains its competence over against the object-self that it estimates and judges—when we pass, that is, into the modes of reflective *sembling and the aesthetic treatment of objects*, a system of ideal meanings is set up—meanings which issue in our highest rules of *self-legislation and subjective control*. This is the personal side. But the development of content had its ideal also. It is one not of subjective but of external control; not of values for self but of facts for knowledge. The ideal extension of content takes place in an enlarged context of particulars and relationships. These are recognitive and general; not personal and selective. In other words, the personal ideal meaning is one of “fitness” of self and its control; that of impersonal ideal meaning is one of comprehensiveness and completeness of the context of knowledge. Yet it is by the method of selective experimentation that this ideal also is advanced (cf. the *Introduction to Experimental Logic*, in vol. ii. chap i.).

when
Semblant or
Hypothetical

Dualism of
Ideal Meanings

The later problem of ideal meaning, therefore, is one of the reconciliation of the terms of the dualism of personal and impersonal meaning. The substantive progression issues in a dualism in this aspect of the mode no less than in those aspects wherein its meanings are general and singular.

47. All this is at its beginning here; it is a *vague, hazy intention*, not a clear meaning; but this is and remains to the last essential to its force. The meanings actually embodied are lacking in the respect that they are not realized. There is the sense of tendency, of possible furthering and progress, of more adequate being. The meaning comes out of the organization actually achieved, for it is a movement of a function of continuously renewed cognition; and it is the prophecy of its continuance. In the schema, the intent is brought to the test of actual meaning in the system of things, but no sooner so, than the result, the fact emerging, *is again taken up and charged with a new ideal meaning*.¹

48. Thus considered, ideal meaning is simply a reflection of the selective and prospective character of psychic process. What may be called the idealism of the construction of the schema, is the continuous movement of the mode of individuation which develops general and singular meanings in the world of fact and truth. On the other hand, the selective and "intending" consciousness surges over the bounds so set up and justifies itself in the sembling, testing, and feeling-in of its own control and hypotheses. This double idealization of psychic meaning alone fully represents the entire genetic movement.

§ 9. EXISTENCE, A MEANING

49. It is in the substantive mode, that the apprehension of things as "existing" comes about, and we are now able from our net conclusions to point out what this means. Assuming the psychic construction as developed in the great dualism of mind and body, we may ask what it

**A Meaning
of the Sub-
stantive
Mode.**

¹ The development of the ideal meaning as taking form in ethical values is one of the main topics of the work *Social and Ethical Interpretations*: it may be called the ethical mode as embodying the development of the ideal self. Later on in this work the aesthetic mode is discussed as the higher form of semblant consciousness in which the synthesis of control modes issues in a system of meanings free from the dualism of ideals pointed out in the text.

means to say that either an external thing or a person, an object in either mode of objective presentation, "exists."

50. Before the rise of the dualism of inner and outer, in that germinal form of it which consists of mere privation or lack of an expected co-efficient, existence cannot be a special meaning at all; for the simple presence of an object, as this or that, is all there is. There is no room for special meanings. I think the term "subsistence"¹ is an adequate one to indicate that complicated "make-up" or mere objectivity of the cognized object out of which the later existence values and distinctions are afterwards to be shaken. It is likely, indeed, that there are no absolutely meaningless presences, no mere "subsistences"; that certain shadings of variation in the setting and inner complications of objects are always present, and this points to the contrast-meanings and dualisms that are to come. This appears positively at any rate in the experience of failure, lack, and disappointment with reference to certain objects. A child, for example, if Disturbed, who had never met with an empty bottle would not have, until it had experienced the actual case, the meaning that milk comes to mean when detached from the bottle context. It is accordingly largely by its removal that the meaning of something that constitutes present and full and characteristic presence comes to consciousness.

It is the experience just cited, indeed, as we have seen above, that precipitates the entire movement issuing in the distinction of inner and outer. But when the dualism of this distinction has once come, the characteristic marks of the members of it on one side and the other fall together as what we have called the co-efficients of the outer and the inner. It is these co-efficients which now guarantee *presence of one or the other sort*. The externally present is reached through representing, convertible contexts. It is the persisting sense-object to which these co-efficients have reference. The inner, on the other hand, lacks these co-efficients, and goes on to acquire those positive marks which constitute the co-efficients of a different and subjective sphere.

51. It is hard to see how any meaning characteristic of existence can emerge before the rise of the experimental consciousness, with its hypothetical attribution of this co-efficient or that. Given a determination working itself out, it

**Experimental
Meaning**

¹ As already suggested. See the footnote to section 52 below.

issues in "this-presence," or some other "this-presence." In the case of absence, followed by presence, there is what on another page¹ is called "reality-feeling" following upon "unreality-feeling"; the same content may have either feeling with reference to the sort of co-efficient normally found with it. And this may give those phases of meaning, already pointed out in the consideration of negative meaning, "this and not other," "this and not that." But the meaning is at most, "present object," "absent object," "inner object," "outer object,"—always a positive content, present or absent.

It is through the negative, I think, that this merges into what may properly be called existence meaning. In a positive construction, the presence value is part of the total meaning of the object. When the co-efficient fails of fulfilment, there is the beginning of the impairment of meaning that comes to stand for non-existence. *issues in Existence Meaning through Un-reality Feeling.*

Unreality feeling means a loss of positive meaning, though it is itself a new shading of positive meaning. In it arises the genetic impulse to further determination, which characterizes the problematical and experimental meaning as such. It is the child's disappointment with the bottle that undermines his "presence" meaning, and contrasts with it a sharp sense of unreality. It is this that motives his attitude of caution, doubt and experiment in coming up to the experience in the future.

52. Here, then, it is that existence takes on positive meaning. It is in the sense of alternative co-efficients of determination and *Existence a* control. In a consciousness of rival determinations, *ment of Alternatives*, the meaning of presence is detached from the simple make-up of the content. The content is made up, it has its characters as so much positive stuff; but it remains to give it that further meaning which will put it *in this or that class of things, now not only presented but, by reason of their actual co-efficient, also existing.*

We have, therefore, to distinguish—as the first important distinction of meanings in this mode—the object as simply made-up or present as *subsisting*, from the object as determined in one or other of alternative spheres, as *existing*. Giving this meaning to "existence," we find it a later meaning than "subsistence." Subsistence is the character of an object having a certain composition as object of cognition; it subsists both before

¹ See vol ii. chap. ii. § 3.

and after the attribution to it of a definite co-efficient of existence. The existence signs are just the recognition signs of one sort of control rather than another.¹

The existence meaning, it is now fairly clear, arises in the further modal determination of presence as involving differences in the matter of make-up or subsistence. If we consider subsistence just the differential mark in objects whereby they are ready to take on the characters meaning existence, then the actually different meanings established by the treatment accorded to objects in the experimental mode, are those of different existences.

It will be well, however, in view of certain difficult questions that arise in the logical mode, to point out what, in this first determination of it, the existence meaning is not.

53. (1) Existence is not itself a content or context, not a new element of objective material of any kind added to or taken away from a thing presented. It is rather an intent, an aspect of a content already made-up, whereby it is recognized as fulfilling a certain sort of expectation or demand made upon it.

Of course, the meaning is a function of this or that content; only this or that sort of existence could belong to this or that object. But we shall find that the mind, once its abstracting processes have gone far enough, is able to make the existence meaning itself an object of thought, and to shift and remove and re-apply existence in many useful ways. In the logical mode it becomes a predicate, a term of ideal or thought content,² and a further presupposition of the meaning springs up in what is called "reality" (spoken of below, § 10 of this chapter).

¹ The term subsistence has this meaning in current usage, as when we ask what a thing "subsists in," what sort of "subsistence it has." The term thus used is equivalent of the German *Bestand* or *Bestehen* (cf. the usage of Meinong in his *Ueber Annahmen*, and *Gegenstandstheorie*, and the rendering of his term *Bestehen* by "Subsistence" by Russell in *Mind*, N.S., 50 and 51, 1904). The distinction places existence genetically midway between "simple presentation" and "judgment" (in the sense of Brentano, recognized later on). A judgment refers some "existing" term to a sphere of "reality" (see the next paragraph). It is something like this, I think, that Meinong means in arguing that *Annahmen*, as "Assumption" or "Hypothesis-making," is a midway function between Presentation (*Vorstellen*) and Judgment (*Urtheilen*), a matter again reverted to in the chapters on Judgment.

² See the distinction between the two sorts of "content" in chapter xi. sect. 2.

54. (2) Existence is in fact a meaning motivated by the recognition of the forms of control characteristic of the objects *as in their proper genetic place*. When consciousness reads the meaning of external existence into an object, the meaning is simply the foreign control under which this object subsists. If, however, the same content is made up—subsists—in a way that escapes external control, it no longer externally exists; it goes over to the mode of existence of those inner objects which exist as objects of the inner life at that stage. But in neither the one sphere nor the other can existence mean more than the objective reading of their dualism justifies. Existence is then not a final nor a static meaning.

55. (3) Existence is not the same as reality, except so far as we find it is at any stage of knowledge all that what we call reality is able at that stage to mean. The question is the subject of detailed treatment later on. Here it is in place to indicate the distinction of existence from reality, and illustrate it by a further positive characterization of the two existence-meanings of the substantive mode.

Reality as a meaning is inclusive of existence, but it is not in all cases exhausted by it. This appears in the striking cases in which existence is applied in varying ways within the same determination of reality. As consciousness develops there arise distinctions, for example, between semblant objects and other inner objects, such as those of fancy, those of memory, etc. We say that these have different existences, alternative existences, and possibly dual or triple existences. A semblant object may be at once an inner object, a memory object, and an outer object; these meanings of existence are there together. Existence, therefore, as a meaning attributed to an objective context, is in an evident way variably interpreted.

56. This appears notably in the mode of judgment, in which new spheres of existence arise from the explicit mode of treating all objects as ideas or parts of personal experience. Such an object is judged to have physical existence, external non-physical existence, existence in fiction or literature, existence in tradition, rumour, or hearsay, mere psychic or subjective existence, humorous existence, etc. There is existence *and* existence.

Reality is not so. It is a meaning of a more exclusive and invariable sort. The real is an existence; but existences are

not all realities. How this can be, and just what reality means, it is our business to inquire later on. And it is only an anticipation of a later result to say that such a distinction has not arisen yet in the meanings achieved by consciousness. In other words, what we are now entitled to is simply and only certain existences—certain classes of control-spheres into which objects fall.¹

§ 10. THE TWO EXISTENCES

57. These classes, by reason of the dualism of substance—attained in the contrast of mind and body as *separated* from

¹ Mr. Bradley's view of existence would seem, when stated in genetic terms, to have elements in common with that of my text. To him existence is "given only in presentation," but "existence goes beyond the now and extends into the past." (*Appearance and Reality*, 2nd edition, p. 73). This would locate existence at a stage that gets its content from presentation but its treatment or control in an image mode. Indeed, in this connexion Mr. Bradley suggests the problem of "sameness" as a meaning holding the presented and the imaged experiences together—the problem found essential in our own discussion and solved by the theory of "remote" and "recurrent" sameness as embodying the "persistence" of the existing object. When Mr. Bradley goes on to say that such a "sameness" meaning is "a relation connecting the past with the present," and that "if so, the thing has become a relation of passages in its own history," I can agree only after the explicit recognition of the change of point of view from the simple existence mode to that of the mode of reflection in which alone such a "history" is reconstructed and the "relations" made objects of thought. Mr. Bradley's illustration of the object pronounced the same after transformations that have removed all the original material, does indeed show the presence of relationship in the meaning of the "thing," but it is "cognized relationship" as a mark of a whole-object in a pre-logical mode, rather than the dual "relation" of the logical. Indeed it is in the latter only that there is introduced the question whether it is "really" the same. The "sameness" or continued existence of the thing is not yet the judgment of identity that it may pass into. It involves the presence-after-absence or "recurrent sameness" of the whole object with the relationships (*Gestaltqualität*) of its organization under a given interest or purpose. This is the qualitative mark that Mr. Bradley's account makes so variable as to serve as a screen for the "disappearance of reality" (*loc. cit.*, p. 74—"things have so far turned out to be merely appearances"). This mark of existence, so far from obscuring reality, *is* reality in the formation period before the full reality-meaning is precipitated. Dualism of reality and appearance is not here possible. Appearance, in any sense that contrasts it with Reality, belongs to that which is merely inner and fugitive, over against the different sorts of existence (see vol. ii. chap. iii. § 4, on "Un-reality Judgments").

each other—are at first only two ; and all objective constructions are in one or the other of these two. Those **Only Two Substantive Existences.** that show outer persistence, independence of the knower, and lack of the inner initiative characteristic of mind, are external existences ; they illustrate one of the two substantive existence-meanings. The other comprises those that have, on the contrary, the subjective set of marks ; these are minds. These are the two spheres of existence.

58. Assuming that whatever reality may later on come to mean, it is not now a meaning, the existence-marks exhaust the spheres of substantive meanings. This state of things issues at once, as we shall see in the next chapter, to certain perplexities and embarrassments for the solution of which the mode of judgment or reflection is achieved. **This Leads to a fruitful Embarrassment,** The progression into this mode brings the *breaking up of the existence meaning into reality and existence meanings.* by which Existence passes on to Reality. The substances become fewer than the existences ; the realities are logical meanings or presuppositions behind existence. All of which means that the two existences, mind and body, are as yet, in the substantive mode, unfinished meanings, needing to be taken up for revision by the individuations of the logical mode.¹

§ II. COMPLICATIONS OF EXISTENCE MEANING.

59. In each of the two existences thus determined there are forming certain distinctions. If we define the external as that

¹ The distinction between existence and reality indicated here is, I think, about what on the surface our general usage indicates. We say, "That exists in your mind, but it is not real" ; or, "That is real, for it exists outside of your mind." Before such a distinction arises, or when it is not intended, existence and reality mean much the same thing. The phrase, "real kinds" in logic, for example, means "substantive kinds," or the existences of the substantive mode.

The movement remarked above, whereby existence becomes many while realities are few, represents, in fact, a fundamental divergence of motive. The manyness of existence arises from its more superficial character as a meaning of mere recognition of control spheres ; it looks backwards upon the modes of objective construction and recognizes the classifications of which they admit. So sense objects, memory objects, play objects, etc., each determined under its characteristic contrast, have existence each in its own mode. Reality, on the other hand, is more abstract. It is mastered by the profounder impulse to reduce classes and generalize meanings. It requires the individuation of objects of different classes together as meaning an underlying and all-fulfilling unity.

sphere which is not inner, it is evident that there may be control spheres alike as not inner, but different in respect

Distinctions forming in the Outer

with the inner. We have found two great spheres of

conversion whereby external control is established, which, however, differ in respect to their own control mode. The "physical" is the sphere of primary control; it comprises sense objects of the bodily sort. The "personal" is the sphere of secondary

between the Physical and the Personal.

control; it comprises personal objects. Each of these is external. As not inner to the knower each is under foreign control. But while thus in the common sphere

of external existence only the former, the physical, falls within the substantive class of bodies. While the processes of conversion, therefore, establish foreign or external control, and such a control sphere is primarily physical, a further movement is necessary whereby the external becomes wider than the physical, and body is no longer the one external existence. This movement is facilitated by the recognition of the other person's context as itself inwardly controlled, and as, therefore, falling within the second of the two existence spheres, that of mind.

Alter Content is passed over to Inner Existence.

There is, of necessity, therefore, the growth of the meaning "other person," alter, or social fellow, who is an inner existence or mind at the same time that his inner context, serving to mediate the knower's external control, also serves to establish him as to that knower an external thing.

The externality is read as separate existence, while the inner control in common is read as common particular meaning in the class mind. This we have seen taking form in early stages of the individuation of persons. It now issues in the meaning of separate personal minds having *common contexts of*

Giving separate Personal Minds.

*thought or a world of common objects.*¹ The peculiar mark of the meaning is the mutual externality of these minds *inter se*. For each mind an environment

of social control processes is established additional to the environment of physical bodies.

60. On the side of the other existence, mind, a divergence of meanings also begins to appear. Looked at negatively, the control of mind is inner over against what is external; but, looked at positively, certain different modes of process may share this common opposition to the

Distinction also arising in Mind Existence.

¹ This commonness of the objects is analysed further in chapter iii. §§ 5 ff. of vol. ii.

external. The material of the inner, indeed, by a necessary movement whose motive, we have already seen, falls into two masses, which we may now explicitly describe.

The give and take processes of secondary conversion also establish a distinction between what is converted or convertible and what is not. The separate person of the preceding section, the alter, has, like myself, his own ego ; he has both convertible and inconvertible images. The inconvertible are his alone as mine are mine alone. As inconvertible they are not common but private. There are therefore, in the one common sphere of existence, the inner life, items that do not become integrated into the context of common meaning. They are the fugitive, temporary images of fancy.

All the rest of the inner content, being convertible, is in a common and stable context.

The contrast of meanings becomes then in this existence sphere, one between meanings *that are inner only, the fugitive*, and meanings that are *both inner and outer*, that is inner as psychic events, outer as meanings convertible in a sphere of outer control, either physical or social. All such content of whatever grade which has been integrated in a context or system of meanings, as over against the mere fugitive, may be called "funded content."¹ Memories are both inner and also mean the outer ; dreams are inner only, they do not mean the outer.

61. Put in this way this distinction in the inner suggests in its terms a form of statement of the distinction made out above in the matter of the outer sphere of existence. The persons of the outer sphere are not only outer, but also inner meanings ; but the physical things are only and entirely outer ; so there are the two classes of external existence described as *outer which is also inner*, and *outer which is merely outer*. This parallels the distinction within the inner between inner which is also outer and inner which is only inner and not outer.

62. What our result sets before us, therefore, may now be shown in the following table :

¹ A term borrowed from the German (*fundierte Inhalt*), used by the Austrian psychologists. "Funded" means set, organized, fixed in a convertible and usable context or system.

Existence Meaning. Sphere.		Control.	Content.
I. Body . . .	Outer	{ Direct Primary Conversion }	Physical Things
II. Body-Context	{ Outer meaning Mind }	{ Direct Primary Conversion }	Others' Minds
		{ Secondary " "	
III. Mind Context	{ Inner meaning Body }	{ Direct Secondary Conversion }	Knowledge as Funded
		{ Primary Conversion None }	Contents Fugitive
IV. Mind ²	Inner	{ Tertiary Conversion Subjective }	Images Funded Self

It may be seen by an inspection of the table which meanings are clear and unambiguous and which are not. The meanings attaching to "Others' Minds" and to "Knowledge" are in a marked degree at a formative stage, having alternative readings. In the next chapter it will be shown that it is in the embarrassments arising from these ambiguous meanings that the motives arise to the achievement of the mode of reflection in which the inner as subject-mind becomes the control of the funded contents of both spheres.

§ 12. THE DUALISM OF INNER STRUGGLE

The position of certain writers should be recalled here who suggest that the dualism of self and not-self is not a development of that between inner and outer, but is a direct dualism between the agent or self and certain of its own compelling or resisting inner experiences, such as pain. Pain, we are told, resists and is set over against the subject-agent that struggles against it. There is here, therefore, a sufficient diremption within the inner life to account for the subject-object dualism.

It would seem that pain, even physical pain, belongs to the inner life. It is carried about with one, it is not objectified in a cognitive scheme, it has as such no conversion co-efficient. Yet as recurring with recurrence of its cause, and as being reinstated with the object when the latter is reinstated, its position is ambiguous. Still with the rise of subjectivity, I think, the individual, say a child, does distinguish the object itself from the pain it causes him, and interpret the latter as being peculiarly his own inner experience. Moreover, its persistence is of the inner continuous type. So we may agree that pain is, all the way through, a mark of subjectivity or inner existence.

Certain
Existence
Meanings
are
Ambiguous
and motive
Reflection.

Struggle
against
Pain is

in Inner,

The question would then arise as to the sort of dualism its resistance and stubbornness create ?

Such a dualism as that present in the struggle against pain, we may reply, is a dualism of an immediate character, akin, indeed, to the sense experience of effort against resistance ; but it does not develop, as the latter does, into the mediate forms that the cognitive dualisms, inner-outer, mind-body, etc., take on. If this be true so far forth there would attach to the experience no relational meaning ; it would remain simply the brute experience of division and struggle—the feeling, “ I am at war with myself.” The recognized privacy and incommunicableness of affective experiences, as such, mark them as being and remaining directly psychic and immediate. The experience of an oyster, when his shell is rent apart, would be of this type ; and but for other developing dualisms, of inner and outer, subject-control and foreign-control, knower and realities known, man’s experience would mean no more. The task of a theory of the sort in question would be to show that the experience under discussion lies genetically at the basis of the cognitive dualisms, instead of that of contrast in controls in the sense-mode to which we have ourselves assigned the rôle. Such a theory I find it impossible to work out. The difficulty is that of accounting for the “ external ” terms of the inner-outer dualisms—body, other persons, truths, realities, etc.—as developments from the type of otherness or resistance given in pains or other resisting contents which are fundamentally classified as inner and not outer.¹

Where the dualism of reflection arises, however, in the progress of the cognitive development of meanings, motivated by its earlier dualism of inner and outer controls, the context of experience as a whole is set up within the inner sphere as a term in dualism with the subject. Then the immediate felt dualism of self and not-self, as given in painful struggle, could take on *intelligible form and meaning* ; for the dualism of self and objects of experiences would absorb its terms. Pains may then be thought of as experiences, along with other experiences, and the dualism of reflection would be sharpened and made in a measure more immediate. The

¹ It is evident, however, that a subjectivist theory of knowledge, bent on minimizing the importance of the non-mental or outer control factor, would find in such a theory a certain attractiveness.

conclusion, therefore, is that experience of the type in question has neither meaning nor issue for knowledge except as its terms are taken up in the existence-classes established in the development of the two great control modes, inner and outer. Given the dualism of reflection, the struggling self is then the subject, and the pains and outer resistances fall together in the world of objects of thought.

Chapter XI

THE SUBJECT-OBJECT DUALISM: EXPERIENCE A PSYCHIC MODE

§ 1. EXPERIENCE AND CONTENT

1. We have already anticipated the progression in the distinction of inner and outer through those phases which antedate the clear meaning of subject-object as a relation.¹

Definitions: And in the earlier discussion certain rules of terminology were laid down for our later observance.
Experience and Idea.

It will be remembered that the term "experience" is to be confined to the relatively late mode in which the entire body of psychic objects are as such set up as content, whether the objects thought about be inner or outer in their cognitive reference. We also decided to call this the "subject mode," seeing that the inner or subjective retreats into the citadel of conscious agency and control over against the entire world of thought or experience.

I may now suggest, as intimated also in an earlier section in passing, that experience so made up constitutes, properly speaking, the "world of ideas." An idea is any object which is thought of as part of the experience of the subject. Any sort of object, when freed from its immediate external or internal reference, and treated as belonging in the first instance in the thought-system, thus having meaning for thought over and above its meaning for some sort of real existence, is an idea. For example, the table I write on is a sense object with external meaning, it is also an image object as representing a thing, but it becomes an idea, a part of experience, when I go beyond those meanings and treat the object as a content of thought *variously usable* in connexion with the body of my objects of all sorts.

2. Another word which needs clear definition at this point

¹ See chapter v. § 5.

is the term "content." It is a term which vibrates between two Content is (1) broad meanings. It is often made to mean—the Pre-logical, the Stuff of meaning employed in our earlier discussions—the Presentation, relatively stable and fixed presentative or other material that is given to consciousness with least modification in the way of imported or derived meaning. It is the given and recognizable and, so far as may be, the steady and unchanging stuff of sense and memory.¹ As such it is contrasted with the variable shadings of meaning and relationship in which it is rapidly enveloped and inwrought. For example, the content John is the visual object of that name, to which the various meanings brother, husband, father, merchant, capitalist, etc., come to attach. Yet John the visual content remains fairly steady and fixed. One of the determining conditions of content in this sense is that it be a common object, given in the same scheme or form to different minds, as opposed to those more private and special renderings of the content which make it a different meaning to each. Visually we see the same content, but may differ very widely as to what it is. A content thus understood is a first-hand, given, and relatively unmodified filling-up of the psychic field. And among such contents there are those of the cognitive sort called objects. This meaning is perhaps the most widespread.

But it shades imperceptibly into a second meaning, according to which a content is any object or meaning definite or (2) enough to have describable and recognizable characteristics. On this definition any objective construction is Logical, Idea as Object of Thought. by definition a content. This meaning, it is evident, subverts the distinction which the first-named definition emphasizes; yet it is seen to grow naturally out of the other so soon as we take the point of view of the mode of reflection. For all meanings are treated in this mode as fixed, definite, and common. As we are now about to discover, it is characteristic of reflection that all items of cognition, from whatever mode, as objects of knowledge, are rendered as ideas in a whole of experience. When this is done for a particular meaning, it becomes content of this mode, even though it is not content in the former meaning of the term, in the mode in which it originally took form. All ideas are contents of reflection: they are relatively fixed, recognizable, and communicable. This second meaning is, therefore, quite

¹ See above, chapter iii., sect. 4, note.

justified as a restatement of the earlier under the requirements of a later mode of conscious process.

It is therefore necessary to recognize and adopt both renderings of the term content, for they embody one and the same significance. But it is at the same time equally necessary to recognize that this is one of the cases in which the natural progression of meanings issues in a differentiation. It is indeed one of the cases in which spontaneous usage has anticipated a distinction which is justified by our present method of inquiry. The danger and embarrassment of it is that in our discussions we do not commonly recognize and allow for such progressions, which are embodied in different meanings of the same term.¹ I shall, therefore, always distinguish ideas or experience as *content of reflection or judgment*, or as *logical content*, as distinguished from the *simple or pre-logical content*, of our earlier discussions.

3. This detailed explanation is placed here, however, for a further reason. The use of this term may be made the text for a discourse. It is of the essence of the achievement of this mode in which the new dualism of reflection is present, that all objects and meanings, which before belonged in especially distinguished worlds or spheres or classes—being “inner” or “outer,” “extra-psycho” or “subjective,” “recognitive” or “selective”—which represent dualisms of essential significance in the development of the mental life as a whole, that all of these now become once for all *part of a life of experience or of ideas* which is now content of reflection. Everything thinkable or meanable, dreamable or semblable, real or unreal, now takes its place in the great system of thought-contents—everything except that one thing, the subject, which, by just the movement which makes the entire world of such contents possible, holds its own presence and act in the shadow of a final reserve. The development immediately following shows how this comes about : how the objects of all sorts fall into the content-system of experience, while the self, whose experience it is, controls and holds the ideas and meanings in their due place and relation.

¹ There are many instances of it ; indeed most of our distinctions of terminology are made necessary by just this state of things. Notable, for example, are the distinctions of meaning of the term “common” as applied to knowledge, given in chapter vii. §§ 5 ff., and of the term “experience,” as remarked upon just above ; and again of the terms “subjective” and “objective,” as pointed out in chapter v. § 5.

§ 2. OBJECTS OF THE MODE : IDEAS

The determination of objects as content of experience as such, has been briefly sketched. The following factors may now be isolated for more extended discussion.

4. (A) We found that the passage of consciousness from the treatment of objects as simply inner and outer, led to certain confusions or embarrassments in the attempt to interpret the individual's personal body. The solution, in its first stage, required the direct cutting of the body into two parts, a process which progresses through certain stages and culminates in the great dualism of body and mind, in the substantive mode. This, however, led, as we saw, to a further embarrassment; for the attempt to treat the private body as exclusively body and in no sense mind does not succeed. There is still the fact that it

is through the essential usability and utility of the muscular and other mechanisms of adaptation, manipulation, etc., in which the experience of effort and volition come to consciousness, that the substantive mind-member of the dualism exists as persistent and effective. This leads then to the carrying over of that aspect

of the body which is intimately and essentially an instrument of subjective agency, to the subjective or mind term, while as still a perceived and objective thing it remains body.

This difficulty appears also in my individuation of another's personal body. It is part of my meaning of inner processes, of images of all sorts, that they are carried with one, in some sense going with the physical presence of the person who has them. I have, therefore, to consider the physical body as also bearer of the mind; and my ejective procedure leads me to interpret another's body as instrument of his efforts and acts of agency as mine is to me. I cannot treat another's body simply as body, equivalent to "thing," for it means to me thing plus the characters of capriciousness, activity, etc., which are the essence of my meaning of mind.

5. An analogous embarrassment springs up also on the side of mind. Is it possible for consciousness consistently to maintain the meaning that mind is a separate substance, detached from body? In fact it cannot. It is only in the objective realm that such a distinction is

The Embarrassment of the Body Person.

Progression to Experience: Body-person is cut in two parts,

but remains ambiguous as instrument of Effort and Adjustment.

So Substantive Dualism arises.

Embarrassment with Another's Body.

Mind is Entangled with Body in Effort.

reached; it is a mode of individuation of contents. The subjectivity of the inner life as such, on the contrary, which is not an individuated content but a mode of control, is in all experience given only in the dispositional processes which have their locus in the private body. The experience of effort it is that brings meaning inward into the mind, as it is also that experience that carries inner meaning outward into the body.

There is need, therefore, of a final movement whereby all inner control meanings may be finally pooled in a single centre of agency and effort over against a similarly pooled body of contents controlled externally.

6. (B) The next step in cognitive development occurs by what may be called the subject-object progression. **Rise of the Subject-Mode.** It is the progression that issues in the rise of ideas, as thought contents, called in the whole of their organization, Experience.

In the rise of experience, considered as a body of objective ideas we have a new and fruitful mode of cognition. Its reason for being would seem to be just the overcoming of the latent embarrassments spoken of immediately above. **Rival Meanings require Adjustment.** Suppose in all cases of action the psychic process was thrown into the necessity of deciding whether its own personal body was a thing to be treated under the co-efficients of externally persisting existence, and exclusively this, or, on the other hand, as a mass of inner contents subject to the sort of manipulation and having the inner persistence belonging to the private life of effort and agency. It would never get along.

7. Furthermore, the difficulties are increased when we remember the modes of commonness which attach to the bodies

of persons. My body is not only a simple object to me, having all the modes of subsistence—in memory, fancy, semblance, etc.—that other real things have; **And also Meanings of "Commonness": (1) On side of Body, and** but it is also simple object to you, and is developed through the same objective modes. So to each of us our bodies have the aggregate meaning of being perceived by people in general, and also the con-aggregate meaning of being objects which each is aware to be thought as common in each and all of our knowledges. All of this on the side of that interpretation which treats the body as a thing of the external world. It is an object of common perception.

Again, the psychic meanings attaching to experience of the personal body are equally varied. It is to me "simply psychic"

The Subject-Object Dualism

as direct experience—say when I act under the strain of muscular effort—and also syndoxic, in that I mean by it something with which read ejectively your similar experience agrees. I am sure that you apprehend your inner control process of your own body as being a common meaning with mine.

Here, then, are two series of meanings attaching to the body as a common object, the series in which it is common from the objective point of view, and that from which it is common from the immediately psychic point of view. One of these comprises meanings characteristic of external objects, and the other comprises meanings equally characteristic of the inner life.

The embarrassment thus wrought out in detail is that anticipated at the end of the last chapter, where it was pointed out that the existence-meaning of body was ambiguous. There is a tract of meaning within which the personal body is *both outer and inner*.

The requirement, therefore, arises in a most compelling way for a mode of cognitive function in which all these meanings may be held together without discord.

8. This is accomplished when as a fact the *body becomes an idea: an object of thought as such, a relatively detached symbol whereby on occasion this or that meaning or interpretation may be given the exclusive place which the dominant interest or the germane context of the moment determines*. This point will be taken up again after the same inquiry has been opened up regarding the progression of that other term of the mind-body dualism, the inner or subject term.

9. It is evident that the requirement of the rise of the meaning of mind *in idea*—that is, the rise of meanings that are ideas of former “inner” objects—is not the same, and that its motives are not the same, as in the case of the corresponding progression of body which we have just traced. Yet although different, the progression has its adequate and necessary *raison d'être*. This is found, I think, in the further development of one of the factors just signalized as also involved in the interpretation of body.

In speaking of the individuation and recognition of personal objects in a certain place above, we pointed out that the self is a common content, the same whether it be determined as ego or as alter. Assuming this, it is evident that when the bifurcation of the person as a whole, into

(2) on side of
Mind

Two opposed
sorts of
Commonness,

Result: Body
becomes Idea.

So of Mind,
but Motives
to it are
Different.

As Content,
Inner is
Located in a
Body;

mind and body, takes place, the content mind remains externally determined ; it continues to be actually located in the particular body.

Yet we find also that it is not controlled by co-efficients of external or extra-psychic control ; but that the sense of agency together with various affective qualities, common in **but it is not under External Control.** so large a degree to both mind and body, serves as mark of the content now become subjective. We accordingly find a characteristic duality of claim, a relative embarrassment arising also in the interpretation of the inner, as was suggested above. It may be stated in these terms : the inner is at once a content, something objective, which has arisen by a series of differentiations from originally neutral presentations.

Control is Identified with Inner Aspect (Effort) in the Body. As such, it is amenable to the meanings attached to objective constructions. But the inner is also a control, a mode of organization, a something not objective at all. Furthermore, there is the complication that it is this latter sort of inner—the control factor—which is implicated in that form of control found in the muscular control of the body through effort and volition.

Citing the former page again on which the existence meanings are drawn up, we note that there is a tract of meaning within which another person's mind is *both inner and outer*.

10. The conflict or dualism of meanings, therefore, which we found springing up in the consideration of the body as object now has reinforcement from the side of a similar **Mind must become Objective Content as Idea.** though different embarrassment on the part of the mind. *And there is a common solution* : mind as objectively determined must pass over to the system of objectively determined content, which will then include **Inner Control as such is Subject.** *all the objective as such* ; and the control now established as inner for both types of content will remain *one and subjective*.

The subjective thus refined will include all those unrepresentable factors of control which regulate and limit an organization in any sort objective, while it itself as such *must escape all determination in terms of what is objective*. The two great classes of contents then remain as contrasted objects or contents of thought not in the respect of being outer as over against inner, but as being contents of presentation, idea, or thought capable of this contrast. All ideas make up the single and common mediate meaning

So Inner-Outer Dualism is succeeded by Subject-Object Dualism.

of experience to a subject-agent or self. They are, whether of one sort or the other, equally ideas of a subject: *ideas of body*, and *ideas of mind*. *There is now a body of experience*: the system of ideas of whatever sort held as such for the various readings and meanings possible in the mode of reflection.

§ 3. THE SUBJECT OF THE MODE: THE "I."

11. Among these meanings, in the case of ideas of mind, certain have very peculiar shadings, notably in the respects in which they belong to the class we have called "common." It is evident that while external objects may be common to distinct psychic centres—whether they know the fact of commonness or not—inner objects or minds must be common. There is, in the first place, the actual identity of content running through the individuations by which the single persons are identified as Mr. So or Mrs. So-so. This content is common; and if that were all, persons as ideas to an observer would have to be "aggregate" meanings. But this is not all; they are identical in content, not as separate determinations may be identical in meaning, but as a single determination is identical, being read as ejective meaning into each and all, by each and all. They are therefore not only meaning in common or "aggregate," but they are of necessity also read as common or "syndoxic." All persons are, when considered as meanings, syndoxic, for they are always viewed from the psychic point of view and are viewed as common. This is true in whatever mode of personal development the meaning is found, since this is the least that personal individuation can be found to involve.¹

12. As soon as consciousness passes out of the sense-memory or pre-logical modes, the other great factor in the determination of personal content arises and comes into its own, that germ of the subjective reading which we have described as Sembling. The growing inner sense of control becomes strengthened and emphasized; and the full mode is ejected into the alter personality as a self inwardly controlling its own determination. When now we come to inquire into the common character of this latter factor, the control factor, we find it necessary to make a careful distinction. As an objective or psychological meaning this self is common, in the sense of syndoxic; we do mean by persons beings each attributing to the others the

¹ It appears in a later discussion (vol. ii. chapter iii. § 2) that in the mode of reflection all the characteristic meanings called Judgments are syndoxic.

same inner control that he finds going on in himself. But how can he do this of himself, when the thing in question is just that intimate sense of control which he cannot objectify nor make into a common meaning of any sort? Even in the case of other persons it is an intent, a form of organization; but to realize it as a psychic experience—that forbids its being made an objective meaning at all.

Hence from the more special and restricted problem of the theory of control-meanings, consciousness is again thrown into embarrassment. Control must at one and the same time be a mark attaching to a personal object of thought, and also be a control by which this and all other objective, meanings are constituted. To be a common or objective self it must be a general, a context, an object; to be a self, it must be unique, a control, a subject. This is a further instance of that ambiguity of existence-meaning described above as "inner that is also outer."

13. The issue is, of course, that to which the urgencies of the earlier embarrassments have been tending: the content self must become an idea, a thing of varying meanings, the bearer of varying and successive interests. In this function the self is a common person, a self among selves, an object to its own inner life; *this in order that other selves may in turn be object to it.* But that this inner life may be constituted, as over against the world of its own experience, the subject-agent lives on in the fact of functional control, direction, and organization of experience itself.

So described it becomes reasonably clear that in the rise of such a dualism as that of the subject-object—the objective system including both the set of objective selves and the set of objective things, as present in idea to a subject—we find a meaning for which the factors have been preparing. They are essentially these, *en résumé*.

14. Body refuses to be exclusively extra-psychic, exclusively physical, since experience of the personal body is mainly of it as an intimately usable and necessary instrument of acts of effort and agency which are of all experiences most essentially inner. The body, therefore, claims to serve both as an objective context and also as an inner subjective agency. Mind, on the other hand, comes forward with a different but an equally urgent and embarrassing double claim. It is, of course, inner, subjective, self-controlled; but in the person of another, as a physical self, and partially so in one's own person, it claims

This gives a new Embarrassment.

The Common Self becomes an Idea: the Control Self becomes Subject.

Résumé.

to fit into and complete a purely objective context. I can get at others' minds only through their bodies; I read a physical series straight up to a psychic terminus, whenever I discover my friend's emotion and analyse his conduct. Each term of the mind-body dualism, therefore, says: I will not be finally treated as being just the one thing, *for I really am and mean to be both.*

So prepared for, the distinction, the new dualism, comes as a redistribution, a resetting of the factors and motives already present. "Why not," we may hear Dame Nature say, "why not segregate the points of essential and unambiguous innerness, the factor so purely psychic that its purity may never again be put in question?"

So that is what she does. The one thing thus purely psychic is, *let it be noted*, that in which body claims inner meaning, and also that wherein mind has inner presence. This something is what *we have all along called control*. It is there and nowhere else—in effort and activity—that body breaks into experience as inner; and it is here also and only here that mind takes its last stand, has its last reserve, after the process of objectifying of all its special contents has gone on to exhaustion. "Let this, then," says the Dame, "be finally the inner, the self of selves, the 'I' in the nominative case and with a capital letter; and let all the rest, body, mind, mixed mass as it is, persisting in its confusions and illegitimate acts of commerce, let it all be mere object in that whole of experience *whose subject the 'I' is.*"

15. This movement was called above a redistribution of the factors essential all the way through to the progression of the cognitive mode. This redistribution may be represented graphically in the following diagrams, which should be looked upon merely as an aid to thought—a thing of schematic and instrumental meaning!




FIG. 2.—MIND-BODY DUALISM, SUBSTANTIVE MODE.




FIG. 3.—DUALISM OF REFLECTION, SUBJECT-OBJECT MODE.

The "Subject-Object Progression" is the movement from the distribution of Fig. 2 to that of Fig. 3. Fig. 2 shows the ambiguity of self (large circle) and of both mind and body (small circles) as objects, by the lines cutting through each of the circles. On this line the ground of the ambiguity is indicated by C (Control). Both mind and body claim to be both inner (i) and outer (o) in the matter of control. In Fig. 3 the solution, in the one meaning "Experience," is shown by means of a circle, in which IC (Inner Control) represents the separation off of the inner control aspect as the subject, while the objects, mind and body, are set in a context of objective meanings or ideas. That is, there is a segregation of the "inner" control factors in IC, the subject, and all "outer" meanings, including objective minds, become its ideas.

Thus we are formally introduced to the most fruitful and significant dualism of knowledge: that of *Reflection*, which is that of Thought and its Objects. It is of course the mode in which logical objects are made up, but their more precise criteria may be again postponed. For the present we may present this great fact of Reflection from various points of view, from which the lines of our earlier discussions may now be seen to converge upon this focus.

The consideration of the objects constructed in this mode led us to the thought of experience as a body of ideas organized by a control which is the subject. I now wish to introduce certain summary conclusions which are to be made pivotal in later developments, and which only cumulative considerations can in any sense finally establish. I shall, however, first give the actual movements or progressions by which these formulations are supported, and show that they are the essential outcome of the strains of genetic change already dealt with.

16. (1) In saying that the self or subject of the mode is a factor of control, the earlier development of that factor should be brought explicitly to mind. It was found, it will be remembered, that the extreme freedom and self-determination of the

semblant consciousness, wherein the whole of the objective or dramatic situation was selectively established, was subject to certain positive limitations and to possible variations. It must

Development of Control-ling-Self:
(1) **In Play, Selective;** be a content, and a schematic one, that the play (and art) consciousness selects—be its selection from among such contents never so free and self-controlled. There must be an antecedent interest, a self-justification,

born of actual experience, which shows itself in the identification of the play impulse with its appropriate material. This comes

(2) **Experimental,** to consciousness in the rise of the actual experimentation of the mode. By its relative isolation, as a function of make-believe, and by reason of its method, it lends itself to the production of hypothetical or instrumental meanings. The control, therefore, by its own natural development, tends to pass over to the type called in the case of memory “mediate,” or indirect. The selective function seems to seek support from its union with the extra-psychic control agencies, in order that a certain continuity and consistent working out of its meanings may be secured.

Yet this is not a result to cause us surprise; for subjective control is not in its genesis a thing of caprice; nor does it lack and not unity of motive. It has resided all along in the larger **Capricious,** active—at first, native and very uniform—dispositions which come to stand for special interests. Even the play

preferences are, from the biological and psychological points of view, distinctly definite in their trend and type of fulfilment. We should expect, therefore, that the purely capricious and unregulated sort of selection often made type of the subjective, when considered as isolated centre of change, would give way before the type which is mediate in the sense of that which is exer-

but at first Directed by Native Disposition. cised through the medium of established and continuously acting conations and habits. The self of this mode is one that recognizes its objects as in large

part those of its own making, through development of its own fulfilments and satisfactions; and in the larger whole of experience itself, in the body of organized and usable ideas, it finds just the vehicle of its own concrete life. *The subject self is no more nor less than the immanent organizing movement of experience.* The external control of sense is

loosened in the joint control of memory; the lack of control in fancy establishes the inwardness of content as material for manipulation; the freedom of play leads to its reduction to order for

subjective purposes ; in thought it is again submitted to the rule of joint control of external and internal factors.

17. (2) This is well brought out when we recall that the object-self is passed over to the domain of content and idea. The self is not only the subject of selective meanings, it is also objective meaning and context.¹

and is Individuated as an Objective Self. It has general and common character as observed and described personality. *It is individuated as you, me, or them.* All this shows the necessary self-submission, in the movement of this marvellous process, of the awaking rational self to the rules of physical and social existence and matter of fact. The co-efficients of extra-psychic control are indeed not now directly applicable ; for this is the world of ideas. The determination of the whole of experience as inner comes first and foremost. But the indirectly and mediately operating **Held to Anchorage in External Co-efficients.** real co-efficients hold the entire system from beneath to its original anchorage. The system is experience and my experience, but *the experiences mean existences, and the ideas mean things.*

Now this is not a tangle, it is an adjustment ; it is not a compulsion, it is a growth. Who can tell beforehand how Nature will solve the embarrassments of her developmental *motifs* ? It might not have been worked out, possibly ; then man would not have succeeded the brutes. It may have come by variation and selection, no doubt it did ; so also did the function of memory, which is an earlier case of mediate control. *In both, the subjective faces the external and by submission conquers it.* The result is a series of meanings to which we are entitled to apply the term *Judgment*.

A New Case of Mediate Control.

In both, the subjective faces the external and by submission conquers it. The result is a series of meanings to which we are entitled to apply the term *Judgment*.

§ 4. HIGHER MEDIATE CONTROL : JUDGMENT

18. We are now prepared to use the term *Judgment*. *Judgment is mediate control of objects in this higher sense, of ideas, of experience.* It is a new mode inasmuch as it holds **Judgment is Higher Mediate Control.** *in a form of unity the assent of the subjective to the determination of the objective.* It is indirect or mediate in much the same sense that the control of memory objects was found to be so, with the modifications made necessary by all the genetic transformations of the movement of psychic progression from that early mode to this.

¹ The Self thus becomes, in Kantian phrase, both a "means" (as object) and also an "end" (as subject of experience)—a truth as important in Logic as in Ethics.

It is mediate or indirect (1) from the point of view of the subjective or selective function, inasmuch as it is not a free or don't-have-to affair, of the type found characteristic of such control. *It is selective, but selective of facts.* It is still subjective since it is essentially the way the self has of maintaining its being and development. It is also mediate (2) from the point of view of the various extra-psychic control-coefficients which claim to be valid in it and to hold its *visé*; for it is not barely recognitive, with full freedom from psychic tests and values; that is as far from true as is the opposed assertion that the subject makes the object by its own caprice. It is, on the contrary, effective only because it employs a system of data, a whole experience, built up by selective ratifications of meanings as fulfilling psychic needs and accomplishing practical adjustments. Its utility is to be found just in its mediateness, which allows the temporary loosening of the reflective context from its moorings in the spheres of immediate fact or existence, and so gives room for the discursive operations by which these spheres may be reinstated on the plane of reference we call Truth. A judgment of truth is a re-reference of a context back to its original control sphere, after its relative loosening from its moorings in the process of reflection. All this will become clearer as we proceed (see the discussion of Truth in vol. ii.).

§ 5. MEANINGS OF THE MODE: OBJECTS OF THOUGHT

19. It is for the sake of new meanings that the development of reflection takes place. The need and claim of different and competing meanings is the urgent motive to the progression. The function of judgment is therefore a mode in which meanings are readjusted and revised, and in which, as in all other modes, they have their own characteristic extension. It will not be at all an unfamiliar procedure in its divisions, therefore, if we consider meanings in this mode as being of both the two great sorts heretofore distinguished, the descriptive or recognitive and the selective. Both are taken up in the function of Judgment.

We find, indeed, that certain prevalent theories of judgment, and theories of the logical function as such, which make judgment its characteristic mode, would be incidentally covered if we considered the development of meaning in this mode under the following division: Judgment as *Acknowledging Function*, Judgment as *Appreciating*

It is Subjective as Selective; but of Facts, which further the Life of Self.

And also Objective, but not as Extra-Psychic.

Function, and Judgment as *Synthetic Function*. These different aspects of Judgment are indeed the chief phases under which the entire mode of logical cognition or thought moves onward to do its essential work ; and later parts of this work¹ are to be devoted to their detailed treatment. I may here only give the general indications which serve to set forth, in outline, the genetic setting of this great mode of psychic process.

20. In the development of the meanings of the reflective mode it will appear that judgment passes through a progression from mere Acknowledgment to various forms of *rati-
fication and confirmation characteristic of reasoning
or thinking* ; similarly in the function of Appreciation there is the simple fulfilment which goes with Acknowledgment and justifies it, and from this the meaning progresses selectively to the mode in which the Appreciation is one of a more or less legislative and imperative character. Of this we have had intimations already in the meanings of the first semblant consciousness.* They here take form as judgments preliminary to the meanings of the *aesthetic and ethical modes* ; and a corresponding development of the meanings reached through judgment in its Synthetic function is from the simple individuations of the instrumental stages of knowledge, pointed out above, all the way to the refined use of the constructive imagination as instrument of discovery and invention. We may reserve the later detailed treatment of these genetic stages of meaning, stopping at this place only to throw them into their larger correlations.

Once we recognize that the mode of reflection is as now indicated a redistribution and resetting of factors already urging on to their final alignment, and that the subject-object relation is but the transfer of all preceding individuations to the world of ideas, we see that the function of judgment must be in a large sense redistributive rather than creative. The function of redistribution is not to be understood, of course, as excluding the essential advance involved in the achievement of this most novel and productive mode ; and I use the term in lieu of

Progressions
in Acknow-
ledgment,
Appreciation,
and Synthesis
of Judgment.

Reflection
a Mode of
Redistribu-
tion and
Resetting of
Contents,

¹ The fuller treatment of Acknowledgment is given in vol. ii. chapter ii., where judgment is considered a criterion of the Logical Mode. The synthetic aspect of judgment is brought out in the discussion of Relation, and Appreciation comes up in vol. iii. Compare the "Introduction" to the "Experimental Logic."

and of
Revision
Meanings.

a better. Such a function involves all the phases of revision of meanings distinguished just above; but viewed retrospectively its results are those of a process which takes pre-existing meanings and re-makes them according to the rules of its own procedure. We acknowledge by judging what we already in some manner apprehend; we appreciate by judging what is already given in the way of direct fulfilment; and we legislate and command by judging what we already conceive or in some simpler way individuate. This is true also in a very strict sense even of the inventive or synthetic function, whereby meanings are by the exercise of the function of judgment apparently enlarged; for—to anticipate a point of our later discussion, one to which the writer is, however, in earlier publications fully committed¹—all such enlargement of meaning, all discovery and proof of truth and value alike, is by a process of selective thinking essentially of the instrumental and Experimental type found in the lower and un-reflective modes.²

Even
Discovery is
Selective.

21. It may be said, in short, that the meanings of the mode are such as result from the possibility of a function of *revision of pre-existing meanings, and of their enlargement by the critical and conscious use of the methods employed in the earlier modes.* The new feature of the mode is that the meanings are now *meanings in idea*; meanings constituting a whole of experience; meanings had, acknowledged, appreciated, and used by a subject whose psychic meanings and intentions they are. This, of course, carries the further problem of determining as to how far and in what conditions the earlier unreflective meanings still hold; that is, how far revision is more than revision: how far the *relations* of ideas supersede the *relationships* of the pre-logical modes; and, in general, what are the limits and conditions of that restatement and resetting of meanings which it is the characteristic office of reflection to bring about.

Meanings
now those
of Idea.

The statement of this problem is not only necessary from the point of view of the theory we are working out, which demands

¹ "Selective Thinking" in *Psychol. Review*, January, 1898, reprinted as chapter xvii. in the volume *Development and Evolution*.

² This is subject, however, to the distinctions to be made in the discussions of Implication and Postulation presented in the later volumes.

an account of this restatement of meanings, but it is implicated in the process itself as one both of new meaning and of practical adjustment. The psychic just by losing its attitude of simple

First Intension yields to Second. apprehension, the meaning of the simply psychic, becomes itself inspector, appreciator, and critic.

The first-handness—the “first intension” character—of knowledge, is succeeded by a certain remoteness of experience—a “second intension”—which embodies meanings only in idea ; and the question of the ways and means of converting these again into the first-hand meanings by some process having rules, criteria, and validity, is one of which it is itself directly aware. Knowledges are no longer simple presences, nor are mistakes simply embarrassments ; cognitions called truths and with them cognitions called errors now arise, and all the discontinuities and dislocations and uncertainties of a world of lack of evidence, partial proof, and misdirected judgment is opened up. All this is summed up succinctly in the statement that the mode is one

Knowledge becomes Truth, and of mediate and joint control. The facts of the world are truths only when mediated through the organization of experience as ideas ; and the appreciations of

the self are only fulfilments when mediated through a context convertible into facts. These processes of indirect now replace those of direct control ; the meanings become affairs of criti-

the Knower becomes an Epistemologist. cism and adjustment. By judging, the subject takes the objective point of view ; he is now not simply a knower, he is perforce a critic, an epistemologist, a reasoner about ideas and realities. The logic of his cognitive processes, before this such only to us who talk about him, is now to him, as well as to us, an “Experimental Logic” of beliefs, and a “real logic” of things and values.

§ 6. THE INTEREST OF THE MODE : THEORETICAL INTEREST

22. There is another aspect of the mode considered as having or being meaning : that in which it is itself object of the interest of our inquiry. Considered as a stage in the continuing development of mind, we have to trace, as we have done in other cases heretofore, the operation of the factors of determination and control which issue in this psychic mode. The theory of meanings, of which we have just indicated the great problems, opens indeed the pursuit of one member of this inquiry, since the

Interest in this Mode Theoretical. meanings are the objects, and their determination defines the objective factors at work in the mode-

But there remains the factor of motive or interest. What is the interest which may properly be called Reflective?

The interest which constitutes the motive to reflection or thought goes by the name of "theoretical interest." If the objects of the mode are no longer first-hand things, but ideas or meanings of second intension, then the interest is one which terminates upon and is fulfilled by ideas as thus woven into experience. Experiences as experiences, with all the characters of truth, error, hypothesis, validity, limitation, idealization, etc., *relations of whatever sort*, these are the termini of the interest of the mode. The interest is that in the exercise of which these meanings are pursued and fulfilled. Interest becomes theoretical when the *relationships* of the earlier modes are individuated as objects of thought, that is as *Relations* subsisting in a context.

23. It is clear, indeed, that this must be true if the world of reflection is to have justification from the view-point of adequate motive or interest. The interests of practical adjustment to things—external objects of all sorts—are already and best fulfilled by the direct treatment of objects as in the pre-logical modes, where immediate presence or conversion give the adequate fulfilments. The interests of semblance in which the selective motive is most pronounced are also fully satisfied in the play-mode, in which, besides the innerness of the context played with which that mode has in common with the mode of reflection, there is also the freedom of don't-have-to or absolute selection, which the mode of reflection lacks. And as to interest of recognition merely, it is a question whether it can be freed from its instrumental or schematic strain, which finds its fulfilment, along with the practical, in the immediate appeal to an external or other positive first-hand co-efficient. If the meanings of reflection are those of redistribution with change of setting and reconciliation of claims, then the interest must terminate upon those relations in which these movements are embodied.

24. This appears plain on the side of the judgment of acknowledgment together with that of synthesis; it would seem to be a continuation, in characteristic form, of the *and is* *Recognitive*. *Recognitive* interest of the earlier modes. We protest on occasion that our interest in a situation, statement, or bit of knowledge, is "purely theoretical"; meaning that our personal preferences, appreciations—in short our practical and selective

interests—are not indulged, but are definitely excluded. Our interest is to be satisfied with the relationships of context duly established as facts or truths. This applies, indeed, to all judgments, even to those of appreciation, as we will see (vol. ii. chap. ii. § 5), for when objects of direct appreciation whose interest is *practical*, are taken up by judgment and woven into relational contexts, they become, like other reflective meanings, theoretical.¹

§ 7. REFLECTION AS POINT OF VIEW¹

25. Another point of interest in this sketch of the relations of this mode to the preceding, is the fact that the distinction between the psychic and psychological points of view now takes on certain special aspects. Evidently, in the transfer of the entire body of psychic objects to the sphere of experience, they are brought into the world of the inner as such. All objects are now inner to the consciousness that reflects upon them. The first phase of readjustment arises in this general fact that reflection is itself an act of objectification, a mode of cognition. So we have to say that in it the point of view is objective with reference to the entire content of thought, but that *this entire content is thought as inner content*.

This in turn involves the further point, second, that this objective point of view is such with reference to mental no less than to impersonal objects, to selves no less than to things; and the objective self, whether the empirical self of the thinker or that of his "alter," is content to the subject of the mode. The self called "me" and the self called "you" are *equally and together ideas along with the things thought of beside them*.

¹ This, will, of course, come up again in the treatment of logical Relation. It is difficult to see how the simple, selective interest of practice can escape the organization that all pre-logical processes undergo in this mode. The passage from the individuation of a thing as schematic, which directly subserves the practical interest, to that of the thing in relations of general meaning, causes, I think, an arrest of the dispositional processes of the simpler mode, and their reinstatement in the larger whole of an interest in *these relational meanings themselves*. All terms of cognition and elements of content are alike made over in idea. Thus a means to an end becomes a particular under general or other logical meaning, and so does any object of utility. So to *judge* either the means as suited to the end, or the thing as suited to its use, is to assert a relation under a general meaning. Yet the simpler interests of direct recognition and of practice survive also and take on new forms in the higher modes. See the chapter on "Schematism in the Logical Mode," vol. ii. chap. iv. •

A third phase of the matter, however, is seen in the fact that it is a psychic life which is holding the experience itself as a whole to its form and meaning. Ideas are matters of immediate awareness, as are all events as such of the mental field. I feel the movements in the series of changes which constitute the progress of my thought. The psychic point of view is accordingly not lost with the widening of the objective. But as thus combined with the objective in the one contrast of reflection, that between subject and object, it issues in the *new point of view of the subject of experience*. This is a point of view which reserves its seat over against both the simple psychic and the simple objective ; and reserves it by that redistribution of the genetic factors which annuls and makes impossible those points of view as simple and exclusive. The objective is now not simply object ; it is object in the inner life of a subject. The psychic is now not simply psychic ; it is psychic by abstraction from those contents which constitute objects. It is impossible quite, as Kant long ago declared, to reach a science of immediate experience, inasmuch as the state of immediate experience is just the state in which the point of view of science is not realized. And we may reverse the Kantian dictum and say with equal truth, that for a science of mind, immediate experience is not a fact, but an abstract meaning of our thought, for the realization of the standpoint of science from which such immediacy can be observed at once annuls the immediacy of the experience. The emotional life is a notorious illustration of this ; no emotion remains immediate experience when we observe and describe it.

§ 8. THE LOGICAL CRITERIA

26. We may say at once that there are no specific characters attaching to the content of objects of thought as such—there is nothing added to psychic objects simply by our thinking about them. This appears from the fact, in the broadest way, that we can think about any of the sorts of psychic objects—those of sense, memory, play, etc.—and still distinguish them in our thought under the specific mark, each for itself, by which its character and place were originally determined. Indeed the discussions of such objects for the purposes of theory proceed upon the assumption that we can make any object indiscriminately an object of thought.

Logical
Object not a
Specific
Content ;

Furthermore, it is an old and well-established position, that the objects of which we think are represented by the process of thought *as in their original modes*; and this is the claim that the mode of thought essentially makes: to give a control which, while mediate, nevertheless mediates the original control. In all cases, the operation of thought reconstitutes the object of a simpler mode.

27. Discussions of the logical objects have therefore, with considerable unanimity, found the criterion of a logical object not in the matter, but in what has been called the form—the setting and relationships—of the things thought about; or, on the other hand, in the process or function by which the object is determined or controlled.

This, it will appear to the reader, is the justification of what is called “formal logic.” According to it, the logical processes are the mind’s peculiar ways of manipulating and treating, by certain general laws or principles, all or any objects, quite apart from the actual matter or content of the object itself.

While formal logic in this sense is of little fruitfulness, just because of its formal character, nevertheless its essential claim that thinking makes no new objective data remains true.¹

The impulse which took form in the old logic is still alive, however, in the newer and more psychological treatment of logical objects. This shows itself in theories which have in common the point of view that the new element imported into the construction of objects in the logical mode is the process or function by which the objects of earlier and simpler modes are re-made and re-interpreted, as experience. The function of judgment is pointed to as in some sense critical for the processes of thought. Logic has become in the main a theory of the rise and functioning of judgment, together with the relative trustworthiness and validity of the sort of meanings which judgment attaches to the various objects already more simply constituted in the successive pre-logical modes. This tendency has the support of so much of our discussion as bears upon it; and we now find it much

¹ It is this formal or relational determination of mental content that justifies the assertion made on a later page that formal logic accepts “relation” as the criterion of the logical.

reinforced by the direct consideration of the positive factors which enter into the determination of the logical object.

28. With this condition established, it is plain that the criterion of the logical as such is found not alone in the matter thought about, but in the way we think about it; not alone in the factors determining the "what" of which the object is made, but in the factors of control which give answer to the question "how" it is made.

Looked at broadly, the mode is one of a *dualism* of self and the objects of its experience; logical objects are, therefore, only those objects which are meanings to a subject of experience. Again, logical objects are those which issue from the redistribution and organization of all simpler meanings in a whole context of experience. They are individuated as in this organization; as *related*, in meanings of general, universal, particular and singular force. Here, evidently, the characteristic mark is the elevation of relationship—actual presence of contemporaneous, like, different and otherwise related wholes—into a single whole exhibiting these *relations*. Relation is individuated as a meaning or object of thought, one whose abstraction from the body of the former objective continuum or complication, it is the special interest of this mode to achieve. Finally, the logical function is that in which these two specifications are given—a subject of experience, and a related objective whole which is experience to such a subject. This function is that to which we have given the name *judgment*. Judgment is the psychic control, issuing from what is now a self, exercised upon those meanings of relation which constitute ideas about things.

29. It is, therefore, now not a difficult thing to express an opinion which we should expect to find fairly acceptable as to the logical criterion. If we are asking about the criterion of the function, it is simply that quite definite and unambiguous attitude of mind, always indicative of judgment as act or disposition, ordinarily called Belief. If we, on the other hand, wish to know the criterion of the content of the logical, it is that relatedness of the whole of our ideas which fulfils and motives theoretical interest. It is the essential way of psychic individuation in this mode. If, yet again, we are bent on inquiring what is the criterion of this mode of psychic life as a whole, that character

One Criterion
not in the
Matter but in
the Form.

Logical
Objects are
(1) Meanings
to a Sub-
ject,

and are (2)
Individuated
in Relation by

(3) the
Function
of Judgment.

Three Cri-
teria: that of
Function is
Belief;

that of
Content is
Relation;

which determines its place in the sequence of modes of cognition, we have to say that it is the dualism of subject and object, meaning by subject the "I" that thinks and judges, and by object the "me" or other thing that the "I" thinks and judges about.¹

30. It is, on the surface, a result of our method of inquiry that we thus reach three points of view, from which this question of the logical criterion may be viewed. They are answers to three separate questions which are not always clearly or at all distinguished. It is to the advantage of our solution that it affords the three separate answers which, however, all hold together in the larger meaning of Reflection.

The further exposition of these criteria follows in later chapters, and their more adequate justification must come from this treatment. Sufficient to say here, that the characteristic features of all the determinations so far reached, as contrasted with those of other writers, may be summed up at this point in two statements. First, we have found quite untenable the position that there is any sort of discontinuity or dualism as between pre-logical function, as merely elaborating matter for thought, and thought as a self-regulating activity coming to utilize such matter *ab extra*. On the contrary, cognition is a continuous function, which undergoes constant renewal in those progressive differentiations seen in the movements of control. Second, the positive dualism is one within the operation of this developing function, the dualism of meanings which arises from a redistribution of the essential factors of all cognitive process. There is no genetic discontinuity in the movement, no transverse break ; there is a series of genetic contrast-effects, due to divergence in

¹ The distinction between this mark, the dualism of subject and object, considered as criterion of the mode of reflection, and the mark of relation which we find to be the criterion of logical subject-matter, seems to be suggested by Mansel in the following passage quoted by Adamson (*Devel. of Mod. Philos.* ii. p. 224, note) : " Every operation of thought is a judgment in the psychological sense of the term, but the psychological judgment must not be confounded with the logical. The former is the judgment of [as] a relation between the conscious subject and the immediate object of consciousness : the latter is the judgment of the relation which two objects of thought bear to each other. . . . The logical judgment necessarily contains two concepts. . . ."—Mansel, *Prolegomena Logica*, pp. 54-5. In the last sentence of this passage, Mansel seems to suggest the distinction upon which the criticism of the "propositional" or "predicative" theory of judgment, in the later chapters, is based.

the strands of matter and function traced lengthwise. In our discussions we name principally the nodal points, the knots of substantive meaning, and the fibres of process; but the movement is one of transition and steady progression in which any point is the just-formed from the preceding and also the just-forming of the succeeding stage.

The further interpretation of the Logical Mode, from that genetic point of view from which the conception now stated has been reached, is to follow in the volume entitled "Experimental Logic."

END OF VOLUME I.